Professor Dennis Wilder’s 23 February seminar titled “Making Sense of the PLA Leadership Shakeup: Causes and Consequences,” examined why Xi Jinping has purged numerous members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and what this means for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) operational readiness. Prof Wilder approached the issue through a bureaucratic politics framework, emphasising factional competition within the PLA rather than viewing the purges solely as anti-corruption efforts.
He outlined four phases. Phase One marked the ascendancy of the 73rd Group Army within the Eastern Theatre Command, which oversees operations around Taiwan. Xi elevated figures such as Miao Hua and He Weidong – officers with ties to Fujian, where Xi previously served. Wilder suggested that Xi’s familiarity with these commanders helped consolidate his power base and aligned with his priority of preparing for potential Taiwan contingencies.
Phase Two saw the weakening of Zhang Youxia’s network. High-profile purges of former defence ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu – both associated with the Rocket Force and reportedly close to Zhang – were justified on grounds of corruption and alleged information leaks concerning missile silos in Xinjiang. Prof Wilder argued these charges provided political cover to undermine Zhang’s influence.
In Phase Three, Zhang appeared to strike back, possibly influencing investigations into Miao Hua and contributing to He Weidong’s removal. This raised questions about the balance of power between Xi and Zhang. Phase Four culminated in Xi moving directly against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in early 2026, with official rhetoric accusing Zhang of eroding Xi’s authority, suggesting deeper purges ahead.
Wilder concluded by posing key questions about the future composition of the CMC, Xi’s criteria for promotion, and the broader implications for PLA readiness. Audience members debated whether loyalty would trump competence, whether younger officers might be more hawkish on Taiwan, and whether the purges would ultimately hinder or accelerate China’s military preparedness and Taiwan timeline.
