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The State of Social Cohesion in Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand

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Introduction

With diverse ethnic and religious populations, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand illustrate the complexities of fostering social cohesion in Southeast Asia, shaped by the power dynamics between majority and minority communities. According to the 2025 Southeast Asian Social Cohesion Radar (henceforth “Radar”), findings suggest that these countries face specific social cohesion challenges, including lower institutional trust and perception of fairness, while performing comparatively well in some areas, such as focus on the common good – an indicator of civic-mindedness and social resilience.¹ Taken together, they offer an important lens for examining how social cohesion develops in contexts where localised conflict intersects with contested power structures.

The perceptions of diversity, inclusion and fairness in particular, are key issues in ethnically and religiously plural societies.² While such dynamics are present across much of Southeast Asia to varying degrees, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand are particularly illustrative, considering their historical trajectories, including colonial legacies and post-independent efforts to forge a sense of nationhood. In the post-independence decades (1950s), observers often perceived that all three nations had strong developmental potential, citing their proficiency in agricultural export, and in the Philippine case, early democratic institutions.³

All three countries also feature a dominant religious group alongside smaller religious minorities, as illustrated in Figure 1. In Myanmar, the Bamar and Theravāda Buddhist majority coexists with smaller communities, including Muslims and Christian groups.⁴ The Philippines is predominantly Catholic, with Muslim communities concentrated in Mindanao and the Bangsamoro region; in terms of ethnicity, no single group constitutes an absolute majority, though Tagalog is the largest group based on the 2020 Census (26.0%) and other smaller groups like Bisaya/Binisaya (14.3%), Ilocano and Cebuano (8.0% each) are present.⁵ Thailand is often characterised as ethnically and religiously “Thai Buddhist,” reinforced by the ideological triad of “Nation, Religion, King”, while Malay-Muslim

1 Chan-Hoong Leong, Amanda Huan, Claribel Low, and Teng Si Lam, *Southeast Asian Social Cohesion Radar* (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Final_Social-Cohesion-Radar-1-July.pdf.

2 Matthew David D. Ordoñez, Hansley A. Juliano, and Enrico Antonio B. La Viña, “Dealing with diversity: State strategies on ethnic minority management in Southeast Asia,” *Asian Review* 32, no. 1 (2019): 85-108, <https://so01.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/arv/article/view/240211>.

3 Htet Kyaw, *Economic development of Burma (1948-1958): The Clash between the Capitalist-based Economic Plan and Socialist Ideology Implementation* (Master’s thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 2020), Chulalongkorn University Theses and Dissertations (Chula ETD) 447, <https://digital.car.chula.ac.th/chulaetd/447>; Håvard J. Kind, *The Sick Man of Asia? Economic Development in the Philippines, 1950–2001* (Bergen: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 2002), https://snf.no/media/dkpkath/a24_00.pdf; David Robinson, Ranjit S. Teja, Yangho Byeon, and Wanda S. Tseng, “II. Overview of Economic Developments Since 1950,” in *Thailand*, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1991), <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781557752215.084>.

4 Jangai Jap and Constant Courtin, *Deciphering Myanmar’s Ethnic Landscape* (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2022), <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/deciphering-myanmars-ethnic-landscape.pdf>; Department of Population, Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, *The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census: Union Report on Religion*, (Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, 2016), https://myanmar.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNION_2C_Religion_EN.pdf.


5 Philippine Statistics Authority, “Religious Affiliation in the Philippines (2020 Census of Population and Housing),” 2023, <https://psa.gov.ph/content/religious-affiliation-philippines-2020-census-population-and-housing>; Philippine Statistics Authority, “Ethnicity in the Philippines (2020 Census of Population and Housing),” 2023, <https://www.publicnow.com/view/E223F62F11383C71CAA64D87C6901F79973DEF7D?1688467651>.

communities in the Deep South and various ethno-linguistic groups continue to maintain distinct identities.⁶

Against this backdrop, this report examines social cohesion in relation to religion, secularism, and violence, focusing on three main questions:

1. What is the state of social cohesion in Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand?
2. How are attitudes towards diversity, role of religious leaders in politics and the use of violence against people based on political or religious identity?
3. How does social cohesion relate to rejection of political or religious violence?

Figure 1. Proportion of Majority vs. Other groups by Religion and Ethnicity in Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.



Note: In the Philippines, Tagalog is labeled as the majority group for visual illustration purposes only as it reflects the largest ethnic proportion; In Myanmar and Thailand, majority groups are more clearly dominant.

Social cohesion in Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand: Stronger social relations, weaker institutional connectedness


Drawing on the Radar study, social cohesion is assessed across three sub-domains: “Social relations” reflects the quality of intergroup and sectarian relations; “Connectedness” refers to confidence in institutions, political voice, and trust in the state; and “Focus on the Common Good”, captures perceptions and behaviours on civic responsibility and concern for others.⁷

Across all three countries, overall social cohesion scores fall below the regional average, though they follow a pattern consistent with broader Southeast Asian trends. As shown in Figure 2, cohesion is characterised by relatively stronger social relations, followed by focus on the common good, alongside weaker connectedness with institutions.

⁶ GROWup, ETH Zürich, *Ethnicity in Thailand*, (ETH Zürich, n.d.), <https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/pdf/Thailand.pdf>; National Statistical Office, Thailand, “Population and Housing Census,” <https://www.nso.go.th/nsoweb/main/summano/aE>.

⁷ Leong et al., *Southeast Asian Social Cohesion Radar*.

Figure 2. Overall Social Cohesion and Domain Scores for Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and the region.



Note: Sample sizes: Myanmar (n=1,007), Philippines (1,003), Thailand (n=1,000), Total Region (n=10,032). % Strong (Top 2 Box) refers to proportion of respondents who selected Strongly Agree and Agree on a 5-point likert scale.

In Myanmar, indicators related to the common good and civic-mindedness are particularly salient (73.2%, Figure 2). A closer look at individual items shows that 88.1% of respondents agree that people in their country find it important to donate to the poor, and 83.3% report that community or voluntary work is valued (Figure 3). These responses show strong presence of social norms on solidarity and mutual support, even as confidence in public institutions is weaker.

In contrast, for the Philippines and Thailand, social cohesion is more closely tied to identification. Higher proportions of respondents – 90.8% in the Philippines and 86.4% in Thailand – agree that people in their country strongly identify as citizens, pointing to the continued importance of national identity and belonging (Figure 3). In Thailand, trust that others will help regardless of religious identity is among the strongest items (85.0%), whereas in the Philippines, the perception that everyone is able to vote ranks comparatively higher (84.4%).

These strong horizontal ties coexist with consistently weaker vertical ties between citizens and institutions across all three countries. As illustrated in Figure 3, the lowest-scoring items relate to trust in institutions and perception of fairness. In Myanmar, strong solidarity and civic engagement sit alongside lower confidence in the fairness of elections (37.2%) and in decision makers’ willingness to protect the interests of all ethnic groups (39.2%). Similarly, in the Philippines and Thailand, respondents express limited confidence that their voices are heard, that courts treat people fairly, or that policy processes serve all groups equitably.

Figure 3. Top 3 and Bottom 3 Statements based on Social Cohesion Dimensions for Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.



Myanmar

	Dimensions	Item	% Strong		Dimensions	Item	% Strong
TOP 3	Solidarity and Helpfulness	People in my country find it important to donate to the poor.	88.1%	BOTTOM 3	Perception of Fairness	People in my country agree that the electoral process is free and fair.	37.2%
	Solidarity and Helpfulness	People in my country find it important to do community or voluntary work.	83.3%		Trust in Institutions	People in my country feel that their voices are heard when policies are made by decision makers.	38.1%
	Civic Participation	Everyone in my country is allowed to vote in elections.	82.0%		Trust in Institutions	Decision makers in government protect the interests of all ethnic groups when they make policies.	39.2%



Philippines

	Dimensions	Item	% Strong		Dimensions	Item	% Strong
TOP 3	Identification	People in my country strongly identify as citizens of our country.	90.8%	BOTTOM 3	Trust in Institutions	People in my country feel that their voices are heard when policies are made by decision makers.	38.4%
	Identification	People in my country are not afraid to openly express themselves in their own language.	84.6%		Perception of Fairness	People in my country feel they are fairly treated by the court of law and have access to legal rights.	39.6%
	Civic Participation	Everyone in my country is allowed to vote in elections.	84.4%		Perception of Fairness	People in my country agree that the electoral process is free and fair.	40.1%



Thailand

	Dimensions	Item	% Strong		Dimensions	Item	% Strong
TOP 3	Identification	People in my country strongly identify as citizens of our country.	86.4%	BOTTOM 3	Trust in Institutions	Decision makers in government protect the interests of all ethnic groups when they make policies.	39.7%
	Identification	People in my country are not afraid to openly express themselves in their own language.	85.0%		Trust in Institutions	People in my country feel that their voices are heard when policies are made by decision makers.	41.3%
	Trust in People	When in need of help, people in my country trust that others will help them regardless of their religious identity.	85.0%		Trust in Institutions	Decision makers in government protect the interests of all religious groups when they make policies.	43.0%


Note: Dimensions in yellow belong to the domain of “Social Relations”, those in blue belong to “Connectedness” and those in orange are under “Focus on the Common Good”. Sample sizes: Myanmar (n=1,007), Philippines (1,003), Thailand (n=1,000). % Strong (Top 2 Box) refers to proportion of respondents who selected Strongly Agree and Agree on a 5-point likert scale.

Taken together, these findings reveal a shared structural imbalance: relatively strong horizontal relations alongside weaker institutional connectedness, albeit with different underlying foundations to cohesion. In Myanmar, civic-mindedness and norms of mutual support play a more prominent role, whereas in the Philippines and Thailand, identification is more salient. Relatively weaker connectedness with institutions helps to explain their lower overall social cohesion scores and provides a critical lens for examining how religion, diversity and violence intersect with social cohesion in these settings.

How religion matters: Importance without theocracy

Religion plays a central role in everyday life in Myanmar and the Philippines, but is less prominent in Thailand. Findings from the Radar show that nearly three-quarters of respondents in Myanmar and the Philippines report religion as “very important” in their lives, whereas in Thailand only around three in ten say the same. Across all three countries, adults tend to rate religion as more important than youth, with the age gap most pronounced in Myanmar (15% difference, Figure 4). Across income groups, lower-income respondents are more likely to report that religion is “very important” in the Philippines and Thailand, while in Myanmar no clear income gradient emerges, indicating that religiosity cuts across socioeconomic lines (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Percentage of Respondents selected “Very Important” when asked “How important is religion in your life?”, segmented by Age and Income groups.




Note: Sample sizes: Myanmar (n=1,007), Philippines (1,003), Thailand (n=1,000); Weighted by Urban/Rural; Not displayed: Senior Age group; “Not important at all”, “Not very important”, “Somewhat important”, “Not applicable”.

Despite these high levels of religiosity, most respondents in all three countries prefer that religious leaders remain separate from political office. Less than one in five respondents agree that religious leaders should be politicians, with marginal differences by age and income: youths and lower-income respondents are slightly more supportive than adults or higher-income groups (Figure 5). These patterns indicate that while religiosity is high – particularly in Myanmar and the Philippines – most people see religion primarily as a moral and social influence rather than a pathway to political power.

Country-specific contexts provide additional nuance. For Thailand, the relatively higher proportion of respondents who support religious leaders as politicians may appear unexpected (20%), given that monks are legally barred from voting and direct political participation.⁸ Myanmar presents a similarly complex picture (16%): although monks are also restricted from formal political office, they have historically exerted informal influence in anti-colonial and anti-military movements, and some have been involved in nationalist or exclusionary movements in recent years.⁹ In contrast, while the Philippine constitution mandates the separation of church and state, it does not impose a specific prohibition on religious leaders holding political office, yet support is comparatively lower (7%) despite a long history of religion and politics intertwining.¹⁰ These patterns indicate that public attitudes toward religion and political authority are shaped by a combination of legal frameworks, historical precedents, and current political trust, rather than religiosity alone.

Figure 5. Percentage of Respondents selected "Yes" when asked "Should religious leaders be politicians?", segmented by Age and Income groups.



Note: Sample sizes: Myanmar (n=1,007), Philippines (1,003), Thailand (n=1,000); Weighted by Urban/Rural; Not displayed: Senior Age group; "No" and "Do not know".

8 Katewadee Kulabkaew, "Is the Participation of Buddhist Monks in Thai Politics Still Taboo?" *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*, January 25, 2019, refer to this link.


9 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, "Who Set the Parameters of Monastic Politics in Myanmar?" *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*, January 31, 2019, <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/media/commentaries/who-set-the-parameters-of-monastic-politics-in-myanmar-by-ny-ny-ny-kyaw/>

10 John Choo, Evelyn Tan, and Daniel P.S. Goh, *Christian Megachurches and Politics in the Philippines*, ISEAS Perspective no. 62 (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, June 2020), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_62.pdf.

Views on diversity: General support for pluralism

Across Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand, only a small minority of respondents think that having many different religions, ethnicities and cultures makes their country a worse place to live. As shown in Figure 6, the majority in Myanmar (53.1%) say diversity makes their country a better place, reflecting a relatively positive valuation of pluralism. In contrast, most respondents in the Philippines and Thailand indicate that diversity “doesn’t make much difference,” suggesting a broadly tolerant and pragmatic stance in which diversity is accepted as a social reality and may not be necessarily seen as enhancing national well-being. These patterns contrast with countries such as Indonesia (77.7%) and Malaysia (62.9%), where a larger majority associate diversity with a better place to live in, potentially reflecting more explicit state policies and public narratives around diversity management and minority inclusion.

Figure 6. Percentage of Responses when asked “Overall, do you think having people of many different religions, ethnic groups and cultures makes this country a better place to live, a worse place to live or doesn’t make a difference?”




Note: Sample sizes: Myanmar (n=1,007), Philippines (1,003), Thailand (n=1,000); Weighted by Urban/Rural; Not displayed: “Do not know”.

Broad rejection toward violence

Most respondents in Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand say that using violence against others because of their political beliefs or religion is “never justified” (Figure 7). Absolute rejection is highest in the Philippines (61%), followed by Thailand (53%) and Myanmar (48%), meaning roughly half or more respondents in each country oppose such violence. Adults are more likely than youth to reject violence in Myanmar and the Philippines, and higher-income respondents in the Philippines and Thailand are more likely to do so than lower-income groups.

Responses may also reflect how respondents perceive the context in which violence occurs. While broad rejection is consistent across all three countries, attitudes are likely shaped by historical and contemporary experiences of conflict, with respondents applying the norm to different actors and situations.

Figure 7. Percentage of Respondents selected "Never Justified" when asked "Do you personally feel that using violence against people because of their political beliefs or religion can often, sometimes, rarely or never be justified?", segmented by Age and Income groups.




Note: Sample sizes: Myanmar (n=1,007), Philippines (1,003), Thailand (n=1,000); Weighted by Urban/Rural; Not displayed: Senior Age group; "Often Justified", "Sometimes Justified", "Rarely Justified", "Do not know".

Social cohesion and attitudes towards violence

Lastly, we examined how different domains of social cohesion possibly shape attitudes toward the use of violence based on political beliefs or religion. Rather than treating social cohesion as a single construct, this analysis explored whether specific domains – such as social relations, connectedness and focus on the common good – relate differently to the likelihood of viewing violence as “never justified”. This helps identify which aspects of cohesion may reinforce moral boundaries against violence. Full results of the analysis are reported in Annex A.

Figure 8. Odds Ratios between Social Cohesion Domains and the Rejection of Violence in Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.



Note: Sample sizes: Myanmar (n=916), Philippines (932), Thailand (n=926); Ordinal Regression of social cohesion domains on attitudes toward violence, controlling for age and income. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate higher odds of rejecting violence.

In Myanmar, after controlling for age and income, none of the social cohesion domains show a significant association with rejection of violence. Whereas for both the Philippines and Thailand, social relations and connectedness are significantly associated with attitudes toward violence, but in opposing directions as seen in Figure 8. Stronger social relations, reflecting trust and reciprocity with other groups in society, increase the likelihood of rejecting violence. In contrast, higher levels of connectedness are associated with a lower likelihood of selecting “never justified,” indicating more conditional or nuanced attitude toward violence.

These patterns suggest that different forms of cohesion shape views on violence in distinct ways. Positive intergroup relations may strengthen shared norms that draw firm boundaries against violence, while broader connectedness with institutions may expose individuals to a wider range of narratives and trade-offs surrounding conflict. Overall, these findings highlight the multi-dimensional nature of social cohesion and suggest that its influence on attitudes toward violence varies across domains and contexts, warranting further research to unpack these underlying mechanisms.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis of Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand – each shaped by distinct majority-minority dynamics and past experiences or contemporary conflict – yields several important and sometimes, unexpected findings. Key findings include:

1. Across all three countries, levels of social cohesion are moderate and broadly align with regional patterns. Cohesion is more strongly anchored in interpersonal trust and solidarity than in confidence in formal institutions.
2. Religion remains important in daily life but does not translate directly into support for religious leaders to take on political leadership; Attitudes toward diversity are generally positive, and there is a broad normative rejection of political or religious violence.
3. The findings also highlight that social cohesion is multi-dimensional and not uniformly protective. Stronger social relation is associated with a higher rejection of violence, while connectedness is associated with more conditional or nuanced attitudes, particularly in the Philippines and Thailand.

These results should be interpreted in light of a few limitations. Self-reported responses may reflect socially desirable positions and subjective perceptions, and may not fully capture underlying attitudes or behaviours.¹¹ National-level samples also risk presenting an overly optimistic picture of cohesion, while not fully capturing local or sub-national tensions and conflicts, particularly among small or marginalised communities in specific geographical regions.¹² Future research with sampling at the sub-national level and measures of local conflict exposure can be done to better understand how lived experiences of violence interact with different domains and dimensions of social cohesion.

11 Roger Tourangeau and Ting Yan. 2007. "Sensitive Questions in Surveys," *Psychological Bulletin* 133, no. 5 (2007): 859-883, <https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859>.

12 Dominic Abrams, Ben Davies, and Zoe Horsham, *Rapid Review: Measuring Social Cohesion*, (Centre for the Study of Group Processes, University of Kent: 2023), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65fd7230f1d3a0001132adc4/Rapid_Review_Measuring_Social_Cohesion.pdf.



Annex

Annex A

Ordinal Logistic Regression Results¹³

This appendix reports full ordinal logistic regression results examining the associations between social cohesion domains and attitudes toward political and religious violence, controlling for age and income. Models were estimated separately for each country. Respondents in the “Senior” age group were excluded due to small sample sizes, and those who selected “Do not know” on the justification of violence item were also omitted from the analysis.

Table A1: Social Cohesion Domains on Attitudes Toward Violence in Myanmar, Controlling for Age and Income.

Predictor	B	SE	OR	95% CI for OR	p
Age (Youths)	-	-	1	-	-
Age (Adults)	0.13	0.13	1.14	[0.90, 1.46]	.292
Income (Low)	-	-	1	-	-
Income (Middle)	-0.30	0.16	0.74	[0.55, 1.01]	.056
Income (High)	0.14	0.16	1.15	[0.85, 1.56]	.375
Social Relations	-0.19	0.16	0.83	[0.60, 1.14]	.240
Connectedness	-0.10	0.13	0.91	[0.70, 1.17]	.456
Focus on the Common Good	0.03	0.17	1.03	[0.73, 1.46]	.845

Note. B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate higher odds of rejecting violence. Sample size: n=916.

None of the social cohesion domains were significantly associated with attitudes toward the justification of violence in Myanmar. Income at the middle level showed a marginal negative association with rejection of violence (OR = 0.74, 95% CI [0.55, 1.01], p = .056), while age, high income, social relations, connectedness, and focus on the common good were not statistically significant predictors. Overall, social cohesion domains, age, and income account for approximately 1.5% of the variance in attitudes toward violence in Myanmar (Nagelkerke’s pseudo- $R^2 = 0.015$).

¹³ Some variables violated the proportional odds assumption according to the Brant test. The ordinal regression results are retained for descriptive and comparative purposes, with interpretation focused on odds ratios and confidence intervals rather than on strict hypothesis testing or precise parameter estimates.

Table A2: Social Cohesion Domains on Attitudes Toward Violence in the Philippines, Controlling for Age and Income.

Predictor	B	SE	OR	95% CI for OR	p
Age (Youths)	-	-	1	-	-
Age (Adults)	0.26	0.14	1.29	[0.98, 1.70]	.066
Income (Low)	-	-	1	-	-
Income (Middle)	0.35	0.15	1.42	[1.06, 1.91]	.019*
Income (High)	0.54	0.44	1.72	[0.76, 4.43]	.219
Social Relations	0.50	0.19	1.64	[1.14, 2.36]	.008*
Connectedness	-0.60	0.19	0.55	[0.38, 0.80]	.002*
Focus on the Common Good	0.03	0.19	1.03	[0.71, 1.50]	.884

Note. B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate higher odds of rejecting violence. Sample size: n=932.

In the Philippines, stronger social relations were associated with higher odds of rejecting violence (OR = 1.64, 95% CI [1.14, 2.36], p = .008), whereas higher connectedness was associated with lower odds of rejecting violence (OR = 0.55, 95% CI [0.38, 0.80], p = .002). Middle-income respondents were also more likely to reject violence compared to low-income respondents (OR = 1.42, 95% CI [1.06, 1.91], p = .019). Overall, social cohesion domains, age, and income explain approximately 3.0% of the variance in attitudes toward violence in the Philippines (Nagelkerke's pseudo-R² = 0.030).

Table A3: Social Cohesion Domains on Attitudes Toward Violence in Thailand, Controlling for Age and Income.

Variable	B	SE	OR	95% CI for OR	p
Age (Youths)	-	-	1	-	-
Age (Adults)	0.19	0.15	1.21	[0.90, 1.63]	.209
Income (Low)	-	-	1	-	-
Income (Middle)	0.25	0.16	1.29	[0.95, 1.75]	.109
Income (High)	0.43	0.18	1.54	[1.09, 2.17]	.014*
Social Relations	0.73	0.20	2.07	[1.40, 3.09]	< .001*
Connectedness	-0.43	0.18	0.65	[0.45, 0.93]	.019*
Focus on the Common Good	0.11	0.19	1.11	[0.76, 1.62]	.578

Note. B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate higher odds of rejecting violence. Sample size: n=926.

Stronger social relations were associated with significantly lower acceptance of violence (OR = 2.07, 95% CI [1.40, 3.09], p < .001), whereas higher levels of connectedness were associated with lower odds of rejecting violence (OR = 0.65, 95% CI [0.45, 0.93], p = .019). High-income respondents were also more likely to reject violence compared to low-income respondents (OR = 1.54, 95% CI [1.09, 2.17], p = .014). Overall, social cohesion domains, age, and income explain approximately 3.4% of the variance in attitudes toward violence in the Thailand (Nagelkerke's pseudo-R² = 0.034).

About the Report

The RSIS Southeast Asian Social Cohesion Radar Research Series, produced by the Social Cohesion Research Programme at RSIS, presents reports that examine different aspects of the Radar's findings and dataset. For enquiries about the series or collaboration opportunities, please contact iccs-mail@ntu.edu.sg

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Ms LAM Teng Si is a Senior Analyst at SCRP. Her research interests include using quantitative methods and data sources – such as surveys and social media data – to uncover public perceptions, particularly around issues of intergroup relations and social cohesion. Her previous research focused on citizenship and immigration, where she examined the perceptions of young Singaporean paddlers' national identity and citizenship in relation to the Foreign Sports Talent Scheme, and explored the impact of moral reframing on views towards immigration policies among students in the Netherlands.

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Established to advance the study of social cohesion, the Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP) at RSIS seeks to engage in policy-oriented research, forge strategic partnerships, and develop leadership to inspire cohesive and resilient societies, both within Southeast Asia and beyond.

With this in view, SCRП aspires to:

- Promote social cohesion research and nurture research talent in this domain.
- Create platforms for dialogue and problem-solving on interfaith and social cohesion issues.
- Inspire collaborative approaches across societies towards the practice of social cohesion.

Website: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/social-cohesion-research-programme/>

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