In 2021, as the COVID-19 pandemic entered its second year, the terrorism landscape continued to occupy policy attention worldwide. Especially prominent was the US’ “strategic failure” in preventing the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, which provided “a shot in the arm” for Islamist terror networks worldwide. Given Al Qaeda’s historic links with the Taliban, the former has arguably never been better positioned since Osama Bin Laden’s killing. Developments in Kabul also impacted the “geopolitical posture” of regional states, particularly neighbouring Pakistan. Similarly, Southeast Asian pro-Taliban-Al Qaeda networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah, drew the lesson that sheer perseverance in fighting a mighty enemy and divine intervention will likewise make them victorious as well.

For the Islamic State and its affiliates worldwide, however, the Taliban victory presented a more complex threat picture. At one level, it generally represented a symbolic win for all Islamist extremist networks worldwide, including IS, because it resuscitated Islamist militants’ belief in jihad to establish an Islamic state, and then a global Muslim caliphate. Yet, in Afghanistan itself, IS appeared violently opposed to the Taliban and its Al Qaeda allies. IS responded to the Taliban victory by publicly questioning its Islamist legitimacy, charging the new Taliban is essentially in cahoots with the US. IS also declared itself the only group fighting to establish a caliphate, thereby deserving of the support of global jihadists. Around Southeast Asia, IS supporters also reacted negatively.

Across the regions surveyed in this volume, in addition to the Taliban’s return and its ensuing impact, the evolving global violent extremist threat is assessed via the following major trends:  Operational Issues and Challenges for Islamist Militants; An Evolving Spectrum of Attack Modalities and Targets; Role of Women, Families and Youth;. Role of Ideological Ecosystems; The Evolving Extreme Right Threat; and  State Responses: A Mix of “Hard” and Soft Measures.

A Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, with its vast ungoverned spaces, could potentially relapse into an Al Qaeda stronghold, attracting foreign fighters as well as some disaffected Taliban fighters. Such fears were reinforced by doubts concerning the Biden Administration’s plan for “over the horizon” drone attacks targeting the IS-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) affiliate in Afghanistan. For its part, IS-KP has developed a stronghold in the eastern province of Nangarhar, which could become a melting pot of radicalised individuals from the region as well as anti-Taliban groups.

The continuing importance of cross-border and wider transnational links of Islamist terror networks was also observed throughout 2021, even as the pandemic-driven movement restrictions that has hampered inter-state and international movements largely flattened the curve of terrorism globally. Attack modalities also evolved globally, while lone-actor attacks persisted. In Indonesia, for example, bombings appeared to be the preferred modus operandi employed by pro-IS militant group. This was in contrast to stabbings and shootings in previous years.

Further, women, families and youth assumed greater operational importance in Islamist terror networks over the past year. In Syria, for instance, ideologically indoctrinated pro-IS women within the Al-Hol refugee camp formed hesba (religious policing) units, violently imposing IS ideology upon former IS fighters’ wives who had denounced IS and were seeking to return to their countries of origin. Women also featured as actual combatants. In the Philippines, the pro-IS Sulu faction in Mindanao appeared to have groomed female suicide bombers, many reportedly the wives, widows or daughters of slain ASG leaders and fighters.

With regards to youth, the pro-IS Neo-JMB in Bangladesh started recruiting children and teenagers into its ranks, mostly from Ahle Hadis/Salafi-dominated villages. In Europe, youth have also been targeted by the Extreme Right, possibly as the push online due to pandemic-related restrictions has provided a ripe environment them to be drawn towards extremist plotting, if not actual violence as yet. Additionally, the importance of ideological ecosystems propagating violent extremist narratives persisted in 2021. Such ecosystems included, amongst other elements, interconnected networks of social media and print platforms, strategic influencers or persons, as well as certain extremist organisational, educational and religious places.

Finally, apart from the 6 January 2021 Capitol Hill riot in Washington, DC, that reportedly involved a number of “identifiably right-wing extremists” seeking to support former US President Donald Trump following his November 2020 election defeat, large-scale acts of violence emanating exclusively from the Extreme Right was limited in 2021. But arrests allegedly continued primarily in the US, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific, mostly Australia. Much of the violence was driven by anger against government lockdown measures and vaccination-related policies. Separately, worrying signs of the further mainstreaming of Buddhist Extremist-fuelled anti-Muslim sentiment was apparent in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, while in India there were innumerable incidents of Hindutva mobs continuing to target Muslim and Christian minorities.

Overall, given the challenging transnational terrorism and extremism landscape in 2021, a blend of hard, short-term and softer medium to longer-term approaches to comprehensively deal with the full spectrum of the threat continue to be required.