Abstract

A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases—quirks of the brain we all share as human beings—are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In Strategic Instincts, Professor Johnson challenges this assumption, arguing that these non-rational behaviors can actually contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, Professor Johnson considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions and war, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Professor Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases—overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. Professor Johnson examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. Professor Johnson acknowledges the dark side of biases—when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Professor Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argue that in the complex world of international relations and war, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance.

About the Speakers

Dominic D. P. Johnson is Alastair Buchan Professor of International Relations and Fellow of St. Antony’s College at the University of Oxford. He received a DPhil from Oxford in evolutionary biology, and later a PhD from Geneva University in political science. Drawing on both disciplines, he is interested in how new research on evolution, biology and human nature is challenging theories of international relations, conflict, and cooperation.

His most recent book, Strategic Instincts: The Adaptive Advantages of Cognitive Biases in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 2020), challenges the common view that human “cognitive biases” are unfortunate errors or mistakes of the brain that lead inevitably to policy failures, disasters, and wars. Rather, it argues they are adaptive heuristics that evolved because they helped us make good decisions, not bad ones. Under the right conditions, these “strategic instincts” continue to lend a competitive edge in conflict and cooperation. His previous books are, God is Watching You: How the Fear of God Makes Us Human (Oxford University Press, 2015), which examines the role of religion in the evolution of cooperation, and how cross-culturally ubiquitous and ancient beliefs in supernatural punishment have helped to overcome collective action problems of human society. Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics (Harvard University Press, 2006), with Dominic Tierney, examines how and why popular misperceptions commonly create undeserved victories or defeats in international wars and crises. Finally, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions (Harvard University Press, 2004), argues that common psychological biases to maintain overly positive images of our capabilities, our control over events, and the future, play a key role in the causes of war.

Pascal Vennesson is Senior Fellow and Head of Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also Professor of Political Science at the University Pantheon-Assas, Paris II (on leave). His research and teaching lie at the intersection of the fields of international relations and strategic studies. Before joining RSIS, he held the Chair “Security in Europe”, at the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies. He also taught “Strategy and Policy” for ten years at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)-Bologna Center.

He is the author, co-author and editor of six books and his refereed articles have been notably published in Armed Forces and Society, International Relations, Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of Global Security Studies, Review of International Studies, Revue Française de Science Politique and Security Studies. An award-winning teacher, Professor Vennesson supervised or co-supervised more than twenty PhD dissertations in international security. He is a member of the editorial boards of Revue Française de Science Politique (French Political Science Review), Security Studies, Armed Forces and Society and the European Journal of International Security. He was a fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control, at Ohio State University’s Mershon Center and a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. He received his MA from the University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne and his Ph.D. from Sciences-Po Paris.