Six months on from the Taliban’s sudden takeover of Afghanistan, the global threat landscape has not been significantly transformed beyond an upsurge in jihadists’ online propaganda replete with celebratory triumphalism. The United Nations Security Council’s February 2022 report on Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) highlights no notable movement of jihadist militants from different parts of the world to Afghanistan to date. Thus, the notion surrounding Afghanistan’s slide back into a hub of transnational terrorism seems exaggerated. At the same time, experts warn it remains premature to evaluate Afghanistan’s potential as a terrorist sanctuary given various jihadist groups, particularly AQ, could take between twelve to eighteen months to revive and relaunch their activities. As such, while diplomatic engagement with the Taliban regime is necessary to avert Afghanistan’s slide into a civil war, the international community needs to carefully monitor the trajectory of different jihadist groups still sheltered in the country.

On February 3, the global jihadist movement suffered a significant blow when US Special Operation Forces eliminated the reclusive IS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi in Syria’s Idlib province. Though largely a ceremonial figurehead, unlike the charismatic personality of his predecessor Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Qurashi’s elimination still represents a major setback for the already embattled IS. Presently, IS’ franchises in Africa and Asia are stronger than the core group based in Iraq and Syria.

Taken together, the emerging global threat picture is paradoxically static yet evolving, which is inspiring various jihadist groups ideologically without translating into an immediate tangible threat. The counter-terrorism and counter-extremism community needs to stay vigilant to carefully track the trajectory of global threats and respond pro-actively. This is even as we are presently witnessing an epoch in the evolution of global terrorism where there is more noise and less action as well as more groups but less terrorism.

Against this backdrop, the March issue of the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA), comprising four articles, looks at some trends in radicalisation in Indonesia and Malaysia and the impact of broader violent extremist threats resulting from the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan for Malaysia and China respectively.

In the first article, V. Arianti and Amresh Gunasingham assess the state of youth militancy in Indonesia. The article identifies a range of neuropsychological, family and socio-economic factors in addition to the role of transnational Islamist movements to explain radicalisation among youth. According to the authors, the case study of Indonesia is instructive given youth perpetrators have featured prominently in recent terrorist plots and attacks in the country. In particular, the role of the family has been significant in enabling the transmission and perpetuation of radical sentiments to younger generations, and is situated within the wider social milieu in Indonesia where extremist and terrorist organisations thrive. Finally, while progress has been made in Indonesia’s “soft” approach and civil society responses in rehabilitating and constructively engaging young perpetrators, several challenges remain.

Next, Akil Yunus discusses the challenges posed by and ongoing efforts in countering online radicalisation in Malaysia during the COVID-19 pandemic. While there has been a reduction in the physical activities of terrorist organisations in Malaysia, terrorist propaganda accentuated by conspiracy theories and racial and ethnically motivated violent extremism has been proliferating in the cyber domain. The article suggests that “hard” approaches will be insufficient; instead, it postulates that a multi-stakeholder “soft” approach involving government agencies, civil society, youth and media will yield better results in confronting extremist threats in the cyber space. Given the limitations in traditional “soft” approaches, the author emphasises “digital resilience” as a potential long term and sustainable solution to the problem of online radicalisation.

In the third article, Stefanie Kam examines China’s principal security interests in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal. The author notes that Beijing’s main purpose in the post-US Afghanistan is to prevent the destabilisation of its Xinjiang province arising from the potential cross-border infiltration of the Turkestan Islamic Party. Furthermore, she notes that terrorist groups such as IS and Al-Qaeda, which have also targeted China in their propaganda in the past, also factor into China’s security calculus. In view of the Islamic State of Khorasan’s more assertive messaging targeting Beijing in the October 2021 Kunduz attack, the intensity of the terrorist threat to Chinese interests would be shaped by the dynamics between the militant groups and Beijing.

Finally, Mohd Mizan Aslam examines the impact of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan on the Malaysian and regional security landscapes. According to the author, in addition to motivating Malaysian fighters to travel to the Afghan theatre, the Taliban victory could potentially rekindle Al-Qaeda’s association with Taliban-allied Southeast Asian jihadist groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The article suggests a possible increase in the militant activities of the pro-Taliban elements and sympathy from political entities in Malaysia that attempt to normalise Kuala Lumpur’s diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Such developments, the author argues, could invite counter-attacks from rival IS-affiliated groups. In addition, the challenges posed by online recruitment, recidivism, and poorly governed areas in Malaysia and the wider region could continue to be exploited by extremist groups.