13 December 2013
Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College Seminar 2013
Executive Summary
Narratives can be understood, using Lawrence Freedman’s definition – as a compelling story line that can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn. A narrative is intuitively equated with a story with a hero and a villain and is presented as a plot and not simply a set of facts. They are social products born out of a particular context, and are dynamic, not static.
Narratives are not static, but are continuously being told and interpreted, and often become a brand that will vary geographically, as well as in the minds of the targeted audiences. As such, narratives are actually interpretive lenses with which people experience their external surroundings. They are essential in the construction of identity as they provide frames of reference to who a person is. More importantly, it allows the dichotomous presentation of an “us” and “them,” and therefore the quick identification of “friend” and “foe.” This is particularly important in the recruitment of members by non-state actors across national boundaries.
Above all, narratives are the foundation of strategy. They provide the organizational framework of policy as they are the anointed rhetorical handbook on how a conflict is presented, argued for and even ended. Furthermore, sound strategic narratives can offer a level of protection to the overall mission in that the stories they perpetuate can be easily adapted to changing scenarios, and therefore provide a level of flexibility for strategy to be modified and change.
With this understanding of what strategic narratives mean, the Seminar proceeded to focus on three sets of issues – the changing context of strategy, the dynamics of the twenty first century Asia Pacific security environment and the competition of narratives therein, and how narratives can apply to military operations itself thereafter.
The context in which strategy is made has changed, and to large extent, the changes have come in the realm of information. The increasing ubiquity of information technologies – both in the processing and communications realms – not only changes the manner in which strategies are constructed; they may even change the specific strategies per se. This increasing ubiquity of information also impacts on the key context of strategy, international politics. Information ubiquity means that an increasing number of actors, especially private and non-state actors, become relevant in the process of making strategy and in international politics. A key interest for state actors, increasingly, will be to ensure that there is coherence between words and deeds; mismatches in words and deeds will undermine the credibility of the state actor, or to use the language of the seminar topic, undermine the effectiveness of the state’s strategic narratives. In this regard, war can be understood as a competition of two or more conflicting narratives. Strategic success increasingly is not just about ensuring that the opponent is no longer in a position to deny one’s attainment of desired political end-states; it is also about ensuring that the international community – states, international organisations, non-state actors and private citizens alike – understands that the opponent is on “the wrong side”.
To a large extent, this abstract argument is being played out in reality. The international politics of the Asia Pacific is increasingly a competition of conflicting narratives. Who, in the first place, are the actors involved in the Asia Pacific? The answer, increasingly, is just about anyone who has an interest (real or imagined) in the region. Inter-state dynamics are being played out in an ever-widening audience, and in this ever-widening audience, the capacity of one side to portray its argument as just is increasingly problematic. Sino-American relations do not play out to Chinese and American audiences alone, but rather include third-party actors who may have no direct involvement in this relationship. And in the twenty first century battle space, therefore, the influence of such third-party actors constitutes a growing difficult problem that current strategic concepts are struggling to get to terms with.
Finally, how do narratives impact on the processes of military operations? Again, the consistent theme that the papers of this Seminar have provided is the need to ensure coherence between words and deeds. From stabilisation operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. Global War on Terror, to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the papers indicate that when there is a serious disjuncture between words and deeds, between rhetoric and reality, strategic success becomes more and more elusive.
Executive Summary
Narratives can be understood, using Lawrence Freedman’s definition – as a compelling story line that can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn. A narrative is intuitively equated with a story with a hero and a villain and is presented as a plot and not simply a set of facts. They are social products born out of a particular context, and are dynamic, not static.
Narratives are not static, but are continuously being told and interpreted, and often become a brand that will vary geographically, as well as in the minds of the targeted audiences. As such, narratives are actually interpretive lenses with which people experience their external surroundings. They are essential in the construction of identity as they provide frames of reference to who a person is. More importantly, it allows the dichotomous presentation of an “us” and “them,” and therefore the quick identification of “friend” and “foe.” This is particularly important in the recruitment of members by non-state actors across national boundaries.
Above all, narratives are the foundation of strategy. They provide the organizational framework of policy as they are the anointed rhetorical handbook on how a conflict is presented, argued for and even ended. Furthermore, sound strategic narratives can offer a level of protection to the overall mission in that the stories they perpetuate can be easily adapted to changing scenarios, and therefore provide a level of flexibility for strategy to be modified and change.
With this understanding of what strategic narratives mean, the Seminar proceeded to focus on three sets of issues – the changing context of strategy, the dynamics of the twenty first century Asia Pacific security environment and the competition of narratives therein, and how narratives can apply to military operations itself thereafter.
The context in which strategy is made has changed, and to large extent, the changes have come in the realm of information. The increasing ubiquity of information technologies – both in the processing and communications realms – not only changes the manner in which strategies are constructed; they may even change the specific strategies per se. This increasing ubiquity of information also impacts on the key context of strategy, international politics. Information ubiquity means that an increasing number of actors, especially private and non-state actors, become relevant in the process of making strategy and in international politics. A key interest for state actors, increasingly, will be to ensure that there is coherence between words and deeds; mismatches in words and deeds will undermine the credibility of the state actor, or to use the language of the seminar topic, undermine the effectiveness of the state’s strategic narratives. In this regard, war can be understood as a competition of two or more conflicting narratives. Strategic success increasingly is not just about ensuring that the opponent is no longer in a position to deny one’s attainment of desired political end-states; it is also about ensuring that the international community – states, international organisations, non-state actors and private citizens alike – understands that the opponent is on “the wrong side”.
To a large extent, this abstract argument is being played out in reality. The international politics of the Asia Pacific is increasingly a competition of conflicting narratives. Who, in the first place, are the actors involved in the Asia Pacific? The answer, increasingly, is just about anyone who has an interest (real or imagined) in the region. Inter-state dynamics are being played out in an ever-widening audience, and in this ever-widening audience, the capacity of one side to portray its argument as just is increasingly problematic. Sino-American relations do not play out to Chinese and American audiences alone, but rather include third-party actors who may have no direct involvement in this relationship. And in the twenty first century battle space, therefore, the influence of such third-party actors constitutes a growing difficult problem that current strategic concepts are struggling to get to terms with.
Finally, how do narratives impact on the processes of military operations? Again, the consistent theme that the papers of this Seminar have provided is the need to ensure coherence between words and deeds. From stabilisation operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. Global War on Terror, to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the papers indicate that when there is a serious disjuncture between words and deeds, between rhetoric and reality, strategic success becomes more and more elusive.
