How Extreme-Right Fringe Cultures and IS’s Exploitation of Social Media and Kin Networks affect the Threat Landscape

Terrorism is an ever-evolving phenomenon, which keeps morphing into new forms, amidst a shifting operational environment and socio-political circumstances. In this regard, this issue explores the growing mainstream attention given to violent fringe subcultures in the extreme-right, such as the Incel, Boogaloo and QAnon movements, which has triggered debates in the academic and policy communities, over whether such forms of violence conform to an emergent trend in terrorism. This particularly follows the indictment earlier this year of Incel activists involved in violent attacks under terrorism laws in Toronto, Canada.

Though these sub-cultures, which mainly operate online, are extreme in their behaviours and prone to violence, they arguably do not fit the orthodox definitions and classifications of terrorism. However, given the toxic operational environment in which these fringe sub-cultures operate (ethnically polarised, politically divisive and violence-prone), coupled with their ability to network on social media and the potential threat of cross-pollination, it is too dangerous to ignore them. Given these new sub-cultures are typically leaderless, lack formal structures and are disorganised, it is premature to regard their issue-specific narratives as terrorist ideologies per se, although they have the quintessential ingredients of evolving into ones. Hence, a new academic and policy discussion is needed to appropriately classify these emerging subcultures, along with the attendant policy measures to address the potential threat they pose.

This issue also focuses on the other end of the threat spectrum, with global jihadist groups like the Islamic State (IS), trying to make inroads through social media propaganda and kinship networks to recruit, radicalise and plot attacks. IS’ stepped-up propaganda outreach in India through its new propaganda magazine the Voice of Hind is a case in point. Likewise, IS’ networks in Southeast Asia continue to effectively use online platforms to appeal to potential recruits and incite them to violence. Last month, two female operatives, believed to be widows of deceased IS terrorists, participated in the twin suicide attacks in Jolo, a known stronghold of the IS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group, in the Southern Philippines, which resulted in 14 people being killed and at least 75 others injured.   

 First, Kyler Ong assesses the more diffused and diversified threat emerging from the extreme-right space in the West in recent years. According to the author, growing ideological convergence in the extreme-right landscape has come into focus, with attacks linked to individuals affiliated to loosely-aligned networks largely operating online, becoming more frequent and lethal. Increasingly, extreme-right lone actors and organisations have become more adept at exploiting social media to widen their echo chambers, and subsequently foraying into the violent space. The mainstreaming of fringe subcultures, such as the boogaloos and incels, which openly call for violence against Western governments, means a more focused and systemic counter-response is warranted. To support the authorities’ efforts, enhanced monitoring capabilities and more nuanced understanding of evolving extreme-right narratives are required.

In the next article, Ahmad Saiful Rijal Hassan and Nur Aziemah Azman examine various examples of online visual media propagated by the Islamic State (IS), from its heyday in 2015 to the present. By assessing a selection of videos, photographs, illustrations and infographics produced and disseminated by the group online, the authors argue that visual media remains a powerful tool utilised by IS in its radicalisation and recruitment efforts. Thematically, some of the visual media captures IS’ public service efforts such as in education and the civil service, while more recent images published online seek to portray IS’ continuing resilience and strength across its wilayat (provinces). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is also framed as divine retribution against the group’s enemies. Given the importance IS places on its visual propaganda, the authors suggest that counter-responses need to be upgraded to include stronger visual elements and textual rebuttals.

In the third article, Kalicharan Veera Singam analyses the narratives found in the IS’ new flagship publication Voice of Hind, which is mainly targeted at an Indian audience. According to the author, articles found in the publication espouse a variety of IS themes, ideas and propaganda messages. The group’s messaging has also evolved from one of calling Indians to perform Hijra (migration) to its so-called Caliphate, to one of championing the rights of Muslims in India. The terror group’s evolved narratives are aimed at capitalising on the growing politico-religious polarisation in the country, with the intent of weakening India’s social fabric and spawning new pro-IS cells. Moreover, while India’s security agencies have been largely effective in thwarting the kinetic threat posed by IS, countering the group’s renewed propaganda campaign could prove to be more challenging.

Lastly, Farooq Yousaf explores the possibilities and implications of kin terrorism in South Asia. The author reasons that attempts by IS to indoctrinate and cultivate family networks, including the wives and young children of male operatives, and incite them to violence, such as in the form of suicide attacks, is a relatively new trend in the region. Yet while kin terrorism in Southeast Asia has received considerable academic scrutiny, it remains underexplored in the South Asian context. Given the social and cultural sensitivities among communities in South Asia, the potential challenges in effectively addressing terrorist-related indoctrination, radicalisation and recruitment that take place within family units, are assessed.