Abstract

A major paradox in international relations is the widespread fear and anxiety that underlies the security dilemma in times of peace, and the prevalence of overconfidence or “false optimism” on the eve of war. This phenomenon is no better illustrated than in Russia’s concern for its security and its ill-fated invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While the hugely more powerful Russia, and many outside observers, expected a quick victory, a year later their early gains have been reversed and they have become bogged down in a long and bloody war against a hardened opponent with strong allies. However, while this is a new war, it is an old story. Historians and political scientists have long identified overconfidence as a cause of war, from the Peloponnesian War in classical times to the Crusades, to World War I and Vietnam, and to the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet overconfidence, as well as the fear and anxiety that reign in times of peace, remain poorly understood.

Professor Johnson draws on history, psychology, experiments, and models to make three arguments: (1) Overconfidence on the eve of war can be accounted for by the “Rubicon Theory of War”, which describes a significant shift in people’s susceptibility to cognitive biases before and after making a decision; (2) Meanwhile, exaggerated fear in times of peace can equally be accounted for by the “negativity bias”, which describes how threats and negative events have much greater effects on our perceptions than do positive ones; and (3) Coexistence of these biases dramatically increases the potential for conflict, since decision-makers simultaneously exaggerate the severity of threats they face and yet exhibit overconfidence about their capacity to deal with them. Professor Johnson explores these phenomena in historical cases, how they are playing out in the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, and then conclude by considering their implications for our perceptions and misperceptions — and the likely consequences — of new geopolitical competitors emerging in other regions today.

About the Speaker

Dominic D. P. Johnson is Alastair Buchan Professor of International Relations and Fellow of St. Antony’s College at the University of Oxford. He received a DPhil from Oxford in evolutionary biology, and later a PhD from Geneva University in political science. Drawing on both disciplines, he is interested in how new research on evolution, biology and human nature is challenging theories of international relations, conflict, and cooperation.

His most recent book, Strategic Instincts: The Adaptive Advantages of Cognitive Biases in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 2020), challenges the common view that human “cognitive biases” are unfortunate errors or mistakes of the brain that lead inevitably to policy failures, disasters, and wars. Rather, it argues they are adaptive heuristics that evolved because they helped us make good decisions, not bad ones. Under the right conditions, these “strategic instincts” continue to lend a competitive edge in conflict and cooperation. His previous books are, God is Watching You: How the Fear of God Makes Us Human (Oxford University Press, 2015), which examines the role of religion in the evolution of cooperation, and how cross-culturally ubiquitous and ancient beliefs in supernatural punishment have helped to overcome collective action problems of human society. Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics (Harvard University Press, 2006), with Dominic Tierney, examines how and why popular misperceptions commonly create undeserved victories or defeats in international wars and crises. Finally, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions (Harvard University Press, 2004), argues that common psychological biases to maintain overly positive images of our capabilities, our control over events, and the future, play a key role in the causes of war.