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**Malay Youth Political Realignment:
Identity, Discontent, Social Media,
and the Turn Toward Conservative
Islamic Politics**

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Introduction

According to the results in the 2025 Southeast Asian Social Cohesion Radar, 37% of Malaysians between the age of 18 and 34 support religious figures taking on leadership roles in politics and society. This opinion is markedly higher than Malaysians aged between 35 to 65 (26%), and well above respondents from Indonesia and Philippines, where just 19% and 11% of Indonesian and Filipino youth, respectively, supported it. This paper explores the reasons why many young Malay Malaysians embrace the less secular view to the role of religion and state politics, and what may we expect on clerical governance moving forward.

To be sure, the trend is not new, and similar findings were obtained other recent studies. A survey carried out by the Merdeka Center in 2022¹, found that 73% of Malay youths expressed positive response to having religious figures take on more public roles. This finding coincides with the surge in support enjoyed by the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) in as it moves from the fringes of the politics and became the party of choice for Malay Muslims. This phenomenon exposes an important shift in the mindset of the younger generation of Muslim voters in Malaysia and has broader ramifications as was seen in the country's 15th general elections in November 2022 as well as the subsequent series of elections held in six states in August 2023. It also pushes both observers and political actors to ponder whether it is an enduring trend or a momentary event that eventually reverts to the mean.

During Malaysia's 15th General Election (GE15) in 2022, a marked political realignment emerged among Malay young voters, particularly those under 35. This cohort has increasingly distanced itself from both Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH), gravitating instead toward PAS, a conservative Malay Muslim political party and the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition. Results from the election as well as the August 2023 state elections held in Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Penang and Negeri Sembilan showed a significant swing away from BN and PH towards Perikatan Nasional and PAS.

Findings from Merdeka Center's surveys as well as qualitative input by political actors and the voters themselves lend the view that this change in political choices went beyond ordinary party preferences but may in fact be part of a deeper attitudinal changes: stronger affinity toward conservative Islamic values, scepticism toward liberal or pluralist political discourse, and an expressed preference for religious leaders over conventional politicians. We suspect that shift can be seen as another "break in convention", akin to the instance when Malay voters shifted from Barisan Nasional after the abrupt sacking and rough handling of Anwar Ibrahim in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – hence called the Reformasi Generation.

As such we take the view that this trend is not merely electoral; it reflects a structural transformation in political identity formation, trust, and information consumption among Malay youth. It cannot be explained by a single factor such as religion, economic hardship, or social media influence

¹ Southeast Asian Muslims Survey – Malaysia, 30 Oct 2021-30 Jan 2022, 1613 respondents aged 18 and above, presented at the ICCS Social Cohesion Radar Workshop, Sept 30th 2025.

alone. Instead, it arises from the interaction of economic vulnerability, identity anxiety, institutional disillusionment, moralised political narratives, and algorithm-driven media ecosystems.

This essay examines three central questions:

1. What are the underlying structural and psychological factors driving Malay youth toward PAS/PN and conservative Islamic politics?
2. What role does social media play in shaping, amplifying, and normalising these attitudes?
3. How do cynicism and dissatisfaction with Malaysia's socio-political order reinforce this realignment?

The argument advanced here is that Malay youth political behaviour since 2022 is best understood as a search for moral certainty and group protection in an environment of economic stress and political mistrust, with religion functioning as a stabilising identity rather than merely a doctrinal commitment. This comes in the wake of corruption scandals and performance failings that marked the milestones of the Barisan Nasional's decline in Malaysia.

Structural Context of Malay Youth in Politics

The shift in political attitudes did not happen in a vacuum, just the Reformasi generation reaction sharply to the hardships introduced by the Asian Financial Crisis as well as the abrasive handling of politics during the then Mahathir 1.0 administration; the present generation of young Malay voters had just come out from 2020-2021 pandemic with depleted household savings, uncertain employment prospects, as well as disconcerting changes in the educational experience. It could be argued that the experiences during the prolonged lockdown of 2020 to 2021 as well as the political volatility of the period had left an indelible mark on the minds of many young voters.

The 2020–2021 COVID-19 lockdowns were a formative political experience for Malaysian youths, it reshaped how they judged government performance, politics, and their own futures. Frequent policy reversals, uneven enforcement, and elite exemptions during MCOs weakened perceptions of state competence and fairness, with some resorting to flying “white flags” to indicate distress and need for assistance. The experience fostered a more performance-based and sceptical view of governance. Trust was not simply lost; it became conditional on clarity, consistency, and empathy. In this sense, former prime minister Muhyiddin Yasin was positively viewed because he was perceived as taking charge (he declared emergency) and dispensed wage support financial aid, as well as allowed workers to withdraw a part of their retirement savings to meet pressing needs.

Economically, the lockdowns disrupted education-to-work transitions, depressed entry-level hiring, and intensified underemployment. For many young Malaysians, this reinforced a belief that upward mobility had narrowed and that existing political elites were detached from youth economic realities. At the same time, prolonged online life deepened reliance on social media for political cues, amplifying anti-establishment narratives and emotionally resonant messaging, it also diminished the remaining

influence of traditional and government owned media outlets.

These experiences fed into GE15 in 2022. COVID-era frustrations pushed some youths toward reformist choices demanding accountability, while others gravitated to oppositional or protest voting. With Undi18² and automatic voter registration, this “pandemic generation” entered the electorate in large numbers, voting through the lens of crisis governance and economic insecurity rather than inherited party loyalties. In addition to the abrupt impact of the pandemic induced difficulties, youths already and now continue to contend the longer-term changes in the socio-economic trends within Malaysia:

- Wage stagnation and underemployment³
- Rising cost of living and housing unaffordability
- Gig economy precarity
- Declining real purchasing power
- Limited upward mobility despite education

However, unlike the Reformasi generation, the material anxieties experienced by the youth are not translating into technocratic or reformist political demands. Instead, the frustration has instead manifested as resentment, moral grievance, and distrust toward elites. In the wake of the political volatility between the roughly five years between May 2018 to August 2023, many young Malays, believed that neither BN nor PH convincingly represent a credible solution:

- BN continued to be perceived with entrenched corruption, patronage, and generational elite capture. The fact that BN joined the PH coalition government in 2022, after decades of hostilities simply emphasized their “lack of principles” and self-serving attitudes.
- PH, after 2018 and again after 2022, is widely perceived as failing to deliver transformative reform, appearing constrained by coalition compromises and elite bargaining. As well as at the same remain broadly perceived serving as a platform for non-Malay interests to usurp political power and influence public policy.

Thus, when economic pain meets perceived political futility, coupled with strong seeming authentic voices from social media, likely pushed young Malay voters to disengage from policy evaluation and instead seek identity-based assurance—a phenomenon observed globally among youth facing structural stagnation.

The above-mentioned push factors were exacerbated among younger Malay voters during and in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic⁴ – where incomes shrank, savings evaporated, and financial distress exposed the weaknesses of the preexisting political order and its actors. Burgeoning social media platforms (especially Tiktok) supplanted established news channels as the primary source of political persuasion, quickly acted as an amplifier to the narratives that exposed purported weaknesses of

2 Undi18 is the landmark Malaysian constitutional amendment passed in 2019 to boost Malay youth empowerment by lowering the minimum voting age from 21 to 18.

3 New Straits Times. (2025, May 3). *Malaysia's real wages down threefold in 40 years, says former BNM governor*. <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2025/05/1211265/malaysias-real-wages-down-threefold-40-years-says-former-bnm-governor>

4 Khazanah Research Institute. (2024, September 26). *The state of households 2024: Households and the pandemic 2019–2022*. <https://www.krinstitute.org/publications/the-state-of-households-2024-households-and-the-pandemic-2019-2022>

the then government. At the same time, it was fully exploited by PAS and its supporters to showcase the more humble, pious and moral credentials of its leaders.

Social Media’s Role: Amplifier, Not Originator

Merdeka Center’s findings on social media consumption patterns show that most young people in the country no longer rely on traditional sources of information and instead turn to social media platforms such as TikTok, YouTube Shorts, Instagram Reels, and, Whatsapp and Telegram groups for current events. As such, even though government and established news channels continue to generate information, the posts seen by young audiences are mostly curated and embellished by influencers and commentators thereby introducing different slants to the original piece of news. Less than 5% of young audiences actually view the news in the original form⁵.

The reframing of news by social media changes impact and message by the transmitter and instead carries that of the interloper. Facing economic insecurity, social disruption, and perceived institutional failure, many Malay youths follow postings and content created by religious leaders, who unlike regular politicians and bureaucrats, offer a sense of moral certainty and authenticity. Being early adopters of technology (originally meant to circumvent curbs on information dissemination by the government), religious leaders, especially from PAS have invested heavily on their social media presence, and it has paid enormous dividends.

Social media collapses traditional hierarchies: sermons, religious commentary, and political messaging circulate side by side, allowing preachers and cleric-politicians to appear relatable, emotionally grounded, and “closer to the people” than technocratic elites. This has allowed them to shift the narrative – that authority is no longer derived from policy expertise or institutional position, but from perceived piety, consistency, and moral conviction—qualities that social media audiences can quickly evaluate through tone, symbolism, and personal conduct.

At the same time, social media reframes political choice as a moral act rather than a pragmatic or programmatic one. Algorithms amplify content that frames politics as a struggle between virtue and vice, often portraying elections as moments of religious duty (*amanah*) rather than civic calculation. Merdeka Center’s survey⁶ found that only a small majority of voters realize the impact that social media platform algorithms have had in the content that they view, most do not question it as the content is designed to align with their beliefs and preferences. Thus, rather than educating the audience, it further herds them into like-minded digital tribes which has further deepens pre-held beliefs and political choices. In the case of Malay youths, voting thus becomes a test of faithfulness (e.g. “I have to vote for a Malay Muslim candidate over non-Muslim ones”), where supporting religious

⁵ Merdeka Center. (2024, December). *Survey on political communications narratives* (Unpublished manuscript).

⁶ Merdeka Center. (2025, September). *Survey on awareness on social media algorithms and AI-generated content* [Presentation]. Monash University Malaysia.

leaders signals moral alignment, while backing secular or pluralist political actors risks being framed as complicity with moral decay.

Unless checked, the trajectory can have negative repercussion on this multi-ethnic country because moralisation narrows political pluralism. Complex policy debates—on wages, governance, or development—are compressed into ethical judgments about character and religious loyalty. As a result, Malay youth political behaviour becomes less about comparing policy outcomes and more about affirming identity, belonging, and moral righteousness. Social media therefore does not merely influence preferences; it restructures how politics itself is understood—transforming it from a contest of ideas into a moral referendum on faith, values, and communal survival. Combined with political actors who are quick to take advantage of identity and religious politics, the outcomes can further exacerbate political polarization of Malaysian society.

Why Religious Leaders Appear More Trustworthy

In an environment of pervasive distrust of career politicians and political parties, religious figures gain appeal not because they are seen as policy experts, but because they are perceived as morally restrained, personally disciplined, less materialistic, and answerable to God rather than donors or elites. It should also be noted that those associated with PAS have long propagated the view that the ulama are the “inheritors of the Prophet (*Ulamak pewaris Nabi*)”⁷ and often equate the criticism of the clerics as an attack on Islam or an act of anti-Muslim/Islamophobic activists⁸.

Moral Credibility

In a political environment often associated with corruption, patronage, and elite double standards, piety can function as a signal of personal restraint and ethical commitment. When youths cannot easily verify policy competence, they may use moral cues—religious knowledge, humility, “clean” personal reputation—as proxies for trustworthiness. Survey work on Muslim youth in Malaysia has long shown strong attachment to Islam as an identity marker, which makes “religiosity in leaders” a salient criterion. The late chief minister of Kelantan, Nik Abdul Aziz can be seen as one such figure – a pious and gentle Muslim preacher who stood alone facing the arrogant and corrupt politicians of the Malaysian federal government⁹. Despite the lagging economic development of the state, the late leader and PAS as the state ruling party carried a high majority in approval and popular votes over three decades.

Embodiment of Identity

The vast majority of Malays in Malaysia see themselves as “Muslim first”, for them religion is central to identity, leaders who “share my faith” can be interpreted as more likely to defend community

7 abdulhadi_awang. (2025, January 25). *Para ulama merupakan pewaris para nabi. Para ulama yang berjuang dan berjemaah Islam rabba-ni...* [Instagram post]. *Instagram*. https://www.instagram.com/p/DFPjTk0yT_i/

8 Abu Irfan Muhammad al-Urduni. (2024, January 3). *Propaganda jauhkan masyarakat daripada ulamak pewaris Nabi*. *HarakahDaily*. <https://harakahdaily.net/propaganda-jauhkan-masyarakat-daripada-ulamak-pewaris-nabi/>

9 Kessler, C. (2015, February 16). *Remembering “Tok Guru”*. *New Mandala*.

interests and dignity. Cross-national polling findings also show Malaysians broadly place high value on leaders sharing their religion and defending religious beliefs—conditions that can intensify among more religious subgroups¹⁰. I would also like to argue that riding over the decades long Islamization process, the socialization of these views is pervasive and occur organically in society, i.e. via educators who influence their students in schools and tertiary institutions, and through superiors and employers who orientate their subordinates and employees via team building and other programs, particularly in public sector agencies and state owned enterprises. The fact that a sizable number of public sector employees originate from the Malay majority state of Kelantan¹¹ (data from others such as Terengganu and Kedah are not available) also means that the social milieu may be transferred to their work circles as well.

Socio-economic Anxieties

Rising living costs, job insecurity, and “future shock” may likely push youths toward leaders who offer stable moral order and certainty—especially when mainstream politics and their actors, looks fragmented and distant from their live realities. Some seen as “betraying the community’s trust” and bringing about threats to the Malay Muslim position in Malaysian politics. Yet even where religiosity matters, one should be cautious against over-reading “piety” suggests bread-and-butter concerns as well as identity politics remain decisive for many youths.

Social Media Amplification

As noted above, TikTok/YouTube/Telegram reward content that is emotionally resonant, simple, and identity-affirming. Religious communicators often excel at this format: short moral narratives, scriptural references, and “clear right/wrong” framing. Research on GE15¹² highlights TikTok’s potency in reaching young/new voters, while political actors explicitly discuss “riding algorithms” to connect with Gen Z.

Changing Socialization

The country’s decades long move to inculcate Islamic values into public life¹³ since 1985 has become fully mainstream and organic. It may also have wider socialization effects in Muslim society in Malaysia, for example, our surveys detect that enrolment in voluntary Islamic religious classes saw an increase from 48% in 2010 to 60% in 2021. Reported observance of daily prayer rituals also increased, for example, those reporting they performed the five-time daily prayer increased from 51% to 80%, in 2010 and 2021, respectively¹⁴.

10 A.R., Z. (2024, August 29). *Pew survey: Eight in 10 Malaysians want leaders who share their religion, stand up for citizens’ beliefs*. Malay Mail. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2024/08/29/pew-survey-eight-in-10-malaysians-want-leaders-who-share-their-religion-stand-up-for-citizens-beliefs/148555>

11 Kosmo Digital. (2023, June 12). *Orang Kelantan paling ramai kerja kerajaan*. Kosmo Digital. <https://www.kosmo.com.my/2023/06/12/orang-kelantan-paling-ramai-kerja-kerajaan/>

12 Ooi, K. H. (2022, December 22). *How political parties used TikTok in the 2022 Malaysian general election*. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. <https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/how-political-parties-used-tiktok-in-the-2022-malaysian-general-election/>

13 Kementerian Pembangunan Kerajaan Tempatan. (n.d.). *Dasar penerapan nilai Islam*. https://www.kpkt.gov.my/kpkt/resources/user_1/pengurusan_kualiti/Dasar_Penerapan_Nilai_Islam.pdf

14 Merdeka Center. (2022, June 16). *Muslim youth survey 2022* [Presentation]. Kuala Lumpur.

Readily Available Political Alternatives

The predisposition towards religious figures taking on more public roles has expanded as Malaysia’s political transition from a dominant party hybrid democracy moves towards more fragmented politics. PAS gained advantage from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the ensuing political splintering within Barisan Nasional. In 2018, PAS again took advantage of the fallout from the 1MDB Scandal and public backlash over the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax.

PAS’s surge among Malay Muslim voters in the November 2022 general elections and its consolidation in the 2023 state elections (“green wave”) rested on a mutually reinforcing mix of identity politics, organisational depth, and campaign-media advantages. The surge in support can be seen in the table below from 2013 to 2022.

Electoral support for BN in 2022, 2018, and 2013 by ethnicity, peninsular Malaysia¹⁵

	GE 2022 (%)			GE 2018 (%)			GE 2013 (%)		BN change
	BN	PH	PN	BN	PH	PAS	BN	PR	
Malay	32.0	13.3	53.4	43.5	22.3	34.0	60.4	39.1	-28.4
Chinese	6.1	92.2	0.8	6.5	93.3	<1.0	16.0	83.9	-9.9
Indian	17.0	78.8	2.3	15.5	83.5	1.0	45.0	53.0	-28.0
Total	24.3	39.4	35.0	31.7	48.7	19.4	45.7	53.3	-21.4

*Pakatan contested as PR in 2013, then inclusive of PAS. In 2022, PAS contested in a number of states as Perikatan Nasional (PN)

First, PAS benefited from a long-running Malay-Muslim political realignment in which anxieties about identity, “status protection,” and perceived threats from opponents (often framed around DAP/PH and liberalism) made Islamist and conservative-nationalist messaging more resonant. Analysts¹⁶ note that PAS’s rise to become the largest party after GE15 reflected expanded Malay-Muslim support, driven by identity-based contestation and PAS’s positioning within Perikatan Nasional (PN).

Second, PAS’s grassroots machinery and welfare-religious networks—especially in its strongholds—helped translate ideology into everyday credibility: mosques, religious schools, even kindergartens and daycare centres¹⁷, create practical relational trust that is harder for more urban, elite-facing parties to replicate. This organisational advantage mattered in both GE15 and the 2023 contests, where PAS/PN could mobilise reliably while rivals faced fragmentation.

¹⁵ Welsh, B. (n.d.). *Malaysia’s democratic deficit: Why youth may not be the answer. Democratization.*

¹⁶ Hamid, A. F. A., & Razali, C. H. C. M. (2022, December 6). *Malaysia’s 15th general election: Malay-Muslim voting trends and the rise of PAS.* S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. <https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/malaysias-15%E1%B5%97%CA%B0-general-election-malay-muslim-voting-trends-and-the-rise-of-pas/>

¹⁷ Mohammad Arif Nizam. (2025, August 11). *Gaji guru Pasti diakui rendah tetapi ada imbuhan dan kerja hanya 4 jam.* Malaysia Gazette. <https://malaysiagazette.com/2025/08/11/gaji-guru-pasti-diakui-rendah-tetapi-ada-imbuhan-dan-kerja-hanya-4-jam/>

Third, PAS/PN drew strength from anti-incumbent sentiment and elite fatigue amid years of instability, corruption scandals, and cost-of-living pressure. In this environment, PAS’s “clean governance” reputation—whether fully accurate or not—operated as a powerful heuristic for voters seeking moral order and discipline in politics.

Fourth, PAS/PN leveraged digital campaigning effectively, being early adopters on TikTok, Spotify and other platforms amplifying identity-and-morality narratives in short, emotional formats that travel fast among younger Malay voters. Commentary on GE15 highlights how coalitions that “got social media right” gained an edge, and monitoring work shows social media became a central battleground shaping narratives and sentiment¹⁸.

Finally, in the 2023 state elections, the PH–BN “unity government” arrangement sharpened two-corner competition in many seats, enabling PAS/PN to brand itself as the clearest opposition vehicle for Malay protest voting—turning GE15 momentum into state-level entrenchment¹⁹. In the process, PAS was also able to attract traditional Malay Barisan Nasional supporters to its side due to their rejection of the DAP-linked Pakatan Harapan candidates.

Implications for Clerical Rule

The preference among many younger Malay Muslim voters for religious figures to play prominent public roles reflects distinct sociopolitical dynamics but does not necessarily imply a desire for clerical rule. Instead, this trend is likely rooted in moral signalling, identity, and democratic pragmatism.

First, religious language and symbolism often function as moral intuition in electoral contexts. In an environment where political trust is low and corruption is widely criticised, voters may use perceived piety as a signal of integrity and ethical conduct, not a prescription for governance by clerics. Youth support thus often reflects a desire for clean leadership rather than rejecting democratic institutions. This pattern is consistent with research noting youth disenchantment with mainstream politicians but not a wholesale shift to theocracy²⁰.

Second, Islam and Malay identity are historically intertwined in Malaysia’s politics, shaping how many Malay Muslims conceptualise political legitimacy. Islamic sentiment resonates with cultural expectations of leadership but does not automatically entail institutional religious control. Indeed, academic accounts emphasise that religion’s political salience is often tied to ethnic identity politics—not the pursuit of religious governance structures beyond constitutional norms²¹.

18 Ismail, N. (2022, November 23). *Commentary: It’s no silver bullet, but did coalitions get social media right in Malaysia’s GE15?* Channel NewsAsia. <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/malaysia-ge15-pn-ph-tiktok-youth-3092326>

19 Ong, K. M. (2023). *Malaysia’s 2023 state elections (Part 2): Campaign strategies and future implications* (ISEAS Perspective No. 2023/66). ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

20 Lee, M. H. (2022, November 14). *Malaysia GE15: Low political literacy and indecisiveness limit youth votes*. Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia. <https://www.isis.org.my/2022/11/14/malaysia-ge15-low-political-literacy-and-indecisiveness-limit-youth-votes/>

21 Chin, J. (2023). *Malaysia: Identity politics, the rise of political Islam and ketuanan Melayu Islam*.

Third, political behaviour among Malay youth is influenced by material concerns—jobs, cost of living, and representation—more than doctrinal governance blueprints. Analyses warning against simplistic “theocratic wave” narratives note that socioeconomic factors (e.g., class insecurity) often underlie support for conservative parties, suggesting instrumental, not clerical, motivations. That the preference for the ulama participation in politics is likely driven by increasing political discontentment and cynicism rather than a real desire for a theocracy²².

Finally, democratisation and political literacy trends show that younger voters engage with formal electoral processes without rejecting democratic norms. Many are new voters under the Undi18 system who still operate within Malaysia’s electoral framework, indicating support for participatory governance rather than clerical rule²³.

In sum, Malay youth’s preference for religiously credible leaders reflects ethical expectations, identity resonance, and pragmatic voting—not inherent endorsement of clerical domination of political power. In that they may perceive that religious leaders function as trust proxies in a fragmented and dysfunctional political marketplace:

- “If politicians lie, religious figures fear divine accountability”
- “If institutions fail, moral authority substitutes for procedural legitimacy”

This explains why religious endorsement matters even among youths who are not deeply observant in practice. The attraction is ethical signalling, not theocracy.

Conclusion

The turn of Malay young voters toward religious figures and by extension, towards PAS and Perikatan Nasional, as well as conservative Islamic politics since 2022 is not a sudden radical shift, nor is it merely a product of religious revivalism or social media manipulation. It is likely a structural response to economic insecurity, institutional distrust, identity anxiety, and moralised political communication.

In the Malaysian context, with its high connectivity, social media acts as an accelerant, not the root cause. Political scandals and the failure of the established system to deliver on better opportunities or incomes that can help mount rising costs drives discontent and cynicism. These factors act as a bridge that allows young voters to consider alternatives. The strong presence of religion in the public space, brought about by the decades long Islamization process eases the younger generation to accept Islam as a political idiom that helps to stabilize identity at a time of contestation with values from outside, and acts as a moral anchor in a volatile political environment.

Looking towards the future, unless Malaysia’s political system finds ways to restore institutional trust,

²² Merdeka Center. (2025, November). *Malay political narratives study and voter typology* [Unpublished study].

²³ Lee, M. H. (2022, November 14). *Malaysia GE15: Low political literacy and indecisiveness limit youth votes*. Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia. <https://www.isis.org.my/2022/11/14/malaysia-ge15-low-political-literacy-and-indecisiveness-limit-youth-votes/>



address youth economic vulnerabilities, speak to identity concerns without polarisation, and rebuild moral credibility in governance; the alignment of Malay youth with conservative Islamic politics is likely to persist—and deepen—well beyond the next electoral cycle.

About the Report

The RSIS Southeast Asian Social Cohesion Radar Research Series, produced by the Social Cohesion Research Programme at RSIS, presents reports that examine different aspects of the Radar's findings and dataset. For enquiries about the series or collaboration opportunities, please contact iccs-mail@ntu.edu.sg

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