01 August 2002
WP030 | Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in Post – Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms, and Organization
Abstract
This paper examines the major changes regarding the Chinese Navy (PLAN, or the
People’s Liberation Army Navy) between the pre-1985 period and the post-1985 period. It
shows that major conceptual changes have taken place to the PLAN’s functions, warfare,
arms, and organization since 1985. On functions, rather than the pre-1985 emphasis on
protecting continental territory through resisting aggression by a singular adversary
against China’s coastlines, the new emphasis has been placed on defending maritime
territory and interests against multiple potential adversaries away from China’s shore. On
warfare, instead of the pre-1985 stress on the defensive counter-amphibious landing
operations, the new emphasis has been placed on capturing and sustaining sea control for
the offensive amphibious landing operations. On naval arms, rather than the old stress on
the defensive, short range, and more numerous light ships, new emphasis has been placed
on developing fewer but better quality, longer range, and multi-role capital ships capable
of offensive operations. On organization, unlike the old focus on the land-based command
and control, manpower, and dispersion, the new stress has shifted to ship-based command
and control and technology-based integration. In the meantime, major obstacles still exist
for the new concepts to be fully translated into reality.
Abstract
This paper examines the major changes regarding the Chinese Navy (PLAN, or the
People’s Liberation Army Navy) between the pre-1985 period and the post-1985 period. It
shows that major conceptual changes have taken place to the PLAN’s functions, warfare,
arms, and organization since 1985. On functions, rather than the pre-1985 emphasis on
protecting continental territory through resisting aggression by a singular adversary
against China’s coastlines, the new emphasis has been placed on defending maritime
territory and interests against multiple potential adversaries away from China’s shore. On
warfare, instead of the pre-1985 stress on the defensive counter-amphibious landing
operations, the new emphasis has been placed on capturing and sustaining sea control for
the offensive amphibious landing operations. On naval arms, rather than the old stress on
the defensive, short range, and more numerous light ships, new emphasis has been placed
on developing fewer but better quality, longer range, and multi-role capital ships capable
of offensive operations. On organization, unlike the old focus on the land-based command
and control, manpower, and dispersion, the new stress has shifted to ship-based command
and control and technology-based integration. In the meantime, major obstacles still exist
for the new concepts to be fully translated into reality.
