



AI's Impact on China's Security Strategy and Asian Regional Security



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Report on the workshop organised by: China Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Rapporteur: Ian Seow Cheng Wei

Editors: Benjamin Ho and Yang Zi

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Introduction

On 24 February 2026, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) China Programme convened the workshop “AI’s Impact on China’s Security Strategy and Asian Regional Security”. The event examined the strategic, institutional, and operational implications of artificial intelligence (AI), with a particular focus on developments in China and the broader Indo-Pacific region. Opening remarks highlighted the intensifying United States (US)-China technological competition, noting that while AI increasingly defines global military standards, governance debates, and technology trade, international political commitment to AI risk governance remains limited.

The workshop comprised three thematic sessions. The first session traced China’s AI trajectory from early defence-oriented research to a state-supported national strategy aiming for global leadership by 2030. Presenters emphasised the growing integration of civilian and military AI applications and the institutional fragmentation among China’s security, technology, and diplomatic agencies. Discussions further highlighted China’s cautious approach toward binding global AI governance, a stance largely shaped by its strategic competition with the US.

The second session explored AI’s impact on Chinese military modernisation and intelligence. Presenters discussed how AI could enhance the People’s Liberation Army’s cyber operations, intelligence analysis, and unmanned systems, while emphasising that technology alone does not guarantee battlefield effectiveness. Instead, human factors such as leadership quality, personnel training, and institutional professionalism were identified as elements for operational success.

The final session provided a comparative analysis of military AI adoption in South Korea and Japan. Cultural, institutional, and demographic factors were highlighted as key influences, while discussions also considered the implications for strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific, noting that AI can act as a force multiplier without necessarily destabilising deterrence.

Overall, the workshop underscored that military AI development is shaped not only by technological progress but also by strategic perceptions, institutional structures, and human factors.

Summary of Welcome Remarks

In his opening address, Assistant Professor Benjamin Ho from the RSIS China Programme highlighted how AI is likely to reshape the regional balance of power, specifically within the military domain. On the intensifying US–China competition in AI, he noted its significant influence on global standards, governance, and trade in sensitive technologies. Despite these developments, he observed that political will on both sides to address risks related to AI governance remains limited. He outlined three perspectives: (i) US concerns about China’s AI-enabled military rise, (ii) China’s fears of AI-driven societal destabilisation by external actors, and (iii) the risk of technological bifurcation affecting other regional states. The session was chaired by Asst Prof Ho and featured three presenters who shared their independent research.

Session I: China’s AI Strategy

Presentations

The first presentation, delivered by Assistant Professor Guangyu Qiao-Franco from Radboud University, examined China’s emergence as a major AI power by tracing its evolution across four historical phases. She noted that AI research is not new, with global work dating back to the 1930s, and argued that China’s progress reflects a gradual, state-supported process.

The first phase (1956–1976) was a foundational period marked by limited AI research, largely concentrated in defence applications such as missile guidance and command-and-control systems. However, progress was severely hindered by domestic political turmoil following the Cultural Revolution in 1966, as universities were shut down and funding declined.

The second phase (1978–2000) saw the re-emergence of AI research under state-guided national projects, particularly in automation. AI development supported China’s broader “Four Modernisations,” particularly efforts to strengthen industry and scientific capabilities as military-related research continued.

The third phase (2006–2016) represented a period of acceleration, with expanded civilian AI applications. Development initially relied on foreign joint ventures, particularly with Western partners, alongside a simultaneous domestic push for indigenous research and STEM talent. Major technology firms such as Huawei and Baidu played leading roles.

The fourth phase (2017 onwards) marks a period “beyond catch-up,” as China seeks to become a global AI leader by 2030. Amid increasing US technology restrictions, China has emphasised technological self-reliance. The boundaries between public and private sectors have also become increasingly blurred, with AI supporting both economic initiatives such as “Made in China 2025” and China’s military modernisation efforts.

Subsequently, Professor Jinghan Zeng from City University of Hong Kong examined Chinese reactions to the emergence of ChatGPT and its implications for the global AI race. He observed that international discourse often highlights US concerns—specifically the fear of being technologically surpassed by China. This has contributed to US measures such as restricting exports of advanced semiconductor chips and encouraging allies to limit the transfer of sensitive technologies to China. However, Prof Zeng argued that strategic anxiety in the AI race is mutual.

Detailing the specific drivers of Chinese strategic anxiety, he framed the current technological landscape as a self-reinforcing AI security dilemma. Chinese concerns about military AI intensified following US President Barack Obama’s announcement of the “Third Offset Strategy” in 2014, which signaled a clear American intent to maintain US technological hegemony. This was compounded by the 2016 victory of AlphaGo over world champion Lee Sedol, reinforcing perceptions that the US held a technological lead.

In the civilian sphere, the rise of ChatGPT sparked concerns regarding technological competitiveness and ideology, with fears that Western-developed generative AI could challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideological control.

Prof Zeng described a cycle where US breakthroughs generate Chinese anxiety, prompting rapid domestic innovation and tighter regulation. This increased Chinese capability, in turn, fuels further US security concerns and restrictive measures. He stressed that the risks posed by AI—particularly for strategic stability—necessitate a robust global governance, though significant challenges remain over how such rules should be established.

The final presenter of this session, Dr Zhang Qiaochu from the European University Institute, examined the range of actors shaping China’s grand strategy in AI and the factors behind its relatively lukewarm stance toward global AI governance. She argued that China is not a coherent actor; rather, its AI policies are driven by competing interests across the security, technology, and diplomatic domains.

In the security realm, the Ministry of National Defence (MND) prioritises national security, sovereignty, and regime stability, showing little support for strong AI regulation given China’s threat perceptions of the US. In contrast, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) favours tighter regulation due to concerns that AI-enabled deepfakes or misinformation could undermine domestic stability and challenge the CCP’s ideological control.

In the technology domain, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and technology firms emphasise the importance of promoting AI innovation. MOST generally believes that governance frameworks should support technological development while managing risks, while companies tend to prefer minimal regulatory constraints.

In the diplomatic realm, a dual-track approach persists due to differing priorities between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the MND. While the MND remains

reluctant to engage in discussions on military AI arms control, MOFA seeks to portray China as a responsible major power supportive of global AI governance. Dr Zhang concluded that these differences contribute to China's overall cautious and fragmented position on AI governance.

Discussion

Assistant Professor Stefanie Kam from RSIS served as the discussant for the panel, synthesising several key themes from the presentations. First, she raised the question of whether China should be understood as a coherent, unitary actor in AI development and governance. While existing literature often portrays a unified national AI strategy, the presentations revealed a more complex reality where multiple actors with differing interests shape China's trajectory.

Second, she emphasised the importance of governance in managing the risks associated with AI, particularly in relation to strategic stability. Drawing parallels with nuclear governance, she noted that emerging AI technologies—especially those with military applications—could have significant implications for nuclear command, control, and deterrence. This underscores the urgent need for frameworks to manage potential risks and prevent escalation.

Third, Asst Prof Kam highlighted the influence of bureaucratic interests within the Chinese government. The presentations demonstrated that institutions across the security, technology, and diplomacy hold competing priorities. These internal dynamics challenge the common assumption of a unified Chinese approach and may help explain China's cautious stance on global AI governance, as well as its limited transparency regarding military AI development.

Q&A

Professor Dennis Wilder from Georgetown University asked Prof Zeng whether technology firms might be better positioned to participate in global AI governance discussions, given their deeper technical expertise and familiarity with the technology. Prof Zeng responded that China's approach remains largely state-centric. Beijing is cautious of allowing technology companies to gain excessive influence that could challenge or undermine the authority of the CCP. This concern was exemplified by recent regulatory crackdowns on major Chinese technology companies.

However, Prof Zeng observed that the emergence of ChatGPT in 2022 prompted some reassessment within China regarding the role of technology firms in advancing AI capabilities. Despite this shift, the government's fundamental position remains unchanged: technology companies must operate within clear political boundaries and should not challenge the CCP's authority. As a result, China's approach to AI governance differs from many Western models, which tend to advocate greater participation by non-state actors, including private technology firms, in shaping governance frameworks and standards.

Ms Mei Ching Liu from RSIS further questioned the shift in China's posture from a lukewarm attitude toward international regulation to a more proactive stance around 2022. In particular, China started to promote initiatives and discussions on international governance mechanisms for AI, including greater engagement in multilateral platforms and proposals for global cooperation on AI regulation. These developments eventually contributed to initiatives such as the push for international governance frameworks and declarations on AI safety and cooperation discussed at global forums in subsequent years.

Prof Zhang explained that China initially expressed support for legally binding commitments on AI governance; however the intensifying strategic and military competition with the US has tempered this position. China is concerned that legally binding rules could constrain its development of military AI capabilities at a time when the US-China strategic rivalry is particularly acute. As a result, while China engages more actively in discussions on global AI governance and promotes norms and frameworks, it prefers non-binding or flexible arrangements that allow it to maintain strategic and technological flexibility, particularly in the military domain.

Session II: AI and Chinese Military Preparedness

The session, chaired by Assistant Professor James Char from RSIS, featured two presenters who examined AI's specific applications within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the lessons drawn from recent global conflicts.

Presentations

Prof Wilder's presentation examined how AI could enhance Chinese military intelligence capabilities. He began by highlighting historical limitations in PLA intelligence performance, citing several notable failures. These included the lack of awareness regarding North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facilities, limited understanding of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the absence of prior knowledge of the reported 2026 US attack on Venezuela, from which the Chinese delegation reportedly departed only hours before the strike.

Despite these shortcomings, he acknowledged the PLA's success particularly in cyber operations and human intelligence activities, including sophisticated hacking campaigns such as Volt Typhoon-style intrusions and network penetration efforts.

Looking ahead, Professor Wilder posited that China is likely to increasingly integrate AI into military intelligence operations. He suggested several potential applications. First, AI could be used to identify vulnerabilities within China's own systems to improve defensive resilience. Second, it may support automated intrusion and cyber espionage activities. Third, AI-generated deepfakes could become tools for information operations. Finally, advanced machine learning systems could help analyse large volumes of human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence, thereby improving strategic situational awareness.

Overall, Prof Wilder suggested that AI will become a critical force multiplier for China's intelligence collection, cyber operations, and data analysis capabilities.

Subsequently, Dr Yang Zi from RSIS examined the implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for China's AI-driven military modernisation. He argued that the conflict has served as an important testing ground for emerging military technologies, allowing the PLA to observe developments in unmanned systems, AI-enabled decision-making, and modern battlefield operations. Current discussions on the war often focus on what it means for Taiwan's defence, rather than on how China is learning from the conflict.

Dr Yang noted that Chinese observers were generally unimpressed with Russia's military performance. Weaknesses were observed in Russia's outdated command-and-control structures and limited joint operational integration. In contrast, inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrated high battlefield utility by destroying more costly conventional military assets. Chinese analysts were particularly interested in Ukrainian drone operations and the integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) frameworks. Russia's limited use of electronic warfare countermeasures against drones was also seen as a critical lesson.

From these observations, China is likely focusing on three areas. First, improving command-and-control systems through AI-enabled MUM-T operations, enhanced wargaming, and unmanned training exercises. Second, strengthening electronic warfare capabilities. Third, applying AI to logistics, including predictive logistics planning, drone-supported infrastructure construction, and medical and supply delivery systems, as reflected in recent joint logistics support force exercises.

Discussion

Asst Prof Char commended Prof Wilder's detailed analysis of the PLA's intelligence performance and how AI could potentially augment military capabilities. However, he questioned whether certain "failures" might instead stem from structural impediments, such as a reluctance among agencies to share intelligence, rather than genuine analytic shortcomings. Asst Prof Char also encouraged a deeper examination of how China's intelligence system has evolved from the Hu Jintao era to that of Xi Jinping, especially in light of extensive PLA purges since 2015. With the Central Military Commission reportedly understaffed following the January 2026 removals of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, he asked how these leadership changes might shape China's approach to military AI and what implications this could have for PLA intelligence and broader military modernisation.

In response Prof Wilder emphasised that even if states possess strong intelligence capabilities, potentially enhanced by AI, poor leadership and decision-making can still squander those advantages. He stressed that military AI should ultimately be understood as a tool rather than a solution in itself. A key issue to watch, he emphasised, is whether Xi Jinping prioritises political loyalty and correctness over professional competence within the PLA. An excessive emphasis on political correctness could encourage groupthink, weaken critical analysis, and undermine the ability of commanders and analysts to respond decisively to intelligence. In this context,

Prof Wilder underscored that the effectiveness of intelligence systems depends not only on technological capabilities but also on the quality of human analysis. Strong analytic skills, institutional professionalism, and the ability to critically assess intelligence remain essential for interpreting information and translating it into sound strategic decisions.

On the lessons the PLA has drawn from the Russia–Ukraine war, Asst Prof Char agreed with Dr Yang’s observation that there may be a degree of technological determinism within the organisation, noting that possessing the most advanced military technology does not necessarily guarantee victory in war. Instead, the success of a state in conflict depends on a broader set of factors, including troop morale, leadership, and the purpose or motivation for fighting. At the same time, Asst Prof Char encouraged Dr Yang to further examine potential deficiencies in the PLA’s cyber operations and how these capabilities might be augmented by AI. Asst Prof Char also suggested paying closer attention to personnel training and AI literacy within the PLA, emphasising that the effectiveness of AI will depend not only on hardware and technological systems but also on whether personnel are sufficiently trained and proficient in using them.

Q&A

Questions directed to Dr Yang centred on the PLA’s integration of emerging technologies vis-à-vis lessons drawn from the Russia–Ukraine War. Dr Bich Tran from RSIS asked about China’s concept of multidomain operations and how it compares to the US Armed Forces. Her question sought clarification on whether China’s interpretation reflects a distinct doctrinal framework or largely parallels existing US concepts. In response, Dr Yang explained that China’s approach is rooted in "systems-of-systems confrontation," emphasising integration across military services to enable coordinated joint operations. He noted that the PLA is prioritising advanced command-and-control systems to facilitate higher-quality intelligence gathering and faster decision-making across domains. He also highlighted the importance placed on achieving electromagnetic dominance, which the PLA views as essential for securing information superiority in modern warfare.

Mr Nishant Rajeev, also from RSIS, raised a question regarding the PLA’s experimentation with drone swarms. He asked how the PLA is currently testing such capabilities and what types of missions drone swarms might be intended to support in future operations. In particular, he invited further discussion on the potential operational roles of these systems, including reconnaissance, saturation attacks, and other coordinated battlefield functions.

Dr Yang replied that the PLA has conducted experimental training involving UAV drone swarms and has increasingly incorporated drones into its joint military exercises in recent years. Dr Yang explained that drone swarms could serve a variety of functions, including target acquisition as well as defensive roles such as electronic jamming, thereby supporting broader operational objectives on the battlefield.

Questions directed to Prof Wilder focused on the nature and organisation of PLA military intelligence. Mr Rajeev asked about the apparent fragmentation within PLA intelligence, noting that intelligence responsibilities are divided across different military branches as well as multiple intelligence agencies, and wondered how this might affect the overall operational effectiveness. In particular, Mr Rajeev asked whether the presence of overlapping bureaucratic structures and parallel intelligence channels could create challenges for information sharing, operational coordination, or decision-making within the Chinese military system.

Prof Wilder explained that, in contrast to the US system—where the Director of National Intelligence coordinates and integrates intelligence across agencies—compartmentalisation of intelligence is generally a standard practice to prevent leaks. However, in the case of the PLA, he noted that intelligence tends to be stovepiped, with limited integration across branches and agencies. Rather than being coordinated through a central intelligence authority, information is often routed directly to Xi Jinping, which can create bottlenecks and reduce the effectiveness of the PLA's overall intelligence operations. This structure contrasts sharply with models where intelligence is systematically fused to support timely operational decision-making.

Session III: AI and Asian Regional Security

The final session, chaired by Dr Daniel Balazs from RSIS, examined military AI adoption in East Asia and the regional impact of China's military AI advancements.

Presentations

Mr Brian Waidelich from the Center for Naval Analyses discussed why Seoul appears to have outpaced Tokyo in adopting military AI despite facing similar regional security challenges in Northeast Asia, comparable demographic pressures, and uncertainty surrounding alliance dynamics with the US Armed Forces. Mr Waidelich attributed the differences to several factors. First, institutional structure plays a role, as South Korea has a more centralised military decision-making system involving the presidency, the Ministry of National Defense, and the armed forces, whereas Japan tends to have more distributed authority in defence governance. Second, initiative design differs: Japan has focused more on manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) in aerial applications, while South Korea emphasises demonstration units and iterative testing before broader force-wide deployment. Third, South Korea sets more concrete personnel and capability targets for AI adoption, whereas Japan's planning remains comparatively less quantified in manpower transformation goals.

Ms Mae Chow and Dr Miguel Alberto Gomez from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy examined how advances in China's military AI may influence security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. They argued that these developments are shaping strategic perceptions by simultaneously increasing confidence within Chinese policy circles while heightening perceived threats among the US and its regional allies.

The presenters emphasised that AI functions as a force multiplier that can enhance both offensive and defensive military capabilities, particularly in intelligence,

early warning, and operational speed and precision. Examples discussed included the use of Chinese UAV systems for electronic warfare and jamming operations, as well as broader efforts to integrate AI into command-and-control processes. However, they cautioned against technological determinism, noting that the effectiveness of military AI ultimately depends on organisational diffusion, training, and the ability of personnel to apply these technologies operationally.

Discussion

Discussant Dr Balazs expressed appreciation for research that challenges conventional wisdom, and offered several targeted recommendations for refinement. Regarding Mr Waidelich's paper, Dr Balazs suggested narrowing the research direction to avoid diluting the core argument. He noted that while the comparative study of South Korea and Japan is promising, the current version pursues multiple inquiries simultaneously. Dr Balazs recommended identifying a central research question and expanding upon it systematically to strengthen the study's conceptual backbone and analytical rigour.

Dr Balazs also encouraged Ms Chow and Dr Gomez to explore deeper Chinese conceptions of strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Dr Balazs noted that conventional wisdom often assumes that the development of military AI by China may undermine regional strategic stability. However, Dr Balazs suggested that it would be valuable to examine Chinese strategic thought more closely, particularly the argument that China's pursuit of military AI could be viewed as reinforcing stability rather than weakening it. According to this perspective, expanding AI capabilities may serve as a deterrent by preventing strategic imbalance and limiting the ability of the US to exercise unchecked strategic dominance in the region. Dr Balazs encouraged the authors to investigate how Chinese policymakers conceptualise strategic stability and how these ideas influence military technology development and regional security strategy.

Q&A

Prof Wilder expressed strong appreciation for Mr Waidelich's paper, noting its well-structured analysis of the differing approaches to military AI adoption in South Korea and Japan. He raised the possibility of cultural factors giving rise to the divergence in AI integration, questioning whether South Korean society and military institutions might display greater confidence in AI technologies compared to Japan, and whether cultural attitudes toward technology could be slowing AI adoption within the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Prof Wilder also noted that both South Korea and Japan face similar demographic pressures, and questioned whether AI systems could help alleviate manpower challenges by enhancing operational efficiency and reducing personnel requirements. In addition, he touched on the sensitive social and cultural dimensions of potential conscription policies, including the broader debate surrounding the mobilisation of women in military service, highlighting that such measures may encounter public resistance despite strategic necessity.

Asst Prof Qiao-Franco also asked Mr Waidelich whether historical sensitivities and concerns over Japan's militarist past act as a constraint on the development and

adoption of military AI in the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The question sought to explore whether cultural memory and societal caution regarding military expansion could potentially limit experimentation, scaling, or operational deployment compared to other regional actors like South Korea.

In response, Mr Waidelich noted that cultural and institutional factors likely play complementary roles in shaping AI adoption. He said that South Korean defence institutions tend to view AI more pragmatically as a tool for modernisation and operational experimentation, which supports faster pilot testing and demonstration projects. By comparison, adoption within the Japan Self-Defense Forces may be shaped by broader societal caution toward military technology and a preference for incremental deployment.

On manpower issues, Mr Waidelich clarified that AI could help mitigate demographic pressures by improving force efficiency rather than replacing personnel outright. Automation, decision-support systems, and unmanned platforms may allow both countries to maintain operational readiness with smaller active forces.

Finally, on historical memory, Mr Waidelich acknowledged that concerns about Japan's militarist past may contribute to a more conservative approach toward emerging military technologies. However, he would likely caution against viewing history alone as determinative, emphasising that policy preferences, institutional norms, and alliance considerations also influence technology adoption.

List of Participants

No.	Title	Name	Organisation	Designation/Appointment
1	Dr	Adrian Ang U-Jin	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Research Fellow and Coordinator, US Programme
2	Ms	Asha A Hemrajani	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Senior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security
3	Dr	Benjamin Ho	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Assistant Professor
4	Dr	Bich Tran	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Research Fellow, Military Transformations Programme
5	Mr	Brian Waidelich ¹	Center for Naval Analyses	Research Scientist
6	Ms	Cheyenne Ong	Ministry of Defence, Singapore	Senior Analyst (International Security and Emerging Technologies)
7	Dr	Daniel Balazs	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Research Fellow, China Programme
8	Mr	David Ooi	Ministry of Defence, Singapore	Deputy Director, ADMM Cybersecurity and Information
9	Prof	Dennis Wilder	Georgetown University	Assistant Professor of the Practice, Georgetown University
10	Asst Prof	Guangyu Qiao-Franco	Radboud University	Assistant Professor of International Relations
11	Mr	Haruki Shigetomi	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Visiting Associate
12	Mr	Ian Seow Cheng Wei	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Senior Analyst, China Programme
13	Dr	James Char	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Assistant Professor, China Programme
14	Prof	Jinghan Zeng	City University of Hong Kong	Professor, Department of Public and International Affairs
15	Mr	Joel Ang	Ministry of Defence, Singapore	Assistant Director (International Security and Emerging Technologies)
16	Ms	Lim Le Yi Kelly	Ministry of Defence, Singapore	Policy Officer
17	Ms	Liu Mei Ching	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Associate Research Fellow, Military Transformations Programme

¹ Mr Brian Waidelich attended the workshop in his personal capacity.

18	Ms	Low Yuh Ling	Ministry of Defence, Singapore	Senior Analyst (International Security and Emerging
19	Ms	Mae Chow	Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy	Research Assistant
20	Ms	Marine Ourahli	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Senior Analyst, Military Transformations Programme
21	Dr	Miguel Alberto Gomez	Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy	Senior Research Fellow
22	Mr	Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Research Fellow, Regional Security Architecture Programme
23	Mr	Nishant Rajeev	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Senior Analyst, South Asia Programme
24	Dr	Qiaochu Zhang	European University Institute	Max Weber Fellow
25	Asst Prof	Stefanie Kam	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Assistant Professor, China Programme
26	Mr	Tan Keng Meng	MINDEF	Deputy Director (International Security and Emerging Technologies)
27	Dr	Yang Zi	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Research Fellow, China Programme, and Deputy Coordinator of MSc (International Relations) Programme
28	Ms	Ysa Marie	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Associate Research Fellow, Future Issues and Technology Research Cluster

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a global graduate school and think tank focusing on strategic studies and security affairs. Its five Research Centres and three Research Programmes, led by the Office of the Executive Deputy Chairman, and assisted by the Dean on the academic side, drive the School's research, education and networking activities.

The graduate school offers Master of Science Programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy and Asian Studies. As a school, RSIS fosters a nurturing environment to develop students into first-class scholars and practitioners.

As a think tank, RSIS conducts policy-relevant and forward-looking research in both national and international security, science and technology, society and economic and environmental sustainability. RSIS also produces academic research on security and international affairs. It publishes scholarly research in top-tier academic journals and leading university presses, and distributes policy research in a timely manner to a wide range of readers.

About the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) comprises ten research programmes, namely: China, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maritime Security, Military Studies, Military Transformations, Regional Security Architecture, South Asia, and the United States.