19TH ASIA PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

Event Report

3-10 August 2017

RSiS Nanyang Technological University
S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY SINGAPORE

Event Report

19TH ASIA PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC: IMPLICATIONS ON SECURITY POLICIES AND DEFENCE RELATIONS

Organised by:
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This report summarises the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

The conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the points expressed in the prepared papers, no attributions have been included in this conference report.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 19th Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO), organised by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), was held at Village Hotel Changi in Singapore from 3 to 10 August 2017. Since its inception in 1999, APPSMO has provided a unique and important forum for military officers and defence analysts to network and exchange views on a broad range of subjects related to regional and international security. APPSMO 2017 continued to facilitate defence diplomacy with the attendance of 57 military officers and defence planners from 26 countries representing Asia, Oceania, North America, and Europe.

During the week-long programme, the participants attended a series of seminars and discussions that featured experts from both the academic and defence communities. The theme for APPSMO 2017 was "International Politics in the Asia Pacific: Implications on Security Policies and Defence Relations". Some of the key topics discussed included counter terrorism, the future of conflict, information and cyberwarfare, rules and norms in Asia Pacific security, defence diplomacy, and preventive diplomacy.

The participants visited the Multi-Mission Range Complex, the Changi Chapel, and were brought on a military heritage tour. They were also brought to the Seletar Aerospace Park and Port Operation Control Centre. On 9 August 2017, they attended Singapore's 52nd National Day Parade. APPSMO 2017 has played an important role as an additional conduit for defence diplomacy by facilitating interaction among senior military officers in and beyond the Asia Pacific. It has provided an opportunity for participants to foster a better understanding of each other, as well as their respective countries.

WELCOME REMARKS

Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, Executive Deputy Chairman of RSIS at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, began by welcoming all participants to the 19th iteration of the Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO). He noted that from its humble beginnings in 1999, APPSMO has grown into an annual international event with both military and civilian participants. The international nature of the programme is testament to the broad support APPSMO enjoys.

Amb Ong observed that this year's APPSMO theme, "International Politics in the Asia Pacific: Implications on Security Policies and Defence Relations", endeavoured to address many important questions and issues governments presently face. Consequently, the speakers invited this year come from varied backgrounds with different perspectives. He looked forward to hearing their comments and questions, and also urged participants to pick their brains during presentations and syndicate discussions.

Additionally, Amb Ong hoped participants would use the opportunity in the coming days to interact with each other. He urged everyone to deepen existing friendships as well as make new ones. He hoped these friendships would last for many years to come as has been the experience of previous APPSMO alumni. Finally, he thanked the Ministry of Defence, Singapore (MINDEF) for giving APPSMO their continued support.technologies where legacy systems need to be integrated with emerging systems.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: DEVELOPING THE NEXT GENERATION SAF AND COOPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS THROUGH THE REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (RSA) TO COMBAT NEW THREATS

Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman, Senior Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Singapore, welcomed everyone to Changi Village and thanked them for inviting him to deliver the keynote address. He noted that APPSMO's two key aims remain unchanged. APPSMO is still committed to facilitating senior military officers in enhancing their knowledge on key security issues affecting the region. It also continues to provide a venue and opportunity for upcoming senior military officers in the region to acquaint themselves with their counterparts and exchange ideas. He noted that the level of international participation, with over twenty countries in attendance this year, reflects the highly interconnected world and underscored that security issues in one region can easily affect others.

Dr Maliki then provided an overview of the increasingly complex security environment and said that ongoing conflicts continue to simmer and threaten regional peace and security. He cited the deliberate and provocative actions by North Korea as an example. The recent nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and any miscalculation in response to that, could destabilise the region. Additionally, miscalculations could upset the existing rules-based international order that has allowed peace and security to flourish in the Asia Pacific for so many years. He hoped the major players in the conflict would find a peaceful way to resolve their differences.

Dr Maliki also pointed to the proliferation of non-traditional security threats such as cyber and terrorist attacks. The recent cyberattacks on the United Kingdom's healthcare infrastructure were alarming. He posited that if such attacks escalated and involved critical infrastructure, the damage to many countries would be incalculable due to the world's growing dependence on technology. Moving on to terrorism, he expressed concern over the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Remarking on the re-emergence of terrorism in the Asia Pacific region, he shared that an estimated 1,400 Southeast Asian citizens have travelled to Iraq and Syria to support ISIS and a large number could now return after its defeat. Dr Maliki highlighted an increase in the number of attacks claimed by ISIS in Southeast Asia, pointing to the ongoing siege in Philippine city Marawi as an example of how violent extremism has spread from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific.

Regional terror groups have been known to use charities and non-profit groups as a cover to fund terrorism. Dr Maliki referenced the Abu Sayyaf group terrorising Marawi as an example of how such militant groups are well-armed, well-organised and well-funded by ISIS. Unlike previous incidents of kidnappings for ransom, they are now supported by funding from illegal drug trafficking networks and a very complex and sophisticated chain of command from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. He concluded that the spread of fighting, although concentrated in Marawi for now, is of grave concern. Furthermore, these groups can easily obtain sophisticated technology (e.g. chemical and biological weapons), and access technological know-how through the internet or the dark web. This will have an impact on security and stability in the region as security services will be hard-pressed to react to opponents who could gain near-peer capabilities.

Dr Maliki also posited that the modus operandi of terrorists is constantly evolving. ISIS, for example, has been effective in using social media and has become increasingly sophisticated in its use of information technology. It has already begun to create its own online platforms to spread radical ideology and to avoid detection and control by existing mainstream ones like Facebook and Twitter. He noted that the key challenges now are fighting the self-radicalisation of individuals as they are exposed to radical ideology on the internet, and correspondingly strengthening the resilience of Singaporeans in the face and aftermath of such terrorist attacks.

Dr Maliki then posed the question: Since armed forces are historically structured for conventional operations, how relevant are they in addressing these non-traditional security challenges? Similarly, as conventional conflicts become increasingly unlikely, how prepared are armed forces if the fight moves beyond the original frontlines of Iraq and Syria and closer to home?

He noted that such conflicts occur in urban areas where militaries would be less able to bring their full range of capabilities to bear. Militaries are generally less equipped for homeland security. In that regard, the military has to step up. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), for example, has built training areas such as the Multi-Mission Range Complex to equip soldiers with relevant new skills.

It was highlighted that the SAF recognises counter-terrorism as a whole-of-government endeavour, and working with other security agencies through an established legal framework is of fundamental importance. To that end, he shared that MINDEF and the Ministry of Home Affairs effectuates Singapore's counter-terrorism plans through island-wide exercises. The SAF is deployed across Singapore to play a greater domestic security role. Similarly, the Home Team sets up Emergency Response Teams for immediate and capable response to violent attacks. In these exercises, Dr Maliki witnessed seamless inter-operability between the military and police. This, he concluded, is not possible if the intentions of the agencies are not aligned. To help achieve this, the Island Defence Training Institute, which can train up to 18,000 National Service men to work with the Home Team, was recently inaugurated. Moreover, attacks are no longer just kinetic in nature. Terrorists now possess cyber tools to attack critical infrastructure and steal information. A country's cyber infrastructure now has to be robustly defended and the security agencies need capabilities to do so. For example, in Singapore, the Defence Cyber Organisation was established for this purpose.

In countering cross-boundary security challenges, Dr Maliki highlighted that Singapore enjoys support and cooperation with allies across the world. Cross-national dialogue is important especially during times of disagreement. He cited the Shangri-La Dialogue and APPSMO as examples of platforms to begin discussions that lead towards common solutions, and gave the examples of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus as more direct platforms to cooperate and build confidence through joint exercises and exchanges. Such exercises, Dr Maliki said, are strategically valuable as they indicate that there is a multi-national effort to deal with threats. As Singapore assumes the ASEAN chairmanship in 2018, it is hoped that these efforts will be further propagated in order to enhance the existing regional security architecture. Dr Maliki noted the propagation of rules and norms was particularly important as maritime and air traffic increases with rising prosperity. Some, like the Code of Unplanned Encountered at Sea, have made good progress. He highlighted that these confidence-building measures will be practiced in upcoming exercises, including those with extra-regional players like China.

Beyond the ADMM-Plus framework, regional countries have established their own mini-laterals to address their own specific threats. For example, trilateral maritime patrols involving Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines to counter activities in the Sulu seas have been conducted, with Singapore and Brunei being invited as observers. In this area, Dr Maliki said Singapore would participate more actively if asked as this was essential for enhancing cooperation. He posited that regional countries will have to show collective responsibility as such joint activities demonstrate to ISIS that there is a solid front against them. He pointed to regional countries like Indonesia and Malaysia offering support to Philippines (Marawi) as an example of progress on this front. As no one country has the bandwidth to address all these threats, the only way forward is for countries to share intelligence and pool resources to combat them together.

In conclusion, Dr Maliki observed that the current generation of senior military commanders will have to wear many hats given the variety of challenges, because the responsibility to defend has not only changed, but the methods to do so also have. He hoped discussions during APPSMO would help participants with this task, and perhaps concrete collaboration would arise. He challenged the participants to translate their discussions into action for the sake of regional security.

SCENE-SETTING ROUNDTABLE: GEOPOLITICS AND TRENDS IN ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY



(L-R) Dr Sanjaya Baru, Dr Thomas X. Hammes, Mr Mattia Tomba, Professor Oh Joon, and Professor Joseph Liow

Professor Oh Joon, Professor of United Nations Studies, Kyung Hee University, South Korea, focused his presentation on geopolitics and trends in Asia Pacific security with regard to the North Korean nuclear issue. He highlighted the importance of arms control in managing nuclear weapons and singled out the 1967 Non-Proliferation Treaty for its comprehensiveness. While a number of states like Iran have initially challenged the regime, most who resisted have agreed to negotiate after sweeteners were provided. North Korea on the other hand, has expressed no interest in making any deals. Prof Oh cited its nuclear tests and rejection of multiple United Nations (UN) resolutions as examples of this.

Prof Oh said that this makes North Korea a threat to global security. He suggested that if the international community allows them to behave in such a manner, other states seeking nuclear weapons might follow suit. To deal with this, three possible courses of action to restore the region's strategic imbalance could be pursued: (i) develop nuclear weapons for defence; (ii) persuade the U.S. to be more active in the region; and (iii) additional pressure to persuade North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons. Prof Oh's preference was for the third course of action. He stressed that the international community should not give in to North Korea, and believes that sanctions could be effective.

Prof Oh painted three scenarios which could play out. First, the international community could continue to exert pressure in its present form. While this method has not born any results, the most severe sanctions have only just been introduced so more time is needed to see its effects. Second, there could be a direct confrontation with North Korea. Prof Oh described this as a

"moment of truth" for the country's president Kim Jong Un where continued provocation will inevitably lead to engagement. The final scenario is dialogue with North Korea to talk the state out of its nuclear weapons programme. He noted that U.S. President Donald Trump had originally believed this was possible. In reality however, confrontation and dialogue might alternate which is why crisis management is of fundamental importance. He noted that China would play an important role in determining the outcome of the crisis as it has more influence over North Korea than claimed.

Mr Mattia Tomba, Senior Research Fellow, Middle East Institute, Singapore, centered his presentation on the economics of strategic balance in Eurasia. He said that Europe is presently facing several serious challenges. Although the European Union (EU) has rapidly expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU is fragmented as Europe has yet to fully recover from last decade's economic crisis and this has created socio-political problems. Also, the wars in the Middle East have created immigration problems and this is compounded by the rise of radical Islam in Europe. Mr Tomba then shifted his attention to Asia, noting that China's rise was driven by the manufacture of cheap goods. He observed that the east coast has boomed, but growth has slowed as the rest of the world cannot consume all of China's exports. China is trying to shift from an export economic model to an import one by trying to move up the value chain. This, however, is challenging as China is competing during difficult economic times.

Mr Tomba warned that low prosperity could create instability in China, and suggested a possible option where power was centralised to better coordinate efforts. This is presently being done but China remains vulnerable. He argued that China could easily be blockaded by the U.S. as the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) still cannot overpower the former's military forces. Since geography cannot be changed, he wondered if China's possible solution to this vulnerability is to acquire more regional allies. In a strategic context, the U.S. would have to think twice before choosing to engage China in confrontation especially if regional states were on the latter's side. A second option is to focus on the development of their land-maritime corridor, the One Belt, One Road initiative, an infrastructural development which will allow China to gain access to the Middle East and Europe. Mr Tomba felt that this could be difficult to accomplish due to the massive cost and instability of the countries the route would have to go through. Also, sea trade cannot be replaced by land trade.

Turning his attention to Sino-U.S.-ASEAN relations, Mr Tomba said that all parties prioritise relations with each other because of economic reasons. Firstly, ASEAN is a fast growing economy. Second, it strategically connects Europe with Asia. Moreover having wound down its involvement in Iraq and

Afghanistan, the U.S. has now shifted its attention to the South China Sea. This has put the U.S. on a collision course with China as the latter seeks to extend its global reach, attempts to protect waters it deems sovereign, and is now trying to create a buffer to secure its trade routes. This has led to Sino-U.S. regional competition and escalation in this competition could disrupt security and trade.

Mr Tomba concluded his presentation by commenting on other global strategic developments. He noted that radical Islam has negatively impacted international security and the way people live and interact with each other. However, this has given the U.S. a reason to remain in Asia as the extremists continue to increase their regional activities. Mr Tomba then singled out Turkey as a rising regional power in linking Eurasia. While it is still recovering from the 2016 attempted coup, he said Turkey remains geographically strategic and can project influence. Finally, Japan might remilitarise in the face of a rising China, with the former being a useful counter-balance to the latter. However, this would be symbolically difficult to accept as memories of Japan's imperialist past from World War Two are still strong in Asia.

Dr Thomas X. Hammes, Distinguished Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, USA, spoke about the indicators of deglobalisation, sharing that as global economies grow, the percentage of international trade will decrease. This retreat from globalisation is already apparent in Europe; even though Europe trades internationally, most of the trades still occur within the region. Also, the flow of global capital has failed to recover from last decade's crisis. Dr Hammes observed that businesses make global investment to better their returns, and globalisation has traditionally been premised on this. But while foreign direct investment in developing economies is still the trend, it has been noted that an increasing amount of investment monies are being sunk into the U.S. instead of foreign shores. Dr Hammes then introduced the drivers of deglobalisation and pointed to robotics as a key propeller. Cheap labour has historically been the main driver of many economies. However, that era may soon be over as smart robots are cheaper and work more efficiently than humans. This would be particularly attractive to small and medium enterprises who would like to keep labour costs low. Dr Hammes also opined that advanced manufacturing techniques enabled by artificial intelligence would be a game changer. 3D printing, in particular, is an important disruptive technology which would facilitate deglobalisation as it promotes local production. He observed that the technology has garnered huge investment funding as the potential of 3D printing in large scale applications is promising. Its advantages include: (i) the need to only import raw materials for production (as

opposed to component parts); (ii) less reliance on labour; (iii) low inventory costs as goods will be produced on demand; (iv) rapid turnaround; and (v) customisable products. Appealing not just to the consumer markets, businesses too would particularly appreciate the protection of their intellectual property through local production.

Other drivers of deglobalisation offered by Dr Hammes included the localisation of energy production. He observed that the U.S. became no longer reliant on importing fossil fuels from overseas as they could be produced locally through fracking. Energy could also now be competitively produced from renewable sources. He outlined how political-social drivers such as protectionism, internet fragmentation with countries such as China developing their own self-contained telecommunications networks, and pressure to preserve the environment, worked against globalisation.

Dr Hammes concluded by describing the impact of deglobalisation on the economy and security. He said that while North America might not be dramatically affected by it as it is economically independent, deglobalisation could lead to premature deindustralisation which would negatively impact developing countries. With less foreign investment in manufacturing – the historic catalyst for a country's growth – the development process in these poorer countries would be hampered. International security, Dr Hammes suggested, would be affected by America's increasing reluctance to participate in foreign intervention. The U.S. is finding interventions more costly in terms of casualties and material losses because cheaper technology now provides adversaries with more effective means of resistance. Strategically, the U.S. could become more isolationist as there would no longer be a need to protect overseas sources of goods since manufacturing, enabled by technology, could be done at home. He reminded the audience that the U.S. has isolationism in its bones. With both the Pacific and Atlantic oceans as protective moats, America has not needed to intervene elsewhere to protect its own security. Historically, this has bred an isolationist mindset. Dr Hammes suggested that Asia Pacific would have to think of a response, including either envisioning how an Asia without the U.S. would look like, or finding other means to prevent the withdrawal.

Dr Sanjaya Baru, Distinguished Fellow, United Service Institute of India, India, focused his presentation on the impact global financial crises have on the global strategic balance. He expressed that the aforesaid has imposed fiscal constraints on governments and has altered the economic balance of power between the East and the West. This has led to a rapid rise of China and a geopolitical decline of the West. Dr Baru then addressed what the geopolitical consequences of these geo-economic changes are. He cautioned against prematurely jumping to the conclusion that the rise of Asia

as a geo-economic entity is due to the shift of global trade from the Atlantic to the Pacific or Indian Oceans. As this shift is fundamentally economic in nature, whether there would be political ramifications is a whole other question that needs to be deliberated upon.

Some have argued that because of 19th century geo-economics characterised by industrialisation, advancement in communications technology, and a mercantilist policy, Great Britain and the U.S. emerged as the dominant global powers in the 19th and 20th centuries respectively. With China following suit now, some believe that the 21st century would belong to China. However, the fundamental difference between the present and the previous two centuries is that geo-economics is now dispersed throughout the world and not just concentrated in a few countries, resulting in a more multipolar world. Dr Baru concluded that the U.S. will likely still dominate globally with others emerging as competitors or allies.

He then turned his attention to economic power being the key instrument of national power, and opined that hard economic power will shape the 21st century. With multipolarity characterising current international relations, new relationships will be formed based on economic hierarchy. In the Asia Pacific, he remarked there would be no U.S. departure resulting in a vacuum. Rather, the U.S. and Japan are working together closer than ever before. Additionally, new relationships in the West will also emerge. Dr Baru singled out the German-French relationship as particularly important. The dynamics of European politics involving Germany, Russia, and France, and the relationships they establish will matter too, as these new partnerships among “middle powers” will alter the geopolitics of transatlantic relations.

Dr Baru concluded his presentation with a few comments on India’s role in Asia. One of the geopolitical implications of India’s rise is its dependence on Asia. While global trade may be declining, India’s trade, particularly with Asia, has increased. In that regard, Dr Baru opined that the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific region has increased – a key factor when analysing the security of Asia Pacific.

SESSION I: STATE OR NON-STATE?: FIGHTING ISIS AND TERRORISM

(L-R) Professor Pascal Vennesson, Associate Professor Bilveer Singh, Ms Jacinta Carroll, and Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna

Professor Pascal Vennesson, Professor of Political Science, Military Studies Programme, IDSS, RSIS, Singapore, started by asking if the phenomenon of terrorism should still be analysed from the perspective of state and non-state actors? Are the capabilities available to fight terrorism still relevant 16 years after the 9/11 attacks? Are we living with and dealing with conflict in a global village? Does globalisation still make sense? If it does, are violent non-state actors still strategically relevant? To answer these questions, Prof Vennesson presented the ongoing debate between traditional and global realists along with the various policy implications. Although both parties have the same fundamental beliefs, they differ in how they relate to the international environment and power allocated to state and non-state actors.

According to Prof Vennesson, traditional realists believe that the defeat of ISIS in Mosul was a symbolic end point that marked the end of the war against ISIS. From their perspective, the “global village” is a misleading myth. When referring to conflict or war, technology has a limited ability to render strategic distance irrelevant. In this regard, the concept of the global village does not apply. Hence, 9/11 was an anomaly and the war on terror is exaggerated. The retaliation against non-state terrorist groups made things worse, as the military campaigns against various violent non-state actors arguably employed too much indiscriminate force, turning some segments of Muslim opinion against the West. From a traditional realist standpoint, distance remains a tremendous constraint for terrorists, while operational environments remain hostile and difficult. Terrorist groups are unable to project power in any significant way over great distances, limiting their capacity to inflict mass destruction and expand their territory. Believing that distance serves to weaken threats from terrorists, traditional realists deem the globalists’ concept of technology rendering distances irrelevant and

effectively “shrinking” the world as false, and that too much resources have been devoted to counter-terrorism due to threat inflation.

Prof Vennesson then went on to discuss the developments in Southern Philippines to illustrate the global realists’ viewpoint that the defeat of ISIS in Mosul is not the end of the war. From the standpoint of global realism, the global village provides the context for an international environment and opens up opportunities for non-state transnational actors to either remain relevant or reach their goals (e.g., territorial ambitions or to compel political change from governments). Prof Vennesson said terrorist groups require both local and international support, while also seeking legitimacy from religion and other sources. From a strategic standpoint, these groups use indirect approaches which provoke psychological and identity dislocation. They do not aim to conquer the territory of distant enemies, but use psychological means to exploit uncertainty. Therefore, for terrorists, war is limited from the material standpoint but total war can be waged using psychological and moral means.

Prof Vennesson concluded that traditional realists can question the extreme claims of globalisation and threat inflation, while global realists recognise globalised insurgent leaders and strategic innovation.

Associate Professor Bilveer Singh, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security, RSIS, Singapore, began by highlighting that the fight against terrorism in South East Asia did not start after the 9/11 attacks. Terrorism already plagued the region for almost five decades, but the developments in Marawi, Philippines, proved how terrorism has become more deadly. For instance, ISIS has always been a distant threat but following their defeat in Mosul, the challenge is just beginning as Southeast Asian fighters who went to Mosul in previously will now return to their home countries to carry out attacks.

Assoc Prof Singh highlighted that for a long time, the issue of terrorism has been focused on Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, with Myanmar potentially next on the list. He shared that while many terror groups currently dwell in Indonesia and the Philippines, terrorism is no longer just a national phenomenon as the region now has sprawling network of terrorists with over 20 nationalities involved. While states are empowered to deal with the problem locally, there are limits to dealing with the problem internationally.

Currently, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates continue to be a threat to the region. One such affiliate is AQIS (Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) which has Myanmar as part of its operation sphere. Assoc Prof Singh further explained that terrorist groups morph as the environment changes, possibly making them the fastest learning organisations. What is seen in Marawi is the second structure and operation of ISIS. It is fundamentally a modified

and improved version of that in Mosul. He warned that although Al-Qaeda and ISIS are divergent at this point, they might join forces as the situation changes.

Regional efforts to get government officials from various levels to talk about terrorism provide an opportunity to build up capabilities against terror attacks. Terrorist groups are fighting beyond national boundaries while nation states continue to be absorbed by sovereignty and territorial integrity. Assoc Prof Singh warned that if a consensus cannot be developed because of legal constraints, nation states will continue to play "catch up" with terrorist groups. He said that countries must work together to mobilise non-state apparatus to battle radical ideology, calling it a whole-of-government and whole-of-society fight.

Ms Jacinta Carroll, Head of Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia, started by addressing the perception that ISIS is a state because it claims territories and has many state-like attributes. Territory is central in the ISIS narrative. She proposed that the growing loss of territory has caused ISIS to change its narrative on the Islamic control of territory to the struggle against injustices by non-Muslims. This deviation however has changed the level of international interest in ISIS; with the loss of territory, there has been less global anxiety about ISIS. Ms Carroll then discussed the questions ISIS has generated around the topic of states. Normally, a state has a responsibility to protect its citizens. However, when citizens of a state fight for ISIS as a freedom fighter, it makes the citizen an enemy of his or her own country. This has caused anxiety among many states as they try to understand the role of their militaries, their targets, and what happens when they detain their own people.

Ms Carroll went on to explain how terrorist groups have effectively used propaganda as a way to gain support. She said that ISIS considers itself as a state but it has no accountability and no obligations to tell the truth. Such freedom allows ISIS the flexibility to create its own narrative. Even after the fall of Mosul, they have adapted and continued to transform their narrative to distract people from the loss, inspire and direct attacks, and reinvent its image.

In order to combat the ISIS narrative, the military should move towards Information Operations to facilitate the projection of the chosen narrative and convince all relevant audiences that the narrative is both ethnical and factual. Ms Carroll further proposed that the responsibility to counter terrorism is not of just the state, but also of the community and businesses. She concluded her talk by giving the audience two issues to consider. First, what plans are in place to address what comes after winning battles against ISIS? And second, how can inter-state cooperation be further encouraged?

SESSION II: FUTURE OF CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

(L-R) Dr Thomas X. Hammes, Mr David F. Heyman, Mr Stephan De Spiegeleire, and Assistant Professor Michael Raska

With reference to the promise of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Dr Thomas X Hammes, Distinguished Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, USA, argued that the future of conflict will be shaped by the arrival of "the small, smart, and the cheap". He began his presentation with an overview of the rapid technological change happening today, and gave numerous examples of how the barriers to high-technology manufacturing become lower as products grow increasingly sophisticated. Dr Hammes highlighted rapid advancements in the areas of space capabilities and artificial intelligence before singling out five technological game changers. First, additive manufacturing processes, typified by 3D printing, could result in cheaper, tougher, and better designed products made out of unique materials and produced in high volume. Second, nanotechnology has seen huge advancements in nanoenergetics which means explosives can be more powerful per volume-size. Third, the monopoly on space capabilities by states has dissolved. Dr Hammes offered that space technology (e.g. cube satellites for imagery and communication) can be accessed by anyone who can afford to pay. Fourth, he suggested that high capability commercial drones with ranges in excess of a thousand miles already exist. Finally, directed energies such as lasers and microwaves are now better understood and the associated equipment is now more compact. Collectively, these technologies would have tremendous impact on both civilian and military affairs.

The advantages of next-generation technology were outlined next. He explored what this meant for irregular war at a strategic or national level. The convergence of these technologies, he said, would favour non-state

actors and put states at a disadvantage. Now that new technologies have improved the efficacy of non-state actors, their sponsors correspondingly become more powerful because the money spent produces more tangible outcomes in the real world. This in turn reduces any existing immunity (i.e. hostile action from non-state actors) the West has hitherto enjoyed. He also noted that attacks would focus on lines of communication and fixed bases and these technologies would threaten to inflict unacceptable losses upon external intervention forces. Consequently, this would deter state intervention as the cost of such interventions would be higher. Dr. Hammes concluded these advancements would shift power to smaller entities and allow for mass mobilisation, forcing states to plan for long wars as opposed to quick victories. As for the operational implications of these technologies, he said that tactical defence would gain an edge as anti-access and area-denial capabilities would be within reach.

Dr Hammes concluded his presentation with a discussion on the impact of these technologies on Asia. He suggested that if the trend was to continue, the U.S. would be less willing to be involved regionally as the cost would outweigh the benefits, and domestic isolationist sentiment would deter intervention. If the U.S. was to continue being involved in the region, platforms such as warships or any other vehicles used to project military power used would have to be cheaper and smaller, with more quickly deployed as opposed to the present approach of deploying a few large ones. Dr Hammes also said that smaller Asian states could now overcome logistical and infrastructural challenges and create affordable and effective defences.

Mr David F. Heyman, Former Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, USA, presented on “Future Warfare and the Cyber Deterrence Toolkit: A Model for Establishing Deterrence as a National Strategy for Mitigating Cyber-threats”. He said that in the landscape of deterrence, developing cyber deterrence must be a priority as the threat is only getting worse.

Mr Heyman began his presentation with an overview of global developments which have impacted cyberthreats. On the positive side, he highlighted the progress the world has made in health, education, and even politics. Despite the high visibility of contemporary conflict, Mr Heyman pointed out they are actually in a historic decline. The world’s progress can be largely attributed to the advancement of global communications. The information technology (IT) revolution has permeated all sections of society; critical infrastructure to even traditional industries such as mining have found their place in the cyber domain. This trend of ubiquitous connectivity is expected to continue. The downside, however, is that the same connectivity that spurred growth has

also created vast opportunities for malicious activities. Consequently, security can no longer be thought of in the physical protection of important assets, but also that of digital ones. Indeed, the emerging world of sophisticated hijacking has brought conflict to our doorsteps, often without the general population even realising it. There has been a huge uptick in cyberattacks in recent years, affecting both virtual and physical infrastructure and causing tremendous inconveniences.

Mr Heyman then turned his attention to the response. He said that a shift from the traditional model of deterrence premised on nuclear wars has to be modified especially in this era of economic interdependency. In this regard, economic sanctions should be part of any cyber deterrence strategy. Formulating such a strategy, however, requires addressing unique challenges for cyberthreats. First, mutually assured destruction, the fundamental logic behind traditional deterrence, may not be possible in a cyber environment. Second, it is often difficult to discern the actors involved in cybersecurity as their allegiances and intentions can vary tremendously. As such, perpetrator and attribution are difficult to pinpoint. Third, cyberattacks are often used as part of larger hybrid strategy. Related to the previous point, it is difficult to discern whether an actor is seeking a political objective, or is merely a paid contractor of another party. Fourth, the systems used to attack are also used positively for national growth. If security in IT infrastructure was tightened, it could limit useful growth and innovation. Fifth, cyberattacks often happen quickly and without warning. Sixth, the cost of cyber weapons is comparatively low. And finally, given the transnational nature of cyberspace, it is often difficult to determine the exact legal boundaries and jurisdictions a state has to respond within.

Mr Heyman suggested that adopting a broad-spectrum deterrence strategy is a way to overcome these challenges. This entailed the development and maintenance of appropriate offensive and defensive capabilities across all elements of society to dissuade adversaries from hostile actions, knowing that any significant threat will be met by sufficient means to either render it ineffective, be thwarted, or met by retaliation. However, a precondition for this was the establishment of a notion of norms to spell out what was acceptable behaviour in cyberspace and related to this, a declaratory policy of redlines. Accordingly, it is important that the consequences of crossing these redlines, based on articulated norms, need to be spelt out and acted on. In operational terms, Mr Heyman suggested a rethink of the concept of defence. In the cyber domain, defence now needed to be active to anticipate what a non-state actor might do, as well as be conceptually examined. He suggested that the fundamental meaning of national defence be re-examined so that appropriate agencies can be included. The nature of cyberthreats

means that security can no longer be guaranteed just by traditional security agencies.

Mr Stephan De Spiegeleire, Principal Scientist at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the Netherlands, believes that addressing future conflict should involve a post-industrial approach. He described how new conflicts have to be resolved with a new mindset and not with the traditional industrial approach of just employing new and better technology to defeat a threat. He likened this approach to that of a diversified investment portfolio where many different investment vehicles, some riskier than others, are employed to achieve a positive outcome. He noted how non-military actors, especially those in economics, can actually contribute to defence.

Mr De Spiegeleire referenced the earlier discussion on globalisation and deglobalisation, multiple future security environments, and how perception of these phenomena and environments is never static but can evolve. Such a dynamic environment, he said, requires structured foresight and strategic planning. He suggested that the first step to achieving such structure is to have the words “security,” “defence” and “armed force” properly defined. While society may have a traditional way of understanding these terms, they should be broadly understood as the creation of an environment for society to flourish in a sustainable way. To that end, society’s conceptions of responsibility and power relations have to change, if maximum efficiency and success in accomplishing conflict objectives and ensuring survival is to be achieved. He cited the example of disruption in education, where teachers are no longer the sole source of instruction. Similarly, in “defence” and “security,” traditional security actors like the armed forces could be complemented with non-traditional ones like humanitarian non-governmental organisations and even UN agencies.

Mr De Spiegeleire illustrated this evolution in mindset with an example of how the Netherlands has changed its organisation of defence over the years. Initially focused on the “national defence force”, he noted that the shift to their present “national defence security ecosystem” acknowledges the importance for a whole-of-society approach to defence. It might even be worth investing in borrowed approaches from other fields to develop new innovative ways of addressing defence. He gave an example of how the medical and biotechnology fields are attempting to stimulate the generation of anti-bodies to deal with diseases from the inside, as opposed to relying on the external introduction of medicine into the body. He cited the specific example of using immunotherapy to treat cancer. Mr De Spiegeleire wondered if this could be applied to defence as well. By first detecting what provokes conflict in fragile states, societal fibres can be boosted to prevent conflict from breaking out in the first place.

Mr De Spiegeleire concluded his presentation with a plea to think more creatively with the way defence is broached. Rather than focus on capabilities which militaries tend to do, he urged the audience to think in terms of the ends, not the means. He described the uneven track record of Europe's approach to defence. On one hand, it was at the forefront of the industrial revolution leading to great improvements in living standards; on the other it also triggered two world wars and many other security challenges and issues which the EU is now trying to address. Mr De Siegeleire hopes that Asia will not make the same mistakes Europe did earlier on. He is optimistic, noting that smaller nations may have an advantage as they are more adaptable, much like small and medium sized enterprises in business, resulting in greater innovation.

SESSION III: INFORMATION AND CYBER WARFARE



(L-R) Dr Linton Wells II, Dr Shashi Jayakumar, Professor Gabriel Weinmann, and Mr Benjamin Ang

Dr Linton Wells II, Executive Advisor to the Centre of C4I and Cyber, George Washington University and Visiting Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, USA, spoke of the concept of cognitive conflict and how states can improve their odds for success. He began by outlining the continuum of conflict, where beyond open and conventional war, there are also hybrid and irregular threats along with measures short of war. Cognitive conflict, which underpins all of these categories on the continuum, is fundamentally about influencing the will to fight. The American way of war has resulted in billions of dollars spent trying to defeat enemies on high intensity battlefields. While Dr Wells acknowledged that war still includes kinetic acts of force, it is not sufficient. Today, measures short of conflict, irregular warfare, and terrorism are being combined with modern information operations. This approach engages political processes, thought leaders, and social media to influence citizens directly or indirectly. This is a shift from targeting military forces, to targeting the will of civilians and political structures. Simply put, the resilience of states and alliances rests in the minds of citizens, not in the physical borders and fielded military forces. Cognitive conflicts are not new, and were already understood by classic military strategists like Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, who famously talked of breaking the enemy's will to fight without actually fighting.

Behind the newfound importance of cognitive conflict are the changing conditions of today. The range and reach of information today is vaster than ever, allowing direct interaction with political systems and target populations. Billions of humans are connected to the global internet, with billions more set to join in only a few decades from now. This access enables the weaponisation of information operations. Individuals and small groups are empowered, and any ideas and knowledge can be rapidly disseminated. This outsized influence of information technology is only set to grow and become

even more important. Correspondingly, cyber operations and content-based influencing information operations are crucial. However, many organisations today are not well suited to engage these changing conditions as their cyber tools and influencing activities are not well integrated. He believes organisations tend to be stove-piped, dealing with their own dedicated people, but suffering from a lack of coordination with each other.

Dr Wells sees three areas that need improvement – the military sphere, the whole-of-government, and whole-of-society initiative. The way ahead for the military dimension is to treat cyber tools and influencing content as related and operating in an integrated manner. This will influence the whole scope of military matters, from technology to personnel, leading to the full military system. In the U.S., information is being added as a joint warfare function, but the process has merely started. Fundamentally, the key is to integrate and have the military and intelligence work together, but it is something that they continue to struggle with today. The whole-of-government approach is harder still, involving organisations with very different missions and capabilities. While generally not tech-savvy, it is important to stress not just the technological aspects like cyber tools, but also creating narratives that reinforce national resilience while targeting adversary, morale, thoughts and values. Involving the whole of society is more challenging – how can inherent resilience be built to survive external attacks? In cognitive conflict, distinctions of peace and war are blurred, existing within collaboration, competition, and conflict. Governments and societies tend to be slow to adapt to technological change, from legislatures creating laws to law enforcement frameworks. Singapore has done a good job at this, through continuous reminders of diversity and the concept of nationality. Institutions such as these must be nurtured, so as to strengthen the resilience of nations.

Dr Shashi Jayakumar, Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, RSIS, Singapore, presented on the threats to Singapore's SMART Nation effort and explored where these threats might originate from. He outlined the four pillars of Singapore's cybersecurity strategy aimed at keeping the SMART Nation safe: (i) strengthen the resilience of critical information infrastructure; (ii) mobilise businesses and civil society; (iii) develop a cybersecurity ecosystem of a skilled workforce, companies, and research; and (iv) step up international cooperation to counter cyberthreats. Dr Jayakumar pointed out that while outlining the cyber strategy is a step in the right direction, it suffers from a lack of clarity and established definitions, as well as having the unintended effect of masking significant challenges ahead.

The threat landscape is asymmetric in modern society, and this is also true for Singapore. With a networked SMART Nation and the Internet of Things,

implications of these threats become huge. Dr Jayakumar outlined three types of threats that come with a networked society. The first is the market for data. In a SMART Nation, data – including health data – becomes extra vulnerable. The second threat is hard cyberattacks against infrastructure and industrial systems. These types of attacks have real world effects as seen in the Ukraine where hundreds of thousands of households lost electricity and heating in the midst of winter after an attack on the country's power grid in 2015. The final type of threat is extortionist attacks as exampled by the recent wave of WannaCry ransomware attacks that encrypted data and demanded ransom payments from its victims.

In an attempt to counter cyberthreats, many organisations are creating air gaps between their intranets and the internet to secure the storage of sensitive information. Yet air gaps are no guarantee. There have been trials where researchers managed to penetrate air-gapped machines through electromagnetic emanations. Beyond these technical means of gaining access to systems, it is the understanding of human nature that has made cyberthreats so effective. From targeted spear phishing campaigns to the 2016 American election hacking scandal, Dr Jayakumar warned more of such attacks will emanate from this type of social engineering.

Across the globe, national authorities are not alone in attempting to manage these threats. Singapore's cyber strategy pillars are built on teamwork and coequal partnerships between the public, private, and international sectors. The true challenge, however, is how to get all stakeholders to take responsibility and engage in fighting threats, ensuring collective approaches to security. Dr Jayakumar also outlined the need for regular security testing of networked infrastructure, and also to educate members of organisations – especially the military – of these cyberthreats. Simply put, the people responsible for budgets tend to view security as a line item that can be cut, a move which could endanger whole networks. Finally, Dr Jayakumar also stressed the importance of giving ethical hackers the space to operate and expose poor security as this will create open feedback loops to learn and improve.

Professor Gabriel Weinmann, Professor of Communication, Department of Communication, Haifa University, Israel, presented on online terrorism trends and how extremist groups use the internet. He began by describing how their online presence has grown through the years. When his centre began monitoring terrorist websites in 1998, they were following just 12. By 2017, they were watching over 9,800 websites. The modern terrorist is technologically gifted, and the borderless nature of the internet means that the issue of online terrorism has become a global problem. Their adaptable nature means they are able to exploit whatever the internet presents to

them. In the beginning, there were only web pages. Terror groups quickly evolved beyond that and used forums and chat rooms to facilitate interaction. They took advantage of social media next, and used platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram to seek people out. Most recently, terrorists have migrated to the dark web to avoid surveillance.

Modern social media is interactive, without gatekeepers, and is trendy and popular with the younger demographic. Prof Weinmann likened the presence on social media to knocking on people's doors. Terrorist groups are not just active on existing social media sites; they have also adapted and spawned their own versions such as JihadiTube which contains a plethora of videos and content. Anwar al-Awlaki, an Al-Qaeda leader, still has an active Facebook page that allows interactive communication even after his death in 2011. On Twitter, the recent campaign of stabbings against Israeli soldiers triggered the sharing of infographics on knife selection and stabbing tactics. The use of the internet also enables narrowcasting – the targeting of specific slices of the population like children, women, overseas diasporas, or even prison inmates. Hamas has used knock-off cartoon characters to appeal to children, while ISIS has created a "Jihad Simulator" through modification of a popular videogame. Al-Qaeda and ISIS have also created websites aimed at recruiting women that were so successful even non-Muslim women wanted to join.

Only four percent of the internet is on the surface and searchable, with some 96 percent invisible and hidden within the deep web. Existing within the deep web is the dark web, which is largely used for criminal and terrorist activities. "Silk Road" was an infamous online black market and the first modern darknet market; it was reported that roughly $1.2 billion in illegal drug transactions were made before it was shut down in 2013. The advantage for these groups migrating to the dark web is safer internal communication; which in turn enables safer coordination of actions, fund raising and transfer, and the purchase of weapons and explosives. The November 2015 Paris attacks were conducted with weapons purchased from Germany through the dark web.

All of this then leads to the question if there really are lone wolves – those who are self-radicalised and organised? Prof Weinmann noted that in reality, wolves do not hunt alone but rather in packs. He observes the same in terrorism; there might be lone attackers but they act with a virtual pack. The Tsarnev brothers, for example, never attended meetings or belonged to any groups, but learnt about bombs from the internet. Prof Weinmann's also shared that his centre has traced the tracks of 97 lone wolves, and found that all had connections to established terrorist organisations that virtually recruited, trained, and directed them to carry out missions.







DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE: CHINA'S RESPONSES TO A CHANGING WORLD

Professor Wang Gungwu (left) with Professor Joseph Liow, Dean of RSIS and moderator of the Distinguished Dinner Lecture on 7 August 2017

Professor Wang Gungwu, Chairman of East Asia Institute, Singapore, framed his presentation to highlight how China had responded to changes around the world, in different periods of its history. Particularly, he focused on the fall of China and then its rise in the last 200 years. He further explained that almost anything China did had depended on learning from its own history and the body of knowledge it has inherited. Prof Wang offered his perspective on the rapid decline of China in the 19th century before moving on to the current thinking of the Chinese.

In the period of rapid decline, China's imperial system was being challenged by a new system that did not fit into its body of knowledge about the past and its ideas of governance. The Chinese were torn between how much they should still look to the past and how much they should look at the challenges of something completely new and powerful. They were slow in responding to change not because they were unaware, but rather, there was a paralysis in determining their responses. The end result for China was disastrous, with the Chinese economy crushed and its share of the world's economy down from 30 per cent in 1800 to only five per cent in 1900.

Prof Wang opined that China was at its weakest when the 20th century began. The Qing dynasty fell but the republic established by Sun Yat Sen did not prevent the emergence of warlords. A civil war later broke out between the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Kuomintang. He elucidated that for more than a decade, foreign powers were able to exploit the infighting and divisions within China by supporting the different warlords. Fortunately, the rivalries between the great powers gave China an opportunity to survive. As the foreign powers were fighting amongst themselves, China was able to play to their rivalries. Through this period, Prof Wang pointed out that the lesson China learnt was the need for the country to be unified.

In addressing misconceptions, Prof Wang mentioned that the importance of reunification was something Chiang Kai Shek understood. After the end of the Second World War, Chiang's China remained mostly intact, territory-wise, with the exception of Mongolia. However, the civil war with CCP continued and within five years, the Communists took over. Nevertheless, save for Taiwan, the communist revolution achieved reunification for China.

Next, Prof Wang believed that Mao Zedong was determined to industrialise China; but had rushed into it and rendered it ineffective. However, because of what Mao had established, Deng Xiaoping was able to build on it when he came to power. In order to industrialise, Deng had asked his people to learn everything from the outside world except for principles of democracy, division of power, and the judicial system as such concepts did not fit well with the body of knowledge that the Chinese were familiar with. Even so, Deng was able to avoid the paralysis that plagued China in the 19th century.

Prof Wang highlighted that China also learnt how important maritime trade was to its economic success and of the rule of law in the international order. While China was not against the Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations, it was against the U.S. naval fleet roaming near its waters. Separately, he also explained that China understood the concept of the rule of law but was more familiar with being "ruled by law". Rule of law entails that law was above the subject, including the state. The Chinese was not comfortable with that concept because, to them, law was man-made and therefore should not be placed above the subject. In conclusion, in order to understand China's responses today, Prof Wang said it was important to look into what the Chinese has learnt from its history and the body of knowledge they have inherited.

SESSION IV: NAVIGATING CRISES IN ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY: APPLYING RULES AND NORMS



(L-R) Ms Bonnie Glaser, Associate Professor Jay Batongbacal, Professor Zhu Feng, and Professor Ralf Emmers

Ms Bonnie Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, and Director, China Power Project, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA, spoke about the South China Sea dispute and outlined what is at stake. They are: (i) ownership of rocks, shoals and cays, and maritime entitlements; (ii) oil and gas; (iii) fish stocks; (iv) commercial shipping valued at $3.7 trillion; (v) FON for military vessels; (vi) rules-based order and international law; and (vii) regional peace and stability.

She went on to discuss the four sources of instability, the first of which is the behaviour of maritime law enforcement vessels. According to data from CSIS's China Power Project which monitors incidents in the South China Sea, from 2010 to present, 76 per cent of major incidents in the South China Sea involved at least one Chinese maritime law enforcement vessel. The second source of instability Ms Glaser mentioned is island-building and land reclamation. China was a latecomer to the reclamation party, but an increase has been observed under President Xi Jinping's administration. As compared to Vietnam, China has created 300 acres of new land at seven features while the former has created 120 acres of new land, mostly reclaiming land at 10 pre-existing islets. Vietnam's works however have not involved large-scale dredging and have been far less environmentally destructive. The third source of instability is the militarisation of the islands. Ms Glaser said that the islands have hangers to house jets, and that China is likely to base military forces there. The last source of instability is challenges to FON. Ms Glaser pointed out that China made excessive maritime claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by: (i) drawing straight baselines around the Paracel Islands; (ii) claiming jurisdiction over

airspace above their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); and (iii) requiring prior permission for innocent passage of foreign military ships through the territorial sea. China also continues to warn vessels and aircrafts moving through international waters and airspace. One prominent incident involved the U.S. P8-A Poseidon surveillance aircraft in May 2015, during which the Chinese navy issued eight warnings to the crew while they were conducting overflights.

Ms Glaser proposed five channels to manage the dispute through diplomacy and law. They are: (i) multilateral agreements; (ii) bilateral delimitation agreements; (iii) fishing agreements; (iv) joint development agreements; and (v) legal rulings. She also touched on the July 2016 UNCLOS Arbitration Tribunal key findings which concluded that: (i) China cannot legally claim "historic rights" to waters inside the nine-dash line; (ii) none of the features in the Spratly Islands generate an Exclusive Economic Zone; (iii) China violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its EEZ by interfering with fishing, hydrocarbon exploration, constructing artificial islands, and failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing inside the EEZ; and (iv) China's construction of artificial islands at seven features violated UNCLOS obligations to protect the marine environment. However, there are limitations of International Law because there is no enforcement mechanism for the arbitral tribunal ruling. There is also no agreement on key elements of UNCLOS such as the proper balance of rights and interests in the EEZ between coastal states and user states, and the legality of China's assertion of jurisdiction over almost all of the water of South China Sea. Additionally, the dispute over the sovereignty of the land features can only be addressed by the International Court of Justice, but that will require participation by all disputing parties.

Ms Glaser concluded that in order to promote stability, there needs to be a rules-based order. This can be achieved through Codes of Conduct, multilateral options to preservation of the marine environment, increased implementation of confidence-building measures, joint development energy schemes, and resolution of different interpretations of rights and obligations.

Associate Professor Jay Batongbacal, Director, Institute of Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, University of the Philippines College of Law, Philippines, started by highlighting the complexity of maritime legal geography. He explained that random natural configuration of the maritime geography and varied claims of coastal state jurisdictions create potential for crisis in the maritime sphere. To add on, coastal and user states also compete for sole jurisdiction over specific areas that often result in maritime disputes. The application of rules and norms are not only an issue of "what to apply", but also "whose to apply".

Assoc Prof Batongbacal described the Philippines-China crisis between 2012 and 2016 as a textbook example of a crisis with protracted effects. He said the problem began in 2009 when China became increasingly assertive within the Philippines' claimed EEZ. It later developed into a crisis when Chinese maritime officials attempted to enforce their laws on Filipino fishermen in 2012. The crisis prolonged further during the arbitration of *Philippines v. China* and through the promulgation of the decision in July 2016. However, by August 2016 the situation had de-escalated.

Assoc Prof Batongbacal went on to discuss former Philippines President Benigno Aquino III's South China Sea policy between 2012 and 2016. He termed the policy approach as legalism and active balancing. Under the Aquino administration, the Philippines went into arbitration which meant no talks were made with China. ASEAN was pushed for a unified position and the Philippines attempted to gain support from external powers and mobilise its support against China. Assoc Prof Batongbacal explained that politically, the Aquino administration re-energised the Philippines-U.S. defence relations as well.

According to him, the ruling of the arbitration was a massive victory for the Philippines as nearly all its principal submissions were ruled in its favour. However, current President Rodrigo Duterte has approached the policy differently from his predecessor. Assoc Prof Batongbacal termed the policy approach as soft landing and active engagement. Under Duterte, the arbitration ruling was temporarily set aside until later in his term. Relations with China was "normalised" with active promotion of economic cooperation and integration; there was less push for a Code of Conduct and disengagement in the rallying of external powers' involvement. Politically, the Duterte administration created distance from the U.S. and EU, and pivoted towards China and Russia. Assoc Prof Batongbacal added that China set two conditions for a Code of Conduct, saying that the framework should be premised on: (i) the South China Sea situation as stable, and (ii) that there must be no major interferences from outside parties.

In assessing the success of Duterte's administration, Assoc Prof Batongbacal felt that the pivot towards China has not done any good to the South China Sea dispute. Instead, China's activities have intensified considerably. First, Chinese fishing activities in the Philippines EEZ around the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal continue, amongst those activities include the destructive harvesting of giant clams and corals. Second, Chinese law enforcement and military presence have expanded. Deployment of ships to Spratly and Scarborough Shoal areas have return levels that of July 2016, after a brief reduction in deployment activity after President Duterte's visit to China. Third, Chinese vessels are operating even closer

to the Philippines' coast. There is also increased aerial presence following China's announcement of regular combat air patrols over Scarborough Shoal. Forth, there has been an increase in research activities conducted by Chinese marine scientific research (MSR) vessels partially or wholly within the Philippines' EEZ without the Philippines' consent. Survey activities have been observed in the Spratly Islands area, around Reed Bank, and along the Palawan Passage and Luzon coastline.

Assoc Prof Batongbacal concluded the discussion with further points to consider based on theory of property rights, such as: (i) the importance of stable rules-based order, (ii) the arbitration as an attempt to push towards rules-based resolution, and (iii) the renewal of relations between the Philippines and China as an attempt to negotiate a transaction-based resolution.

Professor Zhu Feng, Executive Director, China Centre for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University, China, started by asking why the South China Sea dispute has been magnified only in the last 20 years, when the dispute had existed long before? In the 80s and 90s, China utilised coercive military action against Vietnam and the Philippines respectively in South China Sea. However, nothing was said in the international community and therefore those actions did not draw attention like that of today.

Prof Zhu attributed the current state of the South China Sea dispute to two factors. The first is the interpretation of China's behaviour. He acknowledged that China's behaviour in the South China Sea is not perfect. China is becoming more assertive because it is getting bigger and a power shift is emerging that leads to restructuring. Hence, whatever China does is being magnified through the lens of geopolitical competition. As a result, what is traditionally China's act of protecting its maritime rights has been misunderstood as strategically intended manoeuvres.

The second factor is the power structure that is emerging from this power shift. Traditionally, the belief is that the South China Sea dispute is based on sovereignty claims; but now, it is a great power competition. The dispute brought the attention of various powers such as the U.S., Japan, U.K., and Australia back to East Asia. Given the great power competition in the region, Prof Zhu raised the possibility that the South China Sea will see the region being balkanised in the 21st century, as seen before World War One.

Prof Zhu views the South China Sea dispute as one of the most critical flashpoints in Asia Pacific. Domestically, the South China Sea dispute is a problem for the Chinese government due to nationalistic sentiments.

Internationally, Prof Zhu observed that with great powers intervening, small and middle powers tend to overplay their responses. An example he mentioned was the Aquino government brushing aside the Declaration of Conduct, and without any notification to Beijing, unilaterally appealing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the Philippine's jurisdiction. A departure from the Arroyo's government approach, Prof Zhu theorised that it was a political move to change the power dynamics. Another controversy Prof Zhu mentioned is regarding the nine-dash line. He explained that the nine-dash line was drawn in 1947 by the Nanjing government and was sent to the U.S. State Department for consent. The U.S. agreed with the line in 1947 because China was their most trustworthy Asian ally then. However, as it is not the case now, the nine-dash line is deemed illegal.

Prof Zhu challenged the U.S. notion of China's excessive maritime claims. He argued that it is the right of archipelagic countries to draw straight baselines based on similar cases under the international law. The reason that China now faces military intimidation from the U.S. is because of the great power competition.

Prof Zhu went on to discuss the definition of a rule-based order. He said that international law is not absolutist but relativist. International order is not just rule-based order, but also based on international consent which regulates interstate relations. Prof Zhu also argues that China is serious about abiding by international law as seen from the 32 arbitrations China has under the World Trade Organization framework and its commitment to the Paris Climate agreement. Therefore, the issue of adhering to international law should not be judged based on a specific incident.

Prof Zhu concluded that navigating the South China Sea dispute requires countries to cultivate reciprocity in understanding and respect each other. If countries continue to put China on trial, there will be deterioration of relations and backlash with the risk of balkanisation.

DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE: ASEAN AT 50, A FORCE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY

Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar (left) with Professor Joseph Liow, Dean of RSIS and moderator of the Distinguished Dinner Lecture on 8 August 2017

Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, The Republic of Indonesia, began with the statement that ASEAN is recognised internationally and is a main contributor to the peace and stability of the region. This is evident given that there have been no violent interstate conflicts, other than the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple at the Thailand-Cambodian border in 2008 and 2011. She then went on to recap what ASEAN has done in the last 50 years to maintain regional peace and stability.

Prof Anwar explained that against the backdrop of decolonisation, ASEAN was founded by member states that were new and focused on nation and state building. Most of the founding member states were and still are developing countries with the exception of Singapore. Prof Anwar explained that the most important role ASEAN played in the early years was to improve the relationships between neighbouring states, reducing tension so states can focus on their own domestic issues. Prof Anwar addressed the fact that while leaders of ASEAN hardly met and there was no political or economic integration, the fact that relations still improved was a success for ASEAN.

Prof Anwar added that given that ASEAN states are mostly developing nations, resources were mostly allocated to economic development instead of weapons procurement. This saw the decrease in defence budget and an increase in economic development. Despite the increase in defence budget observed today, there is no arms race because ASEAN member states are not worried about their neighbouring states.

Prof Anwar remarked that the principle of non-interference in other's domestic affairs in ASEAN prevented neighbouring intervention and allowed national resilience to be built. She further argued that ASEAN promoted harmonious relations and cooperation although there was no legal foundation or legal standing until the ASEAN charter was presented in 2007. Before the charter, the commitment of national leaders to make things work ensured the harmonious relations and cooperation amongst member states. Prof Anwar further explained that after a period of time, ASEAN started to develop mechanisms to ensure good neighbourly relations. The regional code of conduct and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, part of the foundation for the ASEAN charter, regulated behaviour among ASEAN countries.

In conflict management, Prof Anwar pointed out that ASEAN's role is to diffuse conflicts but never resolve it. Instead, disputing states are made to resolve conflicts through bilateral means or via the International Court of Justice. Consequently, current day ASEAN has become an entity which regional leaders cannot choose to ignore. Even states outside ASEAN look to ASEAN to resolve conflicts or disputes; an example is the facilitation of Cambodia's conflict when Cambodia had not yet joined ASEAN. ASEAN has also played an important role in engaging Myanmar when sanctions against the country were imposed by western nations.

Prof Anwar pointed out that ASEAN has contributed to strategic autonomy of South East Asia. It ensured that South East Asian countries are masters of their own sub-regional order. She also highlighted that ASEAN is the driver for wider regional architecture. ASEAN provides a forum for states outside the South East Asian region to interact due to its inclusive principles. Looking forward, she added that ASEAN was never intended to be a military alliance, but increasingly there is closer military cooperation among ASEAN military establishments, facilitating the organisational development of ASEAN. Hence, Prof Anwar emphasised that ASEAN should be a force for peace in the wider international arena through peacekeeping and humanitarian disaster relief.

SESSION V: DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND THE ARMED FORCES

(L-R) Professor Tan See Seng, Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu, Rear Admiral Don Gabrielson, and Mr Eddie Lim

Rear Admiral Don Gabrielson, Commander of Task Force 73, Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific, spoke about the different stages of military cooperation, from communications approaches to trust building. He began by discussing the importance and value of stability, something that all parties in ASEAN and the South China Sea find important. Both the U.S. and China want stability more than anything else, and are collaboratively working together towards preserving it. Recently, when a U.S. Navy sailor fell off his ship, Chinese ships came to assist in the search and rescue. Beyond individual interactions between ships, the Chief of Navies from both countries talk on a monthly basis. These interactions are not just bilateral, but also multilateral, working with ASEAN and other states through the ADMM-Plus, in addition to American and Chinese officers working daily together at the Changi Command and Control Centre.

RADM Gabrielson pointed out that there are two modes of communication –monologues and dialogues. The importance of communicating through dialogues is to build mutual respect and understanding. The norms of the international system, which have been built up over more than 70 years, lie on the foundation of dialogues, and on the principle of every state having a voice. Norm adherence is what stability depends upon. But communication is only one side of the coin, with interaction being the other. These interactions can be coercive or collaborative in nature. At the end of the day, defence diplomacy depends on the ability to build relationships and trust over time, and this can only be done through collaboration and by creating a collaborative bond. If the combined goal is stability, it requires trust. Trust in turn comes from working together within international norms.

Rounding up his presentation, RADM Gabrielson discussed the importance of intent in building trust. What is the other party's motive or agenda behind an action or relationship? Many of the problems China and the U.S. face today are because of ambiguity. While the U.S. finds China's intention towards the South China Sea ambiguous, the situation is not completely hopeless. RADM Gabrielson stressed the importance of dialogue and collaboration. With more talking and interacting, both sides will become better at understanding each other and it will clarify the different stands. Through defence diplomacy, both sides can gain trust and build frameworks that are mutually agreed upon and necessary in achieving stability. Building upon trust must be done in good faith, leading to a system that preserves stability and benefits the whole region.

Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu, Deputy Director, Strategic Research Institute, National Defence University, China, discussed defence diplomacy from both the academic and Chinese perspective. He started by lifting the assumptions that underpin what the expectations of effectiveness of defence diplomacy are based upon. One assumption is that the military will be at the front when faced with the expectation of violence between nations. This implies that the military will play a crucial role in decision making when issues of security and conflict are involved. While political leaders have the final say, military officers have a core advisory function. Another assumption is that the culture of military organisations is different from other professions and careers. Yet military service has their share of problems, challenges, and hazards unique to their field often which are not shared or understood by other agencies. The frontline nature and the unique culture and conditions of the armed forces allow military people from different countries to interact with each other in fraternal ways that other professions cannot. Sr COL Xu also stressed the merits of defence diplomacy. These include reducing tension in crises, improving communications, and portraying strategic intentions. Another merit is the ability to nurture a favourable environment for settling disputes. Defence diplomacy cannot resolve disputes by itself, but can alleviate tension and help parties reach a resolution easier. However, defence diplomacy is a long-term process that requires building a relationship and trust over years. In contrast, most decision-makers expect quick results.

Sr COL Xu then shared about defence diplomacy from China's perspective. Preferring the term "military diplomacy", the Chinese consider defence diplomacy as foreign affairs performed by defence institutions and the armed forces instead of traditional diplomats. China's military diplomacy has gone through several phases; beginning with regular military exchanges and relationship building to becoming more integrated into the international system. The current phase of China's military diplomacy involves enhancing

security cooperation and taking more responsibility for regional security. The next phase will be a concerted effort to counter the rhetoric of China as a threat, aiming to instead increase trust and reduce suspicion. Sr COL Xu acknowledged that since 2009, there has been tension between the U.S. and China, as well as between China and various ASEAN member states. This has led to a renewal of effort on how to reassure these countries of China's intentions.

China has conducted its military diplomacy through a variety of means. Senior officers from both China and the U.S. regularly conduct visits and exchanges. They have also conducted educational exchanges. For most of the soldiers, it will often be the only time they visit the other country, hence the importance of building relationships through positive experiences. China is increasingly undertaking humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions so as to be involved in the international system. To improve trust, China has been engaging in confidence-building measures. They founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to reassure and build confidence with Central Asian states. Joint exercises have steadily increased, from only two in 2002, to 26 in 2016. Sr COL Xu rounded off by discussing the future priorities of both traditional and non-traditional security. He also said China desires more involvement in the regional security architecture, in particular through relations with the U.S. and ASEAN countries, as this can help manage tension.

Professor Tan See Seng, Professor of International Relations, and Deputy Director and Head of Research, IDSS, RSIS, Singapore, approached his presentation from an academic perspective. He described how defence diplomacy is a contested concept, if not an oxymoron, as it engages military forces in diplomacy which is defined by not resorting to military force to achieve political objectives. He tied it to Sun Tzu, who famously called the ability to subdue the enemy without resorting to force as the supreme art of war. Defence diplomacy is useful as it is able to build mutual reassurance, but it also requires a degree of diplomatic skill. During the Cold War, both of these were required to prevent a nuclear war. With the Asia Pacific region being one that has kept defence spending high even after the end of the Cold War, forces are increasingly focused on non-military threats. When faced with a collective sense of uncertainty of which ones are friends and foes, defence diplomacy becomes an enterprise to how states and militaries interact and learn about each other. The approaches to defence diplomacy vary. Transformative defence diplomacy seeks to transform a situation, with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) being an example which aims to create comprehensive structures to manage a wide range of situations and crises. The U.S. exchanges with the Indonesian military are done with reform and democratic transformation in mind. In Myanmar, the U.S. and the

U.K. use defence diplomacy not as a driver of change, but rather a reward for change. Others states use defence diplomacy for less transformative reasons, and more for pragmatic or transactional reasons such as building capabilities or expanding strategic depth. These also include building relationships among militaries and improving understanding of other cultures. Prof Tan opined that if strategy is the application of resources, as defined by Basil Liddell-Hart, then both the transformative and the transactional approaches are strategy.

Prof Tan then discussed the advantages of defence diplomacy and how it can assist in building beneficial relationships with other countries, which help create a stable regional structure. He mentioned the case of the ADMM-Plus as an instance where ASEAN countries are seeking to enhance regional security through dialogue and consultation, setting in place a culture of peaceful resolution rather than through confrontation. This enables states to engage with each other to build confidence, trust, and transparency. Indeed, defence diplomacy is all about building an inclusive, not adversarial, brand of security. However, Prof Tan pointed out that it does not actually resolve conflicts, but instead improves the odds for a solution. An issue arises when countries get caught up in security dilemmas as well as a zero-sum way of thinking, both of which can be offset by good defence diplomacy. This does not mean that competition and deterrence does not have a part to play, as there is still utility in balancing the strength of potential enemies with allies and partnerships.

Rounding off his presentation, Prof Tan discussed some of the problems involved. Defence diplomacy does not always improve ties. China has had a longstanding relationship with Myanmar through the provision of arms and assistance. Even so, there is still mutual distrust between the two. Countries also hold divergent views on defence diplomacy. Americans expect a larger degree of transparency, hoping to use ties with China to help understand how the Chinese military elites think, while China is unaccustomed to transparency and is suspicious of it. The ADMM-Plus also struggles with the different defence diplomacy approaches of each nation. Its ability to soften tensions becomes constrained by regular diplomatic sparring over the South China Sea. Finally, defence diplomacy can have unintended consequences. After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, despite Singapore's altruistic intentions of helping its neighbours, their Operation Flying Eagle caused anxiety as it indirectly showed Singapore's capability to rapid deploy military force onto foreign shores, implying an invasion ability. Even altruistic missions can sometimes unintentionally worsen security dilemmas.

CLOSING ROUNDTABLE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY FOR DISPUTES IN THE ASIA PACIFIC



(L-R) Professor Ralf Emmers, Dr Jusuf Wanandi, Professor Zhu Feng, Associate Professor Jay Batongbacal, Mr Michael Vatikkiotis, and Ms Jane Chan

Professor Ralf Emmers, Professor of International Relations, Associate Dean, and Head, Centre for Multilateralism Studies, RSIS, Singapore, gave a broader context of preventive diplomacy by first addressing the meaning behind the concept. He explained that the origins of the term "preventive diplomacy" could be traced back to former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. However, he believed that the real brain behind preventive diplomacy was another former Secretary General of the UN – Boutros-Ghali – who claimed that preventive diplomacy should be linked to peacemaking and peacekeeping. Boutros-Ghali argued in 1992 that any process that prevents disputes from arising between parties, prevents existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and limits the spread of the latter when that occurs, is considered preventive diplomacy.

Prof Emmers opined that the concept of preventive diplomacy was popular in Asia. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) picked up the concept when the forum was established in 1994. The central idea was that Asia had to be more active in preventive diplomacy but work within a set of circumstances. Under the ARF's paper, preventive diplomacy had to be consensual. There was also a consensus that the ARF should be involved in preventing disputes between states, not within, due to the notion of non-interference.

Prof Emmers clarified that preventive diplomacy was not conflict resolution, which was about resolving the origins of a particular conflict. Instead, preventive diplomacy was about preventing and de-escalating a particular situation from getting out of control. In that sense, as soon as one could

de-escalate a situation on the ground, one could argue that preventive diplomacy was successful.

He also provided three major variables crucial to successful preventive diplomacy. First, great powers are likely to have conflicting interests in a particular dispute; hence, it would be better not to have them overly involved because they are likely to block initiatives. Second, it is critical to have a legitimate actor conducting preventive diplomacy. The actor must be perceived as neutral and impartial. Prof Emmers believes that the UN is still the most legitimate and neutral actor because in contrast, regional organisations often have member states who are part of the conflict. Lastly, the type of agreement being sought after is critical as well. The simpler the agreement, the better.

Dr Jusuf Wanandi, Senior Fellow, and Co-founder, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia, spoke on the conduct of preventive diplomacy within the ARF. He pointed out that preventive diplomacy have been conducted in the region but not under the auspices of the ARF. He gave two key explanations. One, the conduct of preventive diplomacy for the ARF was dependent on the political will of the great powers. If the great powers did not want to be involved, they would not. Dr Jusuf remarked that with key issues, there is a need to have them involved because their support will provide the much needed traction for preventive diplomacy. Second, the conduct of preventive diplomacy was compounded by the fact that leadership in ASEAN was weak and limited.

Looking ahead, the ARF needs to support preventive diplomacy activities, even those existing outside of the aegis of the ARF. For example, the ARF could support the Six Party Talks as that would strengthen the willingness for the region to solve conflicts peacefully. It is not enough for only the U.S. and China to talk. Also, Dr Jusuf believes that the ARF should shift its focus from traditional security to non-traditional security.

Professor Zhu Feng, Executive Director, China Centre for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University, China, construed that preventive diplomacy is an incarnation of multilateralism because it cannot be successfully applied to any issue without collective engagement. Most importantly, preventive diplomacy is more than just a concept. It is a prevalent international exercise to help build crisis management and conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the problem is how to make preventive diplomacy work.

Prof Zhu opined that preventive diplomacy needs a leadership based on consensus and shared responsibility. There also needs to be a joint endorsement on what should be the expected settlement of the real conflict. He highlighted that there should also be shared identification of potential risks. The example given was the Six Party Talks initiated in 2003. In 2005, there was a joint statement under the Six Party Talks on de-nuclearisation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was one of the signatory states committed to that statement. However, the DPRK subsequently violated that statement. In that sense, Prof Zhu argued that the Six Party Talks fell short of enforcement. Viewed from that context, he posited that preventive diplomacy needs enforcement and commitment in order to succeed.

Associate Professor Jay Batongbacal, Director, Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, University of the Philippines College of Law, Philippines, contributed some thoughts on the challenges of preventive diplomacy in the information age. According to him, social media has heightened public participation in all aspects of governance including foreign relations. However, the problem is that traditionally, diplomacy required information to be limited and communication to be measured and controlled. But this is much more difficult these days as information has become much more widely available.

Assoc Prof Batongbacal remarked that information has become prone to being misused. Through social media, individuals could exist in their own little "bubble" and hear only what they want to hear. In addition, individuals would only speak to those who shared their views. As a result, views based on wrong or misleading information would be reinforced. In an internet-enabled democratic society, connectivity has created more opportunities for insularity among various groups, making preventive diplomacy even more difficult.

Additionally, diplomacy traditionally relied on closed door discussions. The public relied on diplomats to conduct these discussions which rested strongly on their ability to communicate and negotiate effectively. However, communication would become increasingly difficult given the surrounding public discourse and pressures generated. If public opinion turns against the adversary nation, the diplomats will find it difficult to negotiate with one another.

Hence, Assoc Prof Batongbacal posited that public diplomacy must complement preventive diplomacy. Public diplomacy is necessary to moderate voices, calm fears, and prevent narratives from getting out of

control. He emphasised that leaders who conduct preventive diplomacy should assist diplomats using public diplomacy to communicate how preventive diplomacy have helped avert potential national problems. This is more important today with a plethora of populist governments that respond easily to social media.

Mr Michael Vatikkiotis, Asia Regional Director, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), Singapore, gave his perspective on multilateral mechanisms in preventive diplomatic engagement. Firstly, he said that collective security worked well in the region during the Cold War before the onset of strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. The relations between China and the U.S. over contested strategic space were previously manageable before it became more unstable. Multilateral forums, dialogues, and management of fault lines in preventing conflicts had lost some of their salience and effectiveness as a result. Mechanisms such as ASEAN, the ARF, and Six Party Talks had not succeeded in de-escalating tensions. In their place, competing major powers had sought to impose their own bilateral frameworks and security alignments. Thus, the notion of ASEAN centrality for discussing collective security has been weakened.

Mr Vatikkiotis said there is a need for a reinvigorated multilateral mechanism for preventive diplomacy. Given current realities, he suggested a greater use of informal space for dialogue to generate ideas, trust, and confidence-building that could be adopted at the official level. For example, the HD Centre visited claimant states of the South China Sea to discuss how to avoid incidents at sea. Ideas that were generated in these informal forums have helped Chinese and ASEAN officials to adopt protocols for government interactions in that area. According to Mr Vatikkiotis, the HD Centre is working on another set of principles for government interactions between maritime and law enforcement agencies.

The involvement of civil societies to develop tools for early warning and addressing grievances before they escalated was also recommended. For instance, the HD Centre has established a team of local mediating agencies that have successfully resolved or diffused dozens of dangerous conflicts, and helped build bridges to hard-to-reach groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group in Sulu, Southern Philippines. Additionally, Mr Vatikkiotis raised the need to examine the relevance of existing multilateral frameworks in coping with challenges of populism and extremism, among others. For example, ASEAN could devote more time to non-traditional security sectors to shore up pluralism instead of endless conferences on hard security issues. Rather than wondering how to effectively crack down on extremists, ASEAN could find ways to address prevailing social and economic inequalities.

Lastly, Mr Vatikkiotis suggested for more effective coordination between states to manage transnational security threats. He mentioned that the notion of non-interference needs to be flexible, so as to promote effective military cooperation in crucial conflict areas like Marawi. His final recommendation was for relevant political leaderships to reinforce personal ties and encourage direct communication instead of employing disruptive megaphone diplomacy.

Conference Programme

Day 1: 3 August 2017 (Thursday)

1100 hrs **Arrival and Registration of Participants**

1600 hrs **Ice-breaker**

1900 hrs **Welcome Dinner**

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Day 2: 4 August 2017 (Friday)

0930 hrs **Welcome Remarks**
Ambassador Ong Keng Yong
Executive Deputy Chairman, RSIS

0935 hrs **Keynote Address**
Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman
Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, Singapore

1020 hrs **Group Photo-taking & Tea Break**

1100 hrs **Scene-setting Roundtable**
Geopolitics and Trends in Asia Pacific Security

Speakers
Professor Oh Joon
Professor of United Nations Studies, Kyung Hee University, Republic of Korea

Mr Mattia Tomba
Senior Research Fellow, Middle East Institute, Singapore

Dr Thomas X Hammes
Distinguished Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, USA

Dr Sanjaya Baru
Distinguished Fellow, United Service Institute of India

Chairperson
Professor Joseph Liow
Dean, RSIS

1530 hrs **Visit to Multi-Mission Range Complex (MMRC)**

1900 hrs **Opening Dinner**

Guest of Honour
Lieutenant-General Perry Lim
Chief of Defence Force, Singapore Armed Forces

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Day 3: 5 August 2017 (Saturday)

0830 hrs **Introduction by participants**
Australia, Brunei, Cambodia,
Canada

0945 hrs **Session I**
State or Non-state?: Fighting ISIS and Terrorism

Speakers
Professor Pascal Vennesson
Professor of Political Science, Military Studies Programme, RSIS

Associate Professor Bilveer Singh
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security, RSIS

Ms Jacinta Carroll
Head, Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

Chairperson
Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna
Head, Policy Studies and Coordinator, National Security Studies Programme, RSIS

1215 hrs **Syndicated Discussion**

1345 hrs **The Fall of Singapore**

1445 hrs **Visit to Changi Chapel and Military Heritage Tour**

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Day 4: 6 August 2017 (Sunday)

0830 hrs **Introduction by participants**
China, France, Germany, Japan

0945 hrs **Session II**
Future of Conflict and the Role of the Military

Speakers
Dr Thomas X Hammes
Distinguished Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, USA

Mr David F Heyman
Former Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Mr Stephan de Spiegeleire
Principal Scientist, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Netherlands

Chairperson
Assistant Professor Michael Raska
Military Transformations Programme, IDSS, RSIS

1215 hrs **Syndicated Discussion**

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Day 5: 7 August 2017 (Monday)

0830 hrs **Introduction by participants**
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand

0945 hrs **Session III**
Information and Cyber Warfare

Speakers
Dr Linton Wells II
Executive Advisor to the Centre of C4I and Cyber, George Mason
University, and Visiting Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, USA

Dr Shashi Jayakumar
Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, RSIS

Professor Gabriel Weinmann
Professor of Communication, Department of Communication, Haifa University, Israel

Chairperson
Mr Benjamin Ang
Senior Fellow, CENS, RSIS

1215 hrs **Syndicated Discussion**

1430 hrs **Visit to Seletar Aerospace Park and Port Operations Centre**

1900 hrs **Distinguished Dinner Lecture**
China's Responses to a Changing World

Speaker
Professor Wang Gungwu
Chairman, East Asia Institute, Singapore

Chairperson
Professor Joseph Liow
Professor of Comparative and International Politics, and Dean, RSIS

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Day 6: 8 August 2017 (Tuesday)

0830 hrs **Introduction by participants**
Saudi Arabia/ Singapore/ South Korea/ Sweden

0945 hrs **Session IV**
Navigating Crises in Asia Pacific Security: Applying Rules and Norms

Speakers
Ms Bonnie Glaser
Senior Advisor for Asia, and Director, China Power Project, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA

Associate Professor Jay Batongbacal
Director, Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, University of the Philippines College of Law

Professor Zhu Feng
Executive Director, China Centre for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University, PRC

Chairperson
Professor Ralf Emmers
Professor of International Relations, Associate Dean, and Head, Centre for Multilateralism Studies, RSIS

1215 hrs **Syndicated Discussion**

1430 hrs **Visit to Seletar Aerospace Park and Port Operations Centre (POCC)**

1900 hrs **Distinguished Dinner Lecture**
ASEAN at 50, A Force for Peace and Stability

Speaker
Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar
Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, The Republic of Indonesia

Chairperson
Professor Joseph Liow
Professor of Comparative and International Politics; and Dean, RSIS

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Day 7: 9 August 2017 (Wednesday)

0830 hrs **Introduction by participants**
Switzerland, Thailand, The Philippines, Timor-Leste

0945 hrs **Session V**
Defence Diplomacy: Confidence-Building and the Armed Forces

Speakers
Rear Admiral Don Gabrielson
Commander, Task Force 73, COMLOG, WESTPAC

Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu
Deputy Director, Strategic Research Institute, National Defence University, PRC

Professor Tan See Seng
Professor of International Relations, and Deputy Director and Head of Research, IDSS, RSIS

Chairperson
Mr Eddie Lim
Senior Fellow, and Head, Military Studies Programme, IDSS, RSIS

1215 hrs **Syndicated Discussion**

1730 hrs **National Day Parade**

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Day 8: 10 August 2017 (Thursday)

0830 hrs **Introduction by participants**
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Vietnam

0945 hrs **Closing Roundtable**
Preventive Diplomacy for Disputes in the Asia Pacific

Speakers
Professor Ralf Emmers
Professor of International Relations, Associate Dean, and Head, Centre for Multilateralism Studies, RSIS

Dr Jusuf Wanandi
Senior Fellow, and Co-founder, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia

Professor Zhu Feng
Executive Director, China Centre for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University, PRC

Associate Professor Jay Batongbacal
Director, Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, University of the Philippines College of Law

Mr Michael Vatikiotis
Asia Regional Director, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Singapore

Chairperson
Ms Jane Chan
Research Fellow, and Coordinator, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

1130 hrs **Presentation of Certificates followed by Farewell Lunch**

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SPEAKERS

Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar
Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, The Republic of Indonesia

Dr Sanjaya Baru
Distinguished Fellow, United Service Institute of India

Associate Professor Jay Batongbacal
Director, Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, University of the Philippines College of Law

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	Lieutenant Colonel Chris Spearin J5 Planning Lead, Indo-Asia-Pacific Region
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	Colonel Wang Yinghui Associate Professor
	Captain Zhu Dan Lecturer of Naval Command College, PLAN
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	Group Captain Xavier Foissey Chief of Staff, Joint HQ of French Armed Forces
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Military Expert 6 Jason Chia Thuang Ping
Branch Head, Ministry of Defence

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