



# Post-Suharto Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia

RSIS Monograph No. 10

Yuddy Chrisnandi



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**POST-SUHARTO  
CIVIL-MILITARY  
RELATIONS IN INDONESIA**

**YUDDY CHRISNANDI**

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

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To all readers, I wish you my best with the hope that my book may be a source of benefit to all of you.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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# PREFACE

Military studies on countries currently undergoing democracy, or those in transition to democracy, provide an interesting subject for discourse. The early stages of the reformation era in Indonesia in 1998, which marked the decline of the military's authority in politics, is one such case in point. As in the Philippines (1992), when the military under the command of Ferdinand Marcos was forced to take sides with the people-supported civil government (of Cory Aquino), the Indonesian military at the close of Suharto's era followed suit, allowing B.J. Habibie (a civilian) to become Indonesia's third president.

The implications of the national political changes that shifted the military's role, both in the Philippines and Indonesia as well as in Thailand, are still ongoing at the time of writing (June 2006). The position and role of the military provides interesting research for observers undertaking comparative studies on Indonesia and the Philippines as well as in other countries undergoing a transition towards full democracy.

Indonesia under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (from 2004), himself a former military officer, does not fully represent military interests due to the fact that Yudhoyono was elected to power through a democratic national election. On the other hand, neither does he reflect the aspirations of the civil public, who wanted a total military reform of political policies. Numerous problems between the military and civilians created polemics in President Yudhoyono's administration. For instance, the controversy over the successor to the armed forces commander (2004–2005), officers' rights to vote, the reluctance to hand over military business ventures to the government, the storage of illegal weapons by armed forces officers, the procurement of business tenders for the purchase of military equipment, and the extent of military involvement in civil society, were not solved through internal TNI reform. Unlike in the Philippines and Thailand, where the military became impatient (leading to an attempted coup d'état on the leadership of President Gloria Mapacagal Arroyo in

2005) and the military coup in Thailand that removed Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra from power in September 2006, the Indonesian military exercised a certain amount of restraint in responding to the political pressure it received and with external political conditions that did not bolster its aspirations.

To better understand the direction of Indonesian military reform, as well as to measure its accomplishments, one needs an adequate understanding of the military history that led to the drastic changes in mid 1998. The military's decision to back national reform and its commitment to apply internal reform within ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) encouraged them to set an agenda to measure reform efforts, although it must be admitted that, as of today, not all of the internal reform agendas have been fully implemented, with some at a total standstill. So a detailed analysis of the military's role in the transition era is needed to ensure that the transition to democracy leads the military to become a professional elite free of political aspirations. Or will the transition era return the military to the political arena, in spite of the nation aspiring to democracy? What is the future of Indonesia after more than eight years of military internal reform? Nobody can answer any of these questions definitively.

It is interesting to observe how internal military reform, practised since the early stages of the transition to democracy, has revealed the true situation. The military's decision to back the reform movement on 21 May 1998, by allowing President Suharto to step down and followed by its own moves towards internal reform, was surely undertaken with foresight. But, as yet, we do not fully comprehend the rationale behind those decisions. Likewise, we still do not understand why the military decided to back the national reform era or why the military decided on internal reform. Was the initiative from the military itself or was it a submission to external pressure?

It is interesting to review the matter at hand in greater depth. It is a public secret that the military organization exists upon the principles of strict loyalty to its chain of command. Every new decision, especially a strategic decision at the national level, can only be executed after being agreed upon by superior military leaders. If the military's decision to

go with national reform and its internal reform was based on its own desire to undergo change, then the questions arise as to what motivated the army commander at that time, General Wiranto, to take those steps, and what the expected outcome of the reform was.

The real ideal of civil-military relationships had not been achieved by the succession of governments following Suharto's—Habibie's, Abdurrahman Wahid's, Megawati's or even Yudhoyono's. Civilian authorities still need to involve military leaders in decision-making processes and continue to be obsessed over the possibility that they may lose the military's support and loyalty.

On the other hand, many observers have voiced the opinion that the military's internal reform cannot be separated from the pressures of the national reform movement led by strong reformist figures who can influence the army leaders to accept changes. An interesting question to ask here is to what extent did military relationships between the reform movements, the power of President Suharto and his successor, Habibie, influence events during and after the political change. Or did international politics influence internal military change?

To answer these questions and analyse their relation to the newly established civil-military relations in Indonesia, I conducted my research by carrying out in-depth interviews with 27 people, 26 of whom were high-ranking military officials involved in, or at least were aware of, the above discourse, and with former president Abdurrahman Wahid, acknowledged at that time as the "bold civilian" in recognition of his audacity to confront the military.

Observing how the public was moving away from supporting Suharto's New Order regime, the army instigated a collective agreement to back the national-reform process within constitutional boundaries. The military's internal reform was a logical consequence of its support for the implementation of the national-reform agenda initiated on 21 May 1998.

Internal military reform was undertaken as a response to strong public pressure, which insisted that, first of all, the military should disengage itself from national politics and, second, the policy of dual function should be abolished. This was in line with the military's own

awareness that it needed to redefine dual function so as to restrict itself from dominating civil institutions (where retired military officers often sought their next “career”). Former Army Commander General Wiranto and former Army Chief Social and Political Affairs Staff Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono played key roles in determining the military’s internal reform policies, which were carried out in phases. Significant military internal reforms were only apparent when the civilian and dual-function roles of officers were finally abolished in April 2000.

The abolition of the military’s dual-function doctrine signified an important turning point in civil-military relationships in the reform era. During the New Order era, the civil elite felt that civil supremacy could not control the military’s political power in an objective manner. In the post-Suharto era, the military’s power can no longer dominate civil-military relationships.

The decline of military political power did not diminish its bargaining status with the government’s civil policy. The civil government erroneously gave the military equal power in determining the process of political policies. Formally, the military was not involved in practical politics but in practice the civil government still needed its support for government interests. Many examples of civil-military reciprocal relationships existed.

The governments of Habibie (1998–1999) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004) presided over times of harmonious civil-military relationships, at least in terms of conflict, which were minimal. These were times when both civil and military leaders were able to work together and support each other. Civil-military relationship deteriorated during Abdurrahman Wahid’s term in office (1999–2001), when both sides struggled to cooperate and trust each other. The civil government allowed the military an opportunity to involve itself in formulating national policy concerning military matters without involving itself directly in politics.

Even though civil-military relationships appeared to run smoothly during the reform era, the civilian government could not supersede the military, as evidenced by the fact that civil authority has continued to depend heavily on military support since 1998. As a consequence, weak

civil supremacy ensures that the military continues to involve itself in national political processes on military-related issues.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, the insecure legitimacy of the civil government or the disunity of civil political powers in supporting the civil government has increased the military's barter position in political affairs—a move that does not support the concept of creating objective civilian control. This kind of situation could lead the military to return to politics under the guise of restoring national security, giving credence to the theories of military intervention in politics propounded by Eric A. Nordlinger and Amos Perlmutter.

Civil-military relationships improved during Habibie's and Megawati's terms, and were considered by the military to be ideal because military autonomy was not encroached upon in any direct way. The success of both governments in managing the military was not due to their ability to create objective civilian control but to the fact that the external situations made it impossible for the military to make any political intervention. In an effort to maintain stability in Habibie's and Megawati's governments, civil authorities allowed the military sufficient leeway to conduct its own autonomous policies. This freedom almost approached the implementation of the Normal Theory developed by Eliot A. Cohen, which underlines the importance of equilibrium in civil-military roles in respect of authority and duty.

The real ideal of civil-military relationships was not attained in the governments following Suharto's era, Habibie's, Abdurrahman Wahid's, Megawati's or even Yudhoyono's. Civil authorities still involve military leaders in decision-making process on policy, and still worry about losing the military's support and loyalty. Several military problems, like the discovery of a stash of hundreds of illegal weapons in a senior officer's house (in June 2006) and the unilateral decision of the Department of Defence to buy tanks from France for TNI personnel participating with UNIFIL (September 2006), proved that civil authority could not resist the military.

According to Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, the ideal theory of civil-military relationship can be found in countries where civil authorities are able to amicably settle any conflict with the military—a situation

that did not occur in Indonesia during the reform era. The civil-military relationship in post-Suharto Indonesia (1998 to the present) has given rise to a new model for this relationship, which is more accurately described as “equal controllable relations” or, in other words, relations that are balanced and controlled. The relationship practised by the four governments after Suharto’s (equal controllable relations) only brought about a quasi-objective form of civil control over the military but is nevertheless better than relations in the pre-reform era and is deemed appropriate for a country in transition towards democracy.

I hope that this book will enrich public knowledge and contribute to research on military political studies, especially in Indonesia during the reform era. The substance of the book is based on dissertation research informed by field research with the major players shaping the military’s internal reform process. Hopefully, the ideas presented in this book will help us to better understand Indonesia’s future political situation in terms of civil-military relationships and stimulate further research ranging from the ongoing internal military reform processes to the need to promote greater military professionalism in Indonesia.

**Yuddy Chrisnandi**

*Tebet, Jakarta*

*September 2006*

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# THE MILITARY, HABIBIE AND REFORMASI

## PRO AND CONTRA B.J. HABIBIE

Military personnel had reacted to the B.J. Habibie phenomenon in a variety of ways. Largely, they criticized Habibie as having an exclusive, Islamic view, basing their opinions on his position as the chairman of the Indonesian Intellectual Muslim Association (ICMI), while the military's perception of itself was that of an inclusive and nationalistic entity. The military never openly criticized Habibie but discord could be sensed within their ranks. Externally, rumours abounded that the military did not support Habibie, which lent support to the notion that military support for him was only from a few members of the military elite.<sup>1</sup>

The camaraderie between Habibie and General Feisal Tandjung, from 1993 to 1998, did not necessarily mean that the military supported the former. Chief of Army Staff General R. Hartono, a well-known crony of the Cendana family, was one of the senior officers known to have criticized Habibie, albeit behind his back. Prior to this, Hartono was renowned as a "green" army officer (a name for the Islamic group within the army) who was close to Feisal Tandjung and even acted as a proponent for the establishment of the ICMI in Malang, East Java, in 1991 before he took a different course. According to information from military sources, only a few officers were taken in and trained by Habibie to become his close associates. Among them were, Lieutenant-General Sintong Pandjaitan (Habibie's security counsellor), Lieutenant-General Syarwan Hamid

(Minister of Internal Affairs), Major-General Yunus Yosfiah (Minister of Information), Major-General Z.A. Maulani (Chairman of the State Intelligence Coordinating Body) and Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto (Commander of Army Strategic Reserves Command [Kostrad]). Other officers included those who were once close to Feisal Tandjung.<sup>2</sup>

Only a few other military officers who were known to be close to Habibie were placed in key ABRI positions. If they were in the hierarchy, military informants said, that they would have held only subordinate positions under the Commander of the Armed Forces of Indonesia, Feisal Tandjung, who later became the Coordinating Minister for Defence in March 1998.

Communication between Habibie and his military officers was carried out either by Commander Feisal Tandjung or civilians close to Habibie and through officers who related well to Feisal Tandjung.<sup>3</sup> Military support for Habibie can be called elitist because it was not firmly rooted in any organization. This was not only due to the fact that Habibie was not a military person but because it was felt that Habibie's image did not conform to the military's perspective of a pluralist nation.<sup>4</sup>

There were three main responses to the Habibie phenomenon. The first group were the critics who tended to challenge him and developed into a majority group. The second group were those who supported Habibie's political point of view, which comprised mainly of officers close to Feisal Tandjung or with those who had a personal relationship with him. The third group were those who did not object to Habibie's political perspective although personally they held different political agendas, for example, General Hartono or General Wiranto. Both of these generals neither opposed Habibie nor became involved in or supported his political activities. Neither of them was really informed of Habibie's political activities during the political crisis that lasted till the end of President Suharto's rule. As Wiranto reported, he was not involved in any of the preparations that Habibie made at the time of the change of power. Moreover, he also said that he was unaware of Habibie's political position. At that time, Wiranto was merely concerned with securing the constitution and restraining social unrest; the power struggle was not his priority.<sup>5</sup>

Although Hartono, like Wiranto, did not ally himself with Habibie's



group, they did share the same viewpoints. As a minister in President Suharto's government, Hartono, a former Chief of Army Staff (1995–1997), criticized Wiranto as a secular person. In the same way, although Hartono shared the same “Islamically oriented” political vision as Habibie, he felt that Habibie could endanger the position of the president. Information received by Hartono about a movement to install Habibie as president made Hartono join those who opposed Habibie. The resignation of Akbar Tandjung and his colleagues in the Development Cabinet VII, who were regarded as close associates of Habibie, strengthened Hartono's view.

Meanwhile, as Wiranto regarded moves to place Habibie in the presidential post as part of a proper constitutional process, he took a neutral position and denied that, under his authority as the army commander, the military supported Habibie's move to become president.

He claimed that military endorsement for Habibie was constitutionally correct. The military did not support Habibie in a personal context but they supported him by virtue of his position as vice-president. The military emphatically stated that it was not involved in any process of endorsement; it merely wanted to uphold the nation's constitution.

Some people felt that the military supported Habibie to become president to enhance the position of Feisal Tandjung (Army Commander from 1993 to 1998), who also served as Minister of Defence and had a close relationship to Habibie. In the same way, Lieutenant-General Syarwan Hamid, Vice-chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly representing the Army, also openly supported the move to replace President Suharto with Habibie. Apart from these, the intensity of discussions between the Commander of Kostrad, Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto, and Habibie further corroborated the opinion that the military supported Habibie. However, the military still would not admit this to be army policy.<sup>6</sup>

Institutionally, the armed forces under the leadership of Wiranto never officially endorsed or opposed Habibie as president. Support for Habibie came mainly from individual military figures, not from the organization per se. The military wanted to ensure that the president's successor followed the constitution. Therefore, the Commander of the

Armed Forces never instructed his staff to openly endorse Habibie. Support came from individuals but could not be said to have come officially from the army.<sup>7</sup>

Apart from officers who were close associates of Habibie, it is certain that those serving under the command of Army Commander Wiranto were not privy to Habibie's political agenda. During the time of the political crisis, in early 1998, the army, led by Wiranto, focused on maintaining security and paid little attention to the ongoing power struggle among the nation's elite. Consequently, many political developments went unnoticed by many within the TNI leadership, for instance, when the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly ordered President Suharto to resign; the objection by national figures to take part in a reformation committee; the resignation of 14 ministers of the Development Cabinet VII; and President Suharto's decision to step down. These were examples of incidents that were only known by a select military elite group.

## SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE OPPOSITION

Many senior officers reported that they did not pay close attention to Habibie's political manoeuvres simply because they believed that as his supporters were still oriented towards Suharto's government and therefore did not view them as a movement that would endanger national security. The attitude did not extend to opposition groups outside the government, that is, opponents of President Suharto's government that were under close scrutiny.<sup>8</sup>

At that time, public figures like Amien Rais (Executive Director of Muhammadiyah), Abdurrahman Wahid (Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (Chairman of Indonesian Democratic Party) were the main players in Indonesia's political arena who were regarded as being able to pose a threat to national stability. Hence, it made sense that senior officers communicated frequently with them in the interest of national security. Although many other groups emerged to openly criticize and oppose Suharto's government at this time, the military only felt seriously threatened by the above three players, who could exert a

strong influence within society. Apart from those three, the military also paid attention to some intellectuals, like Nurcholis Madjid, Ichlasul Amal, Asman Budi Santoso and Rizal Ramli, to name a few, by constantly communicating with them.<sup>9</sup>

As mentioned before, the task of communicating with certain figures was performed by officers from the intelligence and socio-political services. Intelligence officers, who operated under the instruction of the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), focused their observations primarily on political figures who dealt with the government by observing their movements and communicating with them. Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff for Socio-Political Affairs (Kassospol), under the Army Commander, focused on influencing intellectuals, scholars and leaders of youth organizations. However, in practice, the two services had the same target. Take, for example, Abdurrahman Wahid or Professor Dr. Asman Budi Santoso (Rector of University of Indonesia), who not only communicated with the Army Socio-Political Task Force but also with BAIS. Therefore, it is not surprising that the reports from both bureaus were similar.

In practice, the military conducted the special communication—an operation to influence or intensify communication with particular figures—in different ways. If the military regarded the subjects as having moderate views, then they would initiate intensive communication and even involve them in internal military discussions. On the other hand, when dealing with those they regarded as having extreme views, the military did not involve them in any internal military activities but instead carefully monitored their activities. The military took a cautious approach towards President Suharto's main opponents, like Megawati and Amien Rais.

Although the military aimed to obtain their information directly, senior military officers admitted that intensive communication was generally conducted indirectly. Senior military officers, like the Chief of BAIS or the Kassospol, were afraid to confront those people directly. All regional military commanders (Kodam) used the same pattern, which was to observe the leaders' influence on society. The Kodams, like senior military officers of the Army Headquarters, often held friendly

interactions with a number of public figures both at the central government or regional government levels, which also functioned as a form of socio-political education. Such contacts made it easier for the military to establish direct communication with influential public figures. By applying a regional political strategy, the military ensured that they could reach all levels of society, even though they could not always affect everyone in the way they had hoped to. They admitted that it was not easy to penetrate campuses and influence university students and student movement activists.

Although the officers received no particular instruction to approach or get information, the military as an institution encouraged its officers to establish an active network for their own interest. The role of some officers, like Lieutenant-General Prabowo, Major-General Kivlan Zein, Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah or Major-General Muchdi P.R., whose duties were not directly linked to the intelligence or socio-political bureaus, was to benefit the military by setting up communications with emerging political figures.<sup>10</sup> Military officers shared information on the activities of the figures they were observing but it must be emphasized that requests to conduct such “political operations” and seek information were not mandated by the army chiefs. Likewise, no officer was ever specifically instructed to approach any particular figure. Some military staff have commented that information-gathering methods were part of standard operation procedure (SOP) of intelligence officers to be used as a means for obtaining first-hand information and data on forthcoming plans. The information would be used by the military in the interest of strengthening security, reducing tension and avoiding conflict.

## PERSUASIVE MILITARY COMMUNICATION

The military used techniques of persuasion to approach community figures. In that way, they hoped that community leaders would cooperate with them to establish a harmonious society and crush any movement that opposed the government. The military ensured that they had no affiliations with any particular organization or community figure. They

simply wanted to anticipate societal trends and the security approach required if a serious challenge to Suharto's government occurred.

The military claimed that they acted in the interest of national stability. They also affirmed that their only agenda was to gain information, which, incidentally, they later used to convince President Suharto that the use of repressive action to overcome the political crisis since early 1998 would only further deteriorate the nation's condition.<sup>11</sup>

Communications between the military and civilians had long existed. It was the duty of the district commanders to use their intelligence and socio-political task forces to establish good relations with local figures. The military enhanced their name by visiting religious schools, attending community events, distributing aid at social events, and speaking at political events or other public and political functions. Such activities were not only practised in the New Order era (1966–1998) but also continued on till the end of 1999.

It is thought that the mass movement to support the Special Session held by the People's Consultative Assembly in November 1998, also known as Pamswarkarsa, was supported by senior military officers, including General Wiranto himself, who even attended the regional mass sermons and prayer meetings held in Jakarta, Surabaya and Semarang by the Nahdlatul Ulama.

Furthermore, the military twice initiated meetings with reformists who called themselves the signatories of Ciganjur—at Wisma Yani in Jakarta on 22 January 1999 and at Museum Perumusan Naskah Proklamasi, Jalan Imam Bonjol No. 1, West Jakarta, on 28 September 1999. The first meeting was attended by Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, Megawati and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. The second one was attended by the Ciganjur signatories and the chairmen of major parties that included public figures such as Akbar Tandjung, Hamzah Haz, Matori Abdul Djalil, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Nurcholish Madjid, Professor Dr. Asman Budhi Santoso, Affan Gafar and Ryaas Rasyid.<sup>12</sup>

This method of approach was applied to influential figures to prevent mass demonstration. The military was worried that any horizontal conflict could obstruct its efforts in acting as arbitrator. The officers realized that, as a part of the government system, their duty was to secure the

government's policies and ensure that Habibie would be eligible to be re-elected as a presidential candidate at the next General Session of the People's Advisory Assembly in October 1999. On the other hand, the military clearly understood that the public wanted it to remain neutral and abstain from any political power struggle. The military itself admitted that it was difficult to remain neutral, especially since the public was aware that General Wiranto was being positioned to be the next vice-president when Habibie became the next president.<sup>13</sup> At that time, General Wiranto, who was still the Army Commander, said that he never volunteered to be Habibie's vice-president but it was Habibie himself who requested Wiranto to be his vice-president if he was elected president. He even made a formal request to the Golkar Party just before the 1999 elections. Habibie chose Wiranto not because of his military position but because he saw the advantage of having an alliance with him.

Another reason why the military conducted such communication exercises with public figures was to assure the general public that they would distance themselves equally from all political parties. One benchmark used to measure the success of the reform movement was the Ciganjur Declaration, which aimed at conducting fair and honest general elections.<sup>14</sup> To achieve this, the military had no choice but to remain neutral during the general elections in May 1999, in which 48 political parties took part. In this way, the military was able to subdue any social unrest resulting from a sense of dissatisfaction with the election results. It must be admitted that many people felt that the general election of 1999 was the most democratic election ever recorded in Indonesian history since the general election of 1955. The military claimed the elections were successful because they committed themselves to sustaining the national reformation agenda and remaining neutral during that time. Despite that, public criticism towards General Wiranto still abounded. Many senior officers advised Wiranto not to accept Habibie's offer. They even urged him not to become a presidential or vice-presidential candidate.<sup>15</sup> Wiranto himself seriously contemplated the situation carefully because he did not want to damage his relationship with President Habibie.<sup>16</sup>

In the book, *Witness in the Middle of the Storm [Bersaksi Di Tengah Badai]*, Wiranto admitted that the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, Abdur-

rahman Wahid, also offered him the position of vice-president before the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly in 1999. However, Wiranto did not take his offer seriously.<sup>17</sup> According to the military, the offer not only took into consideration Wiranto's position as Army Commander but also his previous good relationships. This differed from the position of the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP) led by Megawati, which carefully avoided communicating with military officers whose constituents still actively resisted them. Moreover, Megawati gave no indication that she wished to have a figure from the military, like Wiranto, as her running mate.

Another source of information mentioned that Lieutenant-General Tyasno Sudarto, the Chief of BAIS (1999), communicated intensively with members of PDIP, including Megawati. Many military officers believed that Sudarto played an important role in communicating with Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid before and during the General Session held by the People's Consultative Assembly that began on 1 October 1999. In retrospect, it appears that communication conducted by Sudarto and the chairman of PDIP was under his commander's instruction.<sup>18</sup> Besides the formal meeting, as described in *Witness in the Middle of the Storm*, Wiranto emphatically claimed that he met neither Abdurrahman Wahid nor Megawati either before, or during, the General Session held on October 1999.<sup>19</sup>

Although many people considered Wiranto as the strongest contender for the president's position, the military itself never advised its commander to become president. From an institutional perspective, the military wanted Wiranto to withdraw from being a presidential or vice-presidential candidate. In view of that, Wiranto, closely assisted by the commanders of the Armed Forces, addressed the nation on National TV, which was then relayed to other TV stations in the afternoon of 18 October during the General Election 1999. On television, he stated that, acceding to his advisors' counsel, he did not want be affiliated with any political party or person, including President Habibie, for the position of vice-president or president. His desire was to focus on securing the General Session held by the People's Consultative Assembly.<sup>20</sup>

The rejection of President Habibie's accountability report by the

General Session held by the People's Advisory Assembly on 19 October 1999 crushed Habibie's hopes for re-election as president of the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>21</sup> Again, when the name of Wiranto was proposed by the Daulah Ummat Faction as a candidate for vice-president, it indicated that the military had been making more intense political communications with existing parties.<sup>22</sup> The officers affirmed that not one recommendation came from Army Headquarters staff or the Army Faction in the legislative body to support Wiranto as a vice-president candidate. Armed Forces Commander's staff, including Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Admiral Widodo A.S., Major-General Sudrajat, Major-General Sudi Silalahi, agreed that it would be better if Wiranto did not accept or participate in the elections for vice-president or president.

Many reasons were given to explain why Wiranto withdrew as a candidate. First, the army did not encourage him. Second, external resistance towards the army still existed. Third, the political parties did not openly support him. Fourth, the intelligence services had been alerted to the likelihood of riots in certain areas. These reasons motivated Wiranto to order the Chairman of the Army Faction, Major-General Hari Sabarno, then Assistant to the Army's Chief of Socio-Political Affairs, to announce Wiranto's withdrawal as the vice-presidential candidate on 21 October 1999.<sup>23</sup>

## NOTES

1. "I [Wiranto] think Feisal Tandjung was supporting Habibie at that time. The Indonesian National Army is neutral; it is not affiliated to any political party or other non-government association. It supports whoever has been elected constitutionally and at that time, it was Habibie." Interview with General Wiranto, Jakarta, 28 November 2002.
2. Commented by those close to General Feisal Tandjung, for example, Lieutenant-General (reti.) Yunus Yosfiah. See, Usamah Hisyam et al., *Feisal Tandjung: Best for People, Best for the Army [Feisal Tandjung Terbaik Untuk Rakyat Terbaik Bagi ABRI]*, Jakarta: Dharmapena, 1999.
3. Indonesian Army General Feisal Tandjung succeeded in reuniting relationships between the army and the Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie, which had been strained when Habibie established the Indonesian



- Muslim Intellectuals Association. He also asked Habibie to visit and address the staff at the army headquarters in Cilangkap, West Java. *Ibid.*, p. 500.
4. Initially, the army commander was close to Habibie but after Habibie was chosen as the chairman of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association in 1990, a rift grew between them. It was seen as a protest against the establishment of such an association that brought Islam to the fore. *Ibid.*, p. 501.
  5. "I [Wiranto] believe the change (from President Suharto to Habibie) was based on the constitution. As long as there is no other candidate there will be no problem. That is why I say that because it is constitutional, we must support it. This is the army's political statement. We support Suharto to give up the mandate of the People's Consultative Assembly. We support the president's successor B.J. Habibie ..., based upon the 1945 Constitution, Article 8." Interview with General Wiranto, 28 November 2002.
  6. "I [Sudrajat] observed that the officers always stand on values and rules based on constitution and laws. I also observed that the army officers always obey rules, so B.J. Habibie was automatically elected as the president based on the constitution which states that if the president is no longer able to serve his country, the vice-president will become president." Interview with Major-General Sudrajat in Jakarta, November 2002.
  7. "In my [Zacky] opinion, only one or two persons have a personal [supportive] relationship with B.J. Habibie. But, it does not reflect the institutional attitude. Almost all officers obey the commander's line." Interview with Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim in Jakarta, 27 November 2002.
  8. "Habibie was part of the system, he was not a target for observation." *Ibid.*
  9. Nurcholish Madjid was one of the six civilians who were later invited by the Chief of the Socio-Political Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to meet at Army Headquarters on 14 May 1998. See, James Luhulima, *The Days to President Soeharto's Stepping a Back [Hari-Hari Terpanjang Menjelang Mundurnya Presiden Soeharto]* (p. 156), Jakarta: Kompas-Gramedia, 2001.
  10. On 18 May 1998, Amien Rais met Prabowo and said, "I think we can no longer control the situation. I think you must convince Suharto to step down." *Ibid.*, p. 153.
  11. "I [Wiranto] receive information and report on developments. So, if I make a decision, staff will coordinate with the Commanders and Regional Police Chiefs. Although I hold meetings at army headquarters and at the headquarters of the other armed forces, the information I present comes from the grassroots level and not from decision makers at the higher levels." Interview with General Wiranto in Jakarta, 28 November 2002.

12. *Republika* newspaper, "Abort the General Session of the People's Advisory Assembly. Betraying Indonesian People" [*Gagalkan SU MPR Khianati Rakyat*], 29 September 1999, p. 1.
13. As expected, the presidential candidate from the Group of Functionaries (Golkar), Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, on Wednesday (13 October) asked the Minister of Defence and Security / Commander of Indonesian Armed Forces, General Wiranto, to be his future vice-president. Wiranto accepted it as his duty. This choice was made after the Golkar board meeting could not choose one of the four candidates to be the future vice-president if B.J. Habibie would be the future president. The results of the meeting were delivered to Habibie, who was asked to select his own vice-presidential candidate. See, "General Wiranto, the Future Vice President from Golkar", *Kompas*, 14 October 1999, p. 1.
14. The Declaration of Ciganjur stressed: "To conduct a fair and honest general election supervised by an independent team. The general election is a democratic way to end the transition government led by President B.J. Habibie and to legitimately create a new government. No later than three months after the general election in May 1999, the new government should be formed by General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly." See, Wiranto, *Witness in the Middle of the Storm* (p. 149–151), Jakarta: Ide Indonesia, 2003.
15. "Negative public sentiment towards the Army at that time meant that civilians had very little affection for the Indonesian Army. Therefore, after our observations and analysis, we informed Wiranto that we felt he could not gain support and public positive opinion. Finally, Mr. Wiranto decided not to proceed." Interview with General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Jakarta, 11 July 2003.
16. "The first offer of the position of vice-president came from President B.J. Habibie, who had often expressed his wish that at the next presidential election at the General Session of the People's Advisory Assembly 1999, he would take me as his future vice-president." See, Wiranto, *op. cit.* p. 210.
17. "The second offer of the position of vice-president came from Gus Dur. One evening, at around 23.00, just before the opening of the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly, Gus Dur phoned me [Wiranto] and asked me to be his future vice-president." *Ibid.*, p. 214.
18. "In my [Saurip] opinion, it was Mr. Tyasno who was able to persuade Mr. Wiranto to withdraw his nomination. Why? Because Mr. Tyasno was informed the evening before and met with Mr. Wiranto the following morning to advise Wiranto to withdraw. This explains why the election of the vice-president was postponed for a few minutes because while Mr. Tyasno was at Mr. Wiranto's home, Mr. Wiranto insisted that he meet with Mega first which was finally arranged." Interview with Major-General Saurip Kadi in Jakarta, 16 December 2002.

19. "On 21 October 1999, at around 07.00 WIT, or two hours before the vice-presidential elections began, I [Wiranto] invited the vice-presidential candidate from Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to Denpasar Street in the ministers housing complex to meet with me privately. In this short meeting I explained to her that the declining national situation surrounding the presidential and vice-presidential nominations had led to riots and unrest in some areas." See, Wiranto, *op. cit.* p. 217–219.
20. Minister of Defence and Security / Commander of Indonesian National Military, General Wiranto, chose not to become a presidential candidate. Instead, he focused on securing Indonesia. Until now, no parties have proposed that he should become the future vice president, including the Golkar Party, said General Wiranto in his speech on National TV reported in the national press, on Monday (18/10). See, "Wiranto Refused a Proposed Duet with Habibie", *Kompas*, 19 October 1999, p. 1.
21. The People's Consultative Assembly finally rejected President Habibie's report. The voting on whether to reject or accept Habibie's accountability report was tense and close—355 persons rejected, 322 persons accepted, nine persons abstained and four votes were invalid—resulting in a total of only 33 persons who rejected his report. See, "Habibie's Report is Rejected" [*Pidato Habibie Ditolak*], *Kompas*, 20 October 1999, p. 1.
22. Minister of Defence and Security / Commander of Indonesian National Soldier General Wiranto was nominated by the Daulat Ummat Faction and 74 members of the People's Advisory Assembly who signed a statement to support General Wiranto. See, "The Vice President Election is Simmering" [*Memanas Pilihan Wapres*], *Berita Buana*, 21 October 1999, p. 1.
23. Wiranto, *Witness in the Middle of the Storm*: I want to prove that it is more important to me to achieve the aims of Indonesian national security than to chase power. Surprisingly, all staff supported me in this decision. That same night, I submitted my letter of rejection as vice-presidential candidate to the Chairman of the Army Faction, Hari Sabarno, for him to announce at the plenary session of the People's Consultative Assembly in the morning of October 21st, 1999. On October 21st, 1999, at 07.00 WIT, or two hours before the vice-president election began, I invited the vice-presidential candidate nominated by the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party, Megawati Soekarnoputri to Jl. Denpasar, the ministers housing complex. We had a private meeting and in that short meeting, I explained that the national condition had worsened dealing with the election of president and vice president. She was very appreciative and went directly to the People's Consultative Assembly/ Indonesian Legislative Assembly Building to participate in the vice-presidential elections. As we know, Megawati Soekarnoputri was elected as vice president with Gus Dur as the country's president. See, Wiranto, *op. cit.*, p. 217–219.

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## THE MILITARY IN THE REFORMATION ERA

During the reformation era, the Indonesian military announced that it would no longer involve itself in day-to-day politics or intervene any further in political issues. By implementing a solid internal reformation plan for the armed forces, the military expressed its intent to retreat from the Indonesian political arena.<sup>1</sup> The power shift from President Suharto to his successor, B.J. Habibie, generated some important policy changes within the military institution in relation to its role and position in the nation.

After being regarded for more than 30 years as a regime backed by military power, President Suharto's resignation rapidly brought about a decline of military domination in politics. This shift of power emboldened Indonesians to become more demanding in expressing the popular view that the military must withdraw from politics, unlike during the decades of the New Order under Suharto's leadership.<sup>2</sup>

The public wanted the military to return to its former fundamental role as an institution for national defence and security. In doing so, it could not become a political tool for any party, unlike before the reformation when it primarily supported the presence and power of Golongan Karya (Golkar). The military was expected to withdraw from civil government politics and refrain from involving itself in issues that were not related to defence or security tasks. Furthermore, the strong desire of the police force to detach itself from the Indonesian military—best known by its acronym ABRI—further reduced the military's former role, since it was

considered redundant in managing matters of national security.<sup>3</sup>

When the Indonesian Police Force (known by the Indonesian abbreviation Polri) eventually detached itself from ABRI in April 1999, security tasks, which used to be the responsibility of the military, were taken over by the police. Polri soon implemented steps to take over the roles of public security and order that had formerly been handled by the military.<sup>4</sup> In the reformation era, the police could execute its duties autonomously, without any military intervention. In the past, the police was under the auspices of ABRI and therefore could not operate with independence. However, as the police became more relevant and salient during the reformation, it created a shift within the military territorial apparatus units that had for a long time enjoyed the facilities associated with its social role. The military no longer dominated the role of security officers at entertainment places or other public facilities. Instead, its presence continued to decline and it became more and more limited to exercising institutional functions.

Much friction and conflict occurred within this newly formed military-police relationship<sup>5</sup> as a result of lines of authority and boundaries for the officers in the field not clearly defined.<sup>6</sup> This led many military officers to believe that the act of separating Polri from ABRI was done too hastily lacked adequate preparation. Moreover, military officers felt that after its detachment from the armed forces,<sup>7</sup> the pervasive military culture within the police force had produced over-confident and arrogant officers.

Changes within society occurred during the era of reformation and resulted in a vocal public that was no longer afraid to express its opinion. Civilians even dared to openly criticize military roles that they thought were inappropriate. Former military acts deemed to have caused liabilities for civilians were now freely litigated. This resulted in numerous lawsuits for repressive military acts that took place in the New Order era, including the Tanjung Priok case (1984), the Way Jepara-Lampung case (1990), DOM Aceh (1985–1998), the military intervention in Timor Timur (1976) and the Santa Cruz incident in Dili (1991). The military was required to take responsibility for those incidents and did its utmost to convince the public and the new government that those incidents were not solely the military's responsibility, since at the time it functioned merely as an

instrument for the government.<sup>8</sup> The military also perceived the establishment of the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) as not being conducive because the commission tried to curtail and blame the military for acts performed before and during the reformation.<sup>9</sup> The court trial of several military officers who were convicted of serious human-right violations, based on a trial in Timor Timur in August 1999 by a human rights-related court and the open trial of the Tanjung Priok case, which involved soldiers standing trial, were government acts that the military regretted. Though it had little choice but to accept.<sup>10</sup>

Officers confessed that during Suharto's administration, the military was used as a political tool to maintain its power. The military could not resist any orders given by the legitimate president. Officers confessed to be totally under President Suharto's rule. No promotions or military strategic decisions were ever made without his permission. As an institution, the military had no autonomy to manage itself and appoint officers to high official military posts without having first received an agreement from the president, who held the position of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, it is no wonder that chief officials of the armed forces and the police, as well as high officials of the National Army who held strategic positions like the Regional Military Commander (Pangdam), all shared special relations with President Suharto or his cronies. It was common knowledge that the armed forces chief or other chiefs of staff, even though they were trusted persons selected by President Suharto, in practice did not have the courage and power to make autonomous decisions regarding strategic functional decisions for high-ranking officers.

## THE TNI UNDER B.J. HABIBIE'S TERM IN OFFICE

Many officials felt that reformation had allowed the military a wider scope to develop their own autonomy. Under President Habibie's term in office, the commander of ABRI, General Wiranto, was able to make changes, appoint rank promotions and implement several internal military policies with relative ease. President Habibie never disputed any internal military

policy made by General Wiranto but only made recommendations or suggestions that the ABRI commander was free to adopt or reject. Military officers felt that President Habibie had a certain amount of respect for military autonomy and it is no secret that he needed the military to maintain his hold on power. Furthermore, in an attempt to guarantee military support for his government, Habibie requested General Wiranto to become his vice-president if he was re-elected as president.<sup>12</sup>

During Habibie's leadership, it appeared that General Wiranto authorized and managed the military institution's policies. It was also felt that the military had greatly influenced the policies introduced by the president. For example, in relation to the establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda in Aceh (1999), the widespread development of the People's Security Unit (Kamra), the appointment of the new chief of state police (1998), the detachment of the police force from ABRI (April 1999), the support for the Extraordinary Plenary Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (November 1999), the enactment of laws that allowed new political parties to be set up and participate in the 1999 general elections, and the implementation of a presidential election through voting in the People's Advisory Assembly Meeting (October 1999).

Wiranto, in his capacity as Minister of Defence and Security/Armed Forces Chief and as a cabinet minister for President Habibie, was well placed to handle the wide range of policy plans and tasks. This differed considerably from the time when President Suharto ruled the country and positioned the military simply as an instrument to execute his own policies. During Habibie's era, the military was positioned as the president's partner. Its opinion was valued and it was not just regarded as merely executors of the president's decisions. The relationship between the president and the commander of ABRI during Habibie's era could be perceived as a balanced relationship. Even though civilian control over the military could not be completely implemented in the Habibie era, at least the military did not control civil governance. Under Habibie's government, which lasted about 17 months (21 May 1998 to October 1999), no conflicts between military leaders and civil governance leaders were reported. President Habibie's ability to refrain from intervening in internal military affairs resulted in his being accepted by military personnel.<sup>13</sup>

## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TNI AND GOLKAR

Responses to public demand for the military to remove itself from social and political affairs, along with the demand to abolish the dual-function role of ABRI, brought about implications for the military and political parties in Indonesia, especially for Golkar. The military, which had allied itself with Golkar during the New Order regime, was seen as an obstacle towards achieving democracy and a hurdle for the growth of other political parties (PPP and PDI) to overcome. The public's demand for the military to detach itself from Golkar can be seen as an expression of public dissatisfaction over the military's bias. To shortlist names for legislative candidates at all levels, the military involved itself in politics, particularly inside Golkar, through three separate bodies: ABRI, bureaucracy and Golkar (or the ABG path). However, from among those three bodies, ABRI had the final say. When the practice of dual function was in effect, the military exercised great authority in the process of promoting or rejecting a Golkar member.

The national reformation agenda compelled the military to release itself from Golkar and position itself as a neutral unit, not inclined towards any political party. A month after the onset of the reformation, in June 1998, the military forwarded its concepts about ABRI and reformation to President Habibie. While discussing political issues, ABRI realized that Golkar's overwhelming victory in the general elections was largely responsible for creating a situation of political polarization.

The military felt that, by empowering civil society's participation in politics, it could offset any threat of political instability. This new approach was a sign that the military no longer intended to act as Golkar's political instrument and at the same time it allowed other political parties to develop. The military also suggested changes to Act No. 3/1985 regarding political parties and the Golkar Party that required Golkar, in reality, a functional group, to be mentioned as a political party of equal standing with other political parties. The military also firmly stated its commitment to maintain an equal distance with all socio-political powers. The military's open criticism of Golkar was regarded as the preliminary step towards its subsequent detachment from Golkar.



The Extraordinary Meeting of the Golkar National Deliberative Council on July 1998 in Jakarta, which elected Akbar Tanjung (a civil politician) as its general chairman, could be seen as proof that the military is sincere in its intention to detach itself from Golkar. The fact that a retired army service officer, General Edi Sudrajat (who was previously assumed to be backed by the military), failed to take over the leadership of Golkar proved that the military had acted neutrally. The defeat of Edi Sudrajat demonstrated that he had been unable to gain the support of the chairmen of the Golkar Level I House of Representatives in the 27 regions. Many parties were convinced that if the military had really wanted Edi Sudrajat to win, they could have rigged the voting to his favour because, during that time, the majority of the Regional House of Representatives chairmen, Level 1 Golkar, were actually retired ABRI officers. The fact that Edi Sudrajat was defeated clearly indicated that he did not have military backing.

On the other hand, Akbar Tanjung's victory can be seen as a result of indirect military support. Akbar Tanjung, who was then the Minister of State Secretary (Menteri Sekretaris Negara), was known to be relatively close to President Habibie. This made it possible for him to ask Habibie to request from Minister of Defence and Security/Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto an assurance of success. Military officers had been fully aware of the clash of opinions between Edi Sudrajat and President Habibie since the establishment of ICMI (1991). Edi Sudrajat appeared to disapprove of Habibie's move to establish ICMI on the grounds that he felt it to be sectarian in nature. In the context of electing the general chairman of Golkar, the military felt it wiser not to support Edi Sudrajat.

According to several officers, Akbar Tanjung only won because the military had requested support for him from ABRI-based Golkar chairmen at the Regional Representatives Council level. The request was executed by military social politics leaders linked to the office of the Chief of Staff for Social-Political Affairs (Kassospol), both directly and indirectly, around the time of the elections. Even the armed forces commander, General Wiranto, in *Bersaksi di Tengah Badai* [*Witness in the Middle of the Storm*], confessed that he was present at the breakfast hosted by Akbar Tanjung, which was also attended by Golkar's chairmen

of the Regional Representatives Council Level I, during the National Golkar Meeting that took place just days before the election of the general chairman. Wiranto's presence signified his support for Akbar Tanjung, especially as the other candidate (Edi Sudrajat) was absent. Furthermore, Wiranto did not attend the meeting or gathering held by Edi Sudrajat while Golkar's Extraordinary National Deliberative Council Meeting was in session (July 1998). Despite this, Wiranto never actually explicitly proclaimed that he supported Akbar Tanjung as the general chairman of Golkar.

Wiranto gave another explanation for not speaking out. He stated that it was hard for him to take a stand for Edi Sudrajat, who was supported by retired armed service officers, while he himself was still a part of Habibie's government. Despite that fact that the military did not support a candidate with a military background to be the general chairman of Golkar, it can still be concluded that the military played a role in Golkar's Extraordinary National Deliberative Council Meeting. The election of Major-General Tuswandi (1998–2002) and Lieutenant-General Budi Harsono (2002–2004) as Akbar Tanjung's secretary-generals illustrated that the military still exercised a certain amount of influence and was a political force to be reckoned with.

The new paradigm of the Armed Forces' (TNI) role, proposed in early April 1999, confirmed its severance with Golkar and its move to adopt an equal distance from all political parties. The military also severed its links with Golkar in order that it could maintain its neutrality during the general elections held on 7 June 1999. In addition, the military did not put up any objection in the discussions and decision-making processes related to Act No. 2 of 1999 regarding political parties, which resulted in more than a hundred political parties registering. As a manifestation of its commitment to political reformation and neutrality in conducting the general elections, the military produced guidelines on being neutral for the TNI and Polri in the general election, which was signed by the commander of ABRI. The guidelines comprised political attitudes and behaviour that the TNI and Polri should adopt in the general elections of 1999 to distance themselves proportionally and fairly from all political parties participating in the elections. In a publication entitled *TNI and*

*Polri's Neutrality in the General Election*, published by the TNI Headquarters, TNI leaders also firmly defined the meaning of TNI and Polri neutrality. First, the TNI and Polri have no obligation to promote any single participating political party to win in a general election. Second, the TNI and Polri may not side with any political party participating in the general election. Third, the TNI and Polri must be equally fair towards all political parties participating in the general elections.

Besides the above, TNI leaders requested that officers' wives should not become active political party cadres and they also prohibited civil state employees within the TNI and Polri to be members or leaders of political parties. Former organizational relations between the large family organizations of the TNI, Polri and Golkar that had in the past been connected emotionally and historically now had to conform to a political and military outlook and attitude. Officers were restricted during the general elections of 1999 from intervening in the day-to-day activities of the political parties and from influencing civil society during the entire general election process.

According to military officers, policy steps implemented by TNI leaders during the general elections of 1999 proved to be effective, as shown by the absence of civil complaints or protests on the TNI's neutrality. The military claimed that officers respected and executed orders to act neutrally during the general elections of 1999. PDIP's victory in that election on 7 June 1999, by attaining around 35 per cent of the votes while Golkar only attained around 25 per cent, could be seen as the beginning of a successful democracy. Military officers claimed that the state of affairs came about through the implementation of their commitment to maintain neutrality during the elections.

## **TNI UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID**

The election of President Abdurrahman Wahid over Megawati on 20 October 1999, with 373 votes for Wahid and 313 votes for Megawati, was, from the military's perspective, the most favourable outcome because it was the result of a proper constitutional process. When Megawati went

on to become vice-president (with 396 votes) over Hamzah Haz, many assumed that the military had intervened by directing its parliamentary representatives to support her. However, military officers assured the public that during the entire presidential and vice-presidential election process, no command instructions were issued for the ABRI faction to select a specific candidate.<sup>14</sup> Wiranto officially gave each military personnel the liberty to make his own choice but many believed the ABRI faction voted for Megawati, both during the presidential and vice-presidential elections. That sentiment was further reinforced by several indicators, among which were Wiranto's instruction to Lieutenant-General Tyasno Sudarto to maintain good communications with Megawati, Wiranto's rejection of Abdurrahman Wahid's offer to become his vice-president and Wiranto's personal meeting with Megawati at the time of the Plenary Session of the People's Consultative Assembly at his duty residence, as Wiranto himself clarified in *Bersaksi Di Tengah Badai*.

Military relations enacted with various parties since the beginning of reformation until the end of the Plenary Session of the People's Consultative Assembly on 21 October 1999, placed the military in an authoritative position to determine national political power shifts. For example, Wiranto, while still holding the position of Minister of Defence and Security, also became one of President Wahid's formulators, assisting in arrangements being made to form a new cabinet. Thus, the appointment of Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security and the promotion of several ABRI high functionaries like Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Lieutenant-General Agum Gumelar, Lieutenant-General Luhut Panjaitan and Lieutenant-General Suryadi Sudirja as cabinet members in President Wahid's government, which was announced on 26 October 1999, not only demonstrated the close relations between the military and civilian personnel but it also proved that military figures were still active in political military roles. The inclusion of civil figures recommended by Wiranto in the cabinet, namely Dr. Ryaas Rasyid and Professor Juwono Sudarsono, was further proof that the military could still exercise strong influence on the government.

In the early days of President Wahid's administration, the appointment of several high-ranking officers from ABRI and the army headquar-

ters, whom the military considered did not conform to decisions made by its Council for High Ranking Promotions and Duty Rotations (Wanjakti) and were not recommended by ABRI leaders, created a rift between the president and the army. The promotion of General Tyasno Sudarto to Chief of Staff of the Army (KSAD) on November 1999 and Lieutenant-General Agus Wirahadikusumah to Commander of the elite Kostrad on February 2000, followed by other acts aimed at reshuffling members of the high command within the military's structural organization, caused dissatisfaction among army officers.<sup>15</sup> These officers censured President Wahid's policies as unnecessary interventions in military affairs.

In addition to the above mentioned problems, the plan to discharge Wiranto from his position as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security based upon a critical report issued by Komnas HAM that he had been involved in violating human rights in the polling in Timor Timur, coupled with allegations of corruption in the State Logistics Agency (Bulog) and the exposure of President Wahid's misuse of a grant from Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, all combined to undermine the president's credibility among military officers. Even though ABRI's commander, Admiral Widodo A.S., tried to demonstrate and maintain his loyalty towards the president, in reality military policies and commands were still dominated by army officials whose opinions often differed from those of the president.

President Wahid's move to sideline Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security on 21 February 2000 by reducing him to non-active status, although not formally opposed by military personnel, was seen within military circles as a major disappointment to the armed forces. Statements from senior officers like Lieutenant Djaja Suparman, who said that "soldiers feel offended when their leader is afflicted", can be interpreted as an expression of disappointment with President Wahid's decision. Military disappointment and resistance towards the president's policies became more obvious when senior army officers demanded that Lieutenant-General Agus Wirahadikusumah be discharged from his position as commander of the elite Kostrad.

Lieutenant-General Agus was known as a senior military officer with close relations to President Wahid. His promotion was criticized within

military circles for not following regular military procedures. He was the only officer who dared to openly state his support for President Wahid's decision to marginalize his senior, Wiranto, to non-active status. The constant pressure from the military to discharge Lieutenant-General Agus finally took place when he was replaced by Lieutenant-General Ryamazard Ryacudu, following the dismissal of General Tyasno Sudarto as KSAD, who was then replaced by General Endriartono Sutarto in October 2000.<sup>16</sup>

Military officers believed that the dynamics within their organization were not only generated by its own internal conditions but also by political interference, specifically, President Wahid, who intervened in matters long considered solely within the realm of military prerogative. The military regarded these actions as taboo, considering that such activities were clearly defined by a fixed set of standard operational procedures. Military officers at that time felt that President Wahid would never realize his mistakes and, subsequently, feared that a continued pattern of such intervention in the promotion of senior officers. On the other hand, the military found Vice-President Megawati more accommodative towards military interests, so it sought to develop closer relations with her.<sup>17</sup>

The reason that the military gave for re-opening communication lines for its territorial intelligence network was to safeguard and stabilize the political dynamics necessary to oppose President Wahid since the Yanatera Bulog scandal surfaced in August 2000. Pressure from parliamentary members to investigate the Yanatera Bulog case and the status of the grant transfer from the Sultan of Brunei to President Wahid only intensified political tension.<sup>18</sup> The widespread surge of student movement was assumed by many to have been indirectly manipulated by the military as a response to the disturbing undercurrents of President Wahid's policies toward the armed forces. The dominant sentiment was that as the military was dissatisfied with President Wahid's frequent interventions into its internal affairs and, as a consequence, allowed student protests against President Wahid's government to take place.<sup>19</sup>

Officers have admitted to holding intense communications with leading figures of the student movement, government and political party leaders opposed to Wahid. The TNI's response was to support

the proclamation of Memorandum I to President Wahid on 1 February 2001 regarding the Yanatera Bulog case and the controversy emanating from the grant provided by the Sultan of Brunei. Through its TNI faction leaders, the military also supported the decision to implement the People's Consultative Assembly Extraordinary Plenary Session held in July 2001.<sup>20</sup> The military, as stated by KSAD General Sutarto, firmly rejected the presidential decree to discharge the existing parliament on 22 July 2001. The "show of force" by the armed forces' "alert" ceremony at the National Monument (Monas) Square before the announcement of the new presidential decree was the military's indirect way of expressing dissent with the president.<sup>21</sup>

Officers have reported that parliamentary members forged better coordination with the TNI headquarters in facing the political fallout emanating from the erratic behaviour of President Wahid. The president's intervention into internal military affairs, with respect to structural positions, administration policies on the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Aceh and the handling of the Papua separatism movement, not only created disappointment among military personnel, but apparently also resulted in unifying the institution.<sup>22</sup>

The high point of relations between the military and the politicians was when they agreed to support the implementation of the People's Consultative Assembly Extraordinary Plenary Session on 23 July 2001. The session eventually discharged President Wahid from his position and replaced him with Vice-President Megawati. Hamzah Haz (Chairman of PPP) was elected the new vice-president over Akbar Tanjung (Chairman of Golkar) and Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Officers reported that they were not disappointed with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's defeat in the vice-presidential elections. The military was already satisfied with the results of the session, which had constitutionally selected Megawati as president. Megawati was considered far more accommodative towards military interests and therefore the military felt that she would not make any controversial decisions that would further compromise the institution.<sup>23</sup>

The rise of Megawati as Indonesia's fourth president was followed by a run of mutations and promotions within the military organization.<sup>24</sup> The

promotion of General Endriartono Sutarto and Lieutenant Ryamizard Ryacudu as commander of the TNI and KSAD respectively in October 2001 indicated strongly that the military, particularly the army, supported the power succession process from Wahid to Megawati.<sup>25</sup>

During President Wahid's term in office (October 1999 to July 2001), Admiral Widodo A.S. replaced General Wiranto as TNI Commander-in-Chief. Widodo A.S., who formerly took office as TNI Deputy Commander, came from the navy. Furthermore, the position of Minister for Defence and Security, then concurrently held by Wiranto, was entrusted to a civilian, Professor Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, who had formerly held the position of Minister for Education in Habibie's cabinet. During President Suharto's era, TNI commanders and defence and security ministers had always come from the military, especially from the army. The rise of Admiral Widodo A.S. to the highest position of military leadership and the appointment of Professor Dr. Juwono Sudarsono as Minister of Defence and Security was considered by many parties as President Wahid's way of minimizing army domination (military power) and considered to be an indicator of the successful application of civilian supremacy.<sup>26</sup>

Meanwhile, military personnel were not concerned about the shift of leadership within the TNI and the transfer of the post of Minister of Defence and Security to a civilian figure. The military did not view it as a victory for President Wahid's civil governance over the military. It is no secret among military officers that the appointment of Widodo A.S. to replace Wiranto had long been planned, even during President Habibie's time in office. At that time, Wiranto suggested an additional position inside the military structure, for example, deputy commander of the TNI. To allow him to pay more attention to situations external to the military that related to military policies and also due to his workload as a member of the governing cabinet, Wiranto needed a deputy commander to officially focus on internal military duties for the purposes of internal consolidation. Widodo was Wiranto's ideal candidate for that position.

In the same way, as Minister of Defence and Security, Wiranto had frequently mentioned the name of university-professor-turned-politician Juwono Sudarsono as a nominee to replace him. Wiranto was resolved to prepare successors for both of his positions. In time, Wiranto managed to



convince the officer corps that the decision enhanced the military's image, particularly the army's, as it demonstrated commitment and integrity for internal reform. Wiranto and others believed that both men, who were chosen by Wiranto to replace him, would not change existing policies or politically harm the military's special interests. Among the military personnel, Juwono was known as an academic who was tolerant towards military policies and had, prior to his appointment, never been in dispute with the military. Juwono's good name with the military developed when he was trusted to take office as vice-governor of the National Resilience Institute or Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional (Lemhannas, 1996–1998), where he was the only civilian official holding a high-ranking position within a military-dominated institution staffed by senior military officers.

Widodo, on the other hand, was regarded by Wiranto and several other officers as a senior military officer with a non-political navy background. High-ranking officers at the TNI headquarters successfully convinced Wiranto that Widodo should replace him because, at that critical stage of *reformasi*, it was deemed more suitable to appoint a professional figure without any political connections. It was hoped that Widodo would reduce external pressure towards the military, particularly the army, which was in the process of internal consolidation. The appointment would also demonstrate the army's moderation, namely, to willingly relinquish its prestigious position to prove its commitment towards internal military reformation. Military personnel, especially those from the army—the main target of public criticism during reformation<sup>27</sup>—accepted those objective reasons.

Of course, subjective reasons and political calculations also influenced the move to promote Widodo to replace Wiranto as TNI Commander. Like his predecessors, who selected loyal juniors or fellow institutional colleagues to fill the positions they had vacated, Wiranto followed the same track. During Suharto's era, every recommendation had to conform to the president's concepts and thinking. During Habibie's administration, or at the beginning of Abdurrahman Wahid's term, TNI commanders had far more freedom to promote their own choice of personnel in their military organization structure. At that time (1999), besides TNI Deputy

Commander Widodo, several senior officers' names could be mentioned as suitable candidates for the position of TNI Commander after Wiranto's resignation, namely, KSAD General Subagyo H.S., TNI Chief of Territorial Affairs (Kaster) Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, General Secretary of the Department of Defence and Security Lieutenant-General Fachrul Rozi, who were all the contenders.

It can be assumed that KSAD General Subagyo failed to be elected because Wiranto wanted himself to be the sole figure in controlling military access, both externally and internally. If Subagyo had been appointed as TNI Commander, Wiranto's influence within the TNI would have been subjected to restricting formalities. Subagyo, who also came from the army, had a wide range of territorial command and combat experience (General Commander of the Special Forces, 1994–1995, and the Diponegoro Military Area Commander, 1996–1997) as well as having good relations with former president Suharto and his family. As Wiranto still needed military support after his resignation as TNI Commander, he sought a successor whom he could influence. In Wiranto's opinion, Subagyo did not fit the profile and could not be manipulated while in the position of TNI Commander.

Like Wiranto, Subagyo's career blossomed because of President Suharto's support and trust. Both officers had little in common except that they had attained high-ranking posts through their close relations to President Suharto. That being the case, Wiranto could lose bargaining power and prestige if Subagyo had become TNI Commander. On the other hand, Wiranto had moved Subagyo from his current position as KSAD if he was to attain his long-term goal of becoming Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security in President Wahid's cabinet, then to president or vice-president, with the backing of the military, unattainable goals if the TNI commander was not loyal to him.

Another high-ranking officer who was considered very close to Wiranto was Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Many parties believed that he was the most appropriate person to replace Wiranto since he was the man formulating internal military reform policies under Wiranto's leadership.<sup>28</sup> In his position as Kassospol, and then as Kaster, Lieutenant-General Yudhoyono held influence in formulating ABRI's

internal reform policies as well as contributing to political policies made by the ABRI commander.<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, Yudhoyono was still relatively junior compared to other high-ranking officers. If Wiranto had made Yudhoyono his successor, it could create internal military dissatisfaction. Internal military stability was essential for Wiranto to promote his successor. Wiranto admitted that he did not move Yudhoyono to replace him but instead prepared him as a potential candidate to replace KSAD, General Subagyo. When asked, Yudhoyono replied that he did not expect himself to be directly promoted to TNI Commander and the rank of KSAD was the most suitable position for his career advancement (1999).

Another suitable alternative to replace Wiranto was Lieutenant-General Fachrul Rozi, former ABRI Chief of General Staff before he took up his post as General Secretary of the Defence and Security Department. Lieutenant-General Rozi was known to be a professional career officer whose reputation was untainted by external parties in the course of his rise up the military hierarchy. Wiranto seemed to prefer officers with that kind of background, even though it was unlike his own. However, Rozi was only regarded as the reserve candidate in case Widodo failed to be promoted. Evidently, Wiranto had planned the transfers and promotions of his officers well before he vacated his position as TNI Commander.

Therefore, the recommendation to President Wahid by the TNI Headquarters Wanjakti to appoint Widodo as the new TNI commander appeared to have been long planned by Wiranto. As mentioned by Wiranto, adding the post of TNI deputy commander within the military structure was his strategy to facilitate the aforementioned promoted officer to replace him. Wiranto had hoped that Widodo would maintain current policies in order to preserve military interests. Bearing in mind the common practice of Indonesian culture, Wiranto—the main backer of Widodo—had certainly hoped that the officers he promoted would return his favour by demonstrating their loyalty to him. The position of deputy commander, which Widodo vacated, was then filled by Rozi, who later became a general (1999–2000).

The appointment of both high-ranking officers at the end of October 1999 took place simultaneously with the formation of President Wahid's new cabinet. Aside from adroitly convincing internal military units that

Widodo was the right candidate to lead the TNI at that time, Wiranto also managed to get President Wahid's approval. Wiranto's position as TNI commander during the People's Consultative Assembly Extraordinary Plenary Session in October 1999 gave him a strategic role that political powers needed to reckon with, including the elected president. Wiranto's firm political influence meant that he became one of the formulators of the new cabinet led by President Wahid. Other formulators were Akbar Tanjung (General Chairman of Golkar and Chairman of the Parliament), Amien Rais (General Chairman of PAN and Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly) and Megawati (Chairman of PDIP and Vice-President). Wiranto himself held the important position of Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (October 1999) in the government. It was a prestigious cabinet post that allowed him to constantly monitor policy decision-making in the TNI and Polri. It can be said that President Wahid's cabinet arrangement of civil-military relations was still dominated by the military, which was represented by Wiranto. Civilian figures complied with military pressure in making political decisions, even though the military theoretically did not completely dominate politics. Military institutional orders did not involve civilian authorities at all, proving that the military was not under civil control.

However, not all of Wiranto's carefully-laid plans and manoeuvres were implemented. President Wahid's rejection of the Wanjakti's suggestion to elect Lieutenant-General Yudhoyono as KSAD seemed to disappoint Wiranto. On one occasion, Wiranto stated that he had tried his best to convince President Wahid that Yudhoyono was the perfect man to hold the KSAD position but the president appointed Lieutenant-General Tyasno Sudarto, who was the Chief of BAIS TNI. The president's selection was not based on objective considerations, considering there were many other senior officers who had served longer in the same rank of lieutenant-general. Even though Tyasno was a senior officer (AMN year 1970), he had only earned his rank a couple of months after the reorganization of BAIS TNI, when he was promoted from the rank of major-general to lieutenant-general (April 1999). Despite the fact that many parties questioned Wiranto's recommendation of Tyasno, Tyasno's personal relations with President Wahid superseded the aspirations of

those who supported Yudhoyono in becoming the next KSAD.

Wiranto's failure to convince President Wahid to appoint Yudhoyono as KSAD signified a presidential victory over the military. Although some military personnel disagreed with that decision, no real objections were raised. Neither did Wiranto confront the president directly on the decision, even though it clearly dissatisfied him. In relation to this, there are three viewpoints to take into consideration. First, Wiranto had been given a strategic position in President Wahid's cabinet as a political concession as long as he did not interfere in areas considered to be within the realm of presidential prerogative. Second, Wiranto strived to preserve his image as an army figure that obeyed civilian supremacy. Confronting President Wahid while the military's image was in ruins could damage the positive image that Wiranto, a military figure supporting national reformation, had prudently built up since the onset of the *reformasi* movement. Third, Yudhoyono's move into President Wahid's cabinet as Minister of Mining and Energy could be seen as a win-win solution for Wiranto and President Wahid. That being the case, the failure to promote his prospective officers did not mean that Wiranto had failed or had been politically defeated.

From President Wahid's perspective, the appointment of Tyasno meant he could use him to influence the internal policies of the army more easily than Yudhoyono, who was considered as one of Wiranto's loyalists. Additionally, President Wahid did not want Wiranto to exercise any more influence within military circles since he had assumed it might compromise his own political charisma, particularly diminishing his relations with military officers. From President Wahid's perspective, it would be easier for him to communicate with Tyasno because they were already well acquainted. By choosing Tyasno, who was not backed by Wiranto, President Wahid had hoped to gain the full loyalty of the KSAD. Wahid, however, claimed that he chose Tyasno based upon Wiranto's recommendation. According to him, Wiranto had only forwarded two names: Yudhoyono and Tyasno.<sup>30</sup>

Later, Tyasno demonstrated his loyalty to the president by carrying out the president's wish to promote Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah to commander of the elite Army Strategic Reserve, replacing

its previous leader, Lieutenant-General Djadja Suparman (April 2000). That decision generated chaos among army officers, who felt that Major-General Agus was an inappropriate candidate for the promotion. The officers claimed that he had violated the soldier's codes of ethics when he publicly criticized Wiranto and the TNI. Agus recommended that Wiranto's involvement in the human-rights violations in the Timor Timur referendum should be investigated and he requested that Wiranto resign from his position as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security.<sup>31</sup> On TNI matters, Agus suggested that territorial commands like the District Military Command (Kodim) and the Military Area Command (Koramil) should be liquidated since he found them to be irrelevant. That approach invited harsh reactions from internal military circles, even though it received support from civil society.

Criticisms of Agus from TNI officers became more intense when he was made commander of the elite Kostrad. Once in that position, he promptly sought to audit the financial records of the Kostrad Foundation. In one of his announcements, he stated that preliminary audit results had indicated that his seniors in Kostrad had engaged in financial impropriety. Agus Wirahadikusumah's public statement was deemed inappropriate and created a negative response from within the TNI.

The military observed that the polemics surrounding the controversial Agus in the post of commander of Kostrad (year 2000) upset civil-military relations. Officers concluded that internal tension and conflict within the military were basically caused by acts of civilian intervention, which had placed officers who did not conform to military standards into strategic positions, for example, the commander of Kostrad. If President Wahid had not requested KSAD to place Agus as the commander of Kostrad, the lieutenant-general's opinion might well have been overlooked. Alternatively, if KSAD had been recommended by Wanjakti from the TNI Headquarters (Lieutenant-General Yudhoyono), it would have been more difficult for the president to appoint his own choice for such a strategic military position and ultimately prevented the internal conflict within the TNI and strained civil-military relations.

President Wahid's plan to replace TNI Commander Widodo with Tyasno and promote Agus to KSAD had caused conflict within the

military, particularly the army. It marked the most critical time for civil-military relations since the end of the Suharto era. Military personnel felt that President Wahid had grossly interfered in military matters and they accused him of turning the military “upside down”.

At the same time, military personnel criticized the president’s weak policies in handling problems relating to the Free Aceh Movement, known by its Indonesian acronym GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and containing the strong demands emanating from the Presidium Council of Papua, which raised the spectre of separatism and allowed even leading opposition parties to champion independence causes that could undermine Indonesia’s national integrity. From the military’s perspective, such weak action would not only endanger military interests but also the interests of the entire nation. Furthermore, President Wahid’s move to conduct investigations on all military officers who were suspected of being involved in human-rights violations after the polling in Timor Timur (September 1999) and the establishment of an ad-hoc human-rights court only created more disenchantment within military circles.<sup>32</sup> Those incidents encouraged military officers to take firmer action against the president’s policies, especially those related to internal military affairs.

Senior military officers confronted President Wahid by refusing to accept his plan to replace KSAD General Tyasno with Agus. The officers demanded that the TNI commander (KSAD) discharge Agus from his position as commander of Kostrad, followed by a request to pension or put him on the non-activate list, effectively removing him from all structural military positions. A number of senior officers went even further by threatening to resign if the president insisted on promoting Agus to KSAD.<sup>33</sup> Such direct military confrontation against the president indicated that the military did not submit to civil authority under President Wahid’s leadership. Military personnel judged that the president’s policies were not objective to military interests and were therefore considered to be acts of intervention against military autonomy. The military threats succeeded in persuading President Wahid to withdraw his nomination of Agus. The president’s efforts to persuade other senior officers to take up positions he offered were also refused. The discharge of Agus from his position as Kostrad Commander, to be

replaced by Major-General Ryamizard Ryacudu (on October 2000), and the promotion of Lieutenant-General Endriartono Sutarto to KSAD, to replace Tyasno, could be seen as a victory for the military in confronting President Wahid.

That the military was able to dictate the replacement of top TNI army positions with their own choices is clear indication that the civil authorities under President Wahid's leadership were not in control of the military. Military officers acknowledged the dismissal of Tyasno and Agus with delight. The military's success resulted in a return of its self-confidence as a powerful institution with widely recognized political influence. The military also demonstrated that it would not submit to civilian authority in matters that were considered to compromise internal military interests. Apparently, it was the conflict between the civil leadership under President Wahid and the military that was largely responsible for hastening the president's downfall.<sup>34</sup>

During President Wahid's time in office, the phenomenon of civil-military relations can be marked in three phases, each of short duration. The first phase, referred to as the transitional phase, covered the period from President Habibie's administration to President Wahid's time in office, when the military held political influence and a significant role in determining the outcomes of the People's Consultative Assembly sessions. This transition phase gave the military broad bargaining powers to influence the policies of the newly formed government. Civil-military relations at the elite level, although more dominated by military personnel than civilians, were not transparent. The Indonesian society's strong resistance towards the military did not affect civilian politicians' respect for existing military figures like Wiranto and Yudhoyono. The election compromise resulting in President Wahid's victory placed the military institution as a balancing force for parties that opposed President Wahid and those that still hoped for the military's political support.

The second phase took place soon after President Wahid formed his cabinet in the early days of his government, when he began to use his authority to regulate the military. As Wiranto's position had no direct command over the military, President Wahid exploited that weakness



in an attempt to control the military. From the military's viewpoint, a series of unpopular policies proposed by President Wahid included his rejection of the Wanjakti's recommendation for the KSAD position, the promotion of Agus, the use of dialogue and mediation to resolve the problems of Aceh and Papua, the investigation of all TNI high functionaries who were accused of human-rights violations, and the decision to marginalize and place Wiranto on the non-active list when he was Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (Menkopolkam).<sup>35</sup> President Wahid used his legal authority as leader of the civilian government to extensively control the military. These acts succeeded in enforcing military obedience for the president's decisions without any confrontation that directly influenced the implementation of those policies. Effective civilian government control under President Wahid's leadership over the military ran from the end of 1999 until 2000. In his capacity as TNI commander, Widodo, whom Wiranto felt would be expected to fight for military interest by opposing the demands for a human-rights court against military officers and the sidelining of Wiranto to the non-active list, in reality accepted President Wahid's policies. Moreover, the TNI commander could not refuse President Wahid's command to replace the TNI's Chief of Information Centre (Kapuspen), Major-General Sudrajat (February 2000), who was one of the president's opponents, despite the fact that the act over-reached the president's authority to intervene in the military institution. With Tyasno, as KSAD, was considered as a loyal military figure to President Wahid because he recommended Tyasno for the post of KSAD. The military, throughout 2000, was practically under the control of President Wahid. During that same period, the TNI commander also oversaw the abolishment of ABRI's dual-function doctrine, particularly its socio-political function, which was the core of internal military reformation.<sup>36</sup>

The third phase was when President Wahid could no longer control the military and surrendered to its pressure. This phase took place from early 2001 until President Wahid's fall from power. During this phase, the military openly confronted the president on military issues. The objections of high-ranking officers to the allegations of the Kostrad Foundation corruption scandal exposed by Agus (who was backed by the president),

the rejection of Agus's promotion to KSAD, threats of resignation from several high-ranking TNI army officers, and the demand to support the replacement of Tyasno led by Lieutenant-General Endriartono Sutarto that resulted in the military's refusal to support the presidential decree in July 2001, all combined to signify that the military was no longer under President Wahid's control and, following from that logic, no longer under civilian control.

Several factors contributed to President Wahid's loss of control over the military. First, the lack of a deep and strong relationship between President Wahid and senior officers holding strategic positions—either at the TNI, Navy, Air Force, Kodam or Police Headquarters—created a lack of influence and control over the opposing military circle.

Second, President Wahid only received weak political support from the more dominant political parties after his controversial action to discharge several ministers from political parties (Hamzah Haz from PPP, Jusuf Kalla from Golkar, Laksamana Sukardi from PDIP).<sup>37</sup> President Wahid's suspected involvement in corruption related to the Bulog fund and his acceptance of the Sultan of Brunei's gift further diminished his popularity and support among the Indonesian public. The formation of a People's Representative Assembly (DPR) Special Committee to investigate the Bulog scandal further weakened President Wahid's credibility. Along with the dwindling political support from other civilian political powers, the military also expressed its lack of respect for President Wahid and made it clear that it would no longer follow his orders.

The third factor was the general view within military circles that President Wahid's leadership contributed no benefit to the development of military professionalism and tended to endanger military interests. For these reasons, the military was unwilling to be controlled by President Wahid, whom they judged as incompetent. The climax of the president's delegitimization was the military's non-compliance of President Wahid's presidential decree on 23 July 2001, which basically commanded the military to (i) immobilize the MPR/DPR; (ii) conduct a general election in one year; and (iii) immobilize Golkar.<sup>38</sup> The TNI commander's public statement refusing to implement the presidential decree was a sign that a civilian authority—in this case, President

Wahid—could no longer control the military.<sup>39</sup> Ironically, the roles of the military and the police were to function as operational executors of that decree.

The deterioration of civil-military relations in early 2001 made it easy for President Wahid's powerful political opponents within the major parties to withdraw their support for his government. Without military support, President Wahid's political strength was sapped gradually until he was barely able to maintain any form of authority. The main agenda of the Special MPR session held at the end of July 2001 was to replace President Wahid with Vice-President Megawati. It was believed that making Megawati the fifth president of Indonesia was the result of a compromise of the dominant political parties that were backed by the military. In general, military officers had positively assessed Megawati as being more accommodative to the military compared to her predecessor, President Wahid. The officers had negative impressions of President Wahid's leadership; he was criticized as being insensitive to military culture and tradition. His excessive interference in military affairs was the main trigger for the military to undermine and confront his leadership.

In response to the this accusation, President Wahid<sup>40</sup> stated that he had never felt that he was intervening in military affairs. Wahid also denied the common allegation that he had decided upon Widodo as the replacement for Wiranto. According to him, he was simply agreeing to the proposal submitted by the TNI Headquarters that Wiranto handed over to him. Likewise, President Wahid's choice to promote Tyasno as KSAD was not just a spur-of-the-moment idea but, according to him, the name of Tyasno was one of the KSAD candidates proposed by Wiranto together with Yudhoyono. Therefore, he could not be accused of intervening in military affairs. It was his prerogative to select Tyasno from the names recommended to him. President Wahid judged Yudhoyono to have more ability as a politician than as a professional military person to lead the TNI. Furthermore, President Wahid felt that he had never compelled the military to promote Agus to Kostrad commander or for any other high-level position. President Wahid felt that a reformist professional military type like Agus needed to be given an opportunity to lead and transform

the military into a professional force. However, if that was inappropriate, especially if it caused tension within the military, then he would let the military make its own decisions. He proved this when he refrained from promoting Tyasno or Agus after the TNI Headquarters recommended that they be replaced.<sup>41</sup>

According to President Wahid, his military policies were made purely to uphold military professionalism, requiring the military to abide by the rules of an elected civilian government. Based on his point of view, the military was responsible to the elected government led by the president, and had no right to determine its own policy without the knowledge or given authority of the civilian government. President Wahid stated that the military ought to execute the president's command because the president, as the leader of the state, is responsible for the correctness or incorrectness of all MPR-mandated policies. Although the TNI's insubordination was seen as the root cause of the collapse of the Wahid government, the president himself chose not to emphasize this factor even when they refused to implement his presidential decree issued on 23 July 2001. Wahid felt that the downfall of his government was not caused by military intervention but by the political betrayal of Matori Abdul Djalil (Leader of the National Awakening Party, PKB), who was then the current Vice-chairman of DPR-RI, and Megawati, who was his vice-president.<sup>42</sup>

Aside from those controversial civil-military relations, the era of Wahid witnessed some positive and significant developments for military reform. State defence reform began with MPR Resolution No. VI/2000 (TAP), resulting in the separation of the TNI and Polri, and TAP MPR No.VII/2000, on the respective roles of the TNI and Polri. Besides those reforms, the government also submitted several deliberations to the DPR for a state defence bill to replace the Act of Republic Indonesia (UU RI) No. 20/1982 relating to the State Defence and Security Law that were deemed to be inappropriate and against the spirit of reforms. At a later date, Defence Act No. 3/2002 was passed into legislation in an attempt to settle the issue of national security management in accordance with the aspirations of the reform movement.

## THE TNI UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF MEGAWATI

Under the leadership of President Megawati (August 2001 to October 2004), military officers felt that civil-military relations improved as more attention was given to military affairs. Although the government was restricted financially to fulfil the military's budget requirements, officers appreciated the attention they received from President Megawati's government.<sup>43</sup> Non-budgetary aid given by President Megawati in 2002 to build military hostels was an example that the president paid attention to the officers' needs. The TNI greatly appreciated President Megawati's ability to neatly sidestep political restiveness resulting from her policy to aid the military with external national budget funding (APBN), a move that was queried by the DPR. Without entangling the military in the polemics between President Megawati's government and the MPR, the controversy over the source of funds for military aid was settled without causing any further political unrest. Viewed from the military's perspective, officers did not consider it to be an act of civilian opposition against military interests. Instead, they saw it as an issue purely among civilian politicians, namely the government of President Megawati against its opponents, namely, the other political powers. The situation did not overly undermine ongoing civil-military relations.

The government's decision to execute an operation to restore security and law enforcement in Aceh by implementing an emergency military state on 18 May 2003 was seen as an effort to accommodate the military's suggestion to swiftly tackle the issue of GAM. Through this decision, the military, concerned over threats of separatism, was protected by the law and enjoyed unconditional legitimacy to maintain security in Aceh. Ever since GAM began to pose a significant threat to the union of NKRI during President Wahid's administration, the military had been waiting for such an opportunity. Before the implementation of the decision, the military felt that it was denounced and cornered every time it attempted to restore security. In the military's opinion, government policies to prioritize dialogue were no longer effective. In fact, on the contrary, it provided the breathing space necessary for separatism to flourish. Military officers felt that President Megawati's policy to settle

the problems of Aceh decisively was correct and was totally in accord with military expectations.<sup>44</sup> In an effort to solve Aceh's problems, the military enjoyed adequate support from politicians in the DPR, representing civilian political power. Although some parties considered the military state of emergency in Aceh to be a military victory in forcing the civilian government to act, the military itself viewed the move as a necessary act to safeguard the integrity of the nation.

Even if the government's decision to implement a military state of emergency in Aceh was a policy wished for (or wanted) by the military, it was not regarded as a victory of military influence over civilian influence. Instead, it was a sign that civil society was now able to perceive threats in an identical fashion to the military.

Other matters that emerged in the dynamics of civil-military relations in President Megawati's administration included the military's attitude towards amendment of the Constitution (UUD) 1945, particularly the TNI/Polri officers' rights in relation to the general elections, the TNI Law and the government's policy to buy Sukhoi combat planes from Russia.<sup>45</sup> Taking into account society's demand to execute the UUD 1945 Amendment that the MPR had responded positively to, the TNI felt that there was no urgent need to make any fundamental changes. However, the TNI had no objections to adding or completing the existing sections in UUD 1945 as long as they did not interfere with the unity of the Republic of Indonesia, the state philosophy of Five Principles (Pancasila) and the state symbols (the red-and-white flag). Although the military disagreed with the completion of other sections or particular developing discourses arising to discussions pertaining to certain amendments, for instance, the aspiration to return to the spirit of the Jakarta Charter in Section 29 of UUD 1945 that mentioned the obligation to apply Islamic *syariat* for its followers, it did not openly express its contention. Discussions regarding the amendment of UUD 1945, which was conducted four times in MPR, saw no principal opposition or differences between the military and those representing civil society. Military officers felt that they could cooperate with civilians to formulate the sections that required completion through discussions in the MPR. The amendment of UUD 1945, which went through four revisions by the MPR (comprising representatives

from political parties and the military), demonstrated the harmonious civil-military relations in drafting joint political agreements.

The TNI's decision to abrogate their right to be elected in a general election sparked off a strong debate between the civilian and military circles. The civilian circles judged the TNI as being too immature to live in a democratic society that demanded the practice of equal human rights in making political choices.<sup>46</sup> Officers who did not use their political rights to elect and be elected in general elections created an impression that the military was above the rules and regulations that governed ordinary citizens. Some civilians accused the military of being unprepared for democracy and acting in a cowardly fashion.

A number of military personnel expressed concern that if active officers used their rights to elect and be elected, it could endanger the unity of the military institution itself. It was feared that soldiers would become important objects to be traded off or manipulated by various political powers that required military support, which, in turn, could shatter military unity. High-ranking officers felt that it was too early for soldiers to be given suffrage because the military still lacked a complete understanding of democracy and its responsibilities within a democratic system. Regarding the right to be elected, military officers supported the TNI commander's policy to allow only retired or former military personnel to use their rights to be elected or to nominate themselves in general elections. To be explicit, the TNI commander stated that the TNI had been given the right to elect and be elected, but they would not use them in general elections.<sup>47</sup> In general, this military attitude and point of view was easily accepted by the political power elements in the DPR and discussion of the issue was postponed.<sup>48</sup> Thus, military officers judged that the TNI commander's policy was correct and did not compromise civil-military relations. It affirmed that by not using their right to elect and be elected, the TNI could place itself in a neutral position among the other political parties contesting in general elections.

The TNI Bill (2002) proposed by the military circle itself, particularly stipulations from Section 19, Article 1, which stated that, under certain circumstances the TNI commander had the authority to use the TNI armed forces without prior permission from the president, triggered a

strong debate within civil society.<sup>49</sup> Civil society opposed the military's concept of this controversial section. The military was accused of having a hidden agenda to exploit certain situations to re-enter the political arena.<sup>50</sup> Strong reaction also came from DPR politicians, who refused the substance of Section 19 in the bill. From the military's viewpoint, the reactions of President Megawati's government towards the polemics of the problem were not well defined. The TNI Headquarters had no government support for the bill so the military had to face opposition alone. Civilians were concerned that if the bill were put into effect it would legitimize future military political interventions. The substance of the bill was similar to giving the military a blank cheque, threatening Indonesia's newfound democracy.

Finally, heeding the public's concerns voiced by politicians and other civilians, and also owing to a lack of support from its own government, the TNI commander (April 2003) withdrew the bill until the controversial sections could be further deliberated. Military officers understood that the trauma of past military actions continued to weigh heavily on the perceptions of society, giving rise to misunderstandings relating the true intentions of the military. Officers tried to assure the public that the point of the bill was purely to enhance command effectiveness in handling any looming or impending threat. Basically, the military was disappointed that politicians and the government did not support the well-intentioned objectives of the bill, although they were willing to acknowledge society's objections. The military had conceded to civil society but the civilian government still displayed no willingness to exercise any authority in taking effective control over the military or to take the initiative in shaping ongoing civil-military relations. As a civilian institution with legislative power, the DPR acted to control the military. Yet the TNI's autonomy remained untouched due to the president's unwillingness to utilize her executive powers in support of the DPR. Such acts demonstrated that the military was still influential and capable of manipulating politics.

In the same manner, President Megawati's government policy at the end of May 2003 to buy a number of Russian Sukhoi combat planes and other military equipment through barter, with the agreement of the Russian government, also created serious problems with her opponents.



DPR politicians considered the purchase of the Russian combat planes to be illegally procured. Critics of President Megawati claimed that the price of the planes had been marked up through the practice of collusion, corruption and nepotism (KKN), and that purchasing procedures had been violated. Unlike in the past, the transaction was conducted by the Department of Defence using APBN funds that were allocated for the defence and military sector.<sup>51</sup>

The purchasing procedure and memorandum of understanding from the Minister of Trade and Industry (Menperindag) were considered to have been improperly conducted.<sup>52</sup> Many parties felt that involving Bulog as the payment underwriters was inappropriate. Strong criticism came not only from the DPR but also from other civil society groups. In general, society assumed that President Megawati's government used no scale of priority to allocate the budget for development sectors with urgent needs.

Such strong criticism against the purchase of the Sukhoi combat planes forced the DPR to form a Working Committee (Panja) on the Sukhoi case to investigate any suspicion of corruption in the procuring and purchasing process. Panja DPR for the Sukhoi case, led by DPR Commission I Chief, Ibrahim Ambong, called for a hearing from various parties, including the TNI commander and his staff, Menperindag and other state high-ranking officials.<sup>53</sup> Responding to critics of the purchase, the military voiced that it had been unfairly blamed for the decision. Military officers declared that real military requirements for national defence included much more than four government-purchased Sukhoi planes. As explained by retired General Yudhoyono, the provision of the Sukhoi planes was only a small part of the overall Indonesian weapons system that interested parties needed to understand. Military officers could not comprehend why the matter had been grossly inflated. They claimed that the government could only provide a small part of the required military budget.<sup>54</sup>

Even though those in military circles could not conceal their annoyance with constant civilian interference over the Sukhoi incident, they were satisfied with the government's defence of the purchase. The officers approved of how President Megawati's government firmly justified the decision to purchase the planes. Menperindag explained the reasons

for the purchase were manifold: they were inexpensive, there were no political power ties involved, it opposed the weapons embargo currently being carried out by the United States and Europe, and it would result in an acquisition of weapons to be used to defend the motherland. It was also mentioned that the trade exchange of planes with textiles and agricultural products brought no financial loss to the state. Apart from that, the government claimed that there were no mark-ups in the purchase deal for the planes, which had been planned since 1997. The military was satisfied with President Megawati's government's determination to diffuse political pressure arising from that deal, especially with the DPR. An indicator of President Megawati's success in controlling the DPR was the accommodating recommendations of Panja DPR, which stated that the DPR understood the importance of purchasing combat planes for the purpose of national defence, but the DPR had noticed some violations in the purchasing procedure and mechanism conducted by the government.<sup>55</sup> The military was relieved with the attitude by the DPR as they felt that politicians had now begun to comprehend military aspirations.

In general, it could be said that civil-military relations during President Megawati's term in office were more harmonious than during President Wahid's term. Even though many civilian government policies accommodated military interests, it did not mean that the military controlled President Megawati's government. Civil society opposed several military policies, forcing the military to back down. Likewise, it also could not be said that the civilian government led by President Megawati held full control over the military, considering the leniency given to the military to formulate policies together with the government, for instance, in confronting the problems of Aceh, Papua and the use of the military budget. The ongoing civil-military relations could most accurately be described as being balanced or equal, where acts of mutual dependency protected each other's short-term interests with the intention to manifest a long-term agenda for both parties. This kind of civil-military relations is new to Indonesia—one that adapted to the transitional period.<sup>56</sup> This form of relationship is not apparent in earlier administrations, either in President Suharto's term, where the domination of militaristic government was openly controlled by the military for

their specific interests, or in President Habibie's, where it appeared that neither the military dominated civil society nor the civilians controlled the military but in practice the civilian government largely depended on the military. Although it appeared that there was civilian control over the military, in reality it was societal pressure that kept the military from politics. Civilian control over the military was not optimized due to the president's lack of courage to use his authority to manage it. Consequently, the president merely approved military suggestions to implement internal policy and reformation. Civil-military relations in President Habibie's term permitted the military to manage itself without having to abide by any strict civil authority restrictions on military power. The military could make bargains on civilian government policies. From the perspective of objective civilian control over the military, the civilian government determined the boundaries of military authority and policies, without having to bargain. Such a situation did not transpire in President Habibie's administration.

Under the administration of President Wahid, civil-military relations experienced the dynamics of military-influenced dominion over civil society within certain limits until civilians lost their control over the military. The civil-military relations that transpired had a unique pattern. The military accused the civilians of intervention while the civilian government accused the military of not accommodating civilian supremacy. Consequently, tension had its impact on both parties, which expressed different perspectives in formulating policies relating to military issues, particularly in the areas of separatism and military structural positions. The civilian government of President Wahid did not desire a strong military influence within society. However, the manner in which the civil government used its authority over the military was also unacceptable to them. As a result, civil society and the military both felt that they had the ruling authority and were therefore entitled to make policies. Such unbalanced relations could not generate good cooperation. Each party rallied for dominance during the period of October 1999 to July 2001.

In the presidency of Megawati from 2001 to 2004, civilians were inclined to control the military, despite the military being involved in policymaking decisions related to itself. The military was positioned

between the demand for democracy that disarmed military involvement in politics and the military's effort to be professional despite the many limitations and obstacles that blocked them. The military was quite aware that it could not rapidly transform itself into pure military professionals without adequate backing. In fact, they still wished to be involved in the process of making military-related policies without having to request it. The government of President Megawati understood the military aspiration and therefore it was well-received in the military circles. This form of civil-military relations seems appropriate for Indonesia's era of transition that is estimated to continue until 2009. Civilian government control over the military was implemented by accommodating military interests by involving it in the policy decision-making processes, particularly on military related issues. This approach to civil-military relations can be referred to as being the "new" civil-military relations in Indonesia.

President Megawati's greatest achievement in managing more balanced civil-military relations that clearly directed military reform to develop its professionalism was the execution of UU RI No. 3/2002 re State Defence. Based on its substance, UU RI No. 3/2002 defined issues that reflected some of the ingredients of civilian supremacy, for instance, the authority of the defence minister, the duty and role of the TNI, the responsibility of the TNI commander, an appreciation or understanding of the values of democracy, environmental protection, the DPR's role in state defence, citizens' rights and obligations to safeguard their country. The issue of this act acknowledged civilian supremacy in the implementation of state defence.

By the end of President Megawati's term in office, Act No. 34/2004 regarding the TNI was put into effect. The application of this law, with its substantial sections that placed the military in a subordinate role to the democratic civil government, was a monumental achievement for President Megawati's government in shaping military reform. The TNI Act forbade the military from involving itself in practical political activities for any reason. It also clearly placed the military under the control of democratic civilian institutions, namely, the president, the minister of defence and the DPR, whereas in the past, its real position was vague. Even the appointment of the TNI commander, his promotion

or discharge, involved the DPR. Under these conditions, the military was automatically under democratic civilian authority.

## THE TNI UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is the sixth president of Indonesia, replacing President Megawati in October 2004. Yudhoyono is the first president to be democratically elected through a direct general election (Pemilu). Running with Jusuf Kalla, he attained 60.62 per cent of the votes, defeating Megawati (39.38 per cent) in the final round, after eliminating other candidates in the first round: Wiranto (22 per cent), Amien Rais (15 per cent) and Hamzah Haz (three per cent).<sup>57</sup> Subjectively, the military circles considered the victory of Yudhoyono to be the result of citizen support for a military political figure. But on the other hand, it demonstrated that there was no other civilian figure who could compete with Yudhoyono's popularity and untarnished image. From an optimistic viewpoint, the election of Yudhoyono represented the success of democratic development in the national reform era with the potential to eliminate the dichotomy of civil society versus the military in national political life.

Although he was known as a moderate military architect of reform committed to augment civil supremacy, Yudhoyono could not detach himself from the military environment. This was evident from the appointment of several senior military officers to his cabinet, including Sudi Silalahi (former Commander of Military Area Brawijaya, 2001) as Menseskab, Muhammad Ma'ruf (former Kassospol, 1996) as Minister of Home Affairs, Freddy Numbery (officer of TNI Navy Headquarters, 2001) as Minister of Maritime Affairs, and Syamsir Siregar (former Chief of BAIS, 1995) as Chief of National Intelligence Agency (BIN). Although it would have been more appropriate for these ministerial positions to be filled by civilians, they were occupied by the military, causing critics to accuse Yudhoyono of not fully considering civilian competency in his government.

Before the polemics surrounding his cabinet was over, Yudhoyono surprised the DPR by submitting Letter No. R.41/Pres/10/2004 on 25

October 2004 regarding the withdrawal of former president Megawati's letter regarding the replacement the TNI commander. This act stirred up controversy within the DPR and made the military and society in general question his policy. Yudhoyono reasoned that he needed more time to consolidate his government, including the TNI, in this equation. Therefore, he felt that it was not necessary to replace the TNI commander in the immediate future.

Yudhoyono's letter could be considered to be a move to cancel the former president's Letter No. R.32/Pres/10/2004, dated 8 October 2004, on the same issue. President Megawati's letter clearly stated that General Endriartono Sutarto was respectfully dismissed in reply to his request to retire (which was postponed twice) and proposed that the DPR promote General Ryamizard Ryacudu to replace him. However, Yudhoyono reasoned that he needed more time for his overall government consolidation, including the TNI. Strangely, Yudhoyono's letter mentioned that he had no personal problems with General Ryamizard. The last reason induced public speculation that Yudhoyono did not want Ryamizard to be promoted. The move created some conflict between the DPR and the president, since before receiving his letter, a plenary meeting on 15 October 2004 in the DPR assigned Commission I to follow up on Megawati's request. Yudhoyono's act provoked 49 DPR members to consider using their interpellation rights. Those who proposed for interpellation rights judged that Yudhoyono's approach did not reflect a balanced government policy without acknowledging the role the DPR now played in the process of replacing the TNI commander.

In its development, the implementation of interpellation rights was not put into effect even though the motion had been brought to the level of the DPR, specifically at a consultative level, during a Commission I internal meeting on 24–25 January 2005. The DPR's Commission I concluded that it could understand President Yudhoyono's Letter No. R.41/Pres/10/2004 dated 25 October 2004 in the context of an overall discussion regarding the discharge and promotion of the TNI commander. Commission I also recommended that the president should not waste time in replacing the TNI commander in accordance with Act No. 34/2004.

In Act No. 34/2004 regarding the TNI, Section 13 stipulated that the TNI commander was to be promoted and discharged by the president after receiving the DPR's approval. It also stated that active senior military officers from each branch of the armed forces could take turns to hold the position of TNI commander as long as they had previously held the position of chief of staff. Subsequent to the annulment of the president's letter, Ryamizard was eligible to occupy the position of TNI commander as long as he still held the position of KSAD or had not yet reached the age of retirement in April 2006, the time that his candidature was proposed to the DPR. At the time, Ryamizard held the position of KSAD (2004). Marshall Chappy Hakim was KSAU while Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh was KSAL. Instead, in February 2005, TNI Commander General Endriartono Sutarto was brought out of retirement and proposed as the TNI commander in accordance with Yudhoyono's will. Hence shifts in the leadership position followed as each of the force chief of staff were replaced: Ryamizard was replaced by his deputy, Lieutenant-General Djoko Santoso (Army Chief of Staff Deputy, WAKASAD), Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh was replaced by Admiral Madya Slamet Subiyanto (National Defence Institution Deputy Governor (Wagub Lemhannas) and Marshall Chappy Hakim was replaced by Second Marshall Djoko Suyanto (Operational Assistant for the Air Force Chief of Staff, KSAU).

Observers note two manoeuvres in the force chief of staff replacements, namely, the removal of Ryamizard (who had previously been mentioned as a candidate for TNI Commander) from a TNI structural position and the appointment of Second Marshall Djoko Suyanto (a two-star officer), who leapfrogged the more senior Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff (Wakasau) Marshall Madya Herman Prayitno. Djoko Suyanto was promoted to the rank of a three-star officer and shortly thereafter received his four stars. Such promotion procedures were, of course, subjective and did not adhere to the spirit of military professionalism, despite being officially sanctioned. It was clear to the public that Yudhoyono did not want Ryamizard to become TNI commander and had prepared Djoko Suyanto to replace Endriartono Sutarto. However, in 2005, Ryamizard was still below the retirement age and eligible for nomination as TNI commander together with the new chief of staffs.

The question of who was going to replace Endriartono Sutarto as new TNI commander was finally answered in early January 2006 after Yudhoyono officially delivered a letter to the DPR to promote KSAU Marshall Djoko Suyanto to be the new TNI commander. According to the law, the promotion and discharge of a TNI commander required the approval of the DPR. Hence, the plenary conference of the DPR-assigned DPR Commission I to perform a “fit-and-proper” test on the candidate proposed by the president. At his presentation to the DPR, Djoko Suyanto emphasized that he would continue the TNI internal reform process and advance professionalism. The DPR Commission conducted a tough fit-and-proper test session for the candidate on 1–2 February 2006 and finally agreed to promote Yudhoyono’s candidate. Yudhoyono’s courage to choose Djoko Suyanto as the new TNI commander would be a landmark in Indonesian military history. For the first time, a TNI Air Force Officer held the highest position in the TNI.

Yudhoyono’s policy of managing the TNI leadership should be appreciated as an innovative move. His courage to face criticism within the DPR and opponents within his own internal military circle, who disagreed to his policy of marginalizing Ryamizard, could be viewed positively as the symbolic application of civilian authority. In this regard, Yudhoyono, though enjoying prestige as a former military man, nevertheless demonstrated the legitimacy of his office, further enhancing civilian supremacy over the military. Critically, the policy still lacked Yudhoyono’s objective control in developing military professionalism. The president acted subjectively in promoting both the new force chief of staffs and the TNI commander. It was well known that not only did the KSAD come from the National Military Academy (AMN, 1975) but all the other chief of staffs, including Kapolri and TNI commander, were friends of Yudhoyono from the AMN year 1973. The impression given was that Yudhoyono felt more comfortable surrounded by people familiar to him, even though younger generations were placed in positions ready for promotion. Likewise, at a glance, the shift of the TNI commander from an army to an air force background could be seen as an objective requirement based on the mandate in Act No. 34 regarding the TNI. It appeared that Yudhoyono was formalizing a system of rotation by selecting a TNI commander from



the air force after personnel from the Navy had occupied the position during the early period of *reformasi*. However, Yudhoyono had his own subjective reasons to ensure that the position of TNI commander was not given to a person he disliked. It was not based on principles aimed at fostering TNI professionalism.

Yudhoyono's policy on the TNI will broadly influence civil-military relations in the democratic era. Such a TNI leadership composition ensures that Yudhoyono can take effective control over the military. It can be said that Yudhoyono controls the military with his civil authority. The implications of Yudhoyono's policy will influence the process of future TNI leadership replacements, in line with his plans on governance. The TNI remains a critical strategic force to be reckoned with by any civilian political power in the future, including the approaching general elections in 2009. As a former general, Yudhoyono is better placed to understand how to develop, organize and use military power and influence to support his authority. His political opponents were concerned that he could manipulate the military as a political tool to restrict democracy. Yudhoyono's policy regarding the military has not yet fully met the requirements of the model of civilian objective control over the military first posited by Huntington. More time will be needed to manifest the meaning of objective civil supremacy in controlling the military in Indonesia.

## NOTES

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1. The TNI will never again be involved in day-to-day politics. Read, document: *Paradigma Baru Peran TNI* (p. 24), Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, 1999.
2. Never before in history had the TNI been criticized in such a manner. This was clearly demonstrated when, in the first few months after President Suharto's resignation, the mass media news coverage put the TNI in a negative light. After the publication of a long list of TNI errors, the public became even more convinced that ABRI's dual function had to be reviewed since there had been too many distortions. See, Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., *Tentara Yang Gelisah* (pp. 90–91), Bandung: Mizan, 1999).
3. Along with the police force's demand to separate itself from the TNI, there was also a demand for better police professionalism in executing its duties. It was essential for the police force to detach itself from the TNI in order to

- prevent it from being misused by other authorities. The police needed to become an autonomous institution; in the sense that it needed to function without constraints from any external interest or group influences to ensure the establishment of solid law enforcement. See, Santhy M. Sibarani et al., *Antara Kekuasaan dan Profesionalisme, Menuju Kemandirian Polri* (p. 24), Jakarta: Dharmapena, 2001.
4. Act No. 20/82 and Police Act No. 28/1997 state that Polri's basic duty is to act as an instrument for enforcing state law as well as to function as a counsellor, protector and safeguard in society. In other words, to fight against crime, preserve and protect security, law and order in society. To implement these duties, Polri is divided into three operational components: (i) core, which consists of investigation within traffic, national security, intelligence and other functional units; (ii) methods, which is integrated into Polri's operational system; and (iii) object, which are violations against the security, law and order of society, including criminal violations, traffic violations, social deviations, etc. See, Kunarto, *Perilaku Organisasi Polri* (p. 233.), Jakarta: Cipta Manunggal, 1997.
  5. Similar events occurred in Ambon, Mollucas; Binjai, North Sumatra; Pontianak, West Kalimantan; etc. See, "Mempawah Kembali Normal, Perwira TNI dan Polri se-Kalbar Diberi Pengarahan", *Kompas*, 11 December 2003, p. 20.
  6. Polri's greatest challenge after separating from the TNI was to prove that its independence was cogent and not merely a slogan. It was certainly not an easy task to introduce the paradigm of Polri as an independent, free-standing force because, in reality, many citizens did not believe in Polri's ability to investigate criminal cases involving high state officials and so forth. Another problem for Polri was the reluctance of some regions to be open and free in expressing their opinions while horizontal conflicts were also occurring in several areas. Disputes between cultural, ethnic and religious groups after the reformation undermined the highly respected values of humanity, unity, harmony, and so on. See, Shanty M. Sibarani et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 43–44.
  7. "Many conflicts between the TNI and Polri surfaced because police personnel found themselves on the receiving end of more authorities. As a result, some members over-reacted." Interview with Police General Roesmanhadi in Jakarta, 17 December 2002.
  8. "National issues were not determined by TNI. TNI is merely an instrument of the nation. TNI is simply a part of this nation. TNI is actually an existing social group with the same role as any other social group. The number of TNI members doesn't [even] reach a million from the more than two hundred million Indonesian citizens. How could it be possible that [TNI] can affect every aspect and be blamed as the root source of all problems?" Interview with Wiranto in Jakarta, 28 November 2002.

9. "As an ordinary person, I (Wiranto) am upset and annoyed that accusations [of human rights violations] or unprofessional assessments are made without having a proper and in-depth understanding of TNI's job. But aside from this, I realize that this has happened while we, or our nation, are in the midst of change. Therefore, I conducted dialogues with a wide range of social groups to convince them that TNI is sincere in its desire to make changes." Interview with Wiranto in Jakarta, 28 November 2002.
10. On 8 October 2002, the investigation into the murder of the General Chairman of the Papua Board Presidium, Thys Hiyo Eluay, resulted in seven Army Special Forces officers (Kopassus) being held in custody as suspects. On 31 August, mysterious gunshots in Timika, Tembagapura, resulted in the death of three Freeport employees. The suspected perpetrator was a member of the red beret unit. In October 2002, Supreme Prosecutor M.A. Rachman named 14 soldiers as perpetrators of the Tanjung Priok case. Kopassus General, Major-General Sriyanto, was one of them. The court trial of human-rights violations in Timor Timur is still in progress. See, "*Serdadu di Meja Hijau*", *Tempo*, 30 December 2002 edition, p. 100.
11. During Suharto's era, it can be said that military domination was greatly diversified. Politically, for instance, the military dominated the Internal Affairs Department, from the Minister, Head of Social Political Directorate and Head of the Social Politics Bureau. Besides that, the military also dominated executive positions in central and regional offices (governors, regents, mayors, sub-district heads and even foreign ambassadors) and legislative positions. See, Indria Samego et al., *Tentara Mendamba Mitra* (pp. 240–241), Jakarta: Mizan, 1999.
12. "The first offer for the position of vice-presidential candidacy came from President B.J. Habibie. On several occasions, President Habibie stated his wish to proceed as a presidential candidate for the General Session Elections, 1999, with me as his vice-president." See, Wiranto, *Bersaksi Di Tengah Badai* (p. 210), Jakarta: Ide Indonesia, 2003.
13. "Indeed, we have seen relatively extraordinary changes from an old general, Suharto, who always made good, fast, precise, and clearly controlled orders, after paying avid attention to our reports (the military). Our civil presidents came from varied backgrounds, with all their plus and minus points. I (Zacky) see that Habibie is used to holding a ministerial position, he (Habibie) comprehends organizational ethics on cabinet management, and like it or not, he has a unique leadership style." Interview with Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim in Jakarta, 27 November 2003.
14. "Support for Wiranto did not originate from the TNI/Polri faction. Chairman, Hari Sabarno, stated that in order to maintain its neutrality his faction did not nominate anyone." See, "Memanas Pemilihan Wapres", *Berita Buana*, 21 October 1999.

15. Despite this, by assessing the manoeuvres of high-ranking officers, it is apparent that the Tyasno-AWK team, while supported by President Wahid, could not fully penetrate the army elite's barricade in Cilangkap. This phenomenon was further reinforced by the circulation of carefully drafted protest statements that were handed out by the generals who had been removed from their posts during the mutations in February 2000, an expression of resistance among TNI high functionaries towards the reshuffles that had taken place in the aforementioned month. Lieutenant-General Suaidi, for example, refused the position of commander of Kodiklat (Military Education and Training Command in Bandung), which was held by Lieutenant-General Suwardi at that time. Suaidi also refused the position of General Secretary of the Defence Department that was still held by Lieutenant-General Sugiono. See, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Gus Dur Versus Militer* (pp. 76–77), Jakarta: Grasindo, 2002.
16. The removal of Agus Wirahadikusumah's (AWK) name from among the holders of strategic positions during the mutation in October 2000 was subsequent to the resistance by the military's ranking officers toward Wahid's policy. A week before the mutation began, namely on 9 October 2000, Tyasno and Pangdam Siliwangi Zainuri Hasyim initiated a closed-door meeting at the Military Education and Training Command in Bandung, attended by 45 high-ranking army officers from KSAD, KSAD assistants, army inspector generals, to Pangdam, minus Pangdam Jaya, Pattimura and Trikora. The meeting resulted in two options: first, AWK must be brought before the Officers' Board of Honour, *Dewan Kehormatan Perwira* (DKP), and second, AWK would receive an early pension. However, they knew that an early pension for AWK could only be granted with the president's approval and this was a highly unlikely scenario. See, *ibid.*, p. 81.
17. In support of Tyasno, the decision to bring AWK to justice was finally agreed upon and put in writing in a document that was signed by 45 generals. Apart from stating loyalty to the state and legitimate government in an united Indonesia, it requested the KSAD to make plans to take AWK to trial in front of DKP. The document was also the outcome of consultations with retired officers, members of the Post '45 Forum. On 10 October 2000, a delegation led by Major-General Kirbiantoro handed a copy of the document to Vice-President Megawati, who delivered it to President Wahid on his return from his visit to Latin America. In light of the continuous statements of rejection, President Wahid had no real choice but to agree to remove AWK from his position. See, *ibid.*
18. 236 Parliament members, led by the young politicians known as the "cowboy group" several weeks before the Annual Meeting of People's Advisory Assembly in 2000, suggested that Parliament create a special committee to investigate the Yanatera Bulog fund case and the misuse of funds dis-

- bursed by the Sultan of Brunei to President Wahid. The suggestion was then discussed during Parliament's plenary session on 28 August 2000. See, Khamami Zada, *Neraca Gus Dur Di Panggung Kekuasaan* (p. 177), Jakarta: Lakpesdam, 2002.
19. "During Gus Dur's [President Wahid] time, [the military] were indeed quite disheveled. Gus Dur truly turned the military upside down. Gus Dur did exactly as he wanted. Gus Dur even interfered in the appointment of the new district military commander (Kodim). In my opinion, Megawati, despite her weaknesses, heeded ABRI's advice." Interview with Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim in Jakarta, 27 November 2002.
  20. The TNI-Polri faction returned to its non-neutral state after deciding to fully support the expedition of the People's Consultative Assembly Extraordinary Plenary Session (Special Plenary Session) that was previously scheduled for 1 August 2001 but was advanced to 21 July 2001. The move followed President Wahid's controversial decision to promote Polri Deputy Chief, Chaeruddin Ismail, to temporary Chief of Polri without parliamentary approval, as required by TAP MPR No. VII/2000 regarding the Role of the TNI and Polri. See, Arief Yulianto, *Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orba* (pp. 437–438), Jakarta: Raja Grafindo, 2002.
  21. As Gus Dur's legitimacy eroded drastically within parliamentary circles, the TNI's acts of opposition became bolder. The KSAD's act of resistance to change by mobilizing Pangdam; the plan to discharge the chief of Polri; the TNI's official support for expediting the Special Plenary Session of the People's Advisory Assembly; the official commander's statement refusing to implement the president's decree; and the show of force at Monas by the commander of the elite Kostrad are a few examples of how the TNI undermined Gus Dur's policies. See, Khamami Zada, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
  22. Former Kassospol, Haryoto P.S., known for his close relations with Wahid, regarded Wahid's interventionist policies towards the military as being worse than Suharto's during the New Order era. See, Dewi Fortuna Anwar et al., *op. cit.*, p. 86.
  23. "Despite her weaknesses, Megawati heeds ABRI advice. She has no vengeance. She follows her father's [Soekarno] footsteps by acknowledging that the military has national potential that must become the government's partner." Interview with Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim in Jakarta, 27 November 2002.
  24. Finally, on Sunday, 23 July 2001, the People's Consultative Assembly Extraordinary Plenary Session decided to dismiss President Wahid and elect Vice-President Megawati as the fifth Indonesian President through TAP MPR No. III/MPR/2001. See, Arief Yulianto, *op. cit.* p. 441.

25. Even though many parties believed that his fall was the result of the misuse of Yanatera Bulog funding and the donation from the Sultan of Brunei, the main reason was his conflicting relations with the military and Parliament's firm refusal to implement his policies that disadvantaged political parties. See, Khamami Zada, *op. cit.*, hal. 105.
26. Gus Dur, the only president who tried to take on the military, was considered a success in attempting to institute some measure of civilian supremacy in defence and security matters, thereby laying the basic foundations for post-Suharto civil-military relations. Minimalizing the military's role in politics was implemented through a government policy aimed at separating the Ministry of Defence from the Ministry of Politics and Security and placing a civilian as Defence Minister, followed by the separation of Polri and the TNI. The most crucial act was the abolition of the Coordinating Body for the Consolidation of National Stability (Bakorstanas) and Special Research Institution (Litsus). Moreover, mutation inside the military, the dismissal of Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security and the appointment of Widodo as ABRI commander were believed to have significantly shaped the ideal of civil supremacy enforcement. See, Khamami Zada, *op. cit.*, hal. 91–92.
27. The fall of the New Order regime under Suharto had weakened its main supporting system. Political changes had ramifications for the armed forces, the former mainstay of the New Order. The TNI then became the main target of the reformation process. This was unavoidable because for so long the TNI had only served as Suharto's political instrument to maintain and expand his rule. The TNI was also the institution with the most human-rights violations due to the fact that it was positioned as an institution involved in preserving an authoritarian system through repressive actions. See, Khamami Zada, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
28. "Talking about internal reformation concepts, I [Saurip] think [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] is the one. Formal concepts come from SBY." Interview with Major-General Saurip Kadi in Jakarta, 16 December 2002.
29. "We can assume that as the ABRI internal reformation concepts are related to matters of a socio-politic nature, the person who formulated them was Kassospol, or Bambang Yudhoyono." Interview with General-Major Hindartono in Jakarta, 10 June 2003.
30. "The recommendations of that time [KSAD candidates, i.e. Bambang and Tyasno] to me [Gus Dur] came from Wiranto. It is true ... I selected Tyasno. I still select him because as Bambang was more politically skilled, I thought he would be good in the ministry, not in the forces. Well, it was based on input from the army. I don't know why there are so many complaints about him." Interview with K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid in Jakarta, 24 November 2003.
31. Contrarily, General Agus supported President Wahid's appeal to ask Wiranto to withdraw. In a *Time* magazine interview, Agus stated: "It

- would be better for Wiranto to step down while demonstrating to the people of the world that the TNI supports the preservation of human rights and the enforcement of the supremacy of law.” That statement enraged both active officers and retired officers. See, Arif Yulianto, *op. cit.*, p. 400.
32. Military opposition or disagreement with the new democratic civilian government policies mentioned above also occurred in Indonesia during the New Order transition period, both during President Habibie’s and President Abdurrahman Wahid’s term in office. The cases of human-rights violations perpetrated by military officers, either during or after the New Order, were reopened by the new democratic civilian government to seek justice through valid law procedures, although up to today, the results are still incomplete. See, *ibid.*, p. 466.
  33. The removal of AWK’s name from a key strategic position at the time of the mutation in October 2000 was due to resistance by senior officers to Wahid’s policy. One week before the mutation on 9 October 2000, based on the initiative of General Tyasno and the commander of the Military Area Siliwangi, Major-General Zainuri Hasyim, a closed meeting was held at the TNI Army Cadets School, Bandung. A total of 45 senior infantry military officers attended the meeting, including KSAD, KSAD assistants, the army inspector general and all military area commanders (excluding the Jaya, Pattimura and Trikora military areas). The meeting resulted in two motions. First, Lt-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah had to face the Officer Honour Council (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira, DKP). Second, Lt-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah was to take an early pension. However, they knew that they required the president’s approval to agree to AWK getting an early pension, which was difficult to obtain. See, Dewi Fortuna Anwar et al., *op. cit.*, p. 82.
  34. Obviously, the conflict between the military and President Wahid ended up with his dismissal from the government’s key position, indicating that the status of the TNI as a political power still could not be disregarded. See, *ibid.*, p. 88.
  35. Most senior military officers felt that Gus Dur had crossed the limits of his authority as Commander-in-Chief (known by the Indonesian abbreviation Pangti), so much so that the military had lost its authority and prestige as an institution. Several replacements introduced by Gus Dur also were seen as going against the spirit of Resolution MPR/VI/2000. See, Khamami Zada, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
  36. See, document of TNI Commander’s meeting 2000 in *Sejarah TNI*, Volume V, TNI Headquarters, p. 251.
  37. Indications of the gradual collapse of the Wahid cabinet began on 14 November 1999, while President Wahid was staying at the Watergate Hotel in Washington. At that time, the president stated that he had a list of

- three ministers to be discharged pending court verification. Finally, on the Friday evening, 26 November 1999, the president announced the removal of Hamzah Haz and replaced him with the former Rector of the Hasanuddin University. Apparently the retirement of Hamzah Haz was only the beginning of a long series of cabinet problems. Among a series of cabinet changes made by President Wahid, the removal of Jusuf Kalla and Laksamana Sukardi, the Minister of Industry and Commerce (Menperindag) and the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises (Meneg BUMN), respectively, could have been the crucial moves that caused the DPR to exercise its interpellation rights. See, Khamami Zada, *op. cit.*, p. 163–164.
38. On 23 July 2001, at 1.10 a.m., President/Commander of the Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces, Abdurrahman Wahid, implemented a presidential decree/mandate that was read by the presidential press secretary Yahya Staquf. See, Arif Yulianto, *op. cit.*, p. 439.
  39. Responding to the decree, the TNI, on 23 July at 10.00 a.m. at TNI Headquarters, Cilangkap, through TNI Commander Admiral Widodo A.S. and accompanied by all other TNI senior military officers, Kostrad Commander Lieutenant-General Ryamizard Ryacudu, Chief of Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS TNI) Marsdya TNI Ian Santoso Perdanakusuma, Air Force Commander (KSAU) Marsekal TNI Hanafie Asnan, KSAD General TNI Endriartono Sutarto, Navy Commander (KSAL) Admiral TNI Indroko Sastrowiryo, KASUM TNI Djamari Chaniago and Chief of Territorial Staff Lieutenant-General TNI Agus Widjoyo, firmly refused to implement the decree proclaimed by Abdurrahman Wahid. See, *ibid.*, p. 440.
  40. “The accusation that Gus Dur intervened in the military is false. I [Gus Dur] tell you this okay. A while back, at Hotel Borobudur, Agus Wirahadikusumah explained that the reason [the military] participated in the move to overthrow Gus Dur was because they felt that he had interfered in military business by promoting Agus Wirahadikusumah as Army Commander of Strategic Reserves Command (Pangkostrad). I can only say that it is very sad that TNI took such a decision based upon misinformation. That’s all [I want to say]. I had no bad intentions towards Agus W.K. I asked him to become Pangkostrad, but all resisted it, I didn’t press for it. It’s really nonsense that they say I want this or that.” Interview with K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 24 November 2003.
  41. At the mutation in October 2000, the final decision was made that Endriartono Sutarto should replace Tyasno Sudarto as KSAD, and Udayana Military Area Commander Major-General Kiki Syahnakri would become his deputy. In the meantime, Lieutenant-General TNI Ryamizard Ryacudu remained as Pangkostrad. See, Arif Yulianto, *op. cit.*, p. 415.
  42. “The main cause of my downfall as president is the betrayal of Matori. He was the person who instigated the others to overthrow me.” Interview with K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 24 November 2004.



43. "The government's [Megawati] attention to TNI interests is very good, as good as it could possibly be. If the government had funds then surely they would give it. But if they don't, then we can not force it." Interview with General Ryamizard Ryacudu in Jakarta, June 2003.
44. "The government policy to handle the problem of Aceh was loaded heavily with TNI suggestions." Interview with General TNI Endriartono Sutarto in Jakarta, 3 January 2003.
45. "To prevent differences between the civil and military circle, for instance, in the case of purchasing Sukhoi planes, it is better that both parties understand how to develop a harmonious and healthy civil-military relation. They have to be prepared, educated and also respect each others function and domain." Interview with General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Jakarta, 11 July 2003.
46. See, "*TNI Diharapkan Beri Sikap Resmi*", *Kompas*, 15 June 2002, p. 6.
47. See, "*TNI Minta Izin Untuk Tak Gunakan Hak Pilih*", *Kompas*, 21 June 2002, p. 1.
48. See, "*DPR Sepakat Penggunaan Hak Pilih TNI Ditunda*", *Kompas*, 25 June 2002, p. 6.
49. TNI Bill Section 19, Article (1): In a state of emergency where the sovereignty of the country, the unity of the region and the safety of the nation is threatened the Commander may initiate TNI force action to prevent further disruption in the country. Article (2): Conscription of TNI forces as referred to in Article (1) must be reported to the President within 24 hours. Source: Research and Development Division of *Kompas*.
50. See, "*Kontroversi Hak Politik Militer*", *Kompas*, 29 June 2002, p. 8.
51. See, "*Akrobat Sukhoi Menggempur Istana; Sukhoi Memekik Rini Terjengkang; Misteri Mark Up Sukhoi*", *Forum* magazine No. 10, 13 July 2003, p. 52–58.
52. "Sjahrir urges Rini to resign; the chairman of a newly established political party, PIB, Dr. Sjahrir, supported the notion that the Sukhoi case was mismanaged. It was a major issue that violated the law in Chapter 8, Section 23, Article 1, regarding national finance management laws as well as Act No. 3/2002 regarding defence, where Section 25 clearly highlights that State defence expenses are to be covered by APBN. Furthermore, Act No. 29/2002 regarding the APBN where the figures and section clarifications make no mention of the purchase of Sukhoi planes in the defence budget". See, *detik.com*, 2 July 2003.
53. "The Government will not ignore Panja Sukhoi's recommendations; the DPR Commission I Panja that was specially formed following the barter trade of military equipment from Russia, focused on the supply mechanism

- and procedure as well as illegal payment procedures, that was deemed to undermined the procedures of the state's finance system. Some officers suspected to be involved in the purchasing of those planes have been called in for questioning by Panja." See, *Kompas Cyber Media On line*, 25 August 2003.
54. "We need many weapons and military equipment, at least some high tech weapons or helicopters, okay, so that we can catch up with our neighbouring nations. However, till now our country has been unable to supply our vital needs for weapons and equipment. Our country still cannot adequately supply the Armed Forces. The government budget is very small—not meaningless, but it is almost insignificant. Probably below 20 per cent of the actual needs." Interview with General Ryamizard Ryacudu, Jakarta, 22 July 2003.
  55. "Ambong said that Panja had made five temporary conclusions about the Sukhoi case. First, all information concerning the purchasing of Sukhoi were in the hands of Menperindag. Second, the involvement of TNI Commander in the effort to purchase Sukhoi truly could be seen since the early stages. Third, the Defence Department has never been involved in the Sukhoi purchasing procedures like the mandate in Act No. 3/2002 about defence. Fourth, in reality the purchase of Sukhoi was not a special but only peripheral target. Fifth, Panja found out that execution of the Trade and Industry Department (known by the Indonesian abbreviation Deperindag) bureaucracy mechanism did not function well because information did not flow to the lower staff." See, *Kompas Cyber Media*, 3 July 2003.
  56. There are six basic assumptions that point to why idyllic civil-military relations in the transition era were not achieved. First, the state's constitution was yet to be amended. Second, there were no complete laws and regulations about defence, security as well as regulations determining the functions and roles of the TNI and Polri. Third, new thinking on civil-military relations was not only neglected but had yet to become evident within civilian circles. Fourth, civilian politicians were still afraid to offend the military for fear of political survival. Fifth, the Indonesian military's speed in determining its own functions and roles in the aftermath of *reformasi*—as an instrument of state defence willing to adopt a supportive internal security role by assisting Polri. Sixth, a change of the international political constellation since the late 1980s marked by the end of the Cold War era shaped new military professionalism concepts and military roles in various countries. See also, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *op. cit.*, p. 15–16.
  57. In the first round, Yudhoyono gained 34 per cent and Megawati, 26 per cent. Data of KPU 2004.

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## THE MILITARY'S DECREASING ROLE IN POLITICS

As a concept, civilian supremacy is still largely misunderstood by the military, which perceives it as a concept that subjects the military to civilian authority. Others say that it demotes the military in terms of importance. For those who interpret this concept wrongly, there is no civilian-military dichotomy because both military and civilians have equal opportunity to hold any position in the government, whether they be facilitated by political parties or not.

As a matter of fact, the concept of civilian supremacy refers to positioning the military under a civilian government in terms of hierarchy of authority. A civilian government refers to a government that is elected democratically by the people through a general election. In this context, it is not necessary to consider whether the elected president is a civilian or former military officer.

From this perspective, civilian supremacy is a principle that can be applied in a democratic political system. The effort to bring about civilian supremacy—mainly in countries that are undergoing a transitional period from an authoritarian state to a democratic state—is an important aspect of the whole reform process. By applying this concept, it is expected that the democratic system manifest two major roles: democratic control over the military and military professionalism.

To manifest the first criterion, the two sectors of defence management and supervision must be upgraded. Defence management must assert that the highest authority in formulating and determining defence policy lies

in the hands of the government, specifically the President and assisted by the Minister of Defence. The military functions as the executor while Parliament performs the supervisory function to control the process of government policy making and implementing military policy. This hierarchy of authority constitutes the essence of civilian supremacy.

Meanwhile, the second criterion manifests itself if there is a change in the military's attitude, an adjustment in its defence operational principles and a guaranteed standard of welfare for officers. Under these conditions, the military does not regard itself as the sole guardian of the state but it transfers national defence authority to the civilian government. The military no longer involves itself in political or business matters, but focuses only on developing its professionalism in terms of its capabilities, skills and military knowledge—as determined by the civilian government in the national defence policy. However, military advice in political decision-making, for example, participation of the TNI commander as a member of the National Defence Council, is still required.

In Indonesia, attempts to manifest the principles of civilian supremacy have been put into practice since 1999. However, most of these attempts were undertaken by the TNI itself through an internal reform process in response to public pressure demanding democratization at that time, and were not based upon any government blueprint or formulation. In addition, some significant efforts undertaken by the TNI, such as abolishing political positions in the TNI structure, restricting political engagements and reducing TNI personnel membership in Parliament, have contributed to the depoliticization process of the TNI for the sake of civilian supremacy.

More systematic measures have been put in place after the issuance of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Decrees No. VI and VII Year 2000, on the separation of the TNI and Polri, and the enactment of Law No. 22 Year 2002 re State Defence and Law No. 34 regarding the TNI. These laws serve as the foundation for state defence implementation and management, determined the state defence values, aims and principles; affirms the TNI functions and roles as an instrument of defence in the national defence system, determines the principles of defence development, regulates the order of authority and relations among government

agencies and national defence institutions; and regulates the duties of the TNI.

Although there have been much progress in the process of military reform to date, particularly evident in TNI impartiality in politics, civilian supremacy in Indonesia has not been completely realized. Some military elite, for example, still question the civilian government's ability to provide guidance in defence matters. Even with all the prevailing laws and regulations, it does not mean that all legal aspects needed to transform civilian supremacy into reality have been accomplished. Moreover, weaknesses and problems in existing regulations still require modification. For example, the implementation of Article 2d of Law No. 34 Year 2004, which defines professional military personnel as those who are well-trained, well-educated and well-equipped, not involved in day-to-day politics, not engaged in business activities, and so forth,<sup>1</sup> is difficult to implement when the military is restricted by tight budgetary restraints and a mindset shaped by a deeply ingrained military-politics culture. Besides, many defence reform initiatives, such as the management of tasks involving the military with the police and military operations other than war as stipulated in the Article 7 of Law No. 34, have not yet been regulated. Military operations other than war cover 14 fields: tackling the armed separatist movement and rebellions, securing border areas, combating terrorism, securing vital assets, keeping world peace, protecting the president and vice-president, empowering defence areas, assisting the local government and the police, protecting state visitors, mitigating natural disasters and performing search and secure navigations and flights,<sup>2</sup> all of which require further formulation.

A further concern is related to the role and function of the Ministry of Defence as stipulated in Law No. 3 Year 2002, which defines a clearer authority and pattern of hierarchical relation in terms of defence policy making between the Ministry of Defence as a civilian authority on one hand and the military as the executor on the other hand. However, in reality, the authority of the Ministry of Defence in policy politics is still limited by the position of the TNI commander that is directly under the president, and by the fact that the TNI's headquarters does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Department

of Defence. Therefore, the TNI commander still serves as a cabinet member and participates in cabinet meetings to assist in the formulation of government policy.

This situation bears out a sort of dualism in deciding who has the full authority in making national defence policy. The hierarchical authority relations between the Department of Defence and the TNI have not been firmly regulated, since prevailing rules simply state, “in terms of defence policy and strategy and administration support, TNI is coordinated by Department of Defence” (Law No. 3/2002, Article 4, Verse 2). There is no further explanation on the phrase “is coordinated” or how such coordination is to be performed. In other words, the authority of the Ministry of Defence as a civilian authority is still limited by the role of the TNI commander, who is not under the authority of the Ministry of Defence and by the fact that the TNI headquarters does not come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defence.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, no rules had been devised to govern the establishment of the National Defence Council as the agency that determines the general policy of state defence. This makes the national defence strategy formulation and planning less effective.<sup>4</sup>

Generally, laws governing the operational techniques of the implementation of state defence laws—Law No. 3/2002 and No. 34/2004—have begun to indicate an improvement in attaining the goal of civilian supremacy. As stipulated in Law No. 3/2002, Article 17, the president shall obtain approval from the DPR in appointing or dismissing the commander of the TNI. Likewise, Law No. 3/2002, Article 2, on the identity of the TNI clearly defines what constitutes professional military personnel and marks significant progress in military internal reform. These laws require the military to comply with the democratic civilian authority. One concern relates to the clause which states that the commander could exercise his authority to deploy the TNI force at his own discretion. Confusion arose as to whether the rule on the deployment of the TNI force, which is based upon the president’s political decision, is only applicable for war military or may be used for military operations other than war. A definition on what situations require presidential sanction is vital, because the main duty of an Indonesian

national soldier, as mandated by law, is stated as, “on duty for military war operations for duties other than war” (Law No. 34/2004 Article 7, Verse 2).

However, Law No. 34/2004 stipulates two important conditions, which, if implemented, could strengthen civilian supremacy and enhance soldiers’ professionalism. Those conditions are the deployment of territorial command models and military businesses. First, the deployment is “subject to geographical conditions and defence strategy by prioritizing the securing of unstable areas, border areas, conflict-prone areas and remote islands”. Deployment is also limited by the condition that it must “avoid organizations which are prone to political party interests and whose deployment does not always comply with the government administrative structure” (Article 11, Verse 2). The second condition relating to military business states that “the Government shall take over all businesses owned and run, either directly or indirectly, by TNI officers” (Article 76, Verse 1). In reality, senior military officers are most reluctant to hand over their businesses. Until 2006 (two years after the enactment of Law No. 34/2004), the Department of Defence was still encountering many difficulties in auditing the various TNI business entities. The appeal from the Department of Defence for TNI Headquarters to submit financial statements of TNI businesses by September 2005 at the latest was only accomplished in mid 2006. Even the Secretary-General of the Department of Defence admitted that it was difficult to consolidate the institutions under the coordination of the Department of Defence before they were submitted to the government. It appeared that the solution to those problems needed more time and could not meet the requirements proposed by the law. Budgetary constraints, inadequate personnel welfare, the enduring military-political culture and a lack of understanding of civilian supremacy on the part of the military are areas where the military needs to adapt quickly. The following discussion is an attempt to analyse the military’s response to public pressure demanding its impartiality in politics. The shifts in power evident in the reform era signifies significant changes both to TNI internal affairs and in its repositioning within the new constellation of forces that make up the national political system.

## THE ABOLITION OF ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION

The pressure on the military to relinquish its involvement in political issues, which became very intense at the end of 1997, can be regarded as the beginning of a decreasing military role in politics. Many Indonesians claimed that extensive military involvement, as practised in Indonesia during Suharto's administration, did not allow democracy to develop and brought about unsound political conditions, increasing the practice of corruption-collusion-nepotism, and creating law enforcement discrimination. The military was blamed for the multi-dimensional crisis that occurred from mid 1997. Such accusations only added to the military's already negative image. The public's reform demands to revoke ABRI's dual function served as the military's means of exiting politics.

Demands urging ABRI to return to its military function and serve as an instrument of national defence and security with no need to involve itself in society's social political matters increased. Initially, the military felt that it was an attempt to remove its role from state affairs and accused extreme leftist groups or civilians wanting political revenge as being the motivators of acts designed to discredit the military in public.<sup>5</sup>

During and post-national *reformasi* period, the military actually resented demands to revoke its dual function and return to its function as an instrument of state defence. Basically, TNI high-ranking officers disagreed with the revocation of its dual function because it had been so strongly indoctrinated into their way of life. They preferred to implement dual function appropriately and in accordance with the national reform spirit. They accused the people of confusing an understanding of dual function with TNI duties.<sup>6</sup> The military felt that its critics viewed dual function merely from the perspective of military domination of personnel in civilian positions and in the state bureaucracy.<sup>7</sup> In that context, a gap did exist between the military's perception and civilians', who seemed to misunderstand the true meaning of dual function. Critics argued that the root of problem lay in military domination of social-political sectors and government bureaucracy based on the doctrine of dual function. ABRI's dual function meant that military personnel had two duties, that is, the defence-security one and the social-political one.<sup>8</sup> As a social-political



force, ABRI justified its involvement in civilian authority, civilian positions, political parties and other non-military positions.

Most military officers considered it normal for ABRI to involve itself in socio-political sectors because they perceived that ABRI functioned as a stabilizing force and provided the dynamics necessary for development. The military argued that they were capable of unifying the various forms of national potential through their positions within the civilian structure. Based on their strong sense of nationalism, the military regarded civilian relations as being fragile due to their diversity of ethnicity, religion, race and political ideology, which could threaten national unity. The presence of a social political force of soldiers among the people was aimed at integrating the nation. The other reason proffered by the military was their lingering trauma with the PKI movement of 30 September 1965. The military had always regarded the communist movement as a latent threat and claimed that it could re-emerge anytime. In their opinion, the communist ideology developed by its cadres could penetrate discreetly into every sector, threatening the Five Basic Principles of the Republic of Indonesia or the Pancasila ideology, ruining national unity and undermining the government. Therefore, the military claimed that the country needed ABRI as a social-political force to deter threats from communists or from other similar groups that could weaken the legitimate government.

ABRI regarded its dual-function doctrine as the military officers' sacred mission. Any effort to undermine the doctrine would be considered as a threat to its existence in general. However, moderate attitudes demonstrated by ABRI commanders in 1997–1999, when the demand to depoliticize the military was strong, prevented conflict between civilians and the military.<sup>9</sup> ABRI's endorsement of the national reform on 21 May 1998, followed directly by President Suharto's resignation, marked the entry point to fundamental changes in ABRI's social-political roles. National reform followed by ABRI's internal reform indicated that the military was ready to adjust to public aspirations, namely, to create a more democratic political life. On realizing that the people's resistance was so high, demands for the military to withdraw from politics became a significant issue.

Several ABRI internal reform agendas, such as severing organizational relations with Golongan Karya, taking an impartial stance in general elections, abolishing ABRI *kekaryaan* institutions and restricting active military officers from taking civilian positions, which were formally issued on 1 April 1999, could be taken to be moves to retreat from politics. The MPR decree issued after the Special Session on 10–13 November 1999 that called for a halt to ABRI representation in the DPR commencing from the next term (after the 1999 general elections) further distanced the military from politics. ABRI's withdrawal from the DPR did not upset the high-ranking officers as they had already discussed the matter internally as part of a series of initiatives related to their internal reform. In the same way, ABRI representatives in the Provincial and Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) were limited to only 10 percent of the total number of House members<sup>10</sup> until 2004.

Yet, the military still considered its presence in the MPR important because the soldiers who did not use their right to vote needed representatives to articulate their aspirations or add their voice in any move attempted to shape the national constitution. ABRI highlighted that the MPR should be the sole institution for them to participate in politics and it resulted in an MPR Decree in October 1999 to prolong the existence of an ABRI faction in the MPR until 2009.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, TNI Commander General Endriarto Sutarto, in the Annual Session of the MPR, decided not to wait until 2009 but, acting through Lieutenant-General Slamet Supriyadi, Chairman of the TNI/Polri faction, made the decision that they would leave the MPR by 2004.<sup>12</sup> As a consequence, after the 2004 general elections, the representatives of military institutions (including Polri) no longer participated in any civilian government political institutions in Indonesia. This act of hastening the retreat of ABRI representatives from the MPR five years earlier than planned indicates that there has been a delegitimization of the military's role in politics by the people. The military thought that their role in formulating national policies had been taken over entirely by the civilian political power. Therefore, the military's existence in political institutions like the MPR was insignificant.

The sentiment of military depoliticization was also felt during the MPR general session in October 1999. General Wiranto, the incumbent

TNI commander, did not recommend the TNI faction to nominate him as either presidential or vice-presidential candidate. Moreover, the TNI faction withdrew Wiranto's nomination for vice-president despite his candidacy being endorsed by the faction of Daulah Ummah (Nation-State) Party and some MPR members a short time before the voting for the vice-president was to take place.<sup>13</sup> This situation demonstrated that political support for the military was weakening along with the people's demand to remove the military from politics. Likewise, during the MPR Special Session to vote for the vice-president on 25 July 2001, General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was not nominated directly by the TNI Faction but was backed by several MPR members from the Utusan Golongan (Functional Group delegates) and the Utusan Daerah (Regional Delegates). The voting gave the victory to Hamzah Haz as Megawati's running mate while Yudhoyono came in third place, after Akbar Tandjung.<sup>14</sup> Again, this signified that the move towards military depoliticization was still in progress.

The establishment of KPP HAM (Komite Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia or Investigating Committee on Human Rights Violation) for East Timor after the referendum, the Aceh problems during the Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) or Military Operation Area, the Tanjung Priok case and other investigations of human-rights violations, which allegedly involved the military, such as the murder of the President of Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan Council Presidium) Theys Hiyo Eluay, revealed on 11 November 2001, or the shooting of two U.S. nationals working in Freeport in Timika, Papua, on 31 August 2002, were further evidence of the depoliticization of the military an institution indicating that it was no longer immune from the law.<sup>15</sup> The interconnection of decisions passed by the court presiding over human-rights violations in East Timor and the Tanjung Priok case, which indicted several military officers including high-ranking ones, indicated that the military was no longer a political power enjoying immunity. The supremacy of the rule of law prevailing during the reform era was also applied to any military personnel who had violated civil rights. In addition, the revealed conspiracy to murder human-rights activist Munir in 2004—who was found dead on a Garuda Indonesia Airlines flight to Amsterdam—was added

to the list of public accusations of human-rights violations directed at the military, in this case, referring to BIN.

Although the military was disappointed by these accusations, the commander's policy required all personnel to be investigated on charges of human-rights violations. Among those who were charged were Major-General Adam Damiri (former Military Region Commander of Udayana in 1999), Brigadier-General Noer Muis (former Military Resort Commander of East Timor), charged with human rights violations in East Timor after the referendum, Major-General Sriyanto (former General Commander of Kopassus/Special Forces Command in 2003), and Major-General R. Butar-Butar (former Military District Commander of North Jakarta in 1986), charged with human rights violation in Tanjung Priok (1986), all of whom were asked to testify before the human-rights court. Military officers began to acknowledge the civilian government's supremacy in upholding the law, though looking for an assurance that such initiatives would not be overly politicized. The military refused any legal efforts that pressurized and cornered them. They also hoped that all legal action against the soldiers would be based on legal objectivity, taking into account the substance of duties carried out by the accused officers. In order to overcome the legal problems within the military, TNI Headquarters formed a Legal Advocacy Team that was composed of not only of military officers but also competent specialist civilian advocates.<sup>16</sup> The move demonstrated that the military had adapted itself to the prevailing rules and regulations in civil society.

Military depoliticization was also obvious from the military's move to yield the right of way to public opinion from 2001 to 2003, as evidence by its refusal to accede to Article 19 of the proposed TNI Law, which gave authority to the TNI commander to deploy troops in times of danger. The enduring polemics between ABRI Headquarters and civilian figures in the media could not convince the people of TNI intentions. Public criticism and concerns revolved around the political opportunism of the TNI and were aimed at preventing a situation arising where the TNI would benefit from a state of danger, in the end succeeding in forcing the TNI to withdraw their proposition. Eventually, the TNI commander dropped the controversial article.

Indicators for military depoliticization have been discussed so far. Yet, a unique form of depoliticization occurred with the repeal of DOM in Aceh during President Habibie's administration, which changed into a military emergency state during President Megawati's administration. Figures who criticized that policy, such as M.M. Billah (member of National Commission on Human Rights/Komnas HAM), Munir (Kontras) and Hasballah M. Saad (former Minister of Human Rights) argued that the policy was a military attempt to dominate civil society in Aceh.<sup>17</sup> Even though the policy was made by President Megawati Soekarnoputri, with the support from the DPR representing civilian government, it was still alleged to be military dominated. The success of the TNI in leading public opinion to perceive the situation in Aceh as threatening enough to require legal action to restore order went against *reformasi* wisdom over the need to use measures that promoted the use of dialogue in solving the problems of Aceh. However, the officers themselves were convinced that it was impossible to resolve the problems through dialogue. They viewed the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement, clearly as a separatist movement that undermined the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) or Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and therefore could only be handled with military power. The imposition of Aceh's Military State of Emergency on 18 May 2003 was a military policy used to acquire legal justification and thereby avoided accusations of violating human rights and opposing civilian supremacy. Military officers claimed that they did not dominate the political decision-making process for their own interests. On the contrary, they simply carried out decisions made by the civilian government for the sake of the nation. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 28/2003, the whole province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam was declared to be under a state of military emergency.<sup>18</sup> The officers disagreed with the opinion that the imposition of a state of military emergency in Aceh on 19 May 2003 was an attempt to reinstate the military into the political arena. However, the prevailing view was that the return of the military to Acehnese society was a setback in efforts to depoliticize the military. Criticism and condemnation levied at Megawati's government in regard to its policy that supported the military, such as the establishment of military dormitories and the

purchase of combat Sukhoi aircraft, could also be seen as setbacks to the expressed aim of depoliticizing the military. Incessant civilian protests on attempts by the military to promote their interests were a good sign in demonstrating the slow enshrinement of a deeper understanding by politicians and civil society on the need for effective civilian control over the military. Although the military patronized the civilian government, other elements of civil society such as Parliament and political parties had kept up the pressure in controlling military interests. The establishment of a military dormitory and the purchase of the Sukhoi planes were useful lessons for the TNI to learn about how far it could manoeuvre in this new political environment. More importantly, there were further manifestations that the military no longer held autonomous power and could not achieve their objectives unilaterally without the support of relevant civilian institutions.

## THE MILITARY TAKE A NON-ACTIVE ROLE IN POLITICS

During a commemoration of the TNI anniversary on 5 October, TNI Commander Endriartono Sutarto's 2003 oft-repeated statement that TNI officers could not be persuaded to support any political power and the TNI's commitment to remain impartial in general elections was an indication of how strongly the people wanted the military to be detached from politics.<sup>19</sup> The people's worries and concerns over the TNI's impartiality in the 2004 presidential election, where several retired generals—General (ret.) Wiranto, General (ret.) Yudhoyono and Lieutenant General (ret.) Prabowo—ran for presidency, necessitated the TNI Commander to respond by issuing verbal instructions forbidding the TNI to be used as a political support facility for any candidate.<sup>20</sup>

Such an approach needed a normative point of view—the military wanted to avoid the impression that it supported military-tied candidates and wanted to be recognized as being impartial.<sup>21</sup> Public pressure had successfully urged the military to define their approach to avoid politics. Nevertheless, officers admitted that the emotional and cultural bonds they shared with their seniors could not be broken easily, particularly

bonds with those who had once been their superiors or commanders. General (ret.) Wiranto was one of the TNI senior officers nominated by the Golkar party to run for presidency. It appeared that he still had indirect influence over his juniors who held strategic military positions. TNI Commander General Endriartono Sutarto and Army Chief of Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu were among those who were formerly part of General Wiranto's personal staff. However, in his bids for the presidential office between 1999 and 2004, Wiranto denied that he had ever used his influence as a former senior officer over his juniors and the TNI institution.<sup>22</sup> The TNI's normative attitude to remain impartial to the presidential candidate successfully countered public accusations that questioned its impartiality in the 2004 general elections.

Another move taken to depoliticize the military was the transfer of authority relating to internal security from the military to the police force. Since the separation of Polri from the TNI on 1 April 1999, the military were no longer allowed to interfere with police investigations, as stipulated in MPR Decree No. VII/MPR/2000 regarding the specific roles of the TNI and Polri.<sup>23</sup> The military would no longer be able to provide security for establishments such as nightclubs or public places of a non-military nature. The implication of the separation motivated the professional development of each institution. Polri was urged to be more independent in dealing with social and security problems, while the TNI was urged to become more adept at handling matters related to national defence. Police General Roesmanhadi was the first Chief of Police to implement the new role, now assigned to the police, including the consolidation of its tasks after its separation from the TNI on 1 April 1999.

The separation did not automatically place Polri outside the military's control. General Wiranto, in his position both as Minister of Defence and Security and Commander of ABRI, was directly in charge of Polri since it then was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence and Security. The difference was that the military would be unable to intervene in police affairs without the approval of the ABRI Commander, who was also the Minister of Defence and Security. Even if this separation seemed to be faltering at first, it could be considered as progress towards Polri's independence. On 1 April

2000, while Wahid occupied the presidential office, Polri was officially under the direct control of the president.

In general, the act of depoliticizing the military could be interpreted as a civilian effort to return the military to its original role—as an apolitical defence force. The purpose of depoliticizing the military encourages it to attain the professionalism necessary to be effective and enhances the capabilities of every officer to perform his duties to defend the motherland. The people's demand for the military to detach itself from its political role allowed the military to release its political responsibility, a role long viewed as a burden. Some military personnel felt this separation was a relief as it meant that they could now move freely within the military domain without having to make difficult political choices. For others, the separation meant a loss of privileges in the form of socially prestigious positions or economic advantages that were available in the past.

## CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

Referring to the model of civil-military relations presented by Samuel P. Huntington on civilian control over the military, civil-military relations in Indonesia went through a variety of historical phases, each embodying a different model of civil-military relations.<sup>24</sup> Observations that focussed on the last months of Suharto's reign (1997–1998) to the end of 2003, during Megawati's administration, indicate that every government employed different ways to control the military.

In the midst of the multidimensional crisis faced by President Suharto from July 1997 to 21 May 1998, the government was in full control of the military. Internal military dynamics, such as the rivalry between General Wiranto (TNI Commander) and Lieutenant-General Prabowo (Commander of Army Strategic Command) or with General R. Hartono (former Army Chief of Staff),<sup>25</sup> did not deter the military from obeying the civilian government led by Suharto. In fact, the conflicting military figures were basically all Suharto loyalists. Suharto had managed to place his confidantes in strategic positions, such as ABRI Commander, Chiefs



of Staff of every Armed Force, Chief of Police, Commander of Army Strategic Command, Jaya Military Region Commander and so forth.

Maintaining control over important military positions could reduce the risk of a coup or betrayal to authority. Such a military command structure (all being Suharto's men) ensured that the military did not react to the ongoing economic and political crisis. The theory of military takeover under civil authority, as proposed by Eric A. Nordlinger, was unable to overcome the social crisis in Indonesia during the last months of Suharto's reign (1997–1998).<sup>26</sup> Suharto's tight control over the military was the outcome of his ability to educate, promote and maintain good relationships with the armed forces. The officers claimed that Suharto's resignation was not a result of military pressure or opposition within the military. Essentially, ABRI personnel were ready to take any order from President Suharto at that time. ABRI's commanders merely relayed opinions and information but never asked the president to step down. The officers claim that it was Suharto himself who took the initiative to resign.<sup>27</sup>

In fact, during the Habibie administration, the military, now formally under civilian government control, had a relatively equal bargaining position with the president. If the military was under direct orders from the president during Suharto's administration, then the latitude it enjoyed during Habibie's term in office was considerable as it could negotiate with the president when formulating its policies. In addition to the military's internal reform policy, ABRI also had full control to adopt the position of impartiality in general elections and change its approach and position towards Golkar's Extraordinary National Meeting (October 1998). The civilian government led by President Habibie did not directly interfere with the military's external and internal policies. Habibie's aspirations for the military were expressed through the TNI commander, Wiranto.

Civilian control over the military during Habibie's administration was not firmly applied, yet Habibie's government depended largely on military support to maintain its power. This kind of dependency put the military on an equal footing with Habibie's civilian government. Although none of Habibie's policies on military issues was disputed, the military claimed that they did not control Habibie's civilian government. This balanced

state, whereby the military enjoyed a bargaining position with the government to intervene in policies shaped by civilians, was, according to the officers, an ideal state of civil-military relations, even though such a state of affairs would not be recognized within contemporary theories of civil-military relations. During the Habibie administration the military's version of the ideal state of affairs was actually military control over the civilian government when it came to military interests.

Huntington's theory on civil-military relations introduces the concept of civil control over the military in two categories: objective control and subjective control. The former promotes military professionalism that complies with the civilian government based on the constitution and on an institutional basis. The latter creates a cult of an individual (a civilian figure) who uses the military to maintain his power.<sup>28</sup> Subjective control during Suharto's period in office was more dominant than in any other subsequent administration. It can be said that during the Habibie administration neither the objective nor the subjective controls existed.

During Wahid's presidency, as stated earlier, civilian control over the military was not fully practised. In the beginning of Gus Dur's presidency (October 1999 to November 2000), civilian control over the military was evident through his policies over the military, which, though contrary to military expectations, were still acceptable to the military elite, for example, the appointment of Tyasno as KSAD, the elimination of the position of deputy to the military commander, the appointment of Agus as Commander of Kostrad, the discharge of Wiranto from his position as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, the establishment of an ad-hoc human-rights court for East Timor-related matters, and the diplomatic policies and dialogue with GAM in an effort to resolve the problems in Aceh. Wahid underlined that the approach adopted in dealing with the military during his time in office was to make the Indonesian military, as in any other developed democratic country, adhere to rules established by the civilian government.<sup>29</sup> However, the military felt that some of Wahid's policies were seen as acts of civilian intervention. It was evident that the military was adhering to a policy contrary to its own interests. In other words, the president was able to control the military.<sup>30</sup>

Civilian control over the military, which was effectively implemented during the first part of Wahid's term in office, was short-lived. From the end of December 2000, the military had started to contravene Wahid's policy plans, in particular taking umbrage at moves to the promotion of Lieutenant-General Agus and General Tyasno to higher positions. Military solidarity was able to deter Wahid from succeeding in his policy relating to the military. The discharge of Tyasno and Agus from their respective positions led to a loss of civilian control over the military during Wahid's presidency. Further proof of the Wahid administration's inability to control the military was its refusal to appoint Wahid's proposed candidate, Commissioner-General Chairuddin Ismail, to replace General Bimantoro (seen to be closely associated to the military) as Chief of National Police.<sup>31</sup> The culmination of the military's rebuff came when it refused to comply with the president's decree of 23 July 2001, declaring that the country was under a state of emergency. Despite this, the officers still did not feel that the military controlled civil society but believed that the loss of civilian power over the military was due to a constitutional breach on the part of President Wahid, and not a result of military rejection of civilian control. The military also felt that Wahid did not give it enough attention and, as a consequence of his inability to understand military culture, some of his policies appeared controversial. Subsequent to that, in the second year of Wahid's presidency, civilian authority was not able to be asserted over the military. That state of affairs was later given as the reason for the weakening political support towards President Wahid, which led to his downfall in July 2001.

The ability of civilian authorities to control the military during President Megawati's administration, which started in August 2001, resembled the state of affairs during Habibie's term, where the military was not the sole object of civilian government policy. Like Habibie, Megawati did not put the military in a subordinate position to the civilian government but as a partner participating in decision-making processes concerning the military, such as the Aceh issue, the purchase of Sukhoi fighters, the crafting of the TNI bill and the military's internal restructuring. The civilian government under Megawati gave the impression of military autonomy and allowed the military decide its own internal and external policies.

The president appeared to have no concept whatsoever in positioning the military under civilian authority. Political statements from military leaders relating to officers' right to vote or participation in elections, the TNI bill (specifically areas relating to the authority of the TNI commander), the military's position on the 2004 elections, military presence in the MPR, and its views on inter-party conflict, all appeared to be of no concern to Megawati. She gave no instruction and made no decision on how to re-position the military.

Such a state of affairs implied that the civilian government allowed the military to decide its own policies, when in reality the civilian government should instead strive to determine military policy. The civil government believed that without military support, it would be difficult to create social and political stability to maintain its power. The difference between Habibie and Megawati in terms of civilian control over the military was the role of the DPR as a civil institution outside the executive body to exercise oversight over the military. Strong military support for Megawati's government did not totally weaken the civilian government's control over the military. Several policy concepts proposed by the military together with the government, such as the enactment of a state of civil emergency in Aceh and the purchase of Sukhoi fighter planes, were criticized by the DPR. Megawati was able to lay the constitutional foundation for the development of military professionalism by enacting Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI towards the end of her office. During Habibie's term, the DPR had no real task to supervise the military. The similarity between both former presidents was that both adopted a lenient attitude towards the military and thus received strong military support to run their administrations.

The administration of President Yudhoyono marks a time of more controlled and subservient military responses towards civilian government policies. The disappointment of some military officers with the annulment of the proposed promotion of General Ryamizard to replace TNI Commander General Endriartono Sutarto (October 2004) did not bring about any significant civil-military conflict. Yudhoyono maintained full control over the military, even in issues such as the Ambalat border dispute with Malaysia, the Aceh peace talks with GAM and eventual

signing of the peace treaty on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, the presence of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), which was regarded as a sensitive issue to the military because it was seen as foreign intervention, did not engender any real objection towards Yudhoyono's policies. Could this be the result of his military background? The reality is that Yudhoyono continues to be regarded as the legitimate leader of a democratically elected civilian government that has restored more controlled military developments under the authority of a civilian government.

In comparing civil-military relations and the concept of civilian control over the military during the terms of each former president, viz. Suharto, Habibie, Wahid and Megawati, most researchers agree that it was during the Habibie administration that the military had the best opportunities to manage itself and achieve its desired levels of profes-



sionalism. President Habibie and the military leaders shared the same understanding and views on military policies. However, the military had insufficient time to fully realize its strategies due to Habibie's relatively brief period of office (May 1998 to October 1999).<sup>32</sup>

In general, the officers hold a positive impression of Megawati's leadership due to the fact that she did not intervene in internal military affairs and made efforts to discuss her policy plans with the military. During Megawati's term, the military felt respected both in terms of their function and existence. The officers admitted that the central executive of civilian government lacked military views but it was inconsequential as long as the civilian government involved the military in decision-making processes related to the military issues.

Military officers felt that the Suharto and Wahid administrations did not create conducive conditions for the development of good civil-military relations. Suharto manipulated the military to become his instrument for politics and power while Wahid was disrespectful towards the military's opinions and consistently attempted to intervene in the military's internal affairs.

## MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Morris Janowitz and Huntington interpret the term "military professionalism" narrowly as the expertise of military personnel in matters relating to the use of force to handle certain conditions.<sup>33</sup> By "force", it means the use of military skills and equipment necessary to function as a defence mechanism. A professional military, according to Nordlinger, also includes a soldier's ability to follow orders to defend national peace in threatening situations, to use weapons during battle and to detach oneself from non-military affairs.<sup>34</sup> In general, it seems civil-military theoreticians regard the main objective of professionalism as enabling soldiers to master weapon skills.


Unlike the aforementioned interpretation of professionalism, Harry Holbert Turney adds that military professionalism is not merely restricted to military issues. Non-military issues, such as politics concerning the

military's interest, for as long military leaders are concerned, will be a way to determine whether a soldier is performing his duty as a professional.<sup>35</sup> Military professionalism also refers to the equilibrium of expertise, responsibility and solidarity. Another trait of a professional attitude, according to Nordlinger, is corporatism—organizations intervene in politics in response to negative civil society attitude to military professionalism.<sup>36</sup>

Military officers see professionalism as something embedded in a soldier's day-to-day duties. Basically, professionalism is understood as the ability to carry out a duty perfectly and orderly in accordance to the military unit's job description. A soldier is regarded as being professional when he is able to perform in accordance to his duties and responsibilities. Officers avoid generalizing the meaning of military professionalism but take into account the special skills required at all levels of ranks. Different ranks and positions imply different duties and responsibilities for officers, resulting in different standards of professionalism.

Nevertheless, officers do have a basic parameter as a standard for all TNI officers to measure up to: they must possess an expertise in using weapons assigned to them, a commitment to succeed in performing a duty, a high degree of discipline, abide by the law and obey their superiors' orders, as well as having a desire to develop themselves along with having no political attachments. These conditions are commonly quoted by officers as the basics of military professionalism for TNI soldiers. In the course of time, professionalism can be assessed at every level of an officer's rank and position. A soldier's ability to perform his duty well in accordance to his responsibility or to handle problems that arise within his authority will determine whether or not he is a professional. For example, a soldier whose main duty is to be a driver is deemed professional if he can drive well, maintain the vehicle and satisfy the needs of his superior. The same principle applies to a battalion commander. He is deemed professional if he is able to develop the combat ability of his unit, maintain its discipline, accomplish each mission and build corps solidarity as well as be accepted in the community where his unit is stationed. Assessment is based on the performance of each soldier in accordance to his duty and responsibility.

FIGURE 3.2  
Effort to Establish Military Professionalism



In general, the various views expressed by TNI officers referred to as resources for this study unanimously state that the issue of professionalism has long been an agenda for internal discussion and a matter of prime concern. Chief of Army Staff (ret.) General Edi Sudrajat (1987–1992) first introduced the concept with the slogan “Back to basics”. At that time, leaders of the Indonesian Military Army (TNI AD) realized that, as the military was so deeply involved in politics, it needed to upgrade itself. The term regained momentum for discussion when it re-emerged as part of the rhetoric surrounding the terms that political officers and professional officers under Commander of the National Military Force (ret.) General Feisal Tandjung (1993–1998). When Wiranto succeeded Tandjung, the demand for military professionalism was even more prevalent, along with the call for internal military reform.

For officers, professionalism is a military requirement. But they also



admit that it is not enough to simply observe the objective standards of developed countries that are supported by a sufficient budget, state-of-the-art weaponry and strong traditions of professionalism. Even though they are optimistic about making the TNI professional, they must still set conditions, which in themselves are problematic. Officers believe that there are at least four issues to address for the short-term implementation of TNI professionalism: (i) the low standards of soldiers' welfare; (ii) insufficient military budget; (iii) no unified civil authority vision of the role of the military; and (iv) the legacy of the military's dual function that has indoctrinated the military's way of thinking. Bearing this in mind, it is apparent that it will take a long time for Indonesia's military to attain ideal standards of military professionalism. Military professionalism is closely related to the country's ability to control its military and at the same time provide for its interests.

## PROSPECTS OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE

A close observation of civil-military relationships in Indonesia after the Suharto era can be used as a basis to predict the future shape of such relations. In the same way, civilian control over the military, as implemented by each administration, provides valuable lessons in understanding the type of civilian leadership best suited for the military to adopt.

During Megawati's presidency, the military did not oppose demands that they focus solely on defence and military issues because they felt that it addressed the circumstances of that time, that is, to heed the call for democracy from the people. The military realized that the process of democracy that had been unfolding since 21 May 1998 required a strong civilian government that had the power to control the military. That being the case, the military were compelled to comply with policies issued by the civilian authority. The military began to realize that its duties and authority were really no more than an extension of the civilian government's policies in a democratic system of government. The legality of the civilian authority mandated by a democratic nationwide election permitted the civilian authority to manage the military's role.

The military also began to realize that they were unable to decide their own role without the consent of the civilian government.

The political transformation following the national reform movement has required the military to reposition its role. According to the officers, the military's decision to leave the political arena was a positive move towards achieving professionalism. The officers felt that external changes affecting military policies were appropriate and anticipated. They were aware that the changes unfolding rapidly before them had forced the military to leave the political arena abruptly although it had actually planned a gradual transformation. For instance, the planned withdrawal of representatives from the military faction (Fraksi-ABRI) from the DPR/MPR set to take place in the 2004 election took place after the 1999 election. Likewise, military representatives to be recalled from the MPR in 2009 actually withdrew in 2004. In the same way, the termination of the military's dual-function doctrine was never anticipated at the beginning of the reform era. The military still tried to justify the doctrine as essential, though subject to some improvements in its further implementation. Yet, the strong demand for its abolition left the military with no choice but to submit to the will of the people.

The era of democracy has manifested democratic values through acting on the voice of the people. An authoritarian system of government, as practised during the Suharto era, now has no place in the reform period. Ever-increasing public political participation brought about by the freedom of the press and the role of non-governmental organizations are becoming more critical towards shaping government policies.<sup>37</sup> The existence of political parties as a new political power in the reform era has added a new dimension to the development of democracy in Indonesia.<sup>38</sup> The general public's growing political awareness has found a corridor for expressing its aspirations. The paternalistic political culture of the New Order era soon shifted towards political liberalization in the reform era. The current political climate does not seem to have room for authoritarian rule, which is perceived as identical to militarism during the Suharto era. It is no wonder that anything considered militaristic during the reform era has become the target of criticism and condem-

nation. Militaristic culture is now equated with its offshoots—violence, repression and authoritarianism.

The escalation of new political powers from among the civilian population can be seen as the antithesis of the fall of the authoritarian regime represented by the military-affected authority. Civilian figures since the beginning of the reform era have taken on an important role in formulating political policies, including the task of re-positioning the military appropriately. A common concept among the public is that capable civilian leadership will lead the nation to a better life in a more democratic atmosphere. Therefore, the military need not participate in managing the democratic system in the newly emerging society. The civilian authority that is trying to consolidate itself strives to subdue the military under civilian rule. The military is forced to recognize these rules and avoid the political arena. Internal TNI reform has attempted to adopt the path conforming to the aspirations of civil society.

The military that functions only as a national defence instrument does not access the political arena, a civil domain. Thus, civilian authority has the liberty of managing the people through policies and governance without any fear of military threat. Such conditions support the creation of a strong civil society capable of managing its military within set parameters. The consolidation of democracy will succeed if the civilian authority can keep the military out of politics. The exploitation of the military to further strengthen its political position as well as political backing for certain political entities inevitably weakens civil society in its move to consolidate democracy. Democracy flourishes where there is freedom of thought, ideas and expression. The ruling civilian authority needs to reassure the people that it can control and manage the military. Failure to do so will threaten the current progress of democracy.

Indonesia's transition to democracy needs civil-military relationships that share a desire to fulfil the people's aspirations. Both parties need to cooperate based on a mutual respect of each other's roles and duties. They also need mutual understanding in terms of sharing the work domain and authority in accordance with their professional positions.<sup>39</sup> Civilian compliance in listening to the military's opinions on matters that concern them is a way of respectfully acknowledging the military's value. Mili-

tary concerns are not at all confined to issues of a defence and security nature but also refer to non-traditional security issues that cross into the realm of politics, such as national elections, regional elections, national security, international affairs, bilateral issues, terrorism, illegal logging, illegal mining of sand, women and child trafficking, and cross-border smuggling, even though in practice the military does not involve itself in practical politics. Certain parties have alleged that military interests in political matters are still practised. However, the military feels that it has as much right to be concerned with such issues as the rest of the nation.

The military has so far responded cynically to civilian demands for the military to disengage itself from all politics. Some military—calling themselves Soldiers of the People, Soldiers of Struggle and Soldiers of the Nation—feel that they need to act rather than simply allow national issues to linger until they lead to a national crisis or national disintegration. The military stresses that it has legitimate interest in concerning itself and dealing with problems deemed as threats to national integrity. Issues such as the case of separatism in Aceh and Papua, the resurgence of supporters of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) in Ambon, the emergence of discourse on a free-Riau movement, the demand for regional autonomy from many regions, conflicts touching on sensitive issues (namely, SARA or Ethnic, Religion, Race, Inter-group relations) in Maluku, Ambon and Poso, conflicts between ethnic groups in West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan, even clashes between supporters of opposing political parties, have all concerned the military. The military perspective covers numerous issues that converge around the unity and integrity of the nation. When social, economic and political issues that are supposed to be handled by the government cannot be resolved, the military is justified in taking steps to find a solution. The military does not regard this kind of involvement as an act of intervention, but rather as a response to a call of duty to safeguard the country.

In general, the military sees itself as more capable than the civilian politicians or bureaucrats in terms of discipline, recruitment and national commitment. This superiority complex is a mental attitude currently prevalent in the military though it does not present itself explicitly. In

the opinion of the military, the course of reform since May 1998, under the authority of civilian administrations, is still far from restoring the stability that Indonesians have demanded in terms of social welfare, peace and stability. The civilian political elite has so far failed to find united visions to solve the nation's problems. Corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN), which were used as a weapon to topple the New Order regime at the beginning of the reform movement, was deemed as being inappropriate by each successive administrations. The military also feel that the civilian political elite are more concerned with their respective political groups or parties than with the people in general. Competition among the civilian elite to gain financial facilities has created a new aspect of KKN that is motivated by political group interests.<sup>40</sup> As the military desires to restore constitutional military values in the reform era, it supports the direct method of electing the president as a way of choosing a national leader who has strong support and legitimacy from the people.

As such, in the direct democratic election of the country's president in the general elections of 2004, the military supported the candidate who shared the same vision—a high commitment to national unity. In addition, the military preferred a popular individual who was non-sectarian or unattached to any particular religious or ethnic group. The military also preferred a popular individual who could relate well with the military and create ideal civil-military relations from the military's perspective. To realize such an ideal, the military tried to persuade voters, directly or otherwise, to support the candidate who conformed to the military's perspective. In this light, public concern over the return of the military in politics is reasonable.

Time and time again, high-ranking military officers such as General Endriartono Sutarto and General Ryamizard has stressed that the military will remain apolitical and non-affiliated with any political power both in the general elections and the direct presidential elections (such as the one in 2004).<sup>41</sup> The recruitment of many retired military individuals in several political parties only proved that civilian groups still needed military figures to strengthen their influence. Among those who joined political parties were:

- Lieutenant-General (ret.) Yunus Yosfiah, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Andi Ghalib, Major-General (ret.) Muchlis Anwar and Major-General (ret.) Amir Syarifudin, who joined Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP);
- General (ret.) Wiranto, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Prabowo, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Budhi Harsono, Major-General (ret.) Afifudin Thaib and Major-General (ret.) Yahya Sancawira, who joined Partai Golkar;
- Major-General (ret.) Suwarno Adi Widjoyo, who joined Partai Amanant Nasional (PAN);
- Major-General (ret.) Theo Syafei, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Agus Widjojo, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Slamet Supriyadi and Lieutenant-General (ret.) Adang Ruchyatna, who joined Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP); and
- Lieutenant-General (ret.) E.E. Mangindaan and Major-General (ret.) Sutadji, who joined Partai Demokrat.

The presence of such prominent retired military individuals in the political parties in the last elections clearly shows that the military has not really detached itself from the political arena. The success of Partai Demokrat in the general elections, achieving a position within the top five political parties, demonstrated that the party founded by General (ret.) Yudhoyono, a notable military figure, had gained wide public sympathy.<sup>42</sup> It is no wonder that in the wake of the direct presidential elections in 2004, several retired four-star generals, such as Wiranto, Yudhoyono and Agum Gumelar, all competed for the election of president or vice-president.<sup>43</sup> Wiranto beat Akbar Tandjung, a popular, senior, experienced politician, at the Golkar party convention to represent Golkar with a vote outcome of 315 to 227 votes.<sup>44</sup> Yudhoyono was backed by his own Partai Demokrat.<sup>45</sup> Agum Gumelar represented PPP to run with presidential candidate Hamzah Haz as the candidate for vice-president.<sup>46</sup>

The emergence of these military figures has reinforced an increasingly common opinion by some military officers that military leadership was far superior to civilian leadership. The military feel that they have a better recruitment system in ensuring the grounding of personnel with more mature basic leadership characteristics.<sup>47</sup> The military also believe

that they are more concerned about the integrity of the unified state of the Republic of Indonesia and the country's ideology (Pancasila), unlike civilians, whom the military feel do not take the issue seriously. The military was confident that it acts as the unifying force of the nation and has produced a core of leaders capable of unifying the nation. It is not an exaggeration to say that military candidates for the presidency are more likely to uphold the principles of unity, integrity and the need to safeguard nation.<sup>48</sup>

The recruitment of several retired high-ranking military officers into various political parties is seen by some military officers as an expression of an individual's political right, which is totally unrelated to TNI policies. The retired personnel are no longer structurally or formally bound to the TNI. They are regarded as members of civil society with political rights independent from military rules. Yet, despite this, some freely admit that they are still linked psychologically as well as historically to the TNI, and however free they are in determining their own political stand, they cannot disregard any policy issued by the TNI. High-ranking military officers admit that they have never directed any retired military officers to affiliate with any specific political party but they certainly expect that any party they join will have a strong national vision. In the eyes of non-retired military officers, the Golkar and PDIP are nationalist parties. Retired officers who wish to enter politics can make both of these parties their vehicles for continued service to the nation. These officers believe that parties with religious platforms are not suitable for retired officers who themselves are nationalists by nature. Nevertheless, no one would object to any retired officer affiliating with a political party of his own choice.

The TNI, particularly the army, has a hierarchical structure of 12 Regional Military Commands (Kodam), more than 39 Regiment Military Commands (Korem), over 271 District Military Commands (Kodim) scattered throughout cities and municipalities, where each Kodim has up to 15 Territorial Military Commands (Koramil) in villages throughout each district,<sup>49</sup> and exists as a potentially strategic political power to be utilized if needed. During the New Order, such a network was manipulated to its utmost by former President Suharto as a means of mobilizing the

masses and as an instrument of repressive social control to ensure that the Golongan Karya party would win every single election (1971–1997). The structure of territorial commands descending from the top levels of power to the nation's grassroots proved effective in controlling power policies during Suharto's time. Today, the military may still avail themselves to this strategic network for their advantage in manoeuvring the political processes. The existence of such potential military power has been the subject of study among civil politicians. Golkar has had the foresight to encourage high-ranking military officers in its ranks to take positions such as Secretary-General (Major-General Tuswandi, 1998–2002, and succeeded by Lieutenant-General Budhi Harsono, 2002–2004). It also recruited General (ret.) Wiranto and Lieutenant-General (ret.) Prabowo at its Convention for Presidential candidates. The PPP, chaired by incumbent former Vice-President Hamzah Haz, placed Lieutenant-General (ret.) Yunus Yosfiah as the party's Secretary-General in the party's national convention in July 2003. The names of General (ret.) Agum Gumelar and General (ret.) Yudhoyono were openly discussed and promoted by PAN and PDIP politicians respectively as individuals fit to run as vice-presidential candidates alongside presidential candidates Amien Rais and Megawati in the 2004 direct elections. The political potential of these military-based individuals to win the election is high. In addition, military figures are regarded as being able to strengthen national leadership and commitment in defending the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>50</sup>

In dealing with the widespread discourse in society on the need for a military figure as the directly elected president and vice-president in the 2004 elections, military leaders declared that military figures running for presidency were not permitted to make use of military facilities in their campaigns or seek military backing. This was in response to public criticism and fear that military figures, such as General (ret.) Wiranto, General (ret.) Yudhoyono as well as General (ret.) Agum Gumelar, would use military facilities to run their campaigns.<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, the military, in particular the army, conducted its own internal study on the trend for army seniors running for presidency by holding a reunion of army senior officers on 16 October 2003. At the event, facilitated by the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ryamizard, General



(ret.) Wiranto, who was in attendance, took the opportunity to explain to the high-ranking army officers present why he promoted himself as the Golkar presidential candidate.<sup>52</sup> The event further convinced the public that the military was still actively participating in 2004 politics.

The military tradition of respecting one's seniors is a psychological obstacle to the military in its effort to distance itself from such primordial bonds, more so if the senior has been an officer's direct commander or helped to promote him. This tradition remains almost impossible to remove from the subconscious minds of high-ranking military officers, even when their seniors are no longer active or have no more formal links with the TNI. Most of these officers believe that military leadership is superior to civilian leadership in terms of discipline and a sense of nationalism. They believe that military figures are still needed by civil society to lead the country in the transitional era up to 2009. Civilian leaders are still deemed incapable of coping with the challenge of the nation's heterogeneity, which is potentially fragile and unstable in this era. During this current transition towards democracy, which is expected to last until 2009, officers feel that a strong national leadership with credibility and competence is crucial to uniting the nation. To the public, such a leadership is found in the character of a military figure. It is no wonder that critics accuse the military of trying to restore political leadership democratically by way of voicing issues on strong leadership for the presidential race in 2004–2009.<sup>53</sup>

Amos Perlmutter states that in theory there are several reasons why the military intervenes in politics. First is the incompetence of civilian politicians in coping with social turmoil.<sup>54</sup> The democratic transitional era in Indonesia (May 1998 to 2006 and ongoing), has been prone to conflict that leads to social unrest. Such conflict can be triggered either by disputes at the elite level among vying factions or from dissatisfaction within the community at large towards the government's unpopular policies. Fanaticism from party supporters in the wake of elections has also contributed to horizontal conflict within the community. At the same time, vertical conflict from civil society, spearheaded by students with their call to banish acts of KKN, results in the public feeling that the government is not serious about executing its reform agenda and

thus undermines the government's authority. Such critical times present the military with good opportunities to take the lead in coming up with a solution, at the government's request. If they are not managed, the government could lose its authority in the eyes of the people. Society's widespread frustration with the performance of governing civilian politicians has encouraged military-supported national leaders to emerge. Such leaders can come from the civilian sector or the military but are backed by military high-ranking officers.

Transitions have caused the government problems due to its inability to fully manage the role of the military. The TNI, with its history of political involvement during the New Order era, cannot easily disregard its interest in politics, especially when high-ranking officers leading the military hierarchy are from a previous regime deeply entrenched in politics. The generals who hold high positions in the military in 2006, such as General Djoko Santoso, Lieutenant-General Harry Tjahyana or Lieutenant-General Syafrie Syamsedin, are those who in 1998 closely observed the political dynamics of the emerging national reform era.<sup>55</sup> Meanwhile, a group of middle-ranking officers who, in 1998, held military territorial positions such as Commander of District Military Command (Kodim), Head of Staff of District Military Command, Commander of Regiment Military Command (Korem), Head of Staff of Regiment Military Command, assistants to Regional Military Command (Kodam) or middle-ranking assisting officers at various Kodam as well as at the military or army headquarters, and who held ranks of lieutenant-colonel or colonel (and in their 40s), are still expected to be active until they retire at the age of 58 years. These officers are certain to follow ingrained habits, making them close observers of any political development. Thus, it can be predicted that for several years, at least until the administration of 2004–2009, these officers will still be have the dual-function mentality and retain an interest in political affairs. It is thus no wonder that the military is still issuing statements on political matters such as general elections, direct presidential elections, regional elections and other issues of a non-military nature.

True military professionalism, where the military's only concern is national defence, still seems far from becoming a reality. The generations



of military personnel that graduated in the 1970s and 1980s, are not expected to be able to detach themselves easily from politics altogether, considering their having functioned under dual-function conditions for so long. Officers freely admit that the most difficult challenge in the implementation of the military's reform is the transformation of tradition from one that is political to one that is professional. Perhaps military graduates of the 1990s can adopt a more professional attitude. Officers graduating between 1998 and 2006 have not been directly involved in territorial command politics of the dual-function era. At most, they would have only held a post at the lowest level of command (Koramil) or as regular territorial officers with no authority to make decisions. Most

officers who graduated in the 1990s are still captains or majors between 1998 and 2006, serving in combat battalion units scattered throughout Indonesia as a pre-requisite to attaining a stable career, enabling them to move up the military hierarchy. At this level, they are still preoccupied with military matters that are technical in nature. So, during the transition era (1998–2009), they found themselves in a changing environment that is more professionally demanding. Officers of this generation are more adept in dealing with changes of the social system and adapt better to society's demands of their military duties.

In meeting with the increasing need for military professionalism in Indonesia, as a commitment to the military's internal reform, no short-term result is feasible. Many factors outside the military can affect military policies and views towards the external environment. The welfare of soldiers plays an important role in determining success in realizing military professionalism. It is impossible to make such professionalism real without considering the welfare of soldiers. Meeting their primary needs by supplying nutritious food and having good healthcare programmes is essential. In addition, fully maintained and furnished accommodations, either in housing, compound or barracks, maintains the soldier's motivation. Likewise, a monthly salary, bonuses or other incentives guarantee a decent standard of living for the soldier and his family. These elements are vital in attaining the level of professionalism expected, along with the provision of state-of-the-art facilities and armaments required for national defence.

As mentioned previously, cultural reform needs time to adopt a new regeneration process with a new military paradigm that focuses on developing a more professional military. But regeneration alone is inadequate to foster attitudes of military professionalism. The transfer of ideas and knowledge from senior military officers has an important role to play in instilling an awareness of the importance of military professionalism. Seniors holding high-ranking military appointments, such as TNI Commander or Chief of Staff, can become influential in determining the course of military professionalism. Without guidance or strong commitment from military leaders, it is difficult to meet public demands that the military be detached from politics and become professional.

Military leadership is the main factor in determining the pattern of the military institution as a whole, particularly in Indonesia. As such, strong civilian government control is needed to determine adequate and credible military professional leadership. Also, it is the civilian government's duty to manage the tasks, positions, role and authority of the military based on the constitution and other legalities. The legality and civil society's strong support for the elected civilian government gives it more authority to control the military. In this way, civil-military relationships will develop as expected in a democratic society, where the military is fully under the control of the civilian government.

The new civil-military relationship during Megawati's presidency can be used as a basis for managing the military in future civil governments. The meeting point of the equilibrium to mutually support civil-military relationships is achieved when government interests and civilian authority feel the need for the military's support, or if the civilian government allows for internal military autonomy (see Figure 3.3). Such a relationship, which is an equal and controllable relationship, can be appropriately implemented in the ongoing transition era which is expected to continue in Indonesia until at least 2009.

## NOTES

1. Law No. 34 Year 2004 on TNI, Article 2d: Professional military personnel are those who are well-trained, well-educated, well-equipped, not involved in day-to-day politics, not engaged in business activities, whose welfare is guaranteed, obey political policy of the state that adheres to democratic system, civil supremacy, has respect for human rights, and national and ratified international laws.
2. *Ibid*, see Article 7: Military Operations Other than War.
3. Law No. 3/2002 on State Defence, Article 14 states that the authority to mobilize the TNI force lies with the President, while Article 16 states that the Minister of Defence has the authority to decide the funding and other administrative policies for the TNI. Thus, the lines of authority in reality create confusion between the Minister of Defence and the TNI commander since the TNI commander in reality is responsible to the President and not the Minister of Defence.

4. Law No. 3/2002 on State Defence, Article 15: In making the State Defence General Policy, the President is assisted by the National Defence Council.
5. "Those who demand the revocation of dual function are a minority. It's always the same people. We can't forbid them though; perhaps because they were victims of military operations at that time, such as the September 30<sup>th</sup> 1965 movement by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) where many persons went missing or died. But, even if TNI officers are put on trial, it will not contribute to national consolidation. Their families will not accept. They will take revenge as the children know that their fathers are not rich. They only carried out their official duties." Interview with Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, Jakarta, 27 November 2002.
6. ABRI's role as a dynamic and stabilizing element became the priority in every aspect of life and development, considering the situation and condition at that time. Military officers were placed in civilian positions, giving the impression that the military was everywhere and that dual function was being implemented. It was said that the two functions of the army were the army's creation. During the reform era, ABRI's dual function had been redefined as the role of the TNI. It aimed to avoid the misinterpretation that confused dual function with the TNI's activities. The term "role of TNI" refers to the integration between security-defence function and socio-political function in order to eradicate the dichotomous and distinctive nature of the function. See "*Paradigma Baru Peran TNI*" [New Paradigm on the Role of TNI] (pp. 9, 18), Jakarta: TNI Headquarters, 1999.
7. This attitude was, for example, indicated in Agum Gumelar's statement. He thought that the people had put dual function on a par with the TNI's works. Hence, there was a perception gap in understanding this matter. The TNI, however, admitted that there were many military officers who took key positions in a way that made civilians jealous. Interview research, 14 December 2002.
8. ABRI dual function, both security-defence and social-political functions, moved together within two political life environments: politics in the government (political superstructure) and politics in society (political infrastructure). See Soebijono et al., *Dwifungsi ABRI, Perkembangan dan Perannya Dalam Kehidupan Politik di Indonesia* [*The Dual Function of ABRI: Its Development and Role in Indonesian Political Life*] (p. 56), Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992.
9. This more moderate attitude was related to the appearance of several officers who graduated from the United States, such as Agus Widjojo, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Agus Wirahadikusuma, Saurip Kadi and Sudrajat. Upon completion of their studies, these officers interacted with scholars, civil politicians and NGOs, which resulted in their adopting a more moderate attitude. Interview with Agus Widjojo, 5 December 2002.

10. MPR Decree No. X/MPR/1998 on the principles of development reform in the framework of securing and normalizing national life as outlines of the nation and MPR Decree No. XIV/MPR/1998 on the General Election, Law No. 3/1999 on the General Election, Law No. 4/1999 on the Structure and Position of MPR/DPR/DPRD I/II. See "*Paradigma Baru Peran TNI*" [New Paradigm of the Role of TNI] (pp. 30–31), Jakarta: The TNI Headquarters, 1999.
11. Ibid.
12. See "*TNI/Polri Pamit dari MPR/DPR//TNI*" [Polri Left MPR/DPR Forever], *Media Indonesia*, 6 August 2003, p. 1.
13. See "*Wiranto Tarik Diri Dari Calon Wapres*" [Wiranto Pulls Out], *Media Indonesia*, 19 October 1999, p. 1.
14. The data indicating the number of votes are as follows. First round: Hamzah Haz, 238; Akbar Tandjung, 177; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 122; Agum Gumelar, 41; Siswono Yudhohusodo, 4; Abstention, 4 (Total: 613). Second round: Hamzah Haz, 254; Akbar Tandjung, 203; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 147; Abstention, 5 (Total: 609). Final round: Hamzah Haz, 340; Akbar Tandjung, 237. See Leo Suryadinata, *Elections & Politics in Indonesia* (pp. 194–195), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002.
15. See "*Saling Silang Kesaksian Timika*" [Conflicting Testimonies in Timika], *Tempo*, 13–19 2003, pp. 32–35; and "*Mayat Theys Berpindah*" [Theys' Body Replaced], *Tempo*, (n.d.), p. 42.
16. Members of the TNI Advocacy Team: Dr. Adnan Buyung Nasution (Head), Professor Dr. Muladi, Professor Dr. Andi Hamzah, Hotma Sitompul S.H., Ruhut Sitompul S.H., Yan Juanda Saputra S.H., M. Assegaf S.H., Dr. Chandra Motik Yusuf S.H., Gani Djemat S.H., Agus Takabobir S.H., Erman Umar S.H., Dra Bunga C. Kejora, Amir Kyatun S.H.. See Yuddy Chrisnandi, *KPP HAM Bukan Pengadilan [KPP HAM is not a Trial]* (p. 55), Jakarta: Yayasan KB, 2000.
17. See "*Resahkan Masyarakat Aceh Wacana Darurat Militer Perlu Dipertimbangkan*" [Making People Anxious, The Discourse of Military's Emergency Needs Reconsideration], *Media Indonesia*, 29 June 2002, p. 1.
18. See, "*Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan Dimulai*" [Security Restoration Operation Begins], *Kompas*, 19 May 2003, p. 1.
19. See "*Purnawirawan Jangan Gunakan TNI Sebagai Sarana Cari Dukungan Pemilu*" [Retired Personnel Urged not to Use TNI as a Vote Gathering Facility], *Kompas Cyber Media*, 2 October 2003.
20. See "*Purnawirawan TNI Jangan Minta Dukungan dari TNI*" [No Support for Retired TNI Personnel from TNI], *Kompas*, 6 October 2003, p. 6.
21. See "*Soal Dugaan Calon Presiden Tarik TNI untuk Mendukung, Panglima TNI Instruksikan Jajarannya Tetap Netral*" [On the Allegation that Presi-

- dential Candidates Ask TNI's Support, Commander Orders his Troop to Remain Impartial], *Kompas*, 8 October 2003, p. 6.
22. See "Wiranto Bantah Gunakan Jaringan Kodim" [Wiranto Denied Using His Network in Military District Command], *Kompas*, 11 October 2003, p. 6.
  23. MPR Decree No. VII/MPR/2000 on the Role of TNI/Polri. Article 1: TNI serves as main component in the State Defence system. Article 2: TNI as the means of State Defence has main duties in maintaining the State's sovereignty and the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila and UUD 1945 (1945 Constitution), and protect all Indonesian nationals from any threats and disturbances to the integrity of nation and State. Article 6: The Indonesian Police is the State apparatus responsible for maintaining security and upholding law and order while protecting and serving the people. (Source: *Kompas*, October 2001).
  24. It explains the difference between subjective control and objective control conducted by the government in relation to the military's role. When Suharto was president, he implemented an extremely intense subjective control for the sake of his power, as Huntington points out: power, professionalism and ideology; civil-military relations in theory; subjective civilian control, maximizing civilian power, civilian control by governmental institution, civilian control by social class, civilian control by constitutional form, objective civilian control; maximizing military professionalism. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (pp. 80–97), Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964.
  25. Wiranto himself did not admit his rivalry with Prabowo. He even wondered why a subordinate (Prabowo) should compete with his superior. In his view, such an attitude violated the military code of ethics and was rarely demonstrated by military personnel. Interview with General Wiranto, Jakarta, 28 November 2002.
  26. In studying how a government handles praetorianism, a number of issues need to be analysed. The first is what constitutes achievements. This relates to how successful the government has been in achieving its targets. It also refers to the type of management desired by citizens and admired by foreign observers. Failure and inability to maintain security always invokes a decision to intervene because such conditions require an officer willing to act as a policeman and indicates the full dependency of civilians on the military. See Eric A. Nordlinger, *Militer Dalam Politik [Military in Politics]* (pp. 13, 125), Jakarta: Rhineka Cipta, 1990.
  27. "Here is a story of how Pak Harto made his resignation easy ... Pak Harto said calmly, 'I [Suharto] was elected by the people through MPR and thereby became MPR's mandatory. If I [Suharto] am to be overthrown, it is my appointer who should do that through a Special Session ..., if MPR leadership and the factions ask me to step down subject to people's will,



- I will stand down,' ... when we [DPR/MPR leaders] appeared before him [Suharto], the process was facilitated by himself ..., because in the end, the persons who become a general are not those who suddenly show up. He is truly a patriot-fighter." Interview with Lieutenant-General Syarwan Hamid, Jakarta, 2 December 2002.
28. Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–97.
  29. "The institution determining the political position is the President, [but the one] for responsible day to day military operations is surely the HQ ... it's their responsibility when it comes to military affairs, [but] politics is the people [elected civilian officials]. That's simple, I [Gus Dur] think of nothing else." Interview with K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 28 November 2003.
  30. Some noteworthy strategies to reduce the military's role in politics taken by Wahid's administration were, for instance, the separation of the Ministry of Defence from the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, and placing a civilian as the Minister of Defence; the strict segregation between the police and the military, and by placing the military directly under the office of the President; and the dissolution of Bakorstanas and Litsus. See, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Gus Dur versus Military. A Study on Civil-Military Relationship in the Transitional Era* (p. 67.), Jakarta: Grasindo, 2002.
  31. Decree No. VII/2000, on the function of military and police, states that any promotion or dismissal of a TNI commander and Chief of Police must have the consent of the DPR. It was understandable that Bimantoro refused Wahid's request to step down, which was a further indication of how constitutionally weak the president was at that time. See, Santhy M. Sibarani, *Between Power and Professionalism* (p. 190), Jakarta: Dharmapena, 2001.
  32. Even so, Agum Gumelar believes that Habibie's weakness was evident when he recklessly gave away East Timor. His policy was considered inhumane to all members of the military regardless of their rank. Interview, 14 December 2002.
  33. "Within the profession itself there are specialists in the management of violence on sea, on land, and in the air. A military specialist is an officer who is peculiarly expert at directing the application of violence under certain prescribed conditions." See, Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
  34. An officer is [like] a professional with the ability to employ power and force. They use their strength and influence to uphold national security in the face of threats, either subversively or transparently. See Eric A. Nordlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
  35. "A consideration of two types of hardcore professionals. First, there are the mercenaries, troops whose action is against the external relation set. Then there are pretorians, soldiers whose activities are directed to the internal relation set. But before all, there must be a recounting of the leaders of these

- men, good, bad or indifferent are the worst." See Harry Holbert Turney, *The Military* (p. 248), USA: Congress Publishing House, 1981.
36. Civilian intervention seriously affects military officers. Such action is usually taken as an act of contempt to soldiers' professionalism and officers' image by changing merit-oriented criteria to politics-oriented criteria which questions the military's identity as a persona that is neutral, free and honorable, steps over the fixed hierarchy, and prevents officers' from maintaining common interests. See, Eric A. Nordlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
  37. As already recognized, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the Suharto era are among the important critical groups. Unlike other critical groups, NGOs work intensively to find ways to be critical amidst government pressure. Fundamental changes occurring in Indonesia now effect mass organizations in accordance with their characteristics. The face of power is not as rigid as it used to be and people have more opportunities to express their thoughts and demands. See, Maruto M.D. and Anwari (Eds.), *Political Reforms and People's Power* (pp. 182–183), Jakarta: LP3ES, 2002.
  38. New political parties emerged and numbered around 181, 141 of which were later validated and legalized by the Department of Justice and recorded in the government papers. From those, 48 were deemed feasible and proper to participate in the general election (1999), etc. See, Arif Yulianto, *Civil-Military Relationships in Indonesia after the New Order* (p. 363), Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2002 .
  39. In an ideal world, of course, there are no threats of coup d'état, the military will always maintain their military standing within their boundaries and only contribute constructively in national policy debates, there is no, or almost no civil-military conflicts, leaders of both the military and civil society like and respect each other, thus bringing about effective national policy. See, Michael C. Desch, *Politicians vs Generals: Civil Control over the Military amidst Shifting Currents* (p. 6), Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2002.
  40. "The awareness of the political elite in this reform [era] must not ignore national interests—a seemingly difficult feat for them. Most tend to take care of their own interests and of their own group, especially prior to General Elections, to the extent that they neglect the reform agendas such as KKN, because of political interest, thus allowing KKN to prevail. The fact is [abolishing] KKN is central to the reform agenda. But these parties, or out of obligation to the parties, have no real choice but to receive funding raised through KKN, etc." Interview with Major-General Djoko Besariman, Jakarta, 22 May 2003.
  41. See, "Military Commander Instructs his Staff to Remain Neutral", *Kompas*, 8 October, p. 6.

42. See, "Only 10 Political Parties Signed Election Results"; "Partai Demokrat receives 7.45% with 57 seats at the DPR", *Kompas*, 6 May 2004, p. 1.
43. See, "Profile of Indonesia's 2004–2009 President and Vice President"; "Megawati Soekarnoputri-KH Hasyim Muzadi, Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar, HM Amien Rais-Siswono Yudo Husodo, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-HM Jusuf Kalla, Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid, KH Abdurrahman Wahid- Marwah Daud Ibrahim", *Kompas*, 1 May 2004, p. 6.
44. See, "Wiranto Menang"; "Former TNI Commander Jend. ret. Wiranto beats Golkar Chairman Akbar Tanjung", *Kompas*, 21 April 2004, p. 1.
45. See, "Duet Yudhoyono-Jusuf, like Soekarno-Hatta", *Kompas*, 8 May 2004, p. 1.
46. See, "Hamzah-Agum to Build a New Indonesia", *Kompas*, 13 May 2004, p. 1.
47. "In general the military feels that they have advantages in discipline, responsibility, loyalty to duty and the chain of command and officers regard themselves to be true nationalists. Stated by Major-General Hindartono." Interview, Jakarta, 10 June 2003.
48. See, "Wiranto Promises Strong Government", *Kompas*, 12 May 2004, p. 1.
49. Data of the number of territorial commands of Indonesian Military Summary of Forces Appendix; Territorial forces, 10; Military area commands (Kodam), 39; Military regions (Korem), 271; Military districts (Kodim) command, around 14 Koramil each. See, Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (p. 229), Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000.
50. See, "Amien Rais Takes Military to His Side", *Kompas*, 1 December 2003, p. 9.
51. See, "Wiranto Denies Use of Kodim Network", *Kompas*, 11 October 2003, p. 6.
52. See, "Reunion of Head of Staffs and Army Retired", *Kompas*, 17 October 2003, p. 7.
53. See, "Promises Strong Government", *Kompas*, 12 May 2004, p. 1.
54. A tendency to intervene is closely related to the military influence and government bureaucracy while intra-military conflict is closely related to military evolution, organizational development and management. Intervention occurs when corps orientation is threatened by random social movement, interest groups or political parties, etc. See, Amos Perlmutter, *Military and Politics* (p. 174), Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2000.
55. Several officers holding important positions since the initial reform era are from time to time still mentioned in the news: General Wiranto, Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Major-General Djamari Chaniago and Major-General Djaja Suparman, to name a few.

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## CONCLUSION

Political scientists have used Indonesia as a useful example to analyse civil-military relations and problems related to the military's involvement in politics. Several renowned foreign political scientists have focused on the military for its point of research. These scientists include: Daniel S. Lev (*Transition to Guided Democracy in Indonesia 1957–1959*, 1964), Harold Crouch (*Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 1978), Ulf Sundhaussen (*Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1947*, 1982), Arnold C. Brackman (*Communist Collapse in Indonesia*, 2000), Michael R.J. Vatikiotis (*Indonesian Politics Under Suharto*, 1993), Donald K. Emmerson (*Indonesia Beyond Soeharto*, 2001), Edward Aspinall (*The Last Days of President Suharto*, 1999), Bilveer Singh (*Civil-Military Relations Revisited: The Future of The Indonesian Armed Forces in Indonesian Politics*, 1999), Leonard C. Sebastian (*Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force*, 2006). Many Indonesian academic researchers specializing in politics have also analysed the same topic. The long-term dynamics of military political behaviour in Indonesia provides an array of research topics on the military.

The TNI of today is the result of extensive, dynamic military politics in Indonesia. The Indonesian military, which had over a long period of time (1952–1998) consistently played a political role that was formally institutionalized in 1958 and further codified in 1982, saw its reputation collapse as dramatically at the end of the New Order regime, though not suffering the same terminal decline as its long-time mentor, President

Suharto, did on 21 May 1998. The era of transformation marked by the change of government under President Habibie began the process of change that would transform the military from a politically oriented institution to a professional military organization. Society exerted strong pressure to demand that the military no longer intervene in political agencies and, in April 2000, the civilian government finally brought about the abolition of ABRI's dual-function doctrine, which had long been the foundation of military politics in Indonesia.

The steady decline of military involvement in practical political affairs was not only due to the legislation issued to control the military's role (UU No. 3/2002 and UU No. 34/2004) or the military's internal reform agenda, but was also the by-product of the strengthening role of civilian political agencies like the DPR resulting from the outcomes of two democratic elections, the first in 1999 (in which 48 political parties registered) and the second in 2004 (in which 24 political parties registered). This created a conducive climate for civilian government supremacy over the military. In the reform era, the executive agency (the President) and the legislative agency (the DPR), contributed almost equally in controlling the role of the military through the employment of check-and-balance policies on the military that finally induced it to conform to the control of the civilian political leadership. This situation led to the application of adequate civilian guidance capable of moderating if not managing the military's role through limiting its authority and restricting its moves to oppose the policies civilian politicians.

The objective term of civilian supremacy used in civil-military relations, refers the outcome of democratic processes that provide the legal umbrella strong enough for a civilian leader in the executive agency (the President) and the legislative agency (the DPR), as well as the judiciary agency (the Supreme Court), further validated by the results of a general election was supported directly by the public to lay the groundwork of legitimacy to support civilian control over the military. Civilian control over the military is based upon the principle that the military is a part (subordinate) of the executive government that must submit to the authority of the democratic civilian government (led by the President). This executive authority must account for its own policies, including the

decision to allocate the authority or military a supervisory role to the legislative agency (DPR) and the Supreme Court if required. As part of the executive authority in a democratic government like Indonesia, the military cannot determine its own authority or its role without political sanction from the President and the DPR. In fact, the appointment and dismissal of military leaders is determined by the civilian government led by the President but subject to the DPR's agreement.<sup>1</sup> Apart from that, the military is forbidden to involve itself in political affairs and the practice of politics.<sup>2</sup>

However, a set of regulations and a democratic political system does not automatically ensure a professional military free from interventionist political mindsets. In the course of this research, sources have revealed that internal reform involving changes to the structure, doctrine and culture of the TNI did not undergo a sudden transformation towards professionalism. The greatest obstacle is overcoming the ingrained culture of the military that had for so long been involved in politics through the dual-function doctrine and such attitudes were resistant to sudden change.

Problem solving through the use of military methods are redundant in the reform era, which required a more persuasive and open dialogue. Therefore, the military is positioned as the state defence force detached from social affairs in the pattern of the New Order period. A move towards military professionalism is one solution taken by TNI leaders and the government as a means to reduce military political interests so that the military can function consistently as a defence force.

Military professionalism as a means of reducing political culture is almost impossible to achieve without support from the government and civil society. The lack of military pressure to gain political control contributes towards achieving the goal of military professionalism. Budgeting allows for increased military capacity, further military education, the implementation of military exercises, the availability of military means and supplies of adequate modern equipment. An adequate military budget ensures improved conditions for officers welfare and provides facilities and infrastructure within their work environment as well as in their home environment. A decent lifestyle supports efforts to create

professional soldiers orientated to success. Limitations in the government budget and a paltry allocation for the military (until 2006, less than five per cent of the Indonesian GDP) are obstacles in the realization of a professional military.

Military theoreticians in the past have stated that involving the military in political affairs was not entirely based on a strong sense of nationalism from within the military. The failure of the civilian government to manage the country in such dire economic situations and under conditions of political instability allowed the military to appear as the nation's rescuer.<sup>3</sup> In these circumstances, the transition period in Indonesia that began in 1998 was an opportune period for the military to return to the political arena. Therefore, it was not surprising to find political parties backing leading military figures as candidates for the positions of president and vice-president in the 2004 general elections.

The TNI in President Yudhoyono's administration (2004–present) still faces criticism from civilian circles. The implementation of internal military reform still lack real commitment to professionalism and the tardy implementation of laws related to TNI matters undermines the military's earnest public statements to carry out its reform agenda. On the other hand, the military claims that its intention to become more professional is actually hindered by the budgetary constraints. Civil-military relations in Indonesia continue to be bogged down amidst these controversies and constraints.

Overall, the control of the civilian government over the military under the current administration is superior to previous ones. The fact that President Yudhoyono came from the military is possibly a reason why the military honours civilian supremacy under his tenure. Several developments sensitive to the military—the Helsinki peace agreement between the government and GAM signed on 15 April 2005 and followed by the arrival of the Aceh Monitoring Mission from Europe and Asia; the Malaysian government's unilateral claim on Ambalat (believed to be in Indonesian territory) on 8 March 2005; the issue of 42 temporary political asylum visas for 42 Indonesian citizens from Papua by the Australian government on 23 March 2006—did not alter the military's

position towards the Yudhoyono government's approach to addressing these issues. In fact, the military, which is sensitive to NKRI-related problems, appreciates the government's response and is prepared to carry out government policies on these above. These developments are good indicators that civilian control over the military is proceeding effectively under Yudhoyono's leadership.

The U.S. government's weapons embargo against the TNI since 1999 was withdrawn on 23 November 2005. The withdrawal of the embargo marks the improvement of Indonesia's military relations with the United States. However, civil society harshly criticized the military for allowing a civilian (a supplier for TNI-AU) to be caught conducting business on behalf of the military in Hawaii on 9 April 2006. The gradual growth of TNI businesses that used disproportional export credits, the practice of KKN to procure military requirements, the TNI's neglect of officer welfare, a lack of commitment to developing strategic industries, and the inability to prioritize military expenses are criticisms levelled against the military by civil society. Criticism has also been aimed directly at President Yudhoyono for cancelling the appointment of the candidate for TNI commander (in October 2004) and the appointment of Pangkostrad Major-General Erwin Sudjono (on 2 May 2006), who is the president's brother-in-law.

Although President Yudhoyono may have control over the military, he could not have effectively applied his policies over the military without civil society's support. On the other hand, the military seems to now have a better grasp of political realities and the special challenges it faces during this reform era. Such improvement is demonstrated by the military leaders' moves to follow up recommendations made during DPR hearings with the TNI and the Department of Defence. While a promising development, a note of caution is necessary since implementation is still in progress and the author remains doubtful that an emergence of a professional military and ideal civil-military relations will be attained in the near future.

Below are several important conclusions that the results of this research has provided as the basis for future changes for TNI specifically, and Indonesia in general.



### Internal TNI Reform

The main reason behind the internal TNI reform is strong community pressure. Society has demanded that the military cease engaging in politics and the abolition of the dual function of ABRI. This pressure accompanied an internal awareness within the military on the necessity to redefine ABRI's dual function by reducing its intervention in political affairs and by a reduction in the military's domination over civilian agencies (*Kekaryaan*). ABRI Commander General Wiranto and Kassospol ABRI Lieutenant-General Yudhoyono were the main contributors who helped to formulate and decide the course of policy for TNI internal reform. The military was aware that civil society did not support the authoritarian regime of the New Order headed by President Suharto so they produced the collective agreement to support the process of national reform through constitutional means. Internal ABRI reform was the logical consequence of the military's support for the implementation of the national reform agenda that began on 21 May 1998.

### Civil-Military Relations in the Reform Era

Civilian supremacy has not been able to control the military under the authority of objective civilian government politics. In the post-New Order era, the military no longer dominates civil-military relations. The diminished role of the military in politics has not affected its bargaining power on civilian government policies. The military stands equal with civil society in determining the process of political policies. Formally, the military is no longer involved in political affairs but in reality civilian politics needs military influence to support its interests and goals.

Civil-military relations have moved on from the New Order era to become a relationship of mutual benefit. Conditions during the terms of President Habibie (1998–1999) and President Megawati (2001–2004) induced harmonious civil-military relations (minimal conflict), where civilian leaders and the military elite supported each other. Poor civil military relations were experienced during Wahid's presidency (1999–2001), when the two sides could not get along well enough to resolve disputes. Positive civil-military relations in the transition period in Indonesia were balanced relations where the civilian government gave the military an opportunity

to be involved in formulating national policies related to military interests without the military becoming involved directly in politics

### **Implications of Civil-Military Relations**

Positive developments included establishing close cooperation between civilian and military leaders, creating a stable government, avoiding conflict and ensuring the implementation of national development programmes that included the running of two successful democratic general elections. The outcome of the 2004 general elections gave rise to a democratic civilian government (the executive, legislative and judiciary) that has been able to take tentative steps in establishing civilian supremacy and maintaining firm objective control over the military. Ideal civil-military relations occur when a civilian government uses objective control over the military, where government civil political authority presides in any dispute with the military, and results in the military submitting to the civilian authority.

### **Military Professionalism**

The withdrawal of the military from politics has not automatically resulted in a transformation of the military into a professional outfit. Military professionalism in Indonesia is a long-term goal. The determination and the commitment of TNI leaders towards military professionalism face two main obstacles: budget restraints and the cultural limitations or officer mentality, which have not yet adapted to the demise of the dual-function ABRI culture. Military professionalism is still in the policy-making phase and has not been implemented due to technical obstacles. Until now, the military has interpreted professionalism merely as the freeing of officers from intervening in political affairs to focus on the task of defending the country. Professionalism has not yet touched on the aspects of adequate provision of and skills to utilize modern military equipment, weapons and facilities as important prerequisites for a strong professional military.

### **The Implementation of Internal Military Reform**

Although many critics feel that military reform has not changed the orientation of military politics or succeeded in forming the model of a

professional officer, the military feels that some concrete changes have taken place within its internal structure. Institutionally, the abolition of the ABRI dual-function doctrine, the dissolution of social-political ABRI agencies, the abolition of the ABRI temporary duty, the prohibition of an ABRI delegation in the legislative agency (2004), the separation of the police from ABRI, have all restricted the military from the external environment to focus itself on the task of defending the country. The greatest impact on the military is the limitation on its authority in social interactions external to military tasks. This state of affairs is directly related to the increasing shortage of funds available to military leaders for the purpose of improving officer welfare. Fourteen internal ABRI reform agendas were carried out from 1 April 1999 to October 2004, marked by the change of name of ABRI to TNI, followed by new paradigms for the TNI role, the separation of the police from the TNI, to the abolition of the dual-function doctrine, and culminating with the recall of military representatives from the DPR. Officers realized that internal military reform has not yet affected any change in the military culture and have so far been unable to free themselves from their political past and transform itself into a professional military. The military proper remains interested in political matters despite their TNI leaders prohibiting their involvement in any political activity.

### **Role of Military Leaders in Suharto's Resignation on 21 May 1998**

General Wiranto, as the Minister for Defence and Security and ABRI Commander Military, took full responsibility in supporting the transfer of authority from President Suharto to Habibie after deliberating on inputs provided by ABRI Headquarters staff on society's fierce opposition to the government of the day and growing public pressure to topple Suharto from power. As ABRI Commander, Wiranto was acknowledged as the key military figure who played a decisive role in the transition of power from Suharto to Habibie. Wiranto's refusal to accept Presidential Mandate No. 16/1998 that appointed the Minister for Defence and Security/ABRI Commander as Commander of the National Safety and Vigilance Operation became the factor that toppled President Suharto from his position as president. Kassospol ABRI Lieutenant-General Yudhoyono, proclaimed

to be the architect of internal ABRI reform, was the leading military figure who played an important role in influencing the policy of the ABRI commander by responding directly to political situations taking place in this era of national reform. Results of this research refute speculation that a dualism of ABRI leadership existed at that time, proving that military command was under the complete control of the ABRI commander. The assumption of internal military conflict and polarization of the military following the incident on 21 May 1998 is not confirmed in this research. The conflict that took place between Lieutenant-General Prabowo and General Wiranto is not representative of military internal conflict but of an entirely personal nature generated by their competition to gain Suharto's trust.

### **Prospects of the Military in the Transition Era**

The military is still remains attracted to politics. There are numerous examples to illustrate this contention. Many officers who were involved in various political incidents in the national reform era still currently occupy important military positions. The era of transition—expected to last until 2009—will make it possible for the military to re-enter the political arena. This potential will become real if the civilian government of the day fails to advance social welfare, create national stability and maintain national unity. On the other hand, the military will submit to civilian leadership if civilian politics can lay the basis for stable national politics, improve public welfare and gain strong public support. The legitimization of a strong civilian leadership and the success of ongoing economic development will guarantee the military's submission to the civilian government and bring about a professional military that is detached from politics.

### **Officers' Concept of Ideal Civil-Military Relations**

In general, TNI officers perceive ideal civil-military relations as having at least five conditions: (i) the military submits to the democratically elected civilian government without exception; (ii) the civilian government involves the military in the process of national decision-making; (iii) the civilian government understands military issues and honours the

military's internal autonomy; (iv) the civilian authority provides adequate welfare for soldiers and a sufficient military budget; and (v) there is no civil-military dichotomy in social life and the military's role is respected as a part of the national system.

## NOTES

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1. TAP MPR No. VII/2000 on the role of TNI and Polri: DPR-RI approval to appoint and dismiss the TNI Army Commander and Chief of Police. See, Santhy M. Sibarani, *Antara Kekuasaan dan Profesionalisme* (p. 190), Jakarta: Dharmapena, 2001.
2. TAP MPR No. VII/MPR/2000, Article 5: TNI takes a neutral stance in politics and does not involve itself in practical political affairs. The substance of both TAP MPR is accommodated in Article UU No. 3/2002 and UU No. 34/2004 that regulates State security and TNI. The relevant Act that regulates the RI Police Force is UU No. 2/2002.
3. It appears that problems of future civil-military relations in new democratic countries will not originate from the military but instead from civil society. Problems will arise due to the inability of a democratic government to stimulate economic development and maintain law and order. The best method of measuring civil-military relations is to observe how civil and military leaders manage policy disputes among themselves. See, Larry Diamond and March F. Plattner, *Hubungan Sipil Militer & Konsolidasi Demokrasi* (p. 15), Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 2000.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS & INDONESIAN TERMS USED

Acronym	Name in Indonesian	Name in English
ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia	Indonesian Armed Forces (now TNI)
ADRI	Angkatan Darat Republik Indonesia	Indonesian Army
AKABRI	Akademi ABRI	Armed Forces Academy
ALRI	Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia	Indonesian Navy
AMN	Akademi Militer Nasional	National Military Academy
APBD	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah	Regional (Administrative) Budget
APBN	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara	State Budget
AURI		Indonesian Air Force
BAIS		Army Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency
Bakin		State Intelligence Coordinating Body (State Intelligence Coordinating Board 2nd ref board)
Bakorinda	Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah	Regional Intelligence Coordinating Agency
Bakorstanas		Agency for the Coordination of Support for the Development of National Stability
Bakorwil	Badan Koordinasi Wilayah	Regional Coordinating Agency
Balitbang	Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan	Research and Development Division/Agency
BIN	Badan Inteligen Nasional	National Intelligence Agency (formerly Bakin)
Bulog	Badan Urusan Logistik	State Logistics Agency
Danjen (Kopassus)		Commander General of Special Troop Commandoes
Danrem	Komandan Militer	Military Commander



<b>Depanri</b>		National Aeronautics and Aviation Council
<b>Deparlu</b>	Departemen Luar Negeri	Department of Foreign Affairs
<b>Depdagri</b>	Departemen Dalam Negeri	Home Affairs Department
<b>Dewan Syuro/ Syura/Syuriah</b>	Advisory board	
<b>DOM</b>	Daerah Operasi Militer	Military Operational Area
<b>DPD</b>	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah	Regional Representatives Council
<b>DPP</b>		Central Executive Board
<b>DPR</b>	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat	People's Representative Assembly, House of Representatives
<b>DPRD</b>	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah	Provincial Legislative Council, Local Assembly, Regional House of Representatives
<b>DPRD I</b>		Provincial Legislative Council for provinces; City Council for cities
<b>DPRD II</b>		Regional Legislative Council for provinces; City Council for cities
<b>GAM</b>	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka	Free Aceh Movement
<b>Golkar</b>	Golongan Karya (translates as functional group), the government-backed ruling political organization	
<b>GOI</b>		Government of Indonesia
<b>Hankamnas</b>		National Defence and Security Board
<b>Jaksa Agung</b>		Attorney General
<b>Kabulog</b>	Kepala Badan Urusan Logistik	Head/Director of the State Logistics Agency
<b>Kamra</b>		People's Security Unit (militia)

<b>Kanwil</b>	Kantor Wilayah	Regional Offices (district offices of the central government located in the provinces)
<b>Kapolres</b>	Kepala Polisi Resort	District Police Chief
<b>Kapolsek</b>	Kepala Polisi Sektor	Sectoral Police Chief
<b>Kapolda</b>	Kepala Polis Daerah	Regional Police Chiefs
<b>Kassospol</b>	Kepala Staf Sosial Politik ABRI	Chief of Staff for Social Political Affairs ABRI
<b>Kaster</b>	Kepala Staf Teritorial	Chief of Territorial Affairs
<b>Kejati</b>	Kejaksaan Tinggi	Chief Public Prosecutor
<b>Kesbang</b>	Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat	National Unity and Social Protection Agency
<b>Kesra</b>	Kesejahteraan Rakyat	People's Welfare
<b>KHN</b>	Komisi Hukum Nasional	National Law Commission
<b>Kodam</b>	Komando Daerah Militer	Regional Military Command
<b>Kodiklat</b>		Military Education and Training Command in Bandung
<b>Kodim</b>	Komando Distrik Militer	District Military Command
<b>Kombes</b>	Komisaris Jenderal	Commissioner/ Superintendent
<b>Komjen</b>	Komisaris Jenderal	Commissioner General (police)
<b>Komjen Pol</b>	Komisaris Jenderal Polisi	Police General Commissioner
<b>Koopskam</b>	Komando Operasi Keamanan	Security Operation Command
<b>Kopassus</b>	Komando Pasukan Khusus	Army Special Forces (Red Berets)
<b>Kopkamtib</b>		Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (now a defunct internal security agency)
<b>Koramil</b>	Komando Rayon Militer	Sub-District Military Command (Kecamatan) level
<b>Korem</b>	Komando Resort Militer	Military Command at a level below the residency

<b>Kostrad</b>	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat	Army Strategic Reserves Command (green berets)
<b>KSAD</b>	Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat	Army Chief/Army Chief of Staff
<b>KSAL</b>	Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut	Navy Chief/Navy Chief of Staff
<b>KSAU</b>	Kepala Staf Angkatan Udara	Air Force Chief/Air Force Chief of Staff
<b>Lemhannas</b>		National Resilience Institute
<b>Lesperssi</b>	Lembaga Studi Pertahanan dan Studi Strategis Indonesia	Indonesian Foundation for Defense and Strategic Studies
<b>Letda</b>	Letnan Muda	Second Lieutenant
<b>LKIN</b>		Coordinating Institute of National Intelligence
<b>Mabes</b>	Markas Besar	Headquarters
<b>Mahkamah Agung</b>		Supreme Court
<b>Makoramil</b>	Mabes Komando Rayon Militer	Sub-District Military Command (Kecamatan) level headquarters
<b>Mendag</b>	Menteri Perdagangan	Trade Minister/Minister of Trade
<b>Mendagri</b>	Menteri Dalam Negeri	Home Affairs Minister/Internal Affairs Minister
<b>Menhut</b>	Menteri Kehutanan	Minister of Forestry
<b>Menkeu</b>	Menteri Keuangan	Finance Minister
<b>Menko Kesra</b>	Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat	Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare
<b>Menkopolkam</b>		Minister/Ministry of Politics, Legal and Security Affairs
<b>Menlu</b>	Menteri Luar Negeri	Minister of Foreign Affairs
<b>Mensesneg</b>	Menteri Sekretaris Negara	State Secretary
<b>Mentan</b>	Menteri Pertahanan	Defence Minister
<b>MPR</b>	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat	People's Consultative Assembly

<b>MPRS</b>		Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
<b>Munas</b>	Musyawahar Nasional	National Deliberative Council
<b>NKRI</b>	Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia	The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
<b>Pamswakarsa</b>		Civilian guards, civilian security force (military-backed vigilante squads)
<b>PAN</b>	Partai Amanat Nasional	National Mandate Party
<b>Panja</b>	Panitia Kerja	Working Committee
<b>Pangdam</b>	Panglima Daerah Militar	Regional Military Commander
<b>Pangdam Jaya</b>	Panglima Jakarta	Jakarta Military Commander
<b>Pansus</b>	Panatia Khusus	Special Committee
<b>Panwas Pilkada</b>	Panitia Pengawas Pilkada	Election Supervisory Committee at the regional level
<b>Panwaslak or Panwaslakpus</b>		Election Supervisory Committee
<b>Panwaslu</b>	Panitia Pengawas Pemilu	Election Supervisory Committee
<b>Paskas</b>		Air Force's special force
<b>PDIP</b>	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle
<b>Pemda</b>	Pemerintah Daerah	Regional Government
<b>Pemkab</b>	Pemerintah Kabupaten	Regional Government
<b>PEPABRI</b>		Armed Forces Veterans Association
<b>Perda</b>	Peraturan Daerah	Government regulation/by-law
<b>Perpres</b>	Peraturan President	Presidential Regulation/Decree
<b>Perpu</b>	Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang	Government Regulation in lieu of (and with the authority of) a law

PETA	Pembela Tanah Air	Defenders of the Fatherland PETA was one of several militias that were incorporated, after the proclamation of independence in August 1945, to become the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Corps). The BKR later became the republic's military, now known as the Armed Forces (ABRI), which was established on 5 October 1945.
PKB		National Awakening Party
PKP	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan	Justice and Unity Party
PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party
PKS		Justice and Prosperity Party
Pokja		Working Group
Polda	Polisi Daerah	Local police/regional police
Polres	Kepolisian Resor	District police
Polri		National Police
Polsekta	Polisi Sektor	Sectoral Police
Poltabes	Kepolisian Kota Besar	City/Municipal Police
Polwil	Kepolisian Wilayah	District police
PP	Peraturan Pemerintah	Government Regulation
PPB	Partai Persatuan Bangsa	National Unity Party
PPD I		Provincial Elections Committee
PPD II		Regional Elections Committee
PPI		Indonesian Workers Party
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	United Development Party
PUDI	Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia	Indonesian Democratic Union Party
Puskopal		Hospitals run by the navy, the army and the air force.

<b>Puskopau</b>		Indonesian Air Force Cooperative
<b>RAPBD</b>	Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah	Draft Regional (Administrative) Budget
<b>RAPBN</b>	Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara	Proposed State Budget
<b>Seskab</b>	Sekretaris Kabinet	Cabinet Secretary
<b>Sesko</b>		Military Staff and Command School
<b>Seskoad</b>		Army Staff and Command School (not College, not SESKOAD)
<b>Supersemar</b>		11 March 1966 Presidential Executive Order
<b>Tapol</b>		Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
<b>TMMD</b>	TNI Manunggal Membangun Desa	Integration of TNI with the people to develop the villages
<b>TNI</b>		Indonesian National Defence Force/Armed Forces
<b>Tontaikam</b>	Detasemen Intelijen Tempur	Intelligence Platoon Detachment (Kostrad)
<b>Tontaipur</b>	Peleton Intai Tempur	Surveillance Combat Platoon (Kostrad)
<b>TPN</b>	Tentara Pembebasan Nasional	National Liberation Army (armed wing of the OPM)
<b>UU</b>	Undang-Undang	Law/act
<b>Wanhankamnas</b>		National Defence and Security Council
<b>Wanjakti</b>		Council for High Ranking Promotions and Duty Rotations
<b>Wanra</b>		People's Resistance
<b>WIB</b>	Waktu Indonesia Barat	Indonesian Western Time Zone
<b>WIT</b>	Waktu Indonesia Timur	Indonesian Eastern Time Zone



One of the most critical issues in post-Suharto Indonesia is how to reconfigure the role of the TNI, which, since 1965, had been the major socio-political force in Indonesia and the principle backer of the Suharto regime. Since the end of the Suharto era in 1998, the military has withdrawn from political life and sought to enhance its professional skills by focusing on external defence. Despite the fact that elected officials are now expected to determine policy outcomes, has civilian oversight of the TNI been realized?

As a member of the Parliamentary Committee that is expected to exercise civilian oversight in defence matters, Dr. Yuddy Chrisnandi is uniquely placed to analyse this issue. His presentation is based on themes related to a recently completed manuscript on post-Suharto civil-military relations in Indonesia. In this monograph, he analyses the nature of the relationship between the TNI and the four post-Suharto administrations, focusing on whether each of the post-Suharto presidents have been able to establish civilian oversight over the TNI, suggests what lessons we can learn from these experiences and provides us with insights on the future of the TNI.



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