



# Regional Consultation on The Responsibility to Protect

Organised By The RSIS Centre For Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies

CENTRE FOR  
NON-TRADITIONAL  
SECURITY STUDIES



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# REGIONAL CONSULTATION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RtoP)

ORGANISED BY  
THE RSIS CENTRE FOR NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY (NTS) STUDIES

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*This report summarises the proceedings of the consultation as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editors of the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.*

*This consultation adhered to Chatham House Rules. Accordingly, no attributions to speakers and attendees have been made.*

## Executive Summary

Five years have passed since the signing of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, when United Nations (UN) member states agreed to the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Contained in paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document is a commitment by states to prevent four specific types of mass atrocities – ethnic cleansing, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It was a significant commitment outlining sovereignty as responsibility. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states were part of this historic signing, recalling incidents of mass atrocities in their own region, such as in Cambodia and East Timor. Since the 2005 World Summit, there have been numerous regional developments, within Southeast Asia, in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning mechanisms and protection frameworks for its populations, such as the recent establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). However, there has been little discussion on what traction exists and how to operationalise RtoP in the region. In addition, there have been few avenues in Southeast Asia, for policymakers, civil society members, academics and the media to collectively discuss how RtoP is viewed in the region, how it can be better promoted and whether there are any lessons to be learned from past experiences in the region.

It was with these issues in mind that the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, convened the 'Regional Consultation on RtoP' from 8 to 9 April 2010.

The regional consultation had the following objectives:

- Map out and understand different stakeholders' perceptions of RtoP in Asia to track conceptual development
- Analyse the operationalisation of RtoP in Southeast Asia and other Asian sub-regions
- Examine regional mechanisms to promote RtoP in Southeast Asia and beyond

The main findings are as follows:

- **Lack of awareness and understanding of RtoP**  
There needs to be more active promotion of the RtoP definition, explanation of its development and how it can be operationalised in Southeast Asia.
- **ASEAN acceptance of RtoP with reservations**  
Despite accepting the RtoP doctrine in 2005, ASEAN governments are now having reservations about Pillar III. ASEAN governments agree with the use of diplomatic measures in Pillar III but they are strongly resistant to the idea of military intervention in the region. Such reservations are linked to ASEAN's colonial history and its principle of non-interference.
- **Definitional challenges to mass atrocities**  
'Crimes against humanity' is one of the four mass atrocities a state should protect its population from. However, there is no internationally or regionally agreed upon definition for it as there is for genocide, which poses challenges to identifying such a crime.

- **No regional champion to promote RtoP**

Currently, there is no government in the region that champions RtoP. The RtoP doctrine would have more traction in the region if one or more ASEAN member states were to champion and advocate it. However, no state was identified as a potential RtoP champion.

- **Divergence of opinion between overseas and national representatives**

There needs to be better communication between country capitals and their UN representatives in New York. Often UN member state representatives make statements to receive greater acceptance and support in the UN that do not accurately reflect national feeling or policy. This poses a significant challenge to understanding what traction international norms have within states and regions.

- **Limited entry points for RtoP in ASEAN regional mechanisms**

There is limited scope to promote RtoP through the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) because of their mandates. However other regional fora may provide better entry points and deserve further investigation.

- **Encourage engagement and recognition of civil society**

The main advocates for RtoP in the region are members of civil society. For example, in Indonesia, there has been a concerted effort to raise awareness on Pillars I and II by civil society organisations (CSOs). To gain traction in the region, civil society engagement needs to be better incorporated into the regional RtoP agenda.

- **Strengthen early warning mechanisms**

RtoP provides a framework for strengthening early warning mechanisms. Strong early warning mechanisms are the least controversial among ASEAN member states and are a key component to help prevent mass atrocities in the region. These mechanisms should be developed and implemented.

- **Institutional collaboration to promote RtoP**

In order to advocate RtoP more effectively, the doctrine needs to be linked to national human rights institutions, such as to the four national human rights commissions in the region; regional human rights entities, such as AICHR and ACWC; and international level human rights organisations, such as the Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR).

## Welcome Remarks

*Ambassador Barry Desker*

*Dean*

*S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies*

*Nanyang Technological University*

Ambassador Barry Desker extended a warm welcome to all participants of the 'Regional Consultation on RtoP' hosted by the Centre for NTS Studies in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).

Ambassador Desker noted that in the decades since the Holocaust, there have been several mass atrocities in places as diverse as Cambodia, Rwanda, Kosovo and more recently in Darfur. These events have shocked the world and exposed states and non-state actors, who have been complicit in or have caused this violence. Consequently, there has been international pressure to mount an effective response. In an era where media is transmitted globally, there has been a heightened outcry on why nothing has been done about such mass atrocities. To the international community, this has brought into question not only the role of state and non-state actors, but also the responsibility that both hold.

This international moral dilemma has resulted in a discussion on the right to humanitarian intervention, which has evolved into RtoP. The RtoP principle rests on three pillars. First, each state is responsible for protecting its populations from mass atrocities, including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Second, if a state is unable to protect its population on its own, the international community has the responsibility to assist the state in building its capacity, such as the

strengthening of early warning systems. Third, if a state is unwilling to protect its population and peaceful measures have failed, then the international community has the responsibility to intervene first with diplomatic measures, such as sanctions, and then with military force as a last resort (if diplomatic measures fail).

Ambassador Desker emphasised that RtoP is an innovative concept, which introduces the notion of state sovereignty as responsibility. This imposes an obligation on the state towards its people, as well as accords the state certain international privileges. For instance, states would have to worry less about unwanted foreign intervention, if they meet their obligations to respect the fundamental human rights of their populations.

In Ambassador Desker's opinion, there are three issues which are of paramount importance within the RtoP framework:

- The discussion on RtoP cannot be reduced to a simplistic dichotomy, where states insist on absolute sovereignty and non-state actors insist on the absolute right to intervene.
- The concept of RtoP needs to be applied without hidden agendas or political biases. One such instance is the expansion of the definition beyond the agreed upon framework at the 2005 UN World Summit, to cover humanitarian intervention in pariah states such as Myanmar. Not doing so could undermine the application of the concept both regionally and globally.

## WELCOME REMARKS

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- It is important to recognise that states do have legitimate concerns about outside intervention, that may be intrusive, and intentions which are not entirely altruistic.

The heart of the discussion lies in what the limits to RtoP are and whether there are specific, regional characteristics to it. A lot of debate has taken place and is still taking place on how RtoP can be put into practice. The UN Secretary-General's recommendations on Pillars I and II are an excellent point of departure. However there are difficulties regarding Pillar III. Some of the contentious points that emerged in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) debate last July include:

- Requiring RtoP to be applied non-selectively and consistently
- Restricting the scope of RtoP to the four specified areas of mass atrocities
- Calling for restraint in the veto by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Ambassador Desker stressed that it must be recognised that RtoP has certain limitations in focus and scope and is often described as a norm that is 'narrow, but deep'. RtoP gives countries choices to respond to the four crimes that range from direct interventions to standing by and doing nothing. This regional consultation is important for mapping and understanding different shareholders' perceptions on RtoP in Asia and understanding the operationalisation of the doctrine in the region.

He concluded by stating that there is a broad consensus in Southeast Asia that RtoP is a worthy principle. Even though ASEAN states have specific concerns regarding its implementation, they have welcomed the prevention of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Ambassador Desker acknowledged that the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies aims to serve as a platform for discussions and debates on RtoP. He recalled the Protection of Civilians Workshop organised by the Centre in February 2010 as evidence of its work in this area.

## Opening Remarks

*Associate Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony  
Head  
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, and  
Secretary-General  
Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Nanyang Technological University*

Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony welcomed everyone on behalf of the Centre for NTS Studies. She recalled that it has been five years since the historic 2005 World Summit where world leaders unanimously agreed on the concept of RtoP as a new international norm. She emphasised that what is required now is operationalisation. This however, she pointed out is easier said than done because 'it takes some time for ideas to be accepted'.

In general, Professor Caballero-Anthony noted that ASEAN member states are receptive to the promotion of RtoP. However, she identified concerns over national sovereignty, which continue to hinder its universalisation in the ASEAN region. In addition, she acknowledged that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states has been a guiding principle of the regional grouping ever since its inception. Nevertheless, she felt that these challenges are not insurmountable.

Professor Caballero-Anthony concluded that the Centre for NTS Studies is committed to taking the discussion forward and has been doing so through various fora such as consultative meetings and conferences, bringing together people from diverse backgrounds to identify ways to operationalise RtoP in the region.



## Session 1: An Overview of RtoP – Conceptual Issues and Challenges in Asia

The first session gave an overview of perspectives on RtoP at the global and regional levels. In particular, diverging support for Pillars I, II and III was presented and questions on 'sovereignty' and 'community' were discussed.

### A Global Overview of RtoP

There is no clear global understanding of how to implement RtoP. While there is some consensus globally around Pillars I and II, regionally and even sub-regionally, there is less support for military intervention included in Pillar III. Further, there are still some questions about what a globally acceptable understanding of crimes against humanity is, and in what situation and form RtoP applies. From the perspective of those based in New York, there is a lack of understanding on how and to what extent RtoP resonates in Asia. There is an assumption in New York, based on the actions of Asian states when they are in the Security Council, that the notion of sovereignty resonates far more in Asia than in other parts of the world. One of the challenges in understanding how and to what extent RtoP resonates in the region is bridging the gap in the official positions taken by states and the actual sentiments of the people on ground.

Other key challenges include: (1) an evaluation of the understanding and misconceptions of Pillar III; (2) the lack of regional and international awareness, and champions; (3) mobilising a global grassroots movement and; (4) the way forward for promoting RtoP domestically, regionally and internationally. One of the most recent RtoP achievements was the support for the doctrine found at the recent UNGA debate. There was a strong shift in positions from some of the key states, including the Philippines. Additionally, constructive statements came from China, Russia, the Philippines and Myanmar. There was a movement in support of RtoP from significant regional actors such as Indonesia, which went as far as highlighting the importance of Pillar III. It is critical to put the agreed upon principles into operational practice, and the consolidation of RtoP depends on the capacity of states to live up to their pledged commitments.

A salient example of the gap between a nation's true commitment to RtoP and opportunistic political rhetoric is that of Canada. Canada has a strong leadership role in

RtoP and is an interesting case, as its policy on RtoP has been subjected to personality-driven politics. Prior to 2006, Canada's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister drove the RtoP agenda forward, which even saw the founding of an informal UN group of states, the 'Friends of RtoP' in 2006. However, after the 2006 elections, a conservative government was elected which subsequently banned the language of RtoP. This ban has since been overturned. However, this example raises questions as to how deep a nation's commitment to RtoP is, and if the doctrine can transcend political changes, and at the same time reflect the political desires of a nation.

Regionally, however, the status and ability of the 'Friends of RtoP' to act as a galvaniser is more debatable. While Singapore and Korea are currently members of the 'Friends of RtoP' and the Philippines was discussed as a potential member, there is a need for real leadership from Southern states. Under the new co-chair of the Netherlands and Rwanda, perhaps a more robust engagement will emerge, but the 'Friends of RtoP' is still seen as exclusive and largely Western-driven. Given the concerns among Southern states about RtoP, it is important to look for multiple and alternative avenues in advancing RtoP, both with the UN and regionally, such as in Africa and Southeast Asia.

One of the most promising regional areas where the RtoP agenda is finding traction is Africa, as there is a wide acceptance of Pillars I and II and considerable acceptance of Pillar III. There have been many early warning initiatives, such as the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which were useful in the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia. In addition, there is the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and the creation of five African standby forces. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are very active within Africa, and they have a unique status in the African Union (AU) where they can authorise resolutions themselves.

Latin America is similar to Asia, in that there is strong support for Pillars I and II, but not Pillar III. Latin America is not very comfortable applying RtoP in its own region, as it views RtoP as a concept affecting other parts of the world, a sentiment shared in Southeast Asia. Some states in North America are less enthused about Pillars I and II as they already see Pillar III and military assistance as an onerous obligation.

In addition, there has been a decrease in international funding due to the recent economic recession. It appears Canada will limit the amount of funding it puts in projects related to the rule of law and security sector reform, which is part of a wider trend. This raises real questions about how RtoP can move forward if major funders are curtailing their international assistance.

The least promising region is the Middle East, where engagement on RtoP has been rather opportunistic and the use of the concept is only referred to in the case of Palestine.

On the latest developments in the UN Joint Office, the policy committee met in March and will develop an inter-agency framework, which will allow high-level officials to discuss emergency crisis issues and have a direct feed into the secretariat. The policy committee has requested that UN agencies report on how they are mainstreaming RtoP. There is going to be another discussion in the UNGA on RtoP but focused on early warning mechanisms at the regional, sub-regional and international level.

Overall, RtoP has gained traction globally, however, it must be recognised as a top-down agenda. It needs to be considered against regional, sub-regional and national realities. An important distinction must be made between what UN ambassadors, representing their countries, say, and what is implemented on the ground.

### **An ASEAN Overview of RtoP**

ASEAN struggles between two words – ‘sovereignty’ and ‘community’; ideas which are used very liberally in discussions but which the Association has not managed to resolve conceptually. A case in point is the creation of AICHR, which is now a state-led organisation with limited powers – a far cry from what civil society groups had hoped for. Another prevalent challenge for the Association is establishing the credibility of elections in the region and overcoming the subsequent domestic tensions and international cynicism surrounding the results. When grappling with such issues, all possible responses need to be considered both within and outside the language of RtoP.

The least problematic of the RtoP pillars is the first pillar as it reinforces the notion of the primacy of the state. The second pillar, while carefully conditioned to be about

providing international assistance after obtaining the required consent of the receiving state, is problematic as the words ‘assistance’ and ‘consent’ may have different meanings at different times. When these words are used in a context that assumes state sovereignty, it is believed that a fully functioning government genuinely consents to it. However, Indonesia during the Timor Leste crisis 12 years ago, was pressured to consent to various conditions under the auspices of the UN. This raises questions about whether weak states truly consent or are pressured to consent to international assistance.

With regard to Pillar III, it can be noted that selectivity and the underlying structure and politics of the UNSC are inescapable even if the 2005 Outcome Document does say that the application of Pillar III must be UN-sanctioned. Another issue is that of definitions and how one understands ‘crimes against humanity’. ‘Genocide’ has a narrow and agreed meaning, but ‘crimes against humanity’ is open to debate as it has an evolving definition. This is all part of the challenge in thinking about human rights on an international scale. There is a certain claiming nature of human rights advocacy, where existing rights are never static as more ideas and demands are placed on the table. It is important to recognise the roles and influences of history, politics and power in arriving at these ideas and definitions.

Southern Thailand could be seen as an ongoing inter-religious warfare zone, where the Buddhist military has taken up cudgels in a very biased way against some of the Muslim minority population. If the number of casualties is taken into account, the conflict in southern Thailand could be seen as an example of crimes against humanity, but ASEAN does not perceive this situation as an RtoP issue. In Bangkok, the military has been on the streets for weeks to contain anti-government ‘red shirt’ demonstrations, and although they have yet to use force on the protestors, it is possible that violence between the two groups could emerge at some point. The question to consider then is whether this would be regarded as an example of crimes against humanity and if this would provoke an outcry in the region. When considering the realities of relationships of countries within ASEAN and the regional non-interference principle, it is evident that there are serious limitations to the operationalisation of RtoP.

A historical perspective on international community intervention is important to understand the issues

surrounding the implementation of RtoP. The UN was built on the idea of the nation-state but it was only after the Second World War that post-colonial states emerged. Their colonial histories have been instrumental in how borders and countries were shaped. It is important to consider this reality wherein regions were carved out of Western colonial interests and competition, resulting in the arbitrary division of people's lands. The political interests of colonial administrations also led to the appeasement of minority groups, which were afforded greater powers and privileges to rule over the majority populations, as in Burundi in 1972 and 1993, and Rwanda in 1994. Given these political and historical facts, it is prudent to ask what nation-states mean and the nuanced realities of differences among them.

In the post-Second World War period, the world was again divided along political lines, and developing nations became a battlefield for the Cold War. After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, global politics evolved and so did Western political interests in developing countries. Western presence in some developing countries continues to create negative tensions.

The dissemination of the RtoP norm has largely been a top-down driven exercise, with officials at the UN headquarters being more familiar with the concept than those at the regional or national levels. This inconsistency illustrates that there are significant steps to be taken to promote awareness of the concept. The RtoP norm is a challenge because its origins are in humanitarian intervention, and although RtoP was redefined in 2005, one of the challenges for it and its advocates is to inform stakeholders and raise awareness that RtoP is not simply a synonym for military intervention. At present there remains a considerable amount of work needed to explain the concept not only to elites but also to CSOs throughout the region.

## Discussion

The discussion centered on the following topics:

- Traction, influence and operationalisation of RtoP in the region
- 'A la carte' RtoP (acceptance of the partial norm, rather than the whole norm) versus the complete package (accepting and institutionalising all three pillars)
- Sensitivity towards RtoP language

With regard to traction and influence, notwithstanding ambiguity over the term, RtoP has gained some ground and met with success and traction in East Asia, especially Indonesia and Vietnam, particularly around the idea of sovereignty as responsibility, it was argued. Through the forum of the UN, both countries have used their strongest language in support of RtoP. However, some of their rhetoric has been less robust since their rotational terms on the Security Council ended. Nevertheless, the very fact that the language of RtoP has been acceded to on paper means that in the long term, it is an opportunity for other actors or domestic constituencies to hold the state accountable.

With regard to the different pillars of RtoP and their acceptability, it was suggested that there needs to be realistic expectations as to how much influence RtoP has had on the ground. An observation was made that the regional focus has been on Pillar I and to a lesser extent on Pillar II, and some of the ambiguities that remain between consent and assistance continue to be very important. A question was raised in response to RtoP in the region - where there is general support for Pillars I and II but only vague references to Pillar III - which asked whether such an a la carte approach to RtoP is desirable. The general consensus was that this approach, wherein states express comfort with certain aspects of RtoP and not others, is problematic, for all three pillars need to be equal in strength and viability. It was felt that not doing so would lead to a

danger of Pillar III being sidestepped, and to an inability to respond in RtoP-type situations when RtoP options in the form of Pillars I and II are exhausted. Also, it was raised that caution should be exercised when looking for progress as it could simply be states dressing up old interests in new language.

One of the ongoing obstacles noted was the centrality of non-intervention in the region's international relations. It was agreed that norms need champions, and there is currently no regional RtoP champion, be it a state or a network of well-connected NGOs. Situations where RtoP would be invoked are not seen as likely to occur in the region. During the discussion there was still enormous sensitivity to the language of RtoP, which was seen to be reflective of the region. It was felt that the concept has been deliberately misused in the context of the war on Iraq and the war on Georgia, and every time such incidences occur, it sets back the efforts of advocates who are trying to show that the concept has changed, and is not just a license for military intervention. The misuse of the term has set back the RtoP cause, rendering it a fragile norm in the region, despite the progress that may have been made.

A point of discussion was that despite the international outrage about the atrocities in Darfur, the AU did not endorse intervention in Darfur, and similarly, ASEAN would not be open to intervening in Myanmar despite the cases of widespread human rights violations. RtoP is a discourse in ASEAN that is either very ill-defined or so elastic that it has been used by the state to justify its behaviour rather than protect its people. ASEAN so far has been very reactionary, not taking a unified policy stand in the case of Myanmar.

In the case of Thailand, the government has done well in that it has not used force on the protestors. However, the 'red shirts' gave the government no choice but to declare a state of emergency. If RtoP were to be invoked in Thailand, it is important to ask if the 'red shirts' should be protected from the government or whether the government should protect other Thai civilians from the 'red shirts'.

There were several questions raised which looked beyond the principles of RtoP, and asked whether there are any enforceable mechanisms that could be used against governments that fail to protect its people or perpetrate the crimes. Another aspect covered was whether we are looking at state responsibility or punishing individuals for specific criminal acts.

The discussion then covered the legally binding nature of the majority of obligations under RtoP. Thus, it was argued that RtoP promotes a link between state sovereignty and its responsibility to meet its obligations. Another issue raised was whether some aspects of RtoP may be used by a state to dismiss the entire norm and thus not meet its legally binding obligations contained in the concept.

The session concluded by debating the following questions, bearing in mind that norm-making is an elite process and that North-South divides in terms of income inequality and political influence very much shape this process: Who evaluates and how does one evaluate a failed state? How does one move RtoP forward to free the concept from its negative history and connotations of force and intervention (which is a particular challenge in Asia)? Who polices the police?

## Sessions 2 and 3: Country Perspectives on RtoP in Southeast and Northeast Asia

These sessions focused on selected country perspectives from across Southeast and Northeast Asia. The presentations focused on mapping out the particular interactions between an individual state and RtoP, including its application both domestically and internationally.

### Thailand

In February 2008, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan launched the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in Bangkok. However, Thai activity on RtoP has remained limited. Nevertheless, there are several examples of notable international activity by Thailand on RtoP. Thailand is an active member of the Advisory Board to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. It also participated in the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) during its year-long mandate in 1999. This was the first time that Thailand had participated in a mission of this kind. In addition, Thailand was the architect of the 'flexible engagement' policy with Myanmar. The policy of flexible engagement promotes the notion that states are allowed to comment on the internal situation of a state across the border, especially if a given situation causes an impact on that state. There is still a largely traditional view of sovereignty in Thailand, where the nation is put first, and above its people. In this sense, there has not been a significant shift in the relationship between Thailand and the principles of RtoP and sovereignty as responsibility.

There has been no progress made in the resolution of the conflict and quelling of violence in the southern Thai states of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala, especially given the uncertainty over the future of the current Thai government. As such, notions of RtoP are premature in the Thai case at present. The most likely way that the concept of RtoP could be furthered in Thailand is through its network of independent think tanks. There is a danger of RtoP becoming politically-motivated if some other CSOs are used to further the concept, which would hamper the development of RtoP as an accepted norm in Thailand.

### Indonesia

Among ASEAN members, Indonesia has the international and regional reputation as the most advanced state in

the region in terms of democracy and human rights development. This is most notable in the persistent efforts made by Indonesian officials to establish AICHR. This was demonstrated through a series of negotiations to establish the AICHR Terms of Reference (TOR) and efforts to determine whether the Commission could effectively promote and protect human rights in the region. The Indonesian representatives insisted on including in the Commission's mandate the right to conduct monitoring and fact-finding missions in an ASEAN member state. However, this idea was quickly rejected by the other ASEAN members for reasons of preserving the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.

There are at least two reasons why the RtoP principle has not resonated much in Indonesia and Southeast Asia more generally. The first reason is the prevailing association in the region between the RtoP principle and the concept of humanitarian intervention. The second reason is the Indonesian government's lack of familiarity with the RtoP concept. This was evidenced by references from various statements in relevant national legislative bodies. The first challenge remains in raising awareness about the full scope of RtoP. Another challenge lies in overcoming the nationalistic current in Southeast Asia – a by-product of its colonial past which creates the suspicion of RtoP being used as a guise for Western intervention in a country's internal affairs. The final significant challenge is to ensure that RtoP does not get watered down as a concept during implementation. In addition, it is difficult to identify national champions in Indonesia, which ironically, as the most progressive country on these issues, exemplifies the uphill struggle of promoting RtoP in Southeast Asia.

### Malaysia

The Malaysian government is neither in principle opposed to RtoP nor is it a champion of the concept. That said, Malaysia was actively involved in the international military action carried out in response to the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Kosovo. Malaysia's concerns rest with the specifics of RtoP's implementation as an institutionalised concept. While there is support in Malaysia for the notion of RtoP in situations where a state no longer functions, there is deep scepticism that RtoP is being used to justify external involvement, particularly in terms of unilateral military

action. In response to this, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has repeatedly clarified that RtoP is not humanitarian intervention. Rather, it is a positive and affirmative concept of sovereignty as responsibility. The Secretary-General stressed that RtoP is a responsibility that lies first and foremost with the State. Even though these reservations are made in meetings at the UN, Malaysia continues to contribute to capacity building efforts, for example, on the ground in southern Thailand, where a protracted conflict exists. Although the situation there has not escalated to one warranting the implementation of Pillar III, it remains an area caught in violence. At Thailand's request, Malaysia provides assistance in capacity building in the form of vocational training, scholarships, and religious education to southern Thailand.

Another example of Malaysian involvement in RtoP was its reminder to Myanmar of its responsibilities when it cracked down on anti-government protesters in 2007. This was the most public expression of denunciation made through ASEAN, a move out of the norm for an Association known for its reluctance to involve itself in the internal affairs of a member state. Although Malaysia has expressed reluctance towards endorsing military involvement in the internal affairs of another state, it has in reality made such endorsements. In 1994, Malaysia pressed for military action outside the auspices of United Nations if it failed to act decisively to end the violence in Bosnia. Malaysia was similarly assertive on the issue of Kosovo as Yugoslavia's Serbian majority overran the province's Albanian Muslim population and ethnic cleansing allegations became incontrovertible. Malaysia voted with other UNSC members against the resolution that called for a halt to the air strikes on Yugoslavia. As a result, Malaysia is an interesting case as the country lobbies in international forums for incremental progress on RtoP, yet is willing to commit itself to more progressive international efforts to prevent mass atrocities.

## **Cambodia**

Cambodia has a bloody history. Two out of seven people in Cambodia were killed under the Khmer Rouge regime that lasted from 1975 to 1979. The Khmer Rouge was removed from power by Vietnam when the latter captured Phnom Penh in 1979, with Vietnamese soldiers remaining in Cambodia until 1988. In 1988, the Paris Peace Accords were signed and Cambodia embarked on a reunification process that finally led to elections in 1993. As part of the

agreement, Malaysia and Indonesia sent peacekeeping troops to Cambodia. However, it was not until 1999 that the Khmer Rouge was finally defeated.

Since then, Cambodians have asked why the UN did not act to prevent the genocide, and why it was Vietnam that took measures to prevent the killings instead. Cambodia also questioned why the US did not intervene to stop the killings but still identified the government as responsible for the prevention of mass atrocities.

In Cambodia today, many people still recall the time of the Khmer Rouge and do not want the mass atrocities to happen again. A great concern is the current unequal economic development within the country; a problem that led to the rise of the Khmer Rouge in the past. The local population needs to know what governments can do to protect them and what can be done to hold governments accountable when they fail to do so. It was clarified that for RtoP to work, it is essential that people know what the concept is about and what their governments should do to protect them. In sum, the firsthand experience of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge provides clear evidence of mass atrocities taking place and the need to prevent them from happening again. If such crimes are to be prevented in the future, then greater effort must be made to inform people about what they can expect from their governments.

## **Vietnam**

There are three important points to consider when analysing Vietnam's perspective on RtoP in the United Nations meetings, and why it subsequently changed its stance and became supportive of RtoP. Vietnam became engaged when the UN started to talk about RtoP rather than humanitarian intervention. The country is highly sensitive to the concept of humanitarian intervention because it had suffered seven external interventions in the past. Vietnam acknowledged from the 2005 World Summit that RtoP is not a replacement for humanitarian intervention. When considering RtoP, there is a need to balance national sovereignty with national interests, which includes the interests of people. If a government does not protect its people, it is not looking after its national interest. Questions are raised as to whether Vietnam's entry into Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime should be framed as an invasion or whether it should be regarded as an invocation of RtoP. An argument supporting the latter theory states that Vietnam entered

Cambodia to stop the killings within the country and along its borders when the international community failed to respond to several episodes of mass atrocities in the country. The real question is how we craft our understandings of state sovereignty and national interest. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a multilateral order, there are greater prospects to successfully work through the UN to promote RtoP and build state capacity.

Another important point is to analyse the role different stakeholders play in RtoP. The responsibility of civilian protection lies primarily with the state concerned, the primary RtoP stakeholder. The second identified group of stakeholders comprises the UN and the regional community. Civilian protection responsibility in Southeast Asia is placed with the UN, above the regional community, because the UN is a more developed mechanism at present compared to ASEAN. However, there are two issues concerning the legitimacy of these two stakeholders – the UN and ASEAN. The first is that the UNSC mandates intervention but as the grouping is not representative of the world's population, the legitimacy of its mandate is brought into question. The second is that as a result of the ASEAN Charter and its focus on the people of ASEAN, it is increasingly likely that ASEAN will become more important in this field. It is also evident that Vietnam prefers to focus on supporting states to prevent the four crimes of RtoP rather than take action after the four crimes have been committed to avoid appearing politically opportunistic. As it is difficult to establish stability in a country after an external military intervention, preventive action using economic and diplomatic tools should be prioritised. The final stakeholders to highlight are non-state actors who have their own issues of accountability and legitimacy. To conclude, Vietnam is an interesting case of a state that has intervened in another state under the auspices of preventing mass atrocities. It has also been a vocal supporter of RtoP during its term on the UNSC.

## China

The Chinese government supports the concept of RtoP agreed upon during the 2005 World Summit. However, at the same time, it is important to reiterate that the responsibility of primary protection lies with an individual state. Despite the Chinese government's cautious approach to RtoP, it is deeply concerned about the impact of armed conflicts on civilians. In order to appropriately operationalise RtoP, it is important to respect international law, particularly international humanitarian law. The central RtoP focus of the Chinese government has been on preventive measures and an investigation into the establishment of early warning systems. While the Chinese position recognises the importance of RtoP, it always emphasises the need for RtoP to be legitimated by international law. When China specifically applies RtoP to situations such as those in Africa, it stresses the importance of collaboration among all actors including global, regional and national stakeholders. In other words, the Chinese position is to support parallel efforts at the national, regional and global levels, while acknowledging the UN's central mandated role to maintain and promote international peace and security. Overall, China is committed to the principles of RtoP and has shown this through its actions in the UN, such as issuing favourable statements to develop the UN's capacity to avert mass atrocities. However, this goes hand-in-hand with its commitment to national sovereignty and non-intervention. A further caveat is that the Chinese position is to avoid non-consensual force and to support sanctions only when fully backed by relevant regional organisations. Despite these caveats, China is not necessarily opposed to the use of force with a civilian protection mandate. It acknowledges that it may be a necessary last resort to protect populations from mass atrocities, while being mindful of its caveats. China's interpretation of and support for RtoP is therefore grounded primarily in building capacity within states to prevent mass atrocities, and strengthening the UN's ability to assist states to mitigate mass atrocities through humanitarian, diplomatic and other peaceful means.

## Japan

In the international system, the principles of RtoP are becoming the new security norm. Indeed RtoP conversations emerged within the context of human security in the early 1990s. It was through the Human Security Network that RtoP was discussed as a corrective action against the human insecurity of violence. It is clear that while the Japanese government supports the notion of RtoP, it gives only a passive endorsement of the concept because of several key reasons. The first is that there are contesting views on RtoP in Japan ranging from the conservative to revisionist, and the 'silent majority'. The conservative view is that RtoP is not connected to human security, the cornerstone of Japan's diplomatic identity. It was noted that Japan does not militarily intervene in situations where mass atrocities occur even when the international community has to respond to the four crimes to fulfill its responsibility to protect. Japan is primarily focused on the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance aspects of RtoP. The conservative perspective tries to distinguish human security from RtoP. The revisionist view sees RtoP as a 'golden opportunity' and is a commonly held view among the apologists of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Revisionists believe that RtoP can enlarge the space for Japanese forces to engage in peace operations and can serve as an opportunity to revise the constitution, as Japan is, at present, constitutionally bound not to engage in aggressive military action against another state. The revisionist agenda attempts to 'normalise' the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and to use this opportunity to push for a Japanese seat at the UNSC.

The third view is that of the 'silent majority', which includes activists and civil society more generally. This 'silent majority' sees RtoP as a very good concept to change the way we think

about sovereignty, and to stop genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. However, there are concerns, on its link to international law because of the fear that RtoP can be misused. The 'silent majority' also wants to refocus on the prevention aspects of the four crimes and the role of other actors, apart from the state, in RtoP. They identify other important stakeholders such as non-state actors, from international businesses to transnational crime networks, who also need to be held accountable and responsible. They hold a comprehensive view of the global structure and argue that if we only focus on state structure, the role of non-state actors remains hidden. If this is the case, then the 'silent majority' has serious reservations about RtoP.

At present, there is not a majority of people who want an active RtoP agenda in Japan. Japanese policymakers insist that human security encompasses a broader approach in the prevention aspects of the four crimes than what is contained in the RtoP doctrine. Japan has made human security part of its post-Cold War diplomatic identity and so is reluctant to give it up. For example, Japan established a human security trust fund through the UN and created an international committee co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata, that published a report titled 'Human Security Now' focusing on non-military assistance as the most important aspect of human security. The other reason for its reluctance to endorse RtoP is its domestic concerns. Policymakers do not actively engage with the concept of RtoP as it is a politically risky strategy to discuss reformation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. However it may be time to synchronise Japan's human security perspective with RtoP, and utilise both concepts. To do so, Japan has to understand RtoP as a means to strengthen its human security framework, rather than regard it as a challenge to its concept of human security and diplomatic identity.



## Discussion

The discussion focused on the following themes:

- The legitimate versus illegitimate use of military force
- The application of RtoP in Southeast Asia

In the discussion, concerns were raised that RtoP could be misused as a means to interfere in the internal affairs of a country. Through the concerns raised, three themes emerged. The first was the use of force. In order for the use of force to be legitimate, there is a need for consensus. Questions were raised on whether this would be achieved through the UNGA via the Uniting for Peace Resolution or through regional multilateral organisations. For example, China supported sanctions when it was requested by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to do so, because it was a decision made at, and a decision that came from, the regional level. The second theme was the question of opposition to the use of force. The UNSC resolution on Darfur was cited as an example. It was pointed out that the actual issue in that situation was troop deployment, rather than political opposition to the resolution. The third theme was the application of RtoP and the strict boundaries set within the framework. Consensus emerged that countries had agreed on the 2005 World Outcome Document, which meant that it is an accepted framework.

The discussion then turned to identifying regional champions and how to better relate RtoP to experiences in Southeast Asia. It was argued that Southeast Asian policymakers do not respond well to RtoP comparisons with other regions. It is better to cite examples of RtoP that happened within the region than elsewhere. This could assist in building acceptance of the doctrine in Southeast Asia. An example of this would be the Cambodian Genocide, which showcases the importance for robust preventive and reactive measures if such a situation is to be avoided in the future. Cambodia has been touted as a possible regional champion of RtoP as a result of this experience. A question was raised over the likelihood of Japan becoming a regional champion given the similarity of RtoP to human security. However, it was argued that it is unlikely because Japanese policymakers feel that RtoP is a concept already championed by Canada and the Scandinavian countries. It was pointed out that while Japan may not be in a position to employ the use of force, the international community does not expect Japan to do so. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that Japan can draw on areas where it has a comparative advantage, such as in the area of reconstruction. The discussion ended with an observation that participants had an increased awareness and more nuanced picture of the development of RtoP in the region.

## Session 4: Regional Mechanisms to Promote RtoP

The fourth session looked at various regional mechanisms in Southeast Asia to promote RtoP and explored the extent to which institutional developments have been conducive to this process. In addition, effectiveness and challenges for the following institutions were addressed: the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

### The APSC

The formation of the APSC preceded RtoP, and as a result, RtoP was neither referred to nor was a part of the discussions. APSC's objective is to consolidate ASEAN political and security cooperation with the aim of maintaining ASEAN's diplomatic centrality in the Asian context. After the 2005 UN World Summit, mentions of RtoP only reflected stands and opinions of individual member states and the concept was never taken up by ASEAN, giving the impression that it was solely the responsibility of the UN. Yet, many expect APSC to be a good entry point to advocate the use of RtoP, as they believe that the elements of APSC – conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peacebuilding, etc. – resonate well with RtoP. This expectation is rather misplaced, for the APSC does not pertain to intra-state conflict. It is a mechanism through which member states can manage inter-state conflict better. Moreover, APSC is framed within the non-interference principle, and is non-binding.

Other avenues thus have to be explored for the promotion of RtoP. A primary consideration is the diversity of the region – given the different political histories of the countries, it is important to take into account their fears and understandings of RtoP in relation to sovereignty and interference. There is a belief that the kind of crimes that warrant the use of RtoP are unlikely to occur in Southeast Asia, which reduces the urgency of promoting RtoP. Further, there is a considerable misconception of RtoP being only equated with military intervention. All countries still look

to the UN to deploy military instruments for intervention, as ASEAN has not channelled resources into maintaining an ASEAN peacekeeping force yet.

What are the other platforms available? Human rights mechanisms may seem like a possible entry point, but it is important to bear in mind that the ASEAN framework focuses only on human rights promotion, not protection. A starting point could be the revision of the ASEAN Charter. Further, it is important to work on an early warning system. This exists in the APSC blueprint, but the blueprint does not specify what it applies to. Even if this is built upon for inter-state conflict, in due course there is potential for it to be applied to internal conflict as well. There is a need for RtoP champions not only to promote RtoP but also to raise awareness about it. Academics, NGOs and think tanks are well placed to be those champions. ASEAN needs to encourage military-civilian cooperation, which will improve the overall protection of civilians in the region.

### The AICHR

When analysing AICHR as an effective entry point for RtoP, one needs to look at its TOR. The Commission's TOR emphasise promotion of human rights. Discussions on specific protection mechanisms can be controversial, but these protection mechanisms can evolve over time. The TOR document itself is acknowledged to be an evolving text wherein insertions can be made, but there is, for now, no reference to RtoP. Outside of the UN, there has been very little discussion about RtoP within the region. Besides individual states expressing their preferences on which pillars of RtoP are acceptable, there is no official ASEAN position on the doctrine. There is no sense of urgency in arriving at a common understanding of RtoP and the biggest constraint is that within the TOR, one of the overriding considerations is the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Thus there is nothing in the Commission's TOR that promotes or helps to promote RtoP in the region.

In reference to the different pillars of RtoP, there is to some extent a convergence on the positions among the ASEAN member states. There is willingness to accept Pillar I and to a certain degree Pillar II, but Pillar III often proves problematic. It may be useful to consider emphasising aspects of the TOR that could allow the promotion of Pillars I and II. For example, the TOR stipulates that the Commission must encourage ASEAN members to ratify international human rights instruments and to ensure that treaty obligations are met. If one were to look at the record of countries' accedence to the ratification of treaties in the region, one would observe that the Philippines has ratified every possible human rights instrument but its enforcement of these instruments is poor. Across the region, two conventions have been signed by all member states – the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The universal signatory status in ASEAN of the CRC and CEDAW provides an opportunity to explore how RtoP can be promoted within the Commission. One of the first items the Commission is supposed to focus on is to draft a human rights declaration. Consultation with other regional, national and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights creates space for discussion and collaboration with bodies such as OHCHR, international NGOs and national human rights institutions.

Another potential entry point is through the Commission's mandated ability to obtain information from ASEAN member states regarding the protection and promotion of human rights; and its ability to conduct studies addressing thematic issues of human rights. These functions could serve as part of a regional early warning system although not necessarily through the language of RtoP.

With respect to the question of whether regional institutions have been effective in promoting RtoP, the lack of a discussion on RtoP indicates that there is little interest in it and that regional institutions have failed to develop an interest. There have been no attempts to coordinate a Commission position, making it difficult to initiate a conversation about the advantages of RtoP. As for obstacles and challenges, one of the reasons that the Commission has not or cannot be effective in promoting RtoP is that it is not an independent body; and it is accountable to the ASEAN foreign ministers. Much of what it can do depends on instructions from the prime ministers of individual states. A more activist Commission could perhaps be more effective by interpreting its mandate in a more liberal fashion. The current composition of the Commission does not bode well for the promotion of the RtoP agenda and exhibits conservative traits. If the Commission is relatively conservative in how it interprets its functions, then the push to include RtoP in its mandate will have to come from outside the Commission, hence increasing the need for champions from across society.

### **The ARF**

Regional institutions, such as the AU and the European Union (EU) have been playing increasingly important roles, especially since UN peacekeeping forces have not always been able to respond successfully on their own. Recent statements by member states, such as China, have called for stronger collaboration between regional organisations and the UN to work together on peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This may not be a direct reference to RtoP, but it is certainly related. The ARF has the capacity to develop an effective standby force, especially since countries in the ASEAN

region do have the military capability. However, the ARF must build mechanisms for collaboration and coordination and develop standard operating procedures (SOPs), which give instruction on when and under what circumstances the use of force should be applied by such a standby force. In addition, such a standby force should also be available to respond during post-disaster situations and not exclusively be viewed within the context of responding to situations of violence.

## Discussion

The discussion addressed the following issues:

- Awareness raising and creating constituencies to promote RtoP
- Developing links to international institutions for better prevention measures
- The definition of 'promotion' of RtoP
- The utility of other ASEAN documents in relation to RtoP

The first issue raised was on the need to define champions and create constituencies within the region. It was argued that one possible way to present RtoP in the region is through thematic studies. These studies could provide useful information and support in drafting the regional human rights declaration. Another proposal was that the recently established ACWC could be another useful avenue to further the RtoP agenda, particularly on human rights issues concerning women and children.

The discussion then turned to UN efforts to prevent RtoP-type situations and how they were marred by the hypocrisy of the international community. Both the Kosovo intervention and the invasion of Iraq took place without the endorsement of the UNSC, and revealed the increasing marginalisation of the UN, it was argued. As much of the developing world is not represented in the UNSC, questions were raised as to the legitimacy of the UN in the maintenance of peace and security. It was observed that countries are looking at other avenues to further their RtoP agenda. These alternative platforms were identified as the Group of 20 (G20), regional organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, or the AU, and it was noted that some have begun to assume responsibility on RtoP-type situations for their region. Within Asia, it was suggested that the ARF has the potential to play a greater role regionally with the possibility of greater cooperation with the UN in relation to RtoP.

In terms of managing conflicts, it was suggested that the basic emphasis should be on conflict prevention by securing the support of international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to employ development strategies in the region with a main focus on non-military options. Another point raised was that if military intervention has to be applied in a worst-case scenario, the ARF could be utilised as a political forum to provide leadership in coordinating responses, promoting







*Front row: Dr Rizal Sukma, Ms Elina Noor, Assoc. Prof. Mely Caballero-Anubovy, Mr Omar Halim, Amb. Barry Desker, Lt. Gen. Satisb Nambiar, Ms Luong Thy Duong, Dr Liu Tiewa and Prof. Simon Tay.*  
*Middle row: Mr Yin Sopheap, Dr Arpita Mathur, Ms Sarah Teitt, Dr Yoojin Rhee, Ms Naomi Kikoler, Prof. Herman Kraff, Dr David Capie, Prof. Jun Homma, Mr Bertrand Kern, Dr Toshuya Hoshino, Dr Chowdhury Abrar, Mr Endy Bayuni, Mr Soliman M. Sanatos Jr. and Ms Lina Alexandra.*  
*Back row: Mr Alvin Tan, Mr Nur Azha Putra Abdul Aziz, Ms Sadhavi Sharma, Ms Holly Hayward, Dr. Altstair D.B. Cook, Dr. Ryan Clarke, Ms Irene A. Kanjoro, Ms Sofiah Jamil, Mr Pau Khen Khup Hangso and Ms Priyanka Bhalla.*  
*Absent from photo: Mr Sinapan Sanyodorai and Dr Ummu Sabna Bava.*

cooperation in field exercises, and cataloguing evolving normative standards of operation for future use. It was highlighted that this idea can be promoted in respective countries by identifying the availability of such a force even for disaster relief, to show that the military is not always involved in situations requiring the use of force. If military force is inevitable, then it was argued that the framework in which it should be applied would be: a serious threat, clear mandate, all other options have been exhausted, proportionate military means are used in relation to the crimes committed.

The penultimate theme of the discussion focused on the definition of RtoP promotion. It was suggested that RtoP promotion could refer to encouraging member states of a particular regional grouping to accept the principle of RtoP or it could refer to the application of RtoP by its regional institutions. It was acknowledged that since there is an acceptance of the concept in principle by the region already, it is the application of RtoP that needs to be promoted, not simply in the region, but also internationally. Even where the concept has been accepted in principle, there are still reservations expressed on specific aspects

of it. Promoting pillars where there is a consensus could be a starting point for the application of RtoP. Beyond the official endorsement by states, it was noted that there is a need to push for commitment and cooperation, and for developing a common agenda towards the doctrine. For example, it was argued that greater steps could be taken to improve the capacity of the military through training personnel to handle internal conflict situations more sensitively.

The final theme of the debate centred on the references made in the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint which were identified as limited in nature and which do not offer many possibilities for the promotion of RtoP. It was further observed that a focus on these blueprints could result in such a dilution of the concept that as a result, it would cease to hold particular frames of reference, be even more difficult to define, and lose its meaning as a consequence. In the broader ASEAN context, it was suggested that cooperation and trust do not necessarily work concurrently and may pose challenges to the development of regional responses, such as an ASEAN peacekeeping force.

## Session 5: The Role of International Institutions, Civil Society Organisations and Other Actors in Promoting RtoP

The views of states and official regional mechanisms towards the definition and operationalisation of RtoP are important. However, there are actors other than states that represent alternate views of people and populations. This session focused on perspectives of international institutions, the media and civil society on RtoP.

### The International Committee for the Red Cross' Perspective on RtoP

The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) is neither a part of the UN nor an NGO. It is a private, independent organisation that started out as an NGO but was later entrusted by states with an international mandate. This international mandate lies in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Due to this mandate, it has a specific approach to most protection related issues, including RtoP.

Translated into operational realities, ICRC's mandate has similarities with the first two pillars of RtoP as it reminds states of their responsibility on legal matters that protect human dignity, and it provides humanitarian assistance to, for example, conflict victims, to ensure they receive the help they are entitled to under the provision of international law. Specifically, states are reminded of their obligation to protect their populations and prevent situations of serious crimes being committed.

Common Article One of the 1949 Geneva Conventions states: 'The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention *in all circumstances*.' According to ICRC, 'in all circumstances' is the principle guideline for states; under no circumstances can they revoke their obligations. In addition, the Geneva Conventions address protection under international armed conflict. Further, Additional Protocol II (1977) also addresses the protection of victims during internal armed conflicts. Among ASEAN member states, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar and Thailand have not signed onto Additional Protocol II.

More recently in 2004, an ICRC study on the roots of behaviour in war produced two significant conclusions. They are: (1) when combatants have suffered from

violence, and have been directly affected, they are much more inclined to perpetrate the law; and (2) moral, cultural, religious and educational upbringing is much less important in determining whether a combatant commits violations of the law during times of conflict. What is much more important, is whether states have rules in place explicitly forbidding such violations, whether combatants are trained and fully aware of these rules, and whether punishments are inflicted upon those who flout these rules.

According to ICRC, training and awareness on rules of engagement should be integrated into national level officer training programmes and violations should not be tolerated. It was also stressed that ICRC's outreach is impartial and based on humanitarian action, allowing them contact to all sides of an armed conflict, acting both independently and with other organisations to respond to victims' needs. The ICRC approach and the RtoP agenda complement each other and have common aims (particularly in regard to the first two pillars). However coherence in the promotion of RtoP needs to be established.

### Media Perspectives on RtoP

As is the case with many UN packaged acronyms such as RtoP, the media, like the rest of the general population, takes time to understand and familiarise itself with a newly introduced norm. Similarly, many working in the Southeast Asian media industry may not have heard of the term RtoP, but they certainly report on the four serious crimes mentioned in the RtoP framework and on the three pillars of capacity building, assistance and military/humanitarian interventions.

Indonesia for example is quite familiar with the four serious crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing listed in the RtoP framework. One such example is the mass killings that took place in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966 in relation to the abortive communist coup. To this day, victims are still trying to lobby the UN to classify that event as genocide. War crimes and crimes against humanity have taken place in Aceh and



East Timor. Ethnic cleansing was conducted by the Dayak tribe in Kalimantan against migrants from Madura Island. Regarding RtoP's third pillar, there has been some debate in Indonesia. In 1999 when international UN peacekeeping forces landed in East Timor, there was debate about foreign military forces on, what was at that time, Indonesian soil. Similarly the Aceh Monitoring Mission that was established during the peace process sparked debate in parliament on whether or not it compromised Indonesia's sovereignty.

Indonesia is a good place for the introduction of the RtoP concept, as debates on these issues have already taken place. As long as RtoP is a norm that is not institutionalised and made useful for practical adaptation, the media will be interested to a limited extent. RtoP is still viewed as an ongoing academic debate, rather than a concept that can be applied on the ground immediately.

When reporting, journalists and broadcasters often look for the 'sexy angle' of a story and in the case of RtoP, the 'sexy angle' is Pillar III and concerns the question of military intervention when a state is 'manifestly failing' to protect its population. The concept of RtoP needs to be mainstreamed by using language which can be understood by the general public, rather than using esoteric language targeted at NGOs, academics and diplomats. Opinion articles should be written on the third pillar. News articles can be written on humanitarian tragedies and situations of violence as the media is always looking out for interesting, meaningful stories and is adept at relating and constructing narratives.

However, the media needs some criteria in mainstreaming RtoP:

- The media needs to have access to where the stories are happening. Areas of conflict and natural disasters, for example, could be off limits to the media because of access decided by the government, or it could be too dangerous to enter such areas.
- The media needs to have independence and no vested interests while reporting. For example, restrictions were placed on the Indonesian media in what it could report during the Aceh conflict and East Timor's independence struggle. However, it passed on sensitive information

to foreign press correspondents, who could report on the events independently.

- The media needs to have credibility and capacity when reporting such stories.

Advocates working on the RtoP agenda should hold workshops for the media and train them on how RtoP situations can be further reported on and written about. In addition, other forms of media, such as film should be used to mainstream the issue. In the case of the Cambodian Genocide, the film *Killing Fields* succeeded in bringing the issue to the forefront. Perhaps the Indian, Indonesian or Hong Kong film industries could showcase what is happening in Myanmar. As it is difficult to find RtoP champions among states, it may be effective to find a champion among celebrities and appoint a UN Goodwill Ambassador for RtoP.

### **Bantay Ceasefire and Non-State Armed Groups in the Philippines**

Civil society articulation on RtoP is varied and wide-ranging particularly concerning the views of non-state armed groups (NSAGs). In the Philippines, there has been no explicit use of the term 'RtoP' within civil society articulations; however, other human rights frameworks have been used to forward the RtoP agenda, including: (1) human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL); (2) human security; (3) humanitarian protection; and (4) civilian protection.

Human rights and IHL advocacy have a long tradition in the Philippines, dating back to the Marcos dictatorship. Currently, it has become a part of the Philippine peace process, relating directly to an agenda of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Human security has been most systematically articulated by the Human Development Network, composed of policymakers and academics. Humanitarian protection – comprising moral, social and legal perspectives – has been promoted by Oxfam and the Balay Rehabilitation Center, both of which work with internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Philippines.

In terms of civilian protection, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace process articulates that it was created to 'protect the civilian population and properties against dangers from armed conflict' and 'was developed to augment the ceasefire and peace process between the two parties'. CSOs and NGOs are supposed to play the following roles: (1) watchdogs over the state and NSAGs; (2) service providers, including capacity building (synonymous with RtoP's second pillar); and (3) advocates of alternative policies.

The Civil Society Initiatives for IHL (CSI-IHL) expressed that CSOs and NGOs can also adopt the following roles in promoting the concept of RoP: (1) address RtoP concerns at the grassroots level; (2) engage in consciousness-raising; and (3) shape policy. Results have been seen recently in the area of 'policy shaping' as the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 9851 – the 'Philippine Act on Crimes against IHL, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity'. This Act had direct civil society involvement as it was drafted by an NGO representative on the Philippines National Red Cross IHL Committee. Alongside this strong response to the RtoP concept by the Philippines, its weakest response has been the non-ratification of the Rome Statute.

An example of ground operationalisation of the RtoP concept is Bantay Ceasefire, an independent, grassroots monitoring mechanism that acts as a watchdog and monitor for the Mindanao peace process. It monitors the GRF-MILF ceasefire agreement, and promotes human rights, IHL and the Guiding Principles on IDPs. In addition, it monitors the security and welfare of civilians, and monitors clan-based conflict and gender-based violence. Besides being recognised by both parties in the conflict as 'independent and objective', Bantay Ceasefire has made additional gains, including the implementation of its recommendation to include an international third party in the ceasefire monitoring mechanism. Countries such as Malaysia, Libya, Brunei and Japan have shown interest in participating in the International Monitoring Team (IMT). In addition, Filipino NGOs, such as the Mindanao People's Caucus and the Nonviolent Peaceforce, are members of the civilian protection arm of IMT.

An additional peace agreement is the GRP-National Democratic Front (NDF – political-diplomatic arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines) Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). In the current state of engagement, there is no ceasefire and there has been a breakdown of talks. There is no political will to implement CARHRIHL and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)–New People's Army (NPA)–NDF resist engagement with civil society and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). While there has been progress made between the GRP and MILF, serious and peaceful engagement with CPP-NPA-NDF has yet to occur.

Regarding the views of NSAGS towards RtoP, the most interesting development has been observed with regard to the MILF, whose rules of engagement are based on Islam: 'Old people, children and women shall not be harmed or killed, and those people in convents' (Al-Hadith). MILF senior peace negotiator, Datu Michael O. Mastura, has made explicit references to RtoP, citing the Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 2001 report and the 2005 World Outcome Document. Mastura stated: 'As a basic principle, the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the State itself guided by the obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty...If there is a positive notion of sovereignty as responsibility, the MILF seeks shared sovereignty and shared responsibility with the GRP through a negotiated political settlement'. MILF has pronounced on several occasions that the GRP has 'failed to protect' and that the AFP has broken its constitutional role to be the 'protector of the people and the State'. Interestingly the AFP has a new motto: 'The Army exists to protect the human rights of every Filipino'.

It is important to constructively engage NSAGs as they have their own articulation of RtoP. In addition, the proactive role of civil society is vital as civil society is, at times, in a better position to engage with a variety of actors including NSAGs, and is effective in opening up new tracks for RtoP operationalisation.

## Discussion

The discussion centered on the following themes:

- Training of bureaucrats in addition to military personnel on RtoP related issues
- Engagement with non-state actors
- The implications of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention and the International Criminal Court Statute on RtoP

At the beginning of the discussion it was felt that training was equally important for the military and armed personnel as well as public officials on RtoP related issues and the rules of engagement. For example, in Bangladesh under a new democratic government there is more space for dialogue since the establishment of training of both military personnel and bureaucrats on RtoP related issues. It was argued that the culture of impunity must be addressed and followed up on if the RtoP agenda is to move forward.

It was suggested that there is a wide and diverse range of non-state actors involved in conflict, including NGOs, multinational corporations (MNCs) and NSAGs. Given their involvement in conflict, there is reason for engaging with them to bring about resolution of the conflict. It was hoped that these non-state actors can become part of the solution. It was noted that NSAGs are sometimes able to overthrow the state and assume the role of state actor themselves. It was argued that it makes sense to engage them when they are in the 'pre-state' phase. Such engagement may influence their behaviour and actions, when they move on to the position of 'state actor'.

An observation was made that within IHL, it is the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions that addresses national liberation movements. The CRC was identified as the most widely ratified international instrument, which has an operative article, directly addressing non-state actors with regard to the recruitment of children. A further observation made was that a space has been created for justice and accountability with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute. The treaty is seen as a major breakthrough as it applies to every individual and punishes individuals who commit serious international crimes. It was noted that perpetrators of Rome Statute crimes do not go unpunished and are not considered eligible for amnesty. The discussion then moved on to the role of the media in promoting the principles of RtoP, and the significance of press freedom in doing so. In Asia, Cambodia ranks number one and Indonesia, number two, in the area of press freedom according to Reporters Sans Frontières.

Towards the end, the discussion highlighted the importance of remembering that the current system is made by states for states and all actors have to work within that system to operationalise RtoP. It was noted that the Geneva Conventions are universal and most of its provisions, if not all, are considered customary law across all states. In closing, it was observed that no small violation can be overlooked and prevention of crimes equates to both conflict prevention and resolution.

## Session 6: The Way Forward – A Regional RtoP Roadmap for Asia

In this panel, discussants explored possible avenues for advancing the RtoP concept in the areas of theory and practice. While it was acknowledged that RtoP has some way to go before being adopted into the mainstream of international politics, the continuing debates on its conception and use indicate its vibrancy.

### Deconstructing the RtoP Concept

As the concept of RtoP continues to evolve, the way it is 'packaged' must emphasise its identity as a global public good. Given the protean nature of RtoP and the room for debate on its conceptualisation, there is a danger of the concept reaching a level of abstraction that is no longer useful for policymakers and practitioners. To ensure that the language of RtoP does not become too remote for practitioners, RtoP has to be linked to existing provisions in international and national law.

Another potential pitfall for RtoP is the perception that it erodes state sovereignty. Against the backdrop of the region's colonial history, there exists remaining fears of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of countries. Similarly, there are concerns that the post-modern concept of RtoP could be used to justify increased humanitarian interventions in the region. To address this problem, the questions of when RtoP should be used, and what actions can be justified by the use of RtoP should be answered.

Finally, RtoP has to be broadened from its existing conception as an operational concept to a meta-analytical concept. By doing so, RtoP could be used to evaluate whether both states and the international community have fulfilled their vital responsibilities to protect human rights.

### Promoting and Institutionalising RtoP

As the state remains the most important actor in the protection of human rights, RtoP should play a role in creating 'a new social contract' between a state and the international community. This 'new social contract' would lead to emphasis being placed on both the responsibility of the state to protect the rights of its citizens as well as the right of the state to protect its sovereignty.

Adopting this approach could potentially avoid the pitfalls generated by concerns over the 'intervention' aspect of RtoP. By emphasising engagement with states based on their existing national laws for protecting human rights, the 'intervention' aspect of RtoP is de-emphasised and relegated to an option of last resort. Concrete proposals, including the willingness of senior statesmen to use their prestige and networks to promote RtoP and to adopt the concept in national constitutions, can be considered. Two additional obstacles are the lack of champions to promote RtoP at the regional level and the lack of will or capacity of interested groups to commit resources to promote RtoP sustainably.

There are several recommendations to institutionalise RtoP at both the regional and national levels. First, Pillars I and II that deal with prevention and capacity building should be integrated into the existing UN system. As the UNGA has already acknowledged that preventing mass atrocities is a moral duty of the UN, using RtoP to operationalise this mandate is viable. In addition, the ARF should strengthen its relationship with the UNSC and the UNGA in terms of integrating the results of fact-finding missions into its general practice.

Second, the role of the ICC should also be expanded, especially in terms of fact-finding and data-building, to enable better implementation of RtoP. In particular, Article 15 of the ICC could be modified to allow the UNSC to file cases on possible occurrences of mass atrocities with supporting materials. The enabling of this function could provide a good early warning mechanism and prevent conflicts. The ARF could also expand its focus beyond interstate conflict to consider natural disaster response, including the conducting of field exercises for disaster response readiness for its members.

To institutionalise RtoP holistically, a spiral model, where the three pillars of RtoP are implemented at the domestic, regional and global levels, could be adopted. At the domestic level, the target audience for the mainstreaming of RtoP includes civil society actors, the media, human rights commissions and the academe. At the international level, the ARF, ASEAN and AICHR should all be involved. Finally, at the global level, international NGOs, the ICC and the UN should all integrate RtoP into theory and practice.

An alternative framework for institutionalising RtoP was presented from a functional approach. In line with this model, RtoP should be applied according to a set of tests to determine if states have both the capability and the mandate to protect their populations. To determine this, the ‘people-on-the-ground’ should be consulted on their human rights situation. This ‘demand-side’ reasoning can then be used to determine if political will to protect human rights exists or not. If not, the context for implementing RtoP should be considered. Finally, once this is accomplished, the process of determining whether coercive or cooperative means should be used in the protection of human rights should be undertaken.

### **Obstacles to RtoP – The Road Ahead**

The obstacles to the implementation and success of RtoP centre on the fact that policymakers remain hazy about the concept of RtoP, and this conceptual confusion still persists. Others see RtoP exclusively as a policy concept. This transforms RtoP into an end in itself, rather than a means to an end of promoting and protecting human rights. In some contexts, it may be better to use RtoP concepts without using the term ‘RtoP’ explicitly. Part of the problem may lie with the language of RtoP itself. RtoP as a concept must first be disseminated to the wider public and then popularised.

Another challenge to RtoP implementation is the perceived top-down nature of the process from the international community onto states. As a result, it was argued that greater attention should be given to encourage and support efforts at the domestic level to protect civilians. In addition, placing RtoP as a single component in the protection of comprehensive collective security and human rights, can also improve understanding of the concept.

An alternative to RtoP in the form of human security was presented as a bottom-up approach to improve security. By targeting the end goals of freedom from want and freedom from fear through community-level action, the emphasis on who should ultimately be responsible for protecting human rights is avoided.

### **Discussion**

The following topics were taken up for discussion:

- Ways to prevent abuse of the RtoP concept
- The conception of RtoP as a response tool or as a norm for advocating protection
- The criteria for assessing the success of RtoP
- How to promote RtoP while dealing with the issue of state sovereignty

The discussion began with an observation that the concept of RtoP could easily be used to justify regime change and intervention. It was then suggested that in order to address this problem, advocates should emphasise the preventive aspects of RtoP. In addition, the concept of sovereignty could be reconceived. It was felt that instead of focusing on the idea of sovereignty as granting the right to states to disregard the human rights of their citizens, sovereignty should be repackaged to include the obligation of states to protect the human rights of their peoples. In this manner, it was agreed that RtoP becomes useful not only as a tool for protecting human rights, but providing a norm for defining the limits and the essence of sovereignty. An additional comment was made that as long as the effectiveness of regional arrangements is in doubt, these arrangements will be unenforceable.

To help define the areas where RtoP can be applied, it was suggested that a mapping of the political terrain of the region would identify the different aspects of the

three pillars and cases where the four crimes might occur. Furthermore it was felt that this could in turn identify the relevant infrastructure for dealing with violence in the region, especially in the emerging area of engaging with NSAGs to demand accountability from them for their actions.

A consensus began to emerge on the need to identify a set of criteria to determine the achievement of objectives to measure the success of RtoP. The suggested objectives included normalising RtoP and prevention of the four crimes. However, it was observed that the assessment of RtoP success is relative and it depends on the context in which the assessment is made.

The discussion then focused on the reconciliation of the tension between RtoP and state sovereignty. It was argued that this is impossible once Pillar III and military intervention enters the picture. Instead, it was felt that

the issue of whether sovereignty should be overridden should be discussed at the UN level. However, suggestions were made that increasing democratisation among certain states in the region could prevent this.

At the end of the discussion, it was clear that it is important to raise awareness of RtoP. Once this is accomplished, champions can be identified across and within constituencies to advance understanding of the three pillars and begin the necessary groundwork to prevent mass atrocities in the region. Despite mixed understandings and views on RtoP, this regional consultation provided a new forum for discussion on RtoP and an opportunity to identify ways in which an abstract concept can be put into practice through identifying norm champions, policies and institutions which offer entry points for RtoP in the region.



## Programme

### 8 April (Thursday)

#### 08:45–09:10 **Registration**

Please be seated by 09:10hrs

#### 09:15–09:30 **Welcome Remarks**

Ambassador Barry Desker  
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Nanyang Technological University,  
Singapore

12:00–13:15 **Lunch**

#### 09:30–09:40 **Opening Remarks**

Associate Professor Mely  
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S. Rajaratnam School of International  
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Singapore

13:15–15:00

#### **Session 2: Country Perspectives on RtoP in Southeast Asia**

This session and the next session will examine the different perceptions towards and the operationalisation of RtoP in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. Questions to be raised include:

- To what extent, if any, has RtoP gained traction in countries in the region?
- What are some of the challenges and obstacles in advancing the RtoP principles (specifically in Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, China and Japan)?
- What is the role of major powers (China, Japan and India) in the region's engagement and operationalisation of RtoP?

#### 09:40–10:00 **Photo Opportunity and Coffee Break**

#### 10:00–12:00 **Session 1: An Overview of RtoP – Conceptual Issues and Challenges in Asia**

This session will map out and understand different stakeholders' perception of RtoP in Asia. Questions to be raised include:

- What are the different stakeholders' understandings of RtoP? Are there sub-regional differences? How do these differ from the global (UN) understanding of RtoP?
- To what extent, if any, has RtoP gained traction in Asia despite existing roadblocks?

15:00–15:15 **Coffee Break**

15:15–16:15

#### **Session 3: Country Perspectives on RtoP in Northeast Asia**

16:15–16:30

**Coffee Break**

16:30–18:00 **Session 4: Regional Mechanisms to Promote RtoP**

This session will examine which regional mechanisms in Southeast Asia promote RtoP. Questions to be raised include:

- To what extent have institutional developments been conducive to the promotion of RtoP in the region?
- How effective have institutions, such as the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) been in advancing RtoP?
- What are some of the challenges and obstacles faced by regional institutions and how can these be addressed?

**End of Day One**

**9 April (Friday)**

08:45–09:00 **Registration**

09:00–10:45 **Session 5: The Role of International Institutions, Civil Society Organisations and Other Actors in Promoting RtoP**

This session will examine the role of international institutions, civil society organisations and the media in the promotion of RtoP. Questions to be raised include:

- What is the role of international organisations in the promotion of RtoP in Asia?
- What can local, national and regional stakeholders do to promote awareness and advance RtoP in the region?

10:45–11:00 **Coffee Break**

11:00–13:00 **Session 6: The Way Forward: A Regional RtoP Roadmap for Asia?**

This discussion will discuss ways forward to best engage the regional community in promoting and operationalising RtoP. Questions to be raised include:

- What can Asia learn from experiences in other parts of the world in promoting RtoP?
- What steps can be taken to promote and institutionalise RtoP in Asia?

**End of Consultation**



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## About the RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies

The **RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies** conducts research and produces policy-relevant analyses aimed at furthering awareness and building capacity to address NTS issues and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

To fulfil this mission, the Centre aims to:

- Advance the understanding of NTS issues and challenges in the Asia-Pacific by highlighting gaps in knowledge and policy, and identifying best practices among state and non-state actors in responding to these challenges
- Provide a platform for scholars and policymakers within and outside Asia to discuss and analyse NTS issues in the region
- Network with institutions and organisations worldwide to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of NTS
- Engage policymakers on the importance of NTS in guiding political responses to NTS emergencies and develop strategies to mitigate the risks to state and human security
- Contribute to building the institutional capacity of governments, and regional and international organisations to respond to NTS challenges

### Our Research

The key programmes at the **RSIS Centre for NTS Studies** include:

- 1) Internal and Cross-Border Conflict Programme
  - Dynamics of Internal Conflicts
  - Multi-level and Multilateral Approaches to Internal Conflict
  - Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in Asia
  - Peacebuilding
- 2) Climate Change, Environmental Security and Natural Disasters Programme
  - Mitigation and Adaptation Policy Studies
  - The Politics and Diplomacy of Climate Change
- 3) Energy and Human Security Programme
  - Security and Safety of Energy Infrastructure
  - Stability of Energy Markets
  - Energy Sustainability
  - Nuclear Energy and Security
- 4) Health and Human Security Programme
  - Health and Human Security
  - Global Health Governance
  - Pandemic Preparedness and Global Response Networks

The first three programmes received a boost from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation when the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies was selected as one of three core institutions leading the MacArthur Asia Security Initiative\* in 2009.

## Our Output

### **Policy Relevant Publications**

The RSIS Centre for NTS Studies produces a range of output such as research reports, books, monographs, policy briefs and conference proceedings.

### **Training**

Based in RSIS, which has an excellent record of post-graduate teaching, an international faculty, and an extensive network of policy institutes worldwide, the Centre is well-placed to develop robust research capabilities, conduct training courses and facilitate

advanced education on NTS. These are aimed at, but not limited to, academics, analysts, policymakers and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

### **Networking and Outreach**

The Centre serves as a networking hub for researchers, policy analysts, policymakers, NGOs and media from across Asia and farther afield interested in NTS issues and challenges.

The **RSIS Centre for NTS Studies** is also the Secretariat of the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia), which brings together 20 research institutes and think tanks from across Asia, and strives to develop the process of networking, consolidate existing research on NTS-related issues, and mainstream NTS studies in Asia.

More information on our Centre is available at [www.rsis.edu.sg/nts](http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts)

\* *The Asia Security Initiative was launched by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in January 2009, through which approximately US\$68 million in grants will be made to policy research institutions over seven years to help raise the effectiveness of international cooperation in preventing conflict and promoting peace and security in Asia.*



## About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University

The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University (NTU). RSIS' mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia-Pacific.

To accomplish this mission, **RSIS** will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations
- Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

### Graduate Training in International Affairs

**RSIS** offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (MSc) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy and Asian Studies. Through partnerships with the University of Warwick and NTU's Nanyang Business School, **RSIS** also offers the NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme as well as The Nanyang MBA (International Studies). The graduate teaching is distinguished by their focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the professional practice of international affairs and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 200 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

### Research

Research at **RSIS** is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, and the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has three professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, and the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations.

### International Collaboration

Collaboration with other Professional Schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a **RSIS** priority. **RSIS** will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

For more information on the School,  
visit [www.rsis.edu.sg](http://www.rsis.edu.sg)

CENTRE FOR  
NON-TRADITIONAL  
SECURITY STUDIES



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OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**  
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

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