12TH ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

CONFERENCE REPORT

5–10 August 2010
SINGAPORE

**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

PONDER THE IMPROBABLE

12TH ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** was officially inaugurated on 1 January 2007. Before that, it was known as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established ten years earlier on 30 July 1996. Like its predecessor, **RSIS** was established as an autonomous entity within Nanyang Technological University (NTU).

The School exists to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of Asia-Pacific security studies and international affairs. Its three core functions are research, graduate teaching and networking activities in the Asia-Pacific region. It produces cutting-edge security related research in Asia-Pacific Security, Conflict and Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Area Studies.

The School's activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific and their implications for Singapore.

For more information about RSIS, please visit **www.rsis. edu.sg**.

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This report summarises the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

This conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the speakers and paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this report.

Background and Aims of the Conference

The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, has been organising an annual Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO) every August since 1999. In 2010, the programme ran formally from 5 through 10 August, with a welcome dinner on 4 August. Fifty-two senior military officers from the Asia Pacific and Europe participated in the programme.

The academic aspect of the programme was designed to stimulate the participants to consider policy matters from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Distinguished speakers from Singapore and around the world were invited to address subjects such as new dimensions in international security, fighting small wars in the new century, maritime security, terrorism in South and Southeast Asia, the media and international conflict, ethics of war in the twenty-first century, international security and strategic uncertainties, and intelligence and national security.

Besides discussing policy-relevant issues, the officers also participated in a number of social activities. These included visits to the Changi Naval Base and a tour of historic and iconic landmarks of Singapore. These activities gave the officers opportunities to interact with one another and build relationships.

Opening Remarks

Ambassador Barry Desker

In his opening remarks, **Ambassador Barry Desker**, Dean of RSIS and Director of IDSS, highlighted that over the years, since its inception in 1999, APPSMO has seen increasing numbers of country participants. He also noted that APPSMO has expanded to cover the realms of both traditional and non-traditional security issues.

Ambassador Desker emphasised that our understanding of security has undergone a radical transformation. Fundamental to this is the widening of the security agenda. As the security instrument par excellence, this increasingly means that the roles that military institutions have to undertake will also increase. No longer can military organisations only focus on the defence of the realm from external military challenges, these institutions also need to begin to focus on the new challenges in the new security agenda, as well as begin to understand the processes that underpin the emergence of these new security challenges. The militaries of today not only have to handle the challenges of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, but also globalisation and its more unconventional challenges to the security of states.

Bearing the above in mind, this year's APPSMO focuses on the transformation of security and what this, therefore, means for the military organisation. The programme will range from military transformation to the challenges posed by the new media, from fighting insurgencies to securing sea-lanes, from understanding the ways in which intelligence communities are adapting to contemporary security challenges to grappling with the implications of competition for energy resources. The latter is becoming more salient, Ambassador Desker noted, given the increasing competition for energy resources. It should be remembered that access to energy resources is intrinsically linked to a state's national security and a potential source of conflict. The week's discussions will also encompass the accountability of militaries as institutions and the development of conflict management mechanisms.

Ambassador Desker highlighted that a central objective of APPSMO continues to be to facilitate exchanges and the development of personal relationships among senior military officers in the region and beyond. The role of APPSMO in providing the necessary platform for useful and thought-provoking discussion in an informal setting would serve to make discussions on security both candid and honest.

In closing, Ambassador Desker thanked the sponsors—Singapore Totalisator Board and ST Engineering—the speakers and the participants for making APPSMO 2010 possible.

Opening Address

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean delivered the opening speech. He noted that APPSMO provided a much-needed opportunity for senior military officers to understand current security issues and engage in frank exchanges of views in a friendly and informal setting.

Deputy Prime Minister Teo stressed that the global financial crisis, which had accelerated the shift in global economic weight towards Asia, will concomitantly result in shifts in the strategic situation in the region. The rising Asian powers will have new and expanded interests such as access to energy, trade routes and markets, and will seek to safeguard them. In some instances, this will lead them to seek cooperation with others who share the same interests, but there is also the potential for increased competition and friction both with one another and the more established powers. This heightens the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation as states adjust to these new realities.

Apart from traditional security challenges, regional peace and prosperity also remain vulnerable to many new types of trans-boundary threats. These include piracy, natural disasters, new infectious diseases and the persistent threat of trans-national terrorism. The same global inter-connections that promote economic growth also facilitate the rapid spread of these non-traditional security threats into and within the region.

This year's APPSMO, Deputy Prime Minister Teo noted, was taking place against a backdrop of new security challenges, with recent reminders that we cannot take regional stability for granted. While bilateral relationships between several of the key countries remain stable, the rising tension on the Korean peninsula provided a reminder of how irresponsible acts of provocation could destabilise the entire region. The recent differences in the U.S.-China relationship also bear watching.

Apart from short-term developments, there are some key security challenges in the Asia Pacific which will require concerted and collective effort to manage. First is the safety and security of sea lanes of communication. Deputy Prime Minister Teo emphasised that these sea lanes are vital to long-term regional stability and prosperity, and states need to work together to keep access to them open, safe and secure for all. The principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS provide a useful basis to guide the way that various claims to maritime zones and jurisdiction over sea areas can be resolved. He stressed that all states have an interest in ensuring that the international norms in UNCLOS are universally respected. Second, globalisation facilitates recruitment by terrorist groups, self-radicalisation, and the copycat transfer of terrorist methods, through the Internet and the international travel network. The recent wave of detentions in regional countries shows that this threat has not abated. Constant vigilance and effective

community efforts to reintegrate individuals who have been arrested are needed to prevent them from returning to their terrorist ways. An added worry is the spread of extremist ideologies to other prisoners in the prisons where these detainees are held.

Although these challenges pose real risks to regional security, they also present opportunities for security cooperation between states. These are complex problems that cannot be solved by a single country, or even a small group of countries. States thus have a shared interest in working together to ensure that risks are managed and threats are neutralised early, and conflicts prevented. To this end, we see more countries coming together and engaging in multilateral dialogue to find solutions to these challenges. The regional security architecture in the Asia Pacific contains a good mixture of different platforms for such discussions.

Deputy Prime Minister Teo added that the military has a very important role to play in both multilateral defence dialogue and practical security cooperation. Regional militaries participate in pan-regional dialogue and professional exchanges at a wide range of multilateral forums. These platforms complement and enhance the already extensive network of bilateral interactions between regional militaries. Beyond this, it is important that militaries interact in practical exercises and operational frameworks for security cooperation. By working with one another in these practical ways, regional militaries will build up comfort levels, develop friendly professional relationships between individual military officers, and improve mutual understanding of one another's viewpoints and constraints. When regional militaries come together through arrangements that allow all stakeholders to play a part, in a flexible way in accordance with their means and circumstances, these efforts can deliver real security dividends for all parties.

Finally, Deputy Prime Minister Teo wished everyone in attendance a lively and engaging week of interaction.

LECTURE SESSION 1
New Dimensions in International Security

Steve Smith

Steve Smith discussed some of the leading theories about international politics. By examining the dominant theory of realism and its alternatives, Smith challenged the audience to critically examine their assumptions about what constitutes "security".

Smith began by discussing the relevance of using various theories to understand international security. He noted that while often dismissed by practical policymakers, academic theories highlight the basic assumptions that influence all decision-making. These assumptions often lead to "policy-based evidence" rather than "evidence-based policy". It is, therefore, important to be aware of one's assumptions to avoid making poor choices.

Smith said that realism was the dominant theory in the field of international relations. Realism assumes an anarchic world where self-interested states naturally compete against one another for limited resources. States are the main actors in international affairs. Non-state actors are of limited importance and domestic forces rarely influence a state's external behaviour.

States are concerned with survival, security and power rather than ethics and morals, and are preoccupied with safeguarding their vital interests. As such, states exist in a security dilemma, making cooperation and international institutions weak and unreliable. Smith went on to highlight the shortcomings of realism's assumptions. He observed, for example, that anarchy sometimes leads to cooperation rather than competition. Furthermore, by assuming a zero-sum competition between states, realism emphasises relative gains over absolute ones, which is not always the case. The anarchical status-quo model of realism also cannot explain major changes in world politics. Finally, with its preoccupation with the state, realism cannot adequately explain the contemporary influence of both non-state and domestic actors brought about by globalisation.

Smith then discussed some alternatives to realism: constructivism, critical security and human security. Constructivism argues that perceptions of security and insecurity are as much social as they are material. Thus, in contrast to realism, constructivism argues that culture and ideology can shape the way states relate to one another. Critical security studies, he highlighted, argues that security can only be achieved when individuals, rather than states, are given economic and political freedoms. Human security is similar to critical security in focusing on the individual, but widens the concept of security to include the economic, environmental, food, health, personal, community and social aspects.

In conclusion, Smith argued that the three alternatives to realism offer a more comprehensive appreciation of international security. It is, therefore, important to broaden our conception of international security and examine our basic assumptions if we are to understand and deal with such issues.

PANEL DISCUSSION 1
# Fighting Small Wars in the New Century

John Mackinlay noted that insurgency was a technique that evolves at the same pace as the society from which it arises. According to Mackinlay, Mao brought the techniques of insurgency across a very important threshold. His achievement was to develop it into a process by which to subvert populations on a large scale. Mao's brand of guerrilla warfare was methodological, in which the people who lived in operational areas became the campaign winning asset. In Mao's terms, insurgency is therefore characterised by the centrality of the civilian population—victory for the insurgents or the counter-insurgent hinges on the disposition of the people.

In tactical terms, if the goal was to win over the population, then the principal instruments used to achieve that aim must be predominantly political, not military. In addition to security, the process depends on political techniques such as subversion and education. From the Maoist perspective, the movement must have genuine political personality if it wants to be a credible threat to the government.

Post-Maoism, the conditions of globalisation started to alter the monolithic nature of insurgency. With mass communications it became possible for groups of potential insurgents to contact and coordinate on a hitherto unknown level. The revolutionary nature of contemporary communication technology is altering these societies across the world.

The use of propaganda has become a defining characteristic of post-Maoist insurgency. For the organisers of insurgency and counter-insurgency, propaganda has become central to planning. For the insurgents, propaganda in the form of violent imagery has been used to galvanise groups of disaffected peoples around the world to join their movement. It energises the uncommitted to start searching for more information and direction, potentially culminating in their radicalisation and training elsewhere.

Therefore, insurgency has evolved from the Maoist model, which is hierarchically structured, highly labour intensive and territorially defined. Today, it is almost the antithesis of the Maoist model—highly unstructured, less reliant on labour and almost completely without defined geography.

John Mackinlay

Contemporary insurgency is more agile, with a swifter decision-making process cycle, than any coalition of military forces and civil agencies could ever achieve. Insurgents are agile because they are not territorially constrained, and the swiftness at which insurgent attacks happen outstrips reactive counter-striking. The lack of a defined structure gives insurgent groups the advantage, because the counter-insurgent cannot decapitate their leadership. The insurgent group simply moves and regroups to strike again at a more favourable location and time.

In closing, Mackinlay asserted that the impulsive, structure-less and constantly evolving form of contemporary insurgency is quintessentially a twenty-first century phenomenon. The international response to this form of insurgency, however, remains inadequate and the lack of progress by recent military campaigns have demonstrated this deficiency.

The second speaker, **Terence McNamee,** described fault-lines as the root of all insurgencies. These fault-lines were often social or political in origin, and in some senses are timeless. Additionally, ill-conceived attempts to address them, stemming from a simplistic appraisal of complex circumstances, often inadvertently fuelled insurgencies. These insurgencies often varied from case to case, with multiple fault-lines, and no single template solution to solve them. McNamee cited the racial tension in Nigeria as an example.

McNamee noted that in the present, with the exception of the African continent, war between states was rare.

Terence McNamee

Rather, the main cause of death was through political violence along fault-lines. All countries, he observed, have divisions. This is especially the case in areas with a colonial history, fragmented societies with obvious economic and religious differences and governments that do not have legitimacy. McNamee cited the example of the African continent and highlighted that, thus far, many attempts to address these fault-lines have backfired. He stressed, however, that fault-lines were not fundamentally irreconcilable.

McNamee argued that there are four key issues which need to be recognised when addressing fault-lines: (i) good governance, (ii) the value of elections, (iii) the nature of engagement and (iv) flexibility in the approach by the international community.

For any government, their biggest challenge is not to allow those who have lost the elections to be marginalised, disenfranchised and yet accumulate significant power through other means. It is imperative that an elected government find a way to keep the "losers" weak lest they disrupt the management of the country. It is also important that the elected government not simplify fault-lines into a dichotomy of two exactly opposing views. In reality, there are often shades of grey, and the government must be cognizant of this.

It is also important to correctly value elections. McNamee pointed out that many of the most divisive fault-lines occurred in countries that were ostensibly democratic. He argued that many external observers over-emphasised the importance of elections and saw the conduct of them as the "be all and end all". In reality, however, many insiders, having witnessed the inequity of the electoral process, felt that a number of such elections were hollow. These insiders would also equate the lack of transparency as a sign of governmental weakness and illegitimacy. Although elections may be deemed as a quick fix by external parties, they also create an "us-versus-them" dynamic which may have negative consequences.

McNamee also cautioned that the West would do well to avoid engaging the developing world in a condescending manner. He noted that in this age of globalisation, the developing world actually had a better idea of the West than vice-versa. McNamee observed that the West lagged in its understanding of how the developing world was using technology. This mastery of technology has allowed the developing world to manipulate the West and circumvent some of its rules.

McNamee suggested that the international community needed to be more flexible in its responses. Military solutions were now a less viable approach, with international mediators now in greater demand than ever. That noted, peacekeepers were still in demand. McNamee also argued that the West should apply its standards circumstantially and not be too rigid and "by the book". He pointed to the success of Somaliland (as opposed to Somalia) as a viable state even though the country's government still fell short of Western standards.

In conclusion, McNamee reiterated that fault-lines are universal because there is no such thing as a "natural state", and that good governance was instrumental to preventing violence.

The third speaker, **Kumar Ramakrishna,** aimed to use the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) as an examination of how the British colonial government in Malaya had employed propaganda in the campaign against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and identified possible lessons for COIN today. From 1948–1952, the British adopted a hard-line approach that included the forced resettlement, mass detentions, deportations and collective punishment of rural Chinese communities suspected of colluding with communist insurgents. The two main reasons for the early British approach were firstly, British imperial policing habits that originated in the "Irish model" of policing that was transmitted to Palestine in the 1930s and then Malaya in the 1940s and early 1950s and secondly, racial stereotypes that resulted in mass alienation of the rural Chinese.

Ramakrishna identified the arrival of High Commissioner and Director of Emergency Operations, LG Gerald Templer, and Commissioner A. E. Young in 1952 as the turning point of the Emergency. As part of the community

Kumar Ramakrishna

policing approach, which emphasised that the "police must be part of the people and people part of the police", Young launched a massive retraining programme that included courses in the Cantonese and Hokkien dialects for European officers. By the end of 1954 to early 1955, the slowly increasing rural Chinese confidence in the police and government was obvious.

Ramakrishna suggested that Templer's secret was a nuanced understanding of propaganda. In Malaya, propaganda covered not just words but also deeds—both planned and unplanned. Templer's cessation of mass detention, deportation and collective punishment policies; the upgrading of resettlement areas into well-guarded, properly sited, well-equipped "New Villages"; and the inauguration of so-called "White Areas" where ordinary people could move around freely and live normally without Emergency restrictions represented positive "propaganda of the deeds" to the rural Chinese communities.

The British colonial government began to slowly turn things around in the Emergency when it recognised that the most important thing was to deny the CPM the hearts and minds of the key community—in this case the rural Chinese. This meant that "all-of-government", not just the Malayan Police but also the Army and the District Officers on the ground, had to be more community-orientated and more politically sensitised. In DGIS Alec Peterson's legendary words, "everybody had to be propaganda-minded".

On the lessons for COIN today, Ramakrishna argued that we must recognise the essential nature of religiously inspired insurgencies which is actually political ideology couched in religious language. Since insurgents do have some degree of support in the wider religious community, it is all the more important to understand that COIN operations that eliminate the insurgent threat without alienating the wider community from which the insurgents emerge are the decisive requirement. Ramakrishna elaborated that excessive reliance on "enemy-centric" kinetic tactics, lack of tact and sensitivity in securing information from individuals in the religious community and lack of care and respect in searching private homes and sacred places of worship serve to fuel the extremist single narrative of a religious community being treated like second-class citizens.

In conclusion, Ramakrishna reiterated that "propaganda-minded" COIN policy is the key. Officers and men should be trained not merely in the technical aspects of COIN operations against insurgents and the wider community of support but also in the potential political consequences of those procedures. He recommended the promotion of a "propaganda-minded" COIN policy across the board, drawing in military, civil society and all other relevant agencies. He also reiterated the importance of ensuring that the message emanating from government rhetoric is consistent with that emanating from its actual deeds.

PANEL DISCUSSION 2
Securing the Seas

RADM Bernard Miranda started the discussion by sharing his experience as the commander of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, where he led an international team that conducted counter-piracy operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden from January to April 2010. The Task Force comprises forces from the European Union, NATO and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and some independent nations. There are also a number of organisations that support the CTF by facilitating information-sharing and coordinating merchant shipping. These include UKMTO in Dubai, Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa that supports the EU Task Force and the NATO Shipping Centre. Miranda also noted that there were three different communication systems being used by the various forces deployed, namely the U.S.-provided Centrics system, the EU-developed Mercury system and Singapore's Access system. He stressed that given the different nations and complexities involved, effective interaction was critical to the success of the CTF operations.

Miranda provided insights into the nature of piracy off the coast of Somalia. He highlighted that pirates were involved in a wide range of illegal activities including human trafficking from Somalia to Yemen. Pirates, it was noted, stayed away from the main merchant shipping routes and preferred to attack vessels that strayed from these routes. Ransoms ranged from US$1 to 5 million dollars. This enabled the pirates to equip themselves with better ships and engines, weapons such as the AK-47 (the weapon of choice) and rocket-launched grenades, logistics that enabled them to engage in sea operations for up to six weeks and communication technology such as satellite phones and GPS.

The presence of security forces and best management practices by merchant ships have helped to minimise piracy. Yet, the latest trend shows that piracy incidents have stretched further away from the Somali coast with pirates engaging in raids as far as waters off India and the Maldives. This has forced the CTF to adjust its operations and conduct patrols beyond its area. Miranda shared that CTF efforts to counter piracy had been hampered by several issues. These included insufficient number of ships, helicopters and maritime patrols for deployment; difficulties involved in the prosecution of pirates; and the failure on the part of some merchant ships to exercise best management practices thus making them vulnerable to piracy attacks.

RADM Bernard Miranda

In conclusion, Miranda stressed that information sharing, good force flow and the shipping industry's exercise of best management practices are key to countering the threat of piracy. He also noted that counter-piracy patrols could only help to reduce the incidents of piracy. The problem of piracy was ultimately the result of problems within the state.

The second speaker, **Satoru Mori**, addressed the impact of China's expanding maritime capabilities on the security environment in the South China Sea. He noted that other states in the region were responding by expanding their own maritime capabilities while continuing to increase their economic ties with China. The United States, on its part, was committed to ensuring the freedom of navigation. Mori suggested that while the U.S. position should be trusted, there is a need to develop an intra-regional mechanism to devise ways to secure the seas.

In order to manage maritime disputes, it is necessary that all claimants nurture strategic trust. This can be done by engaging in rule making, expanding security based upon strategic trust, and compliance with existing maritime declarations, rules and agreements. It was stressed that managing maritime disputes involved alleviating the security dilemma thus reducing the risk of strategic confrontation as well as the development of rules of order in the region which could resolve the disputes. Mori noted that the latter is crucial, particularly in the Western Pacific region.

Although Chinese naval expansion is legitimate, it has raised concerns because it was not clear how China would

Satoru Mori

use its naval capabilities in pursuing its maritime claims. Mori noted that China has not only expanded its navy's horizon in the region but also allowed its navy to legally pursue its maritime claims. In the light of these developments, it is important for China to reassure other claimants that it will not change the ground conditions through forced action, and establish mechanisms to make forceful action impossible.

According to Mori, the major security concerns in the South China Sea can be divided into two categories: high intensity conflicts, such as Taiwan, and low intensity conflicts. The latter are manifest, for instance, in the possession of disputed islands by claimants and regional-level warfare followed by the denial of third-party jurisdiction to access the maritime zone and even the limiting of the freedom of navigation in international waters. To prevent this, he suggested that there is a need to formulate a framework based on the "carrot-and-stick" method.

Mori offered two suggestions for dealing with maritime security issues. The first, an intra-regional option, was the establishment of a mini-lateral collective maritime security forum. Any violation of existing regulations concerning the South China Sea could be reviewed by this forum and member states could formulate and coordinate multilateral responses. These responses could range from the issuing of a joint political statement to maritime action. The second, an extra-regional option, called for the strengthening of relations with the United States. This, it was noted, could be provocative and problematic as it excludes China. There were a number of ways states could pursue this option. They could, for instance, receive U.S. humanitarian medical assistance programmes. An example of this would be

Japan, which received a U.S. hospital ship as part of the humanitarian assistance partnership programme. States could also conclude visiting forces agreements with the United States much like what the Philippines had done. States could also expand the scope of existing security cooperation with the United States on the model of the Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT). Another option was for states to multi-nationalise the issue of freedom for navigation.

In conclusion, Mori stressed that regardless of whichever course was adopted by states in the region, the engagement of China in rule making and rule-compliance was crucial to the nurturing of strategic trust and stability of the maritime order.

The third speaker, **Sam Bateman,** discussed several current maritime security issues in the Asian region. He highlighted that the region was considered to be the most complex maritime area in the world. The issues plaguing it revolved around maritime legalities, rights and duties in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), extended continental rights claims, disputes in the South China Sea and the threat of piracy.

While the Law of the Sea has become a major factor in regional maritime security, it remains problematic because many aspects of it are not universally agreed upon. In particular, the issue of navigational regimes and the interpretation of rights and duties in the EEZ continue to be contested. The case of the EEZ, it was noted, is a sui generis. As it is neither part of the continental shelf nor high seas, it is subject to multiple interpretations. It is generally agreed that coastal states have sovereign rights—not sovereignty—over EEZ resources, and jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research, protection of the marine environment, resource management and installations. However, there are disputes over issues such as the distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights, the designation of EEZs as international waters, restriction on military activities, and the distinction between marine scientific research, intelligence collection, military surveys and hydrographic surveys. Bateman highlighted the incident in the South of Hainan in March 2009, in which China alleged that the ocean surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable breached laws for the conduct of scientific research by not getting its consent to survey Chinese EEZ areas.

It was noted that coastal states have sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf. In certain cases, the continental shelf

Sam Bateman

may extend up to 350 nautical miles from territorial sea baselines or even further. Coastal states had 10 years from 13 May 1999 to lodge submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). While CLCS does not consider submissions related to disputed areas, some of CLCS submissions have been very controversial. These included Japan's submission for an extended continental shelf from Okinotori; India's and Myanmar's submissions of extending continental shelf which are likely to leave Bangladesh as a zone-blocked country; the joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia for an extended continental shelf in the South China Sea, which was objected to by China, Philippines and Brunei because it involves disputed areas in the South China Sea.

Bateman noted that in the case of the South China Sea islands and reefs, China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines are claiming full or part of the disputed area. The situation has been particularly problematic due to the lack of maritime boundaries, limited cooperative arrangements and the lack of clear jurisdiction. Due to such disputes over sovereignty, environmental issues such as illegal fishing, unreported fishing and the degradation of coral reefs have not been dealt with effectively. Bateman suggested that the United States could play a more constructive role, by offering more "carrots" in the form of skills and expertise to help manage the marine environment, resources and safety at sea.

Turning to discuss the issue of piracy in Southeast Asia, Bateman characterised it as opportunistic petty theft. The number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asia, it was noted, had reduced throughout the 2001–2009 period. The reasons behind this are the peace agreement in Aceh, increased surveillance and patrolling at sea, tighter government control and policing onshore, greater security awareness in the shipping industry and establishment of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP). Nonetheless, the region still has hotspots of piracy.

In conclusion, Bateman noted the recent deterioration in the South China Sea situation and urged the need for preventive diplomacy and maritime confidence, and security building measures.

PANEL DISCUSSION 3
Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia

Muniruzzaman began his presentation by noting that South Asia, home to approximately one third of the human population, has become the centre of gravity of global terrorism. The region has witnessed a higher rate of escalation of terrorist attacks than other parts of the world. Terrorism perpetrated by Islamist militants in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh is threatening the security of the region. In addition to this, it was highlighted that India is facing new challenges presented by the Maoist and Naxalites, on the one hand, and Hindu radicalisation, on the other.

Several new problems confronting South Asian states were discussed. These included self-radicalisation (especially via the Internet), prison radicalisation, female radicalisation and the phenomenon of migrant workers based in the Middle East who returned with ideas and ideals which they perceived to be incompatible with their home countries. These problems are particularly salient given that South Asian states only employ kinetic means to deal with problems associated with terrorism.

Muniruzzaman also shared that while terrorists most commonly use the tactic of suicide bombings in urban areas, there has been an increasing shift towards attacks using small arms in place of bomb blasts. It was stressed that terrorist organisations are getting savvier in strategic communication and that in some cases there is a nexus between terrorism and organised crimes. The base for terrorist recruitment is no longer confined to *madrasahs*. There is evidence that recruitment has also taken place in elite universities. Muniruzzaman proposed that South Asia should learn from Southeast Asia's successful

counter-terrorism operations and work towards having more operational joint exercises.

In conclusion, he warned that the threat of terrorism in South Asia is escalating and it is a problem that needs to be seriously addressed by the states in South Asia. It will take a long time to counter, and unless it is successfully dealt with, it will see continued violence in the years to come.

According to the second speaker, **Sidney Jones**, the landscape in Southeast Asia is more optimistic. Jones suggested that in examining the regional threat of terrorism, it is illustrative to examine the case of Indonesia where the threat has lessened given the robust police operations. However, she cautioned that the threat has not disappeared. In fact, it may have become more complex as the problem now is not solely about dealing with Jemaah Islamiah, but about dealing with small and fractured groups.

Jones noted that the most important development in Indonesia in 2010 was the uncovering by the police of the *Lintas Tandzim* (Cross-Organisational Alliance) consisting of about seven groups, which came together to build a militant training camp in Aceh. It was highlighted that many individuals who were part of this alliance had met one another while they were serving time in prison. It was also noted that although the alliance in Aceh described itself as being an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Indonesia, there was no evidence of a direct al-Qaeda connection. Furthermore, this alliance revealed the constant realignment and regrouping of disparate groups that was occurring. The key factor that these groups agreed upon

Muniruzzaman

Sidney Jones

was that targeted assassinations were a better option than large-scale bombings as they minimised Muslim deaths.

Jones explained that these groups criticised the Jemaah Islamiah for being too soft and passive. The latter had decided that they were too weak, for the time being, to actively engage in a jihad and should focus instead on community outreach and religious education. There is now a greater focus on the part of the Jemaah Islamiah on the "near enemy"—i.e. the Indonesian government—for its failure to implement Islamic laws and establish an Islamic state. The police are also categorised as enemies for their active involvement in counter-terrorism efforts.

In conclusion, Jones emphasised that in spite of the ongoing manifestations of terrorism, Southeast Asia has not turned into a "second front" in the global fight against terrorism. But she stressed that while the problem is manageable, it is not one that will go away anytime soon. She also noted that governments in the region had to confront a number of challenges including weak intelligence, weak monitoring of prisons and ex-prisoners, poor understanding of radicalisation and recruitment, and corruption.

The third speaker**, Rohan Gunaratna,** argued that the contemporary wave of terrorism started in the Middle East in 1968. However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the centre of gravity for terrorism shifted to South Asia. He reasoned that the terrorist threat in the Middle East would have declined further if not for two factors: the continuity of the Palestine-Israel conflict and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

According to Gunaratna, most Asian and Middle Eastern terrorist groups are based at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He asserted that Dr. Abdullah Azzam who created al-Qaeda in August 1988 wrote in his book that al-Qaeda was the vanguard to show other groups the ways of jihad. Since its establishment, al-Qaeda has inspired 30 to 40 terrorist groups around the world and has provided them with a platform for training in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Gunaratna explained that the Taliban factions in Pakistan have united as the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan. Pakistan,

Rohan Gunaratna

he suggested, had witnessed the emergence of the Taliban on its soil because during the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan there was no concerted attempt to isolate the Taliban from escaping to Pakistan.

Gunaratna went on to share his findings on trans-national terrorist linkages. The Jemaah Islamiah in Southeast Asia, he argued, is persistent in sending operatives to Iraq and other locations to learn new skills. There is increasing concern over the possibility of bomb-makers from other regions, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan and Iraq coming to share their expertise with militants in Southeast Asia.

He also gave a brief recount of the 2009 Jakarta bombing attacks, emphasising on the importance of security screening for employees, and warned about the reconnaissance and surveillance terrorists would do prior to an attack. On a more positive note, Gunaratna noted that the counter-terrorism unit in Indonesia had achieved significant success till date.

In conclusion, Gunaratna argued that the threat in Southeast Asia was negligible and will diminish because of its efficient counter-terrorism initiatives. In contrast, the threat in South Asia remained formidable. He asserted that it was crucial for the international community to assist Pakistan and stressed that counter-terrorism operations require parallel efforts ranging from kinetic to economic and humanitarian assistance.

LECTURE SESSION 2
Media and International Conflict

Nik Gowing discussed the changing role of the media in times of international crisis, the increasing democratisation of the media and the increasingly vital role the media is playing in influencing those in power as well as military and security operations. He also addressed the implications of information transparency, the battle for public perception, the tensions between new technologies versus new security realities and the efforts expended by governments and militaries to keep up with the new media technologies.

New forms of media technology have made information easily available and accessible. These new media technologies included cell-phone cameras and video cameras, which could easily be obtained by amateur reporters and ordinary citizens. The collection, processing and distribution of news reports have quickened. With the proliferation of mobile phones with built-in cameras and the Internet, ordinary civilians also have the power to be members of the media. Events could be captured instantaneously on a mobile phone's camera and immediately transferred to other media for public broadcast. He cited the example of the Iranian government's clampdown on protesters in the wake of the contested election results and the Myanmar government's suppression of protests in September—October 2007 as instances where reports and pictures of the crackdown were released on the Internet almost immediately, causing international outrage.

In this new real time environment, institutions of power—be they the government, security organisations or corporations—can be vulnerable. There is a gap between the speed at which information is being dispersed and the ability of the institutions of power to respond.

The democratisation of the media may, however, have its consequences. The latest developments might be quickly covered, but in the rush to get a scoop journalists might compromise the accuracy of their stories. Furthermore, authorities might experience difficulty in dispelling rumours if inaccurate reports were unthinkingly carried and broadcast by the media. Additionally, instant news could generate negative repercussions.

Nik Gowing

As was seen in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the terrorists' handlers in Pakistan exploited the intelligence furnished by the media to plot the deaths of more people. The impact of such developments was that governments have been put in an increasingly difficult position to address many of the pressing issues raised by the media swiftly. The failure to do so might undermine the standing of governments and their agencies. Another potential impact of the new media was that they could influence military activities. A case in point was the American military assault undertaken in September 2008 in Azizabad, Afghanistan. U.S. news released reports that seven civilians had died in the attack while a camera captured images of almost 55 killed. The result was that the U.S. military was called on to account for the civilian deaths.

In summary, the media and government officials have their work cut out for them—they have to determine the accuracy of the information they broadcasted and received. The process, however, could be time-consuming and could limit the media organisations' capacity to provide timely news. While established and respected television channels and newspapers have their internal vetting system, media channels eager to broadcast the latest news to enhance their ratings might gloss over inaccuracies and transmit false information. Inaccurate media reports could undermine social stability. Inaccurate media reports could also affect government decision-making adversely.

The Ethics of War in the Twenty-first Century: Military Robots and the Battle Space of the Future

Christopher Coker commenced his presentation on the premise that the ethics of war in the twenty-first century was more important vis-à-vis the past predicated on an increasingly transparent battle space. This has in turn led to scrutiny by various parties over "what you do in war" and "how you do war". As things stand, the battle space of the future is likely to be dominated by robotics. Forty-three countries currently operate drones, which in a decade or so will become old fashioned. The crescendo in mechanical automation has led researchers such as **Ronald Arkin** to explore "artificial conscience" in robots that can perform more ethically than humans on the battlefield. Beyond the war of automation there is also the automation of war. Take Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) pilots for instance. They keep regular hours and work in a rather safe environment. They keep regular cycles of home-work-home. Is this war?

There are perhaps three rhetorical questions for reflection. First, "Shouldn't you have to look the enemy in the eye?" Second, "Don't you need to know the consequences of your actions?" Finally, "Should killing be as easy as sending an email?" These questions arise from the human factors that have always been associated with war, including sacrifice and courage. Or is war heading down the path towards an emotionless endeavour with no hatred and is merely a routine? In traditional warfare, the combatant and his enemy face risks. The aim has been to redistribute this risk to an acceptable level. High-tech conflicts in the twenty-first century have led authors like **Michael Ignatieff** to question if the basic equality of moral risk (kill or be killed) in traditional war has been subverted. This is where the question of morality arises—"If you are not at risk yourself, is it legitimate?"

Coker suggested that one view holds that automation has meant that risks in war are "managed" along two lines. First, UAVs provide "strategic persistence" allowing one to be at war for a long time. Second, UAVs reduce the risk of mistakes. These "pilots" have greater composure than "real" pilots. A contrasting view is that you should only kill somebody who wants to kill you in turn and is

Christopher Coker

a worthy adversary. This was addressed in traditional warfare by soldiers on opposing sides. The UAV's line of sight, however, does not reveal if a target is "worthy". Furthermore, if one takes sacrifice—people laying down their lives—as a yardstick of legitimacy, then robots do in fact de-sacrifice war. While this is not immoral, the automation of war perhaps makes it illegitimate.

What then of ethics? First, this is to encourage the enemy to accept defeat in a way so that they will not fight longer. In essence, it is to give them closure. Second, ensure that one's own soldiers do not become so corrupt that they become bad citizens. But are UAV pilots in danger of becoming unethical? They have become distant emotionally, psychologically, morally and physically due to technological advances. This is compounded by "synthetic training" where they train more but educate less. To top it off, they are disconnected by an "online" and "offline" world.

In closing, Coker discussed the potential of turning war into a game. He noted that the next generation is game savvy. The issues that arise include the change in neuron-pathways due to persistent gaming which leads to easier digital overload (of information). This, in turn, forces the individual to log off emotionally and bypass reflection and emotion. The challenge is thus to ensure that pilots do not turn into the computers they control.

Intelligence and National Security in the Twenty-first Century

Sir John Scarlett

Sir John Scarlett noted that there is no fixed definition to the meaning of national security or intelligence. He opined that every nation is responsible for its own sovereignty and thus national security is a means of protecting the state and its national secrets. National security thus goes beyond the conventional understanding of the term, which is typically associated with just the physical security of a nation. National security may also involve natural disasters and pandemics, uncontrolled immigration, domestic crime and the economy. The intelligence service's role is to protect the country's interest through an effective national security framework.

Globalisation, it was noted, is leading to important changes in the relationship between the state and citizen, and the position of the nation-state. This did not, however, mean that nation-states have disappeared. As long as nation states exist, national security would continue to play a part in its existence and intelligence is the key component of national security. Intelligence allows nation states to recognise potential threats and react. Indeed, national security today protects the nation states from the increasing threats posed by non-state actors, particularly from terrorism and ideological extremism.

The nation state is vulnerable to threats from a variety of sources. Thus, prior knowledge of the potential threats is imperative. Intelligence is able to build on that knowledge bank and this information is of high value to both political and military leaders. Sir John emphasised that in a potential crisis situation, intelligence has the ability to provide strategic advantage to decision-makers tasked with protecting national security.

Sir John asserted that good intelligence requires good surveillance, analysis and data management. It is thus in the interest of the country to be constantly modernising national capabilities so that it is always ahead in its ability to interpret intelligence reports and provide timely solutions. With the increased emphasis on national security in the post 9/11 period, intelligence agencies have been notably successful in the area of inter-agency collaborations. He noted that today, there is more collaboration between intelligence services at an international level. With so many agencies working towards a common goal (such as counter-terrorism), nation states can achieve a sound national security agenda.

In conclusion, Sir John reiterated that the future of national security is heavily reliant on good intelligence but this is only possible if the necessary information/knowledge is fully exploited and well analysed.

LECTURE SESSION 4
Al-Qaeda's Strategy of Attrition

Bruce Hoffman began his presentation by asserting that as terrorism is a premeditated and purposeful crime, it ostensibly has a strategy. Despite U.S. officials repeatedly announcing al-Qaeda's weakening strength, it is still able to pose a challenge and threat to nations and global security. Today, there are at least 11 major al-Qaeda networks of operation. Among them are al-Qaeda's senior core leadership, al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda in East Africa (al-Shabaab). Indeed, part of the appeal of terrorism to its practitioners is precisely the fact that a small group of individuals can have a disproportionate impact on both its target nation or society and the global community.

According to Hoffman, al-Qaeda continues to function on four longstanding key operational levels. These include, "al-Qaeda central", directly controlled and commanded by al-Qaeda senior leaders. There are also al-Qaeda sleepers who have often received only a modest amount of training and are normally given formal autonomy and independence. The al-Qaeda network is a network of like-minded affiliates and associated terrorist and insurgent groups that aligned themselves ideologically with al-Qaeda but are separate independent groups with their own command and control structures. They also follow their own agendas. Lastly, there is what Hoffman describes as "the al-Qaeda galaxy"; a level that consists of individuals or independent cells that have no direct contact with al-Qaeda but are inspired and ultimately motivated by radical clerics and Internet propaganda to conduct attacks. Although they are not a part of al-Qaeda operations, this group plays a prominent and integral part in al-Qaeda's strategy.

Although al-Qaeda may be weakening, it employs a strategy of attrition that plays to its networking strength and compensates for its numerical weakness. First, it seeks to overwhelm, distract and exhaust its adversaries financially by forcing them to engage in long-term military deployment overseas. Operationally, the group deliberately seeks to flood the national intelligence systems with threats and background noise with the aim that distracted by these, intelligence services will overlook key clues. It also tries to create, foster and encourage fissures and divisions within the global alliance arrayed against it by attacking key coalition partners. Furthermore, it seeks to conduct local campaigns of subversion and destabilisation in key operational theatres, especially failed or failing states such as Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.

Bruce Hoffman

Hoffman stressed that despite its small numerical strength, al-Qaeda has disproportionate plus-up capabilities of allies globally who work behind the scenes as a force multiplier both in respect to kinetic and non-kinetic operations. It also seeks to recruit and obtain access to citizens of enemy countries who have clean backgrounds, focusing particularly on European nationals, especially converts who retain their names and have visa waiver access to the United States, and American citizens and residents. Al-Qaeda also continues to take advantage of opportunities that are presented from continuing to monitor, identify and exploit gaps in enemy defences. Al-Sahab, al-Qaeda's active media arm, has critical input capabilities such as the gathering of strategic intelligence in addition to its output functions of production and dissemination of propaganda.

Hoffman asserted that it is possible to argue that al-Qaeda is achieving each of its strategic objectives. Al-Qaeda's determination has led to its success in adapting and adjusting to the changing environment, allowing it to sustain itself for 22 years. The inability of governments to deter the organisation only enhances the viability of al-Qaeda's strategy. Therefore, an effective strategic response should combine the tactical elements of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities (continuing to kill and capture terrorists and insurgents) and the equally strategic imperative of breaking the recruitment cycle of terrorists and insurgents that has sustained both al-Qaeda's continued campaign and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.

Hoffman concluded by saying that al-Qaeda has to be continuously isolated and countered intellectually, theologically and financially.

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH TALK
Strategic Uncertainty

Eliot A. Cohen

In his distinguished lunch talk, **Eliot A. Cohen** examined the strategic uncertainty within the military enterprise brought about by the ongoing "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) or "military transformation".

By way of preamble, Cohen examined the origins of the RMA and traced the development of the RMA both in theory and in practice. He argued that while military analysts have talked about the RMA for the last 20 or so years, the real question is whether a radical shift in military affairs has occurred, or whether we have merely seen the normal, evolutionary processes of change in the conduct of war and strategy. According to him, the nature of the "strategic uncertainty" that is gripping the military enterprise depends on how we understand the RMA.

As an example of how the RMA can mitigate uncertainty in the battlefield, Cohen cited the centrality of technology in the conduct of war. During the 2003 Iraq War, a Marine company commander was able to, on his laptop, view images of a street in an Iraqi town via a fighter-bomber flying overhead, thereby vastly enhancing battle-space awareness. He further explained that the successful use of technology must be accompanied by the existence of a "learning organisation" that encourages experimentation and is tolerant of failures.

However, the option of the RMA to cope with strategic uncertainty works only up to a point. Cohen argued that in the real world of geopolitics, countries and non-state actors have responded to the U.S.' technology-driven military dominance in a variety of ways. For example, China's response to the American mode of the RMA has been one of selective transformation with a view to neutralising those American advantages that endanger them. This has taken the form of computer attacks and counter-electronic measures. This approach seeks to capitalise on asymmetries ironically inherent in American superiority.

Cohen pointed out that the most worrisome counter to the RMA, and potentially the greatest source of strategic uncertainty, is the use of asymmetric techniques of terror. He noted that the modern terrorist has managed to combine ingenious uses of technology with old-fashioned fanaticism.

In conclusion, Cohen reiterated that war remained a rough and dirty business. However, technology is now pervasive in every aspect of war. The extent to which technology, and the broader RMA, can cope with strategic uncertainty remains to be seen.

LECTURE SESSION 5
China and Energy Security in East Asia

Zha Daojiong began by noting that China accounts for 4.7 billion tons of carbon dioxide and 23 million tons of sulphur dioxide global emissions, and that its energy intensity is much higher than the world's average. To successfully address the environmental and high-energy intensity issues, China had set the reduction of its energy intensity by 20 per cent as the priority of its energy policy. However, Zha asserted that despite the implementation of policy measures, meeting this goal would be difficult given the present and continuing pattern of energy consumption.

Zha highlighted and discussed the various initiatives introduced and implemented by China to promote energy efficiency and protect the environment. These included the establishment of the Energy Service Company and the China Energy Conservation Association. Zha specifically discussed China's power generation industry. It was stressed that China's plans for power generation by 2020 involved a move towards cleaner energy sources. He, however, noted the difficulties of clean energy application and the complications involved in these sources of energy being connected and dispatched through the grid.

Zha then moved to address the issue of energy security in East Asia. It was noted that one problem that needs to be addressed is the low level of institutionalised cooperation between states in East Asia. Nevertheless, key achievements such as the rapid rate of economic growth and poverty reduction should not be ignored.

Zha Daojiong

Zha noted that the insufficient work that has been done on China and energy security in East Asia was symptomatic of wider flaws in the study of China's relations with the world. He asserted that there was a structural weakness in the study of China's international relations and that, generally, insufficient attention is given to China's relations with other states. Zha highlighted several areas and issues that should be explored further. He specifically pointed to the hydro power plant in the Lancang river basin, which made cross-border hydro electricity trade possible and could enhance the connection between the states through which the river flows. This could also serve to reinforce the energy security status in this region.

Conference Programme

Wednesday, 4 August 2010

> 1900 hrs Welcome dinner

Thursday, 5 August 2010

> 0930 hrs Opening remarks
> *Ambassador Barry Desker*
> *Dean, RSIS, and Director, IDSS*
>
> 0935 hrs Keynote address
> *Mr. Teo Chee Hean*
> *Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Singapore*
>
> 1020 hrs Group photography
>
> 1045 hrs Session 1
> **New Dimensions in International Security**
>
> *Chair:*
> *Associate Professor Alan Chong Chia Siong*
> *RSIS*
>
> *Speaker:*
> *Professor Steve Smith*
> *Vice-Chancellor and Chief Executive*
> *University of Exeter*
>
> 1200 hrs Lunch
>
> 1330 hrs Panel discussion 1
> **Fighting Small Wars in the New Century**
>
> *Chair:*
> *Associate Professor Joseph Chinyong Liow*
> *Associate Dean, RSIS*
>
> *Speakers:*
> *Dr. John Mackinlay*
> *Department of War Studies*
> *King's College London*
>
> *Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna*
> *Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS*
>
> *Dr. Terence McNamee*
> *Deputy Director*
> *The Brenthurst Foundation*
>
> 1930 hrs Dinner
> *Guest of honour:*
> *H.E. Mr. S R Nathan*
> *President of the Republic of Singapore*

Friday, 6 August 2010

> 0830 hrs Introduction by participants
>
> 0930 hrs Panel discussion 2
> **Securing the Seas**
>
> *Chair:*
> *Assistant Professor Emrys Chew*
> *RSIS*
>
> *Speakers:*
> *RADM Bernard Miranda*
> *Republic of Singapore Navy*
>
> *Professor Satoru Mori*
> *Hosei University, Japan*
>
> *Dr. Sam Bateman*
> *Senior Fellow and Adviser*
> *Maritime Security Programme, RSIS*
>
> 1200 hrs Lunch
>
> 1400 hrs Visit to Changi Naval Base
>
> 1930 hrs Free and easy

Saturday, 7 August 2010

> 0830 hrs Introduction by participants
>
> 0930 hrs Panel discussion 3
> **Terrorism in South and South East Asia**
>
> *Chair*
> *Mr. Mushahid Ali*
> *Senior Fellow, RSIS*
>
> *Speakers*
> *Major General Muniruzzaman*
> *President*
> *Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies*
>
> *Ms. Sidney Jones*
> *Senior Adviser, International Crisis Group*
>
> *Professor Rohan Gunaratna*
> *Head*
> *International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), RSIS*
>
> 1200 hrs Lunch
>
> 1430 hrs Tour of Singapore
>
> 1830 hrs Free and easy

Sunday, 8 August 2010

0830 hrs Introduction by participants

0930 hrs Session 2
Media and International Conflict

Chair:
Mr. Kwa Chong Guan
Head
External Programmes, RSIS

Speaker:
Mr. Nik Gowing
Presenter, BBC World

1100 hrs Discussion
Media and International Conflict

1200 hrs Lunch

1400 hrs Session 3
The Ethics of War in the 21st Century: Military Robots and the Battle Space of the Future

Chair:
Associate Professor Bernard Loo Fook Weng
Coordinator of Executive Education and External Teaching
Coordinator of the Military Transformations Programme, RSIS

Speaker:
Professor Christopher Coker
Head of Department
International Relations Department
London School of Economics & Political Science

1800 hrs Singapore Technologies Distinguished Dinner Lecture
Intelligence and National Security in the 21st Century

Chair:
Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, RSIS, and Director, IDSS

Speaker:
Sir John Scarlett
Former Chief of MI6

Monday, 9 August 2010

0830 hrs Introduction by participants

0930 hrs Session 4
Al Qaeda's Strategy of Attrition

Chair:
Assistant Professor John Harrison
RSIS

Speaker:
Professor Bruce Hoffman
Security Studies Program
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

1045 hrs Discussion
Al Qaeda's Strategy of Attrition

1200 hrs Distinguished lunch talk
Strategic Uncertainty

Chair:
Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, RSIS, and Director, IDSS

Speaker:
Professor Eliot A. Cohen
Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), John Hopkins University

1630 hrs National Day Parade

Tuesday, 10 August 2010

0830 hrs Introduction by participants

0930 hrs Session 5
China and Energy Security in East Asia

Chair:
Assistant Professor Li Mingjiang
RSIS

Speaker:
Professor Zha Daojiong
School of International Studies
Peking University

1145 hrs Presentation of certificates followed by farewell lunch

1400 hrs Departures

List of Speakers, Chairpersons and Participants

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