APPSNO

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Exploring Crisis Resilience

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT

5th Asia Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)

REPORT OF A CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY
THE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (CENS)
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Rapporteurs: Jenna Park, Ng Sue Chia, Sulastri Osman, Yeap Suyin, Wendy Chan, Muhammad Saiful 'Adli Bin Ayob and Yolanda Chin.
Edited by: Yolanda Chin

This report summarises the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Speakers and participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

BACKGROUND AND AIMS OF THE CONFERENCE

National security is today a complex domain, encompassing matters ranging from the challenges of homeland security management, to designing coping strategies for a wide variety of traditional and non-traditional threats. National security, especially in a rapidly changing and complex environment, remains a key concern for countries worldwide.

In line with this, and with the aim of promoting a multi-agency and networked government approach as an important response to today's complex and uncertain security milieu, the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS), part of Singapore's Prime Minister's Office, is jointly organising the 5th Asia Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO). APPSNO is targeted at senior government officials from the Asia Pacific and beyond with responsibilities for national security matters. It is hoped that APPSNO will become an important tool for promoting the analytical frameworks, mindsets and skills needed for effective national security management.

APPSNO is driven by two primary objectives:

1. To enhance exposure to global best practices in national security. Participants will be given the opportunity to learn about the trends and global best practices in national security issues through lectures by prominent speakers and informal discussions. The small-group interactive discussion format enables participants to share ideas, anecdotes and experiences that will be of broad professional interest.

2. To facilitate an international network of national security experts and practitioners. APPSNO will provide the platform for participants to network with global national security experts as well as develop stronger relationships with their regional counterparts. Interaction will be facilitated through field visits, sight-seeing and social activities.

OPENING REMARKS

Dean Barry Desker

Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, welcomed guests and participants to the Fifth Asia Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO), an event jointly organised by the Centre of Excellence for National Security – a centre within RSIS – and the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) under the Prime Minister's Office. The theme for APPSNO this year is 'Exploring Crisis Resilience'.

Dean Desker noted that events in Japan over the past month have shown how resilience in a crisis – at the individual, group, community and national level – was vital to overcoming a catastrophe. The stoic behaviour of individuals and their community centeredness, evident in the social order in the aftermath of the massive earthquake and tsunami, indicate the underlying resilience of Japan's culture and society.

In a similar vein, Pakistan, New Zealand and Australia have strove to cope with the natural disasters that have befallen them over the past year. In each instance it was undeniably the strength of character and human spirit that facilitated recovery after much of the material things were swept away. These events illustrate the value of resilience in a crisis.

While the concept of resilience is most clearly seen in a post-crisis situation, Dean Desker emphasised the need to build resilience pre-crisis. This involved preparing and training the community at large to respond to crises before one occurs.

Dean Desker remarked that being better prepared entailed considering questions surrounding how future threats and challenges can be better detected; whether resilience during a crisis is innate or can be taught and developed through institutional processes; and whether it is possible to avoid or minimise the making of bad decisions in a crisis. These issues and more would be the highlight of talks and discussions during APPSNO.

OPENING ADDRESS

Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security Wong Kan Seng

Wong Kan Seng, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, delivered the opening address. He remarked that the continual interest from so many participants in APPSNO, both local and foreign, reflects the common belief that when it comes to matters of National Security, there is a need to work together across agencies and across national boundaries, especially as security challenges confronting governments today are transnational and complex in nature.

According to DPM Wong, the recent earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan brought into sharp focus the remarkable resilience of the Japanese people. Local communities, businesses, and individual Japanese came together and responded in a calm, disciplined manner to the disaster, helping and supporting one another. He added that while it may be attractive to use the Japanese examples to describe what resilience should be like, it may be more instructive to delve into the topic of what essential 'ingredients' make the Japanese resilient as a society.

In exploring the idea of a 'Resilience DNA', DPM Wong shared that there were three dimensions – the pragmatic, affective and ideological – that constituted its building blocks during peace times that societies need to invest in to respond and recover successfully from a crisis. Central to these building blocks is the presence of effective national and community leadership at different levels able to mobilise the society and activate the 'Resilience DNA' during and post-crisis.

DPM Wong stated that it is not sufficient for a society to merely recover from a crisis. He stressed the need to also identify and exploit opportunities so that societies and economies can operate on an even higher level of normalcy than before the crisis.

DPM Wong added that the spirit of exploiting opportunities and building strengths from adversities will allow resilience to become an important dimension in strengthening social and economic capitals for all societies. A resilient society will attract good quality investments because outsiders will see that the nation is able to bounce back and develop new strengths.

In conclusion, building a resilient society is not an easy task but it is a journey worth making for Singapore to survive in a fast changing world.

SESSION I

SINGAPORE'S STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (NSCC)

(From left) Kok Ping Soon and Bilveer Singh

Kok Ping Soon provided an overview for Singapore's Strategic Framework for National Security.

Singapore is a small city-state with a multi-racial and multi-religious society. Being an open economy with one of the world's busiest port, it is vulnerable to potential terrorist threats that could disrupt its social fabric, economy and infrastructure.

The threat of terrorism has been evolving and continues to pose a threat to modern society. While the local cell of the Jemayaah Islamiyah terrorist network has been effectively checked by the local security forces, regional organised terrorism and self-radicalised individuals remain as potential threats to Singapore's security at large. Moreover, the mode of attack has shifted from traditional forms such as hostage-taking to the use of technological devices such as explosive toner cartridges.

Following this, Singapore's National Security Strategic Framework uses a three-pronged approach. First, the organisational framework is premised on an integrated whole-of-government networked approach towards security policy and crisis response coordination. Inter-ministry committees were established to provide policy and planning solutions that would be executed by the appointed security agencies.

Second, physical hardening and capacity-building measures have been implemented. This includes reviewing existing measures, identifying gaps and devising new solutions. For instance, a multi-agency team comprising policymakers and officers from various agencies are tasked with the protection of key infrastructures such as Jurong Island, where major petrochemical plants are situated, to ensure security layering.

Third, efforts have been made to strengthen the social and economic resilience of Singapore. The Community Engagement Programme (CEP) and Corporate First Responder Scheme, for instance, aim to involve citizen and business enterprises in crisis prevention and safety-and-security exercises. The overall objective of national resilience is to foster strong and deep networks of trust and vigilance within the community through the adoption of a holistic whole-of-society approach to crisis prevention, response and recovery.

In conclusion, Singapore's National Security Strategic Framework emphasises the importance of multi-agency collaborations and engages the public in the fight against terrorist networks.

DISCUSSION

A number of participants showed interest in the National Security Framework, especially the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. Questions were asked on the challenge of vigilance fatigue when incidents occurrence is few and the need to balance between confidentiality of sensitive information and social empowerment in their efforts to maintain resilience. Kok suggested that while a certain degree of confidentiality needs to be maintained in managing risk, current circumstances suggest that more engagement and empowerment of society are necessary through the integration of emergency exercises into activities on the ground.

Another topic pertaining to the framework on social resilience was the measurement of the effectiveness of the whole-of-government approach. Kok argued that the key measurement lies in the whole process of inter-agency coordination and empowerment of citizens' heart, hand and mind in facing challenges effectively and the maintenance of resilience with limited resources while participating actively in international collaborations as well.

In response to the query on how to deal with the attitude of indifference and apathy, Kok pointed out that as terrorists have become very sophisticated and their attacks unexpected, strengthening nationhood is essential to managing the outcome of the risk. He also stressed the importance of sensitising the community to these issues in order to create security awareness and literacy.

SESSION I I

WHY WE NEED CRISIS RESILIENCE: THE TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT

(From left) Edwin Bakker, Mohamed Feisal Hassan and Leonard Sebastian

Edwin Bakker delivered a presentation on the concept of resilience in relation to counter-terrorism.

Bakker defined terrorism as intentional acts, by their nature and context, which may be seriously damaging to a country or to an international organisation. These acts are committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government to perform or to abstain from performing any act, or destabilising the fundamental political, constitutional, economic and social structures of a country. Following from this, the ultimate purpose of terrorism is to intentionally commit a crime to intimidate, compel and destabilise society. Therefore, cultivating resilience against terrorism is about preventing successful acts of terrorism, not being intimidated, and stopping the terrorists from destabilising society.

Bakker defined resilience as a positive capacity of people to cope with stress and adversity which may result in individuals bouncing back to the previous state of normal functioning, or using the experience of exposure to adversity to produce a "steeling effect" and function better than expected. This "steeling effect" in relation to terrorism is the ability of a society to fight against terrorism and consists of physical, social and political resilience. As physical resilience can be enhanced by simply setting up physical preventive measures such as walls and fences, Bakker said that the bigger challenge

lies in cultivating social and political resilience. He said that social and political resilience consists of limiting the occurences of terrorist attacks and limiting the impact and success of terrorism. On one hand, limiting the occurences of terrorist attacks could be done by creating vigilance and resistance against the fundamental roots of terrorism, especially religious radicalisation. On the other hand, limiting the impact and success of terrorism entailed cultivating the mindset of society to stay vigilant yet not harbour unnecessary fear. Bakker said that this can be achieved by maintaining good communication between government and communities and constantly sending out a message of preparedness to minimise the impact of an actual crisis.

In conclusion, Bakker pointed out that although resilience may be a critical factor in overcoming crisis, it still has its own limitations. He said that resilience cannot prevent every single terrorist attack, especially those carried out by lone wolves. He also added that resilience cannot be cultivated in a short period of time and thus requires a long-term plan to incorporate it into mainstream society. Bakker concluded that in order to develop resilience, it is crucial to learn from positive experiences in the past and constantly improve the preventive measures against possible terrorist attacks.

Mohamed Feisal Hassan delivered a presentation on the subject of religious radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts around the world and Singapore. Mohamed said that the challenge of religiously radicalised terrorist groups lies in their resilience, which is getting stronger due to the attractiveness of radical ideology, similar background and grievances shared by members of the group, mishandling of issues by the authority, and the active exchange of technical expertise and financial assistance within the network. He emphasised that the influence of religious ideologues contributes the most to religious radicalisation and thus, it is crucial to correct and prevent the spread of their ideologies.

Mohamed said that efforts to counter radicalisation through rehabilitation can be found around the world including Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Singapore. The rehabilitation efforts can be divided into four categories: religious rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation, social rehabilitation, and vocational rehabilitation. Saudi Arabia follows the PRAC strategy for rehabilitation, which stands for Prevention, Rehabilitation, and After-Care. In the case of Yemen, the Council of Ulema which consists of the chosen members from the Committee for Dialogue, is in charge of rehabilitation efforts and it is mainly carried out by conversations on the Quran and Sunnah.

In the case of Singapore, a collective counter-radicalisation effort by the government and the Muslim community was launched following the arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members in December 2001 and early 2002. Government officials engaged prominent Muslim leaders to discuss possible approaches to correct the radical ideology that was wrongly imbued in the radicalised individuals. This was mainly aimed at rehabilitating the detained extremists and developing a community-wide counter-ideology programme. This resulted in the establishment of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in 2003, comprising prominent Islamic teachers and scholars in Singapore. The programme, which aimed at countering religious radicalisation by providing counselling services to JI detainees and their families, carried out activities such as religious, psychological and social rehabilitation, as well as creating public awareness. Thus they seeked not only to correct the distorted religious ideology but also worked to help individuals integrate into society as good citizens.

Mohamed then presented a few findings of the RRG through their consultation with JI detainees. He said that they often possessed a distorted religious ideology due to a poor understanding of the context and teachings of Islam. They were generally misled in their pursuit of spiritual renewal, guidance and true leadership. They deemed Islamic and secular lifestyle as completely incompatible and considered non-Muslims as their enemies, thus rejecting the concept of religious harmony and tolerance.

Mohamed concluded by sharing some lessons learnt from religious rehabilitation efforts in Singapore. First, the government and religious leaders must maintain a close relationship in order to effectively combat religious radicalisation. Second, religious leaders need to interpret religious teachings in context. Third, it is important to encourage sincere voluntary assistance to rehabilitation efforts among those who have the capability. Fourth, counseling radicalised individuals requires a long-term plan, perseverance, technique, and skills.

DISCUSSION

Pointing to the case of murder of the Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh, one participant inquired the reason behind the conflict between Muslim community and mainstream society in Netherlands. Bakker answered that it was mainly due to the inadequate response by the government towards the growing hostility between Muslims and mainstream society. As the Muslim community expanded, it also created negative public perceptions of the Muslim immigrants as they were associated with a lack of education and high crime rate. When the public expressed hatred towards the Muslim community, not only did the government react poorly to the issue, but some even attempted to exploit this sentiment to gain support. All in, he said that it was the combination of visceral anger towards the Muslim community and the lack of a clear message from the government that sparked the inter-racial conflict.

Another question pertained to the reason behind a growing number of self-radicalised youths and the measures to prevent self-radicalisation. Bakker opined that in the European context, it was mainly due to the combination of pursuit for adventure, the search for identity and purpose of life, a sense of loneliness and a desire to redress grievances. He said that Muslim youths in Europe faced a greater identity crisis than their parents and some turned to religious radical ideology. Mohamed added that whatever the contributing factors of self-radicalisation may be, it was important for authorities and the community to continuously engage in a dialogue with youths to correct distorted ideology and prevent them from proliferating. Therefore, it is important to set up a platform or institution that facilitates this dialogue.

Lastly, a participant asked about the role the non-Muslim community could play in the nationwide counter-radicalisation efforts. The speakers were of the opinion that non-Muslims and Muslims both play equally important roles in the fight against radicalisation. It is important for non-Muslims to refrain from stereotyping Muslims as dangerous people and instead to view their values and practices in the proper context of their culture and religion.

DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE

"CAN INTUITION IMPROVE DECISION MAKING IN A CRISIS?"

Gerd Gigerenzer

Gerd Gigerenzer made a case for the role of intuition in decision-making in a crisis. He identified three components of an intuition: (1) it is a judgement that appears quickly in consciousness; (2) its underlying processes are not fully understood; (3) yet it guides the making of important decisions. He further argued that intuition is more than impulse and caprice; it has its own rationale. Some consider intuition to be merely biases that are a result of cognitive limitations, whereas others believe intuition to be the optimal weighing of pros and cons. For Gigerenzer, intuition is based on fast and frugal heuristics, which exploit evolved abilities in our brains.

Elaborating on the processes of intuition, Gigerenzer noted that intuitions are often based on simple heuristics. A heuristic is a rule of thumb that focuses on a few important features and ignores all other information. Gigerenzer argued that some intuitions linked to crises follow the same process. He went on to demonstrate that in crises and other high-stake situations with uncertain outcomes, expert minds that intuitively rely on

heuristics can make faster and better inferences than do information-greedy statistical algorithms. He added that contrary to popular belief, more information, more time, or more deliberation are not always better, and less of each can at times be more beneficial.

On the issue of terrorism, Gigerenzer pointed out to the audience that terrorists strike twice: first with physical force and second with the help of the human brain. An effective response to terrorist attacks entails two important tasks. The first task is to prevent further attacks. The second task is to help people understand the consequences of their intuitive responses to such events. For instance, he noted that many people followed their intuition and avoided flying after 9/11, leading to a spike in fatal road accidents. He argued that through existing systems like the education system, people can be taught how their intuitions influence their actions so that they can avoid responding in ways with detrimental consequences.

Gigerenzer went on to argue that the results of scientific studies on heuristics can be used to design a decision-making model that is fast and cheap on information gain yet can in an uncertain world be better than optimisation models. Drawing on an example of intuitive design in emergency situations pertaining to patients with heart problems, Gigerenzer demonstrated that the robustness of a fast and frugal tree for predicting heart attacks based on heuristics produced better results than optimisation models like the heart disease predictive instrument (HDPI).

In conclusion, Gigerenzer shared that risk literacy is an important aspect of resilience and that there are two key elements: first, the understanding of evidence, for instance statistics; and second, the understanding of intuition. He stated that both experts and laymen can be taught the basics of intuition with a focus on how they function. This would in turn empower citizens to be part of the solution when crises arise.

DISCUSSION

In response to the question on the relevance of intuitive decision making for higher level military decision makers, Gigerenzer drew to attention the anxiety that most higher level decision makers in businesses and healthcare face, namely the fear of making wrong decisions or going with unexplainable gut feelings that usually come with experience. This has led to much waste of time and resources as employees and consulting firms are engaged in writing long reports to justify the gut feelings of top decision makers, or doctors running unnecessary tests, all for defensive reasons. He explained that such defensive actions could also have a negative impact on the military, especially if there is a culture of choosing Option A, which can be better justified if something goes wrong, over Option B, which a military leader's intuition suggests is the best option although he may not be able to explain why.

Replying to the query on the correlation between intuition and experience, Gigerenzer stressed that intuition is a form of intelligence that differs from other forms of intelligence because it is not conscious. It is knowledge, experience, and also rules from the adaptive tool box that we have but are unaware that we possess. Moreover, the moment one's attention is consciously directed to what he is doing, the outcome of his intended action may change course. For instance asking an experienced golfer to concentrate on his game might affect his results negatively as his unconscious intelligence is interrupted by the conscious thinking process.

SESSION III

INDIVIDUAL RESILIENCE IN A CRISIS: IS THERE A 'RESCUE GENE'?

(Frem left) Scott Graham, Hassan Ahmad and Emrys Chew

In his presentation, **Scott Graham** focused on the issues of why some people responded better in crisis, whether there was such a thing as a "rescue gene", whether culture made a difference in responding to crises and what could be done to increase community resilience. From his experiences responding to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and that of his colleagues in Great Britain and Spain during the London and Madrid bombings, Graham noted that one of the common threads in all three crises was the willingness of individuals to come forward to help the victims of the attacks. Known as convergent or spontaneous volunteers, these individuals were not deterred by the risk of physical and psychological harm to themselves. According to Graham, this could be due either to their nature or characteristics nurtured by their surroundings or families. This desire to help encompassed qualities of hardiness, the ability to deal with stressful situations, being able to see value in the actions taken, possessing a desire to be part of the solution and accepting the ambiguity and complex changing environment of disasters. The challenge is to find ways to channel this desire to help and transition it into a sustained feature in disasters.

According to Graham, culture plays a part in this drive to serve. It gives context for the disaster itself and provides a framework for responding to it. He notes that while the drive to help is manifested in every culture, cultural sensitivity should be observed in dealing with victims of disasters.

Graham provided five areas to consider in moving forward when dealing with a disaster. First, he noted the need to increase community readiness and resilience. Second, there is a need to generate additional volunteers and to increase the engagement of existing volunteers. This should ideally be done during peace time and not under the stressful conditions of disasters. Third, there is a need for disaster agencies to increase their visibility and relevance. Fourth, partnerships between governmental agencies, the private sector and non-government organisations should be strengthen. Graham cited the example of himself coming to Singapore and attending APPSNO as representing this idea of strengthening partnerships with other stakeholders. Last but not least, there is a need to engage the youth and to embrace new technologies. Graham notes that technology is an enabler, easing the dissemination of information and being an effective tool in fund raising. To engage the youth, the modalities of teaching children should be tailored accordingly. In order to encourage a culture of preparedness in a short span of 10 years, Graham recommended that one should start with children who will be able to make a difference when they come of age.

Through his experiences in dealing with 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, Graham notes that there has been greater focus on business continuity. This is critical as should the economy falter, the community would be badly affected. He suggested that while there is a preference to send resources to disaster hit areas, it is better to send monetary contributions as this would allow resources to be bought locally thus helping the economy. He notes that in general, forty per cent of businesses in the United States never reopen after a major disaster, which has a huge impact on rebuilding efforts.

Graham concluded that a tremendous amount of money is being spent in the United States on responding to disasters but the proportionality of what is spent in preparation and prevention is miniscule in comparison. It is time for governments to invest upfront and ensure adequate preparation in dealing with disasters.

In his presentation, **Hassan Ahmad** noted that the number of natural disasters have risen over the last two decades, causing millions of deaths and massive economic losses. Such major disasters can also cause affected communities to be vulnerable to other forms of threats such as epidemics and social unrest. Driven by the need to mitigate risks and increase societal resilience, it is imperative that those involved in humanitarian relief work put in place critical capacity building structures and processes.

Defining resilience as the ability to adapt well to crises and bounce back from them, Hassan noted that even an advanced and well-prepared country like Japan could be overwhelmed by a complex humanitarian crisis. Some of the contributing factors behind the stoicism shown in the face of such devastation included the fact that the Japanese were taught from young to value the collective over the individual and the importance of working together. There is an emphasis on respecting the elders, loyalty and hard work. The inculcation of these values is integrated into their education system. Thus, the ability of the Japanese to come together and react in a calm manner in the midst of a disaster is not something unexpected in their culture but only became strongly salient to the world through international media reporting.

Insights into the Japanese psyche could be gleaned from certain common phrases used. One is 'shikata ga nai' or "it can't be helped". Another is 'gaman' which refers to patience and perseverance in the face of suffering. Historically, the country also showcased a cohesive spirit referred to as 'Yamato-damashii' which propelled the nation's imperial aspirations and motivated the rebuilding of the country after its defeat in World War II. This same spirit was seen during the Kobe earthquake after which the country's economy bounced back in just 18 months, defying various predictions on the recovery period needed.

The country's disaster preparedness mechanism was also a major factor in the equation. Children are put through disaster drills in school. At the national level, the country has put in place a successful tsunami-alert scheme and early warning systems. This is coupled with a tendency for the Japanese people to listen and carry out government orders to evacuate.

In comparison, Hassan noted a differing level of resilience and responses in other communities affected by disasters. He observed that while many communities were able to adapt to the changed circumstances of the post-disaster periods, not all were able to bounce back from them. Reiterating that resilience encompasses not only the ability to adapt but to bounce back, he stressed the importance of values such as sociability, flexibility, perseverance, self-confidence and insightfulness in increasing the resilience of communities towards crises. Apart from this, an adequate amount of resources, whether from local governments or international communities, is necessary.

Hassan noted that crises were uncommon situations and therefore common sense or practice might not reap the desired outcomes. In conclusion, taking the Japanese as an example, the 'rescue gene' can and should be nurtured, especially within communities that are highly prone to natural disasters.

DISCUSSION

A question was posed to the speakers on how to ensure cooperation in today's inter-connected and globalised world across cultures. In response, Graham recounted that in his experiences dealing with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, people appeared more compassionate and willing to help during catastrophic events. This better nature served to propel people to reach out to help during disasters and served as a reminder that everyone is part of the human family. Hassan noted that the ASEAN region has improved on humanitarian assistance in the wake of the 2004 tsunami. However, he was of the opinion that more needed to be done in putting in place key systems that would allow for better response and penetration.

To the question of whether there was a way to prepare those willing to give assistance to confront the challenges of disasters, Graham explained that the essence of being able to respond is based on the community and on the infrastructure that exists at the time of the disaster. The real positive opportunities lie with community groups as they were already self-organised, possessed a common understanding of each other and had a common support network. He noted that there were now attempts to promote community-based response groups to augment traditional emergency management response in the United States. While there is generally still a culture of dependence on the later as the primary solution to disasters, there is now a push to encourage communities to be a part of their own solution and recovery. According to Hassan, every disaster is different in terms of impact and the level of response that is required. Citing the case of Aceh during the 2004 tsunami, he noted that even with evacuation drills, the impact of the disaster would still have been huge given the fact that there was hardly any coastal defense system in place. However, a different scenario presented itself on the island of Simeulue where the entire island was inundated but there was only one death as the people knew they had to run to higher grounds until the sea subsides, knowledge passed down from their forefathers.

A question was posed as to whether the level of preparedness of ASEAN in dealing with the effect of natural disasters has improved since the 2004 tsunami. Hassan was of the opinion that ASEAN is better prepared to deal with disasters seven years on and cited the way the organisation was able to persuade the Myanmar government to open its doors to humanitarian relief after Cyclone Nargis in 2008 as an example of its proactive approach. He noted however that there is room for ASEAN to come together and pool valuable resources such as military assets which are crucial in a disaster.

A participant pointed out that there was a recently concluded ASEAN chief-of-defence meeting where there was an agreement to finalise standard operating procedures for the provision of military assets towards humanitarian and disaster relief. He then posed a question to the speakers on the most effective means of engaging the youth in Singapore who have not experienced firsthand the effects of a natural disaster. Hassan noted that the Ministry of Home Affairs has begun an initiative of engaging the youth by inviting Mercy Relief to participate in sharing their experiences with schools under their community engagement program. He notes however that the response should not be solely focused on disaster relief. Subscribing to the view that poverty breeds vulnerability, Mercy Relief started a sustainable development program in six countries around the region. This involves a bid to improve the lives of the poorest communities in these countries most prone to disasters. Graham added that opportunities should be taken to use teachable moments to educate children, not only about the most common threats they face but also about disasters around the world. He also called for efforts to implement deliberate sustained programs to educate children on the different types of hazards they may face.

FUTURES THINKING FOR NATIONAL RESILIENCE

Jeanette Kwek

Jeanette Kwek offered an overview of the research, experimentation, networking and community-building work of Singapore's Centre for Strategic Futures (CFS), part of the Public Service Division in the Prime Minister's Office. The Centre builds on Singapore's long-standing work in scenario planning and the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) Programme started in 2004.

Kwek outlined two forms of scenario planning exercises. The first type – national scenarios – carried out every four to five years examines driving forces of change in both the global and domestic environments. A range of plausible scenarios for Singapore in a 15 to 20 year time frame is then generated based on these trends. These scenarios are then presented to the relevant government agencies for them to consider how their policies for the future could accommodate these possible outcomes.

The second type – focus scenarios – involves identifying specific topics which the centre then works with interested ministries to develop in depth. Such topics include climate change and the new media's impact on the government's engagement with the public.

In her evaluation of scenario planning as a strategic planning tool for the future adopted by the government, Kwek pointed out that it was useful in shedding light on emerging deep driving forces and their possible branching points. However, a limitation was its weakness in addressing discontinuous change, such as wildcards and black swans, and emerging strategic issues of which the effects on the future were unclear. Following from this, there was the realisation that other tools were needed to augment efforts at understanding the future. In this respect, RAHS was implemented to facilitate looking beyond the horizon for emerging issues and threats for the government's attention. The CSF was later set up to explore other methods for thinking about the future, as well as communicating their work to the larger civil service audience for them to take action.

Kwek went on to identify three main thrusts of the CSF's work. The first thrust – experimentation and discovery – entails defining focus, environmental scanning, sense making, developing possible futures, designing strategies and monitoring. An example of this exercise was the use of policy gaming to stress-test strategies and policies. The second thrust is internal and external networking. The CSF facilitates internal networking by providing a platform for the various government agencies with a futures unit to share their work on foresight, strategic planning and risk management. External networking involves reaching out and tapping on the perspectives of academic institutions and the private sector on what might happen to Singapore in the long term and how to respond. The third thrust – foresight to policy – focuses on building resilience through managing risks.

Kwek outlined three key challenges facing the CSF: engagement with the partner ministries and agencies, ensuring that their output has credibility and policy relevance and recruiting and retaining people who have both the interests and requisite skills.

DISCUSSION

On the question of whether projecting into the future involves the use of specific tools or just the recruitment of creative people, Kwek responded that it required a combination of both. The CSF recruits a very diverse group that reads widely and share information and also conducts their own research on the effects of traditional indicators such as demography, economic development and geostrategy. Ultimately, creating the vision of the future depends on gathering information and then using one's imagination to push boundaries. To this end, apart from scenario planning, some tools used include backcasting where people were asked to imagine the best and worst possible futures then work backwards to understand how they could be derived.

Another question raised pertained to the tendency of government agencies to focus on instances where their predictions materialised and to ignore instances where they predicted incorrectly. Kwek responded that the objective of studying the future is to generate alternative possibilities for policy-makers to consider and not the impossible task of predicting the future with accuracy. Hence success is determined by the centre's ability to stimulate policy-makers to ask questions that they usually would not and reevaulate their mental models. She added that key to achieving buy-in from stakeholders is to produce credible and rigourous reports that take into account input and feedback from the various agencies concerned.

SESSION IV

CRISIS RESILIENCE: THE ROLES OF HINDSIGHT AND FORESIGHT

Zachary Shore

Zachary Shore highlighted the importance of the manner in which challenges to national security affairs are framed in the decision-making process. While policy-makers tend to focus on the problem of plugging information gaps by gathering comprehensive information, Shore argues that the quantity of data attained is less important than the targeted approach of gathering specific relevant data. This in turn requires the expertise of properly framing the questions to challenges at hand prior to the information-collection exercise.

In a survey of the literature on prediction and its limits for national security decision, Shore noted that most studies highlight the futility of attempts to predict outcomes and ignores the reality of how policy-makers nevertheless have no choice but to do so. In this respect, he opined that while there is no formula for guaranteed accuracy in predicting the outcome of events with implications on national security, better decisions could be made if the right questions to obtain relevant information were asked.

Drawing on case studies of successful policy decisions pertaining to national security challenges, Shore made the case for the role of "strategic empathy" in making better policy decisions. Unlike futile attempts to predict random events or black swans such as spontaneous societal upheavals and regime collapses, strategic empathy refers to the prediction of targeted outcomes based on an understanding of the motivations and constraints of the key actors. The four levels at which strategic empathy operates on are: the individual level (e.g. personality and ideology of the actors), organisational level (e.g. the decision-making processes the actors work within),

systemic level (i.e. the forces that will constrain the actions of the actors), and finally the level of the zeitgeist (spirit of the times).

Shore distilled two key lessons from the case studies of successful policy decision-making. First, on the challenge of distinguishing information that counts from those which do not, Shore argues that the desired outcomes were achieved because the key decision-makers challenged the dominant paradigm by applying strategic empathy which led them to focus on specific relevant sets of information detrimental to the outcome of the crises.

Second, Shore opined that effective decision-makers do not necessarily have to be a field expert in order to make good decisions. Instead, it was more crucial for the individual to possess the expertise to frame questions to problems in the right way and to challenge the data that guides the dominant discourses.

In conclusion, Shore stressed that a way to improve the prediction of black swans or assessments of events is to ask the right questions to obtain the relevant datasets for decision making. A step towards framing questions correctly is by asking new ones. For instance, when faced with a difficult problem to which there appears to be no answers to, reframe the problem with different questions. In doing so, one is forced to focus on different datasets which may result in overcoming the impasse or generating new insights to the issue at hand. Lastly, Shore stated that the techniques of strategic empathy could be learnt through rigorous practice.

Marc Gerstein

Marc Gerstein examined the organisational roots of disasters. Drawing on systems theory, current research on risk safety, and studies on the collapse of historical civilizations, as well as Gerstein's research with Edgar H. Schein on the forces behind institutional "dark secrets", Gerstein offered insights on how corporate board members, regulators and law makers could lessen the risk of large-scale damage and catastrophe.

Drawing on case studies of high profile disasters such as Enron, the BP Macondo well explosion of 2010 and the recent financial crises, Gerstein contended that certain organisational conditions inhibit the learning of what has happened before. This, he argues, is because the study of the past inevitably reveals policy mistakes of the past. Greater transparency may also shed light on less honourable intentions of decision makers. As a result, there is a strong desire to keep such information – or "dark secrets" – private. This in turn compromises the organisation's ability to realistically appraise the future. As a result, organisations are inhibited from taking timely actions in the interest of the larger society.

Gerstein noted that in most organisational disasters, the insiders often have prior knowledge but do not act on them. Gerstein identified four causes of such disasters: the "unknown unknowns", threats we know a little about but not enough to control it, risks denied as a result of ambition and hubris, and dark secrets. On dark secrets, he noted that organisations like to keep secrets because good corporate citizens are expected to protect the reputation of their organisations and are likely to be punished otherwise (e.g. whistle blowers).

Gerstein offered three suggestions to overcome the problem of dark secrets. First, to take advantage of early warning, have external sources that individuals who identify problems early but are ignored by their organisations can approach and be protected from retaliation. Second, individuals who suppress truth-tellers have to be punished. Third, there is a need to preserve the integrity of the regulatory regimes such as watchdogs and auditors. This is especially challenging as regulators are also members of organisations and so face the same constraints as those they regulate. Hence there is a need to tackle the problems of political will and effective leadership.

DISCUSSION

On Shore's concept of strategic empathy and the need to understand the motivations and constraints of key actors, a participant asked how one could identify who these actors are to begin with. Shore responded that "the other" could be divided into individual, small groups and large groups. Strategic empathy is difficult to achieve for understanding large groups because of the diversity within it which makes it difficult to make accurate, reliable and consistent predictions about. However, the approach could shed light on individuals and small groups of leaders making key decisions.

Gerstein was asked for his views on how organisations should respond to uncertainty about different crises and challenges they may possibly face. He argued that it was important to analyse what one already knows about the issue, the risks involved and the potentially affected groups. Unfortunately these questions are often highly politicised and so the data and analyses themselves become politicised resulting in the loss of objectivity. Hence there is a need to depoliticise these issues, which is very difficult.

On the issue of weak signals, a participant highlighted two points raised in the presentations: first, these signals are often ignored because they tend to be inconclusive and second, they constitute an ocean of noise due to the sheer volume of them. Is there therefore a need to build capabilities to track all of these weak signals and if so, is there a realistic and pragmatic way of doing so? Shore was of the opinion that there is no need to track all weak signals precisely because much of them are merely noise. Instead, it is more important to focus on just the relevant information, which is in turn determined by the manner in which the questions to the problem are framed. Gerstein concurred that it is not about the amount of information gathered but about asking the right questions. Important questions to ask include how one would know if an event that is being predicted is actually happening and whether there is still time to do something about it. Shore added that useful insights are often rendered redundant if the leadership cannot be convinced to take them seriously.

SESSION V

DESIGNING THE CRISIS RESILIENT ORGANISATION

Chris Arculeo

Chris Arculeo discussed what is meant by resilience and how it can be embedded into organisational culture. He argued that adaptive behavior coupled with the development of long term strategic aims are the cornerstone to building a resilient organisation.

It was noted that resilient organisations put plans in place to manage outcomes rather than specific scenarios, and create a capabilities-based approach. Furthermore, resilience must be owned by the corporate board and must be sponsored by corporate board members. A steering or working group comprised of business continuity, risk and security managers should be tasked with overseeing organisational resilience and the implementation of a resilience programme. Consideration should be given to the development and implementation of audit and performance management reviews in respect of resilience. The risk appetite of the organisation should be developed based upon the continued delivery of core service activities, the protection of high value services and assets, which may include the physical, personnel and information assets of the organisation.

CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

APPSNO 2011

5th Asia-Pacific Programme
For Senior National Security Officers
11th - 15th April 2011
The Sentosa Resort and Spa, Singapore

NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT

(L to R)

Seated: *Mr. Sean Lee, Assoc. Prof. Joseph Liow, Dr Zachary Shore, Mr. Hassan Ahmad, BG Stan Osserman, Dr. Edwin Bakker, Mr. Kok Ping Soon, Mr. Peter Lim, Mr. Quek Gim Pew, Dean Barry Desker, RADM (NS) Sim Gim Guan, BG Hoo Cher Mou, Mr. Colin Koh, Dr. Gerd Gigerenzer, Mr. Chris Arculeo, Mr. Scott A. Graham, Dr. Marc Gerstein, Mr. Mohamed Feisal, Assoc. Prof Bilveer Singh.*

2nd row: *Mr. Chow Wai Kwong, Supt. Linda Lee, Dr. Jeannie Tey, Ms. Kwong Jeongmin, Mr. Irawan Haji Abdullah, Mr. Chian Kuan Yew, Dr. Benjamine Ng, Mr. Panidone Pachimsawat, Assoc. Prof. Eric Yap Peng Huat, Mr. Agus Ruchyan Barnas, ME6 Lim Gek Seng Ronnie, Ms. Siti Suriani Abdul Majid, Ms. Aryati Hajis, Mr. Chan Po Tien Gary, ME6 Law Choong Kian, Mr. Ali Bin Omar, LTC Teoh Chun Ping, LTC Alvin Yeo, Col. Ong Chia Choong, Shri Ashok Kumar, Dr. Norman Vasu.*

3rd row: *Mr. Andrew Vincent, Col. (Ret) Tay Tiong Beng, Mr. Melvin Wong, Sr. Col. Ouyang Wei, Supt. Lee Chwee Huat, Mr. Colin Lim, Mr. Fabian Tan, Mr. Habhajan Singh, Mr. Ling Young Ern, Mr. Richard Quah, Ms. Nafees Macci, Mr. Jimmy Mak Kum Wah, LTC Lim Teck Keong, Supt. Lee Nai Kong, Mr. Lim Guan Cheong, LTC Saw Shi Tat, Mr. Gregory Goh, LTC David Neo.*

4th row: *Mr. Baden McMaster, Mr. Tan Ee Sin, Mr. Nguyen Quoc Toan, MG Kim Rithy, Mr. Ng Keok Boon, Mr. See Hoe Kiat, Mr. Alvin Leow, Mr. Zainul Abidin, Asst. Prof. Oguzhan Basibuyuk, Mr. Jasbir Singh, Mr. Andrew Leong, Mr. Eugene Toh, Mr. Vincent Teo Chin Seng, Dr. Peter Paul Galvez, SLTC Arthur Kuan.*

Arculeo stated that awareness includes understanding risks and vulnerabilities, thereby enabling quick detection of a change and a rapid response. Information gathering, management and interpretation are key functions in developing situational awareness and appropriate responses. That all involved is on the same page is also critical in the successful response and recovery to a crisis.

He went on to argue that poor communication, both internal and external, have been a contributor to many disasters both in situational awareness, the response and recovery of the crisis. He recommended that a media strategy be formulated as part of the crisis management plan.

Arculeo stressed that the reality of the interdependencies of societies and organisation must be understood and developed as part of the crisis resilient organisation plans and responses. Information and intelligence sharing within sectors is imperative in terms of understanding threats, vulnerabilities and expected responses and so must form a part of strategic and operational planning.

In conclusion, the most successful and resilient organisations are those who understand, plan for and have strategies to utilise crises and enable the organisation to learn, grow and prosper from them.

Stanley Osserman

Stanley Osserman shared his insights on some key factors for effective planning, response and recovery from disasters.

The following considerations were recommended to be included in pre-event planning. First, the fundamental role of the government needs to be clear, which is to ensure that the people could lead normal lives. This would also entail clarity on the desired end state to work towards and setting priorities to that end. Second, national and urban planning should pay attention to zoning (i.e. the identification of vulnerable areas and measures to address them) and the strict enforcement of building codes. Third, risk and threat assessments should be conducted to prioritise threats and political will needs to be shored up to ensure that resources are available to mitigate disasters. Fourth, a lead coordination agency should be appointed and authorisation to disburse funds and be accountable for it needs to be clear. Fifth, he recommended a separate disaster response plan for biological threats (e.g. pandemics or terrorist-related) for which medical experts should play the lead role. Sixth, planners need to ensure that people on the ground know how to respond. Seventh, relationships and cooperation between governments, agencies, departments and also between the public and private sector should be established. Eighth, a backup command post for the continuation of operations and governances need to be planned for. Ninth, second and third order effects should be anticipated. Tenth, logistics have to be planned for, namely transport of relief supplies and the organisation of NGOs involved. Lastly, there needs to be regular exercises and training to test the plans and ensure everyone is aware of their role. In the event of a lack of funds for this purpose, tabletop exercises should be carried out.

On turning plans to action in an actual disaster, Osserman stressed the following points. First, assess the damage and resources available then prioritise action based on the principle of "people first". Second, tap on the various networks developed during the pre-crisis period. Third, with regards to strategic communications, leadership is critical. The strategic message should be thought out in advance and executed well. It also needs to build confidence in the government among the civilian population in a sincere manner.

On the post-disaster period, Osserman pointed out the need to know when to shift from rescue to recovery and to also look out for secondary disasters. He also cautioned against predators who take advantage of the crisis and advised that proper book-keeping practices be maintained throughout the entire process. Lastly, he pointed out that there will always be critics regardless of the effort put in and outcome, to which he suggested that one would just have to accept it and move on.

DISCUSSION

The panel was asked to comment on how the culture of adapting to change can be embedded into organisations, especially at the leadership level. Arculeo opined that it was the duty of public servants to consistently strive to do better and not be complacent as agencies that only rely on contingency plans of the past are likely to be unprepared to deal with current crises. It is thus critical to inculcate a culture of learning in key organisations. Osserman suggested that a way to put across important ideas to resistant upper management is to demonstrate how the consequences of ignoring the issue could have a negative impact on them. While this may not necessarily result in the release of funds and resources, it will at the very least make them think about the issue.

Another question raised pertained to responding to disasters with unprecedented scales of destruction not anticipated for in the planning exercise. Arculeo pointed out that because it was not possible to plan for such disasters, the focus should not be on the scale of the problem but how the government and people respond to it. Ultimately, it is the human behavior and characteristics of the leaders that matter the most because they set the tone for the organisation. He also stressed the importance of decision makers having sufficient rest during the crisis as it is critical that they be able to make important decisions with a clear head. Moreover, there is also a need to realise that not everything can be done if the scale of the problem is overwhelming. Hence it is critical during the planning period to prioritise what would be worth spending resources on and what not to so as to accumulate "strategic reserves". Osserman added that strategic communications is important when the disaster is overwhelming. Senior leaders need to shine, be calm and reassure the people by giving them a clear idea of what is already being done and what more needs to be done. It was added that an exercise worth putting in place is to train first responders to detect an impending crisis without any communications alert and yet be able to respond accordingly.

On the role of technology for disaster management, some examples of its use in a crisis listed included the use of satellite images to capture images of affected areas before and after the crisis for purposes of damage assessment. However, it was also pointed out that low technology equipment may sometimes be as effective or even better.

SESSION VI

PROMOTING CRISIS RESILIENCE: BUILDING CRISIS LEADERSHIP

Majeed Khader

Majeed Khader and **Jansen Ang** shared with participants the importance of effective leadership in crisis management. The presentation was based on a crisis leadership study and training programme that the Behavioral Sciences Unit (BSU) of Singapore's Home Team Academy regularly conducts for its agencies and recruits. It also highlighted for participants the scientific framework and key qualities of effective crisis leadership.

Khader mentioned that for the BSU, crisis is seen as a dynamic situation where things are changing constantly and multiple events are occurring simultaneously. It is also an emotional chaos as crisis usually contains elements of surprise or "Black Lion" events, which, the BSU has adapted from the original "Black Swan" term to refer to "things that were never supposed to happen, happening". When not managed promptly and effectively, crisis can

Jansen Ang

snowball into a greater disaster with ripple effects on different sectors.

It was noted that good crisis leaders do not only have to reduce the probability of crisis from happening, they also have to prevent crisis from reoccurring. This task is further complicated in that crisis leaders usually have to operate in an environment marked by uncertainties and coordinate multi-agency emergency responses. As such, effective crisis leadership for the BSU entails personal effectiveness, recognition of situation awareness, operational knowledge, team management, effective decision making, crisis communication and task management.

These qualities do not only provide a framework for crisis leadership competency but also underline the importance of personal values, pre-crisis training and team building.

The importance of trust and confidence building in a crisis were also emphasised. Ang asserted that effective crisis teams are never built during a crisis but before it. He also added that as pre-crisis training will also prepare crisis leaders and teams to communicate the right information to affected parties in a chaotic setting.

In conclusion, Khader and Ang emphasised the need to "think about the unthinkable" and summarised for participants the following best practices. First, a crisis portfolio mapping out both possible and seemingly unlikely scenarios that might disrupt one's organisation's operations should be developed. Second, based on the list of scenarios provided, participants were also encouraged to prepare for the "Black Lion" events by challenging the norm and thinking out of the box. Third, Khader and Ang reiterated the need to form an "A-Team" or key crisis team even before a crisis occurs. Fourth, signal detection skills should be sharpened. Signal detection should not be limited to the identifying of weak signals but also the reporting of 'near misses' which provide good information for the prevention and mitigation of crises. Fifth, crisis management could be built into daily operations. Finally, Khader and Ang highlighted the importance of learning from the past and having chief executive officers make crisis prevention a top strategic priority. It was also stressed that effective crisis leaders have to be trained for and good crisis leadership practices put into place before and not during a crisis.

5TH ASIA PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS

10–15 APRIL 2011
THE SENTOSA RESORT AND SPA, SINGAPORE

Sunday, 10 April 2011

1900 – 2130	Welcome Dinner hosted by ***Barry Desker***, Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and ***Kok Ping Soon***, Director, National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC)

Monday, 11 April 2011

1010 – 1040	Opening Remarks ***Barry Desker***, Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Opening Address ***Wong Kan Seng***, Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, Singapore
1040 – 1115	Reception/ Coffee Break
1115 – 1135	Group Photo-taking
1135 – 1145	Briefing for Local Participants
1145 – 1215	Introduction to RSIS, CENS and APPSNO ***Bilveer Singh***, Acting Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU
1215 – 1330	Lunch
1330 – 1445	**Session I: Singapore's Strategic Framework for National Security** Speaker: ***Kok Ping Soon***, Director, National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC), Prime Minister's Office, Singapore Chairperson: ***Bilveer Singh***, Acting Head, CENS, RSIS, NTU
1445 – 1455	Coffee Break
1455 – 1930	Heritage Walk

End of Day 1

Tuesday, 12 April 2011

0900 – 1030	Presentations on Homeland Security Management by Participants
1030 – 1045	Coffee Break
1045 – 1215	**Session II: Why We Need Crisis Resilience: The Transnational Terrorist Threat** Speakers: ***Edwin Bakker***, Head, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ***Mohamed Feisal Bin Mohamed Hassan***, Senior Analyst, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), RSIS, NTU Chairperson: ***Leonard Sebastian***, Associate Professor, RSIS, NTU
1215 – 1330	Lunch
1330 – 1430	Syndicate Discussions
1430 – 1500	Coffee Break

1500 – 1630	Free and Easy
1730 – 2130	Cocktail Reception followed by Distinguished Dinner Lecture
	Distinguished Dinner Lecture: Can Intuition Improve Decision Making in a Crisis?
	Speaker: ***Gerd Gigerenzer***, Director, Centre for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
	Chairperson: ***Barry Desker***, Dean, RSIS, NTU
	End of Day 2

Wednesday, 13 April 2011

0900 – 1030	Presentations on Homeland Security Management by Participants
1030 – 1045	Coffee Break
1045 – 1215	**Session III: Individual Resilience in a Crisis: Is There a 'Rescue Gene'?**
	Speakers: ***Scott Graham***, Disaster Services Director (Northeast Area), American Red Cross
	Hassan Ahmad, Chief Executive, Mercy Relief
	Chairperson: ***Emrys Chew***, Assistant Professor, RSIS, NTU
1215 – 1330	Lunch
1330 – 1430	Syndicate Discussions
1430 – 1500	Coffee Break
1500 – 1630	**Scenario Planning Presentation by Singapore's Centre for Strategic Futures: Futures Thinking for National Resilience**
	Speakers: ***Jeanette Kwek***, Senior Strategist, Centre for Strategic Futures, Public Service Division, Prime Minister's Office
	Chairperson: ***Yolanda Chin***, Research Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU
1630 – 1730	Free and Easy
1730 – 2000	APPSNO Alumni Dinner
	End of Day 3

Thursday, 14 April 2011

0900 – 1030	Presentations on Homeland Security Management by Participants
1030 – 1045	Coffee Break
1045 – 1215	**Session IV: Crisis Resilience: The Roles of Hindsight and Foresight**
	Speakers: ***Zachary Shore***, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School
	Marc Gerstein, Marc Gerstein Associates Ltd
	Chairperson: ***Jackson Ewing***, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, RSIS, NTU
1215 – 1330	Lunch

1330 – 1515 **Session V: Designing the Crisis Resilient Organisation**

Speakers:
Chris Arculeo, Fire and Rescue Service Advisor, Office of the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, UK

Stanley Osserman, Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate, United States Pacific Command

Chairperson:
Norman Vasu, Deputy Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU

1515 – 1530 Coffee Break

1530 – 1630 Syndicate Discussions

End of Day 4

Friday, 15 April 2011

0930 – 1030 **Session VI: Promoting Crisis Resilience: Building Crisis Leadership Part 1**

Speakers:
Majeed Khader, Director, Behavioral Sciences Unit, Home Team Academy

Jansen Ang, Deputy Director, Behavioral Sciences Unit, Home Team Academy

Chairperson:
Bilveer Singh, Acting Head, CENS, RSIS, NTU

1030 – 1050 Coffee Break

1050 – 1200 **Session VI (continued): Promoting Crisis Resilience: Building Crisis Leadership Part 2**

Speakers:
Majeed Khader, Director, Behavioral Sciences Unit, Home Team Academy

Jansen Ang, Deputy Director, Behavioral Sciences Unit, Home Team Academy

Chairperson:
Bilveer Singh, Acting Head, CENS, RSIS, NTU

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400 **Session VI (continued): Promoting Crisis Resilience: Building Crisis Leadership Part 3**

Speakers:
Majeed Khader, Director, Behavioral Sciences Unit, Home Team Academy

Jansen Ang, Deputy Director, Behavioral Sciences Unit, Home Team Academy

Chairperson:
Bilveer Singh, Acting Head, CENS, RSIS, NTU

1400 – 1415 Course Evaluation

1415 – 1430 Coffee Break

1430 – 1645 Tour of Home Team Academy

1645 – 1900 Free and Easy

1900 – 2130 Cocktail Reception followed by Certificate Presentation Ceremony and Closing Dinner hosted by ***Barry Desker***, Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

END OF PROGRAMME

ABOUT CENS

The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

WHY CENS?

In August 2004 the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategising national security policies requires greater research and understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategising national security. To this end, CENS works closely with not just other RSIS research programmes, but also national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister's Office.

WHAT RESEARCH DOES CENS DO?

CENS aspires to be an international research leader in the multi-disciplinary study of the concept of Resilience in all its aspects, and in the policy-relevant application of such research in order to promote Security within and beyond Singapore.

To this end, CENS conducts research in four main domains:

Radicalisation Studies

- *The multi-disciplinary study of the indicators and causes of violent radicalisation, the promotion of community immunity to extremist ideas and best practices in individual rehabilitation. The assumption being that neutralising violent radicalism presupposes individual and community resilience.*

Social Resilience

- *The systematic study of the sources of – and ways of promoting – the capacity of globalised, multicultural societies to hold together in the face of systemic shocks such as diseases and terrorist strikes.*

Homeland Defence

- *A broad domain encompassing risk perception, management and communication; and the study of best practices in societal engagement, dialogue and strategic communication in crises. The underlying theme is psychological resilience, as both a response and antidote to, societal stresses and perceptions of vulnerability.*

Futures Studies

- *The study of various theoretical and conceptual approaches to the systematic and rigorous study of emerging threats, as well as global trends and opportunities – on the assumption that Resilience also encompasses robust visions of the future.*

HOW DOES CENS HELP INFLUENCE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY?

Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best practices in responding to those threats. In addition, CENS organises courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and response to, national and homeland security threats.

HOW DOES CENS HELP RAISE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES?

To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a number of security and intelligence-related publications, as well as write op-ed analyses in leading newspapers. Radio and television interviews have allowed CENS staff to participate in and shape the public debate on critical issues such as radicalisation and counter-terrorism, multiculturalism and social resilience, as well as the perception, management and mitigation of risk.

HOW DOES CENS KEEP ABREAST OF CUTTING EDGE NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH?

The lean organisational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research.

For more information on CENS, log on to **http://www.rsis.edu.sg** and follow the links to "Centre of Excellence for National Security".

ABOUT RSIS

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. Known earlier as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies when it was established in July 1996, RSIS' mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis,
- Conduct policy-relevant research in defence, national security, international relations, strategic studies and diplomacy,
- Foster a global network of like-minded professional schools.

GRADUATE EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science (M.Sc.) degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Thus far, students from more than 50 countries have successfully completed one of these programmes. In 2010, a Double Masters Programme with Warwick University was also launched, with students required to spend the first year at Warwick and the second year at RSIS.

A small but select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students who are supervised by faculty members with matching interests.

RESEARCH

Research takes place within RSIS' six components: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2004), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (Centre for NTS Studies, 2008); the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN, 2008); and the recently established Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS, 2011). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region.

The school has four professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to conduct research at the school. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations and the Bakrie Professorship in Southeast Asia Policy.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS maintains links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

ABOUT NSCS

The **National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS)** was set up in the Prime Minister's Office in July 2004 to facilitate national security policy coordination from a Whole-Of-Government perspective. NSCS reports to the Prime Minister through the Coordinating Minister for National Security (CMNS). The current CMNS is Deputy Prime Minister Mr Wong Kan Seng.

NSCS is headed by Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence Coordination). The current PS(NSIC) is Mr. Peter Ong, who is concurrently Head of Civil Service Permanent Secretary (Finance) and Permanent Secretary (Special Duties).

NSCS provides support to the ministerial-level Security Policy Review Committee (SPRC) and Senior official-level National Security Coordination Committee (NSCCom) and Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ICC). It organises and manages national security programmes, one example being the Asia Pacific Programme for National Security Officers. NSCS also funds experimental, research or start-up projects that contribute to our national security.

NSCS is made up of two components: the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) and the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (JCTC). Each centre is headed by a director.

NSCC performs three vital roles in Singapore's national security: national security planning, policy coordination, and anticipating strategic threats. As a coordinating body, NSCC ensures that government agencies complement each other, and do not duplicate or perform competing tasks.

Visit the **www.nscs.gov.sg** for more information.



S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
TEL 65-6790-6982 | FAX 65-6793-2991 | EMAIL wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg | WEBSITE www.rsis.edu.sg