The Taliban’s dramatic return to power in Afghanistan in the wake of the US’ military withdrawal, has sparked concerns of a global resurgence of transnational terrorism and extremism. Pro-Al Qaeda jihadist networks around the world, many with historical ties to the Taliban, have celebrated the latter’s return. As the Taliban solidifies its control, the prospect of Afghanistan reemerging as a safe haven for transnational jihadist groups, to regroup and plan terrorist attacks around the world, including in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East, looms large.

Expectedly, jihadist groups have responded in contrasting ways to the Taliban’s return. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide have framed the Taliban’s victory as their own and feel emboldened. The Taliban’s win reinforces their belief in the jihadist doctrine of strategic patience towards the end goal of establishing a global Muslim caliphate. In contrast, the developments represent a setback for the Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates, which are trying to portray the Taliban as “nationalists” and “compromised” jihadists.

At the same time, in today’s fractured, diffused, localised and low intensity threat environment, the modus operandi of jihadist groups has shifted from obsessing with terror spectaculars to lone-actor attacks, in part due to reduced operational capabilities. As jihadists’ ideological narratives, operational tactics, and strategic focus have evolved, global, regional and local responses should also adjust accordingly. With concerns around far-right extremism in the West, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic and great power competition assuming greater salience, the agenda of the jihadist extremists will also interact with these emerging threats in novel ways, producing new complexities and complications.

Against this backdrop, the current issue features five articles focusing on the global threat landscape and its evolution, two decades on from the September 2001 attacks. The first article by Raffaello Pantucci and Abdul Basit takes stock of the global threat picture on the 20^th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, amidst the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. The authors note that while the Taliban’s victory is also a symbolic win for Al-Qaeda’s brand of jihadism, the present threat landscape is qualitatively different from 2001. Hence, while a morale booster for Al-Qaeda’s worldwide affiliates, it is unlikely to materialise in September 2001-like attacks. Both Al-Qaeda and the IS lack the operational capability to execute large-scale coordinated attacks against the West. Their focus is also more on regional conflicts in different parts of Asia and Africa. The authors map the jihadist landscapes of South, Southeast and Central Asia and the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North America.

In the second article, Chayanika Saxena outlines India’s delicate position after the ouster of the Afghan government backed by the West and New Delhi. The US and India have long-held differences over their respective Afghan policies, especially the US’ partnership with Pakistan in its global war on terror, and the role Islamabad has played in shaping developments in Afghanistan. According to the author, the recent US withdrawal has dealt a significant blow to Indian geostrategic and security interests, which will compel Delhi to quickly adapt its policies to the new regional dynamics and shifting alliances to secure Indian interests, including in the counterterrorism sphere. While cordial relations with the Taliban regime are extremely unlikely, India might have to stave off its long-standing reluctance to engage directly with the group, to better safeguard Indian interests.

In the third article, Sitara Noor outlines the likely implications of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power from Pakistan’s perspective. The author argues that Pakistan expects the Taliban to fulfil their commitments of granting rights to Afghan women and other political and ethnic minorities, alongside addressing the international community’s counter-terrorism concerns. She cautions that the Taliban’s failures to fulfil these demands would destabilise Afghanistan, negatively impacting Pakistan. She outlines an uptick of terrorism, the influx of refugees and the intensification of regional proxy wars, as the potential outcomes of an unstable Afghanistan for Pakistan.

In the fourth article, Iftekharul Bashar looks at the security implications of the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan for Bangladesh. Much like the rest of South Asia, Bangladesh has a history of Islamist extremism and terrorism, and is likely to face an uptick in terrorist activity. Developments in Afghanistan will rejuvenate terrorist groups in Bangladesh that share a common ideology with the Taliban, and are seeking to establish ties with the new regime. The author argues there could be increased attempts by Bangladeshi militants to travel to Afghanistan for combat or operational training, or indirectly benefit from the lawless situation in the latter. As such, proactive monitoring, effective border security, and regional and international collaboration will be required to manage the evolving threat.

Finally, Suraj Ganesan discusses the Islamic State (IS)’s strategy in Afghanistan and the region after the Taliban takeover. His article taps into information in encrypted social media platforms such as Telegram, to gain insights into the IS’ anti-Taliban propaganda and related activities. According to the author, IS frames the Taliban’s openness to Afghan nationalism, acceptance of some minorities and its formal engagements with other states, as policies which render its Islamist credentials questionable. IS’ push via its propaganda efforts, which are aimed at keeping sectarian and conflict tensions running, and operational advances, as it seeks to maintain a presence in the territory, could spur the Taliban to engage in more violence as a consequence.