30 December 2021
Global Leadership in a Polycentric World
Executive Summary
I. The next 20 years is likely to witness significant changes, particularly in the overall configuration of the international order. One key challenge lies in the issue of global leadership. With the United States’ international primacy increasingly challenged and questioned, and the rise of China’s geopolitical influence generating considerable anxiety, smaller states have to carefully consider how best to navigate the new international environment. With a more polycentric global structure as the likely outcome, issues of international leadership and the rules and norms governing the global order are likely to come under heightened stress and challenge in the medium to long term. This workshop seeks to provide important insights into the structural shifts in the global order by identifying the key drivers, players (or countries), and emerging theatres of conflict (either regionally or globally). Specifically, it will consider new threats and opportunities that smaller states will have to confront in the international operating environment in the coming two decades and chart out possible strategies to respond. These points were the focus of the China Programme’s November 2021 workshop, which brought together a diverse group of scholars from China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The meeting was conducted online with about 40 other participants.
II. It was shared that China’s view of global governance is very much related to its ability to lead, which at present remains somewhat partial. While China is likely to want to take a more active role in global economic issues, it is reluctant to assume the same mandate as the United States’ in dealing with security issues. And although China could potentially be a leader in multilateral forums, a global leadership transition from Washington to Beijing still remains unlikely. Moreover, it seems that China’s present goal is to secure regional leadership instead of pursuing global leadership.
III. It was also observed that China seeks global governance as a shared responsibility, one that all major powers contribute to. China’s preference is for decisions to be made at the United Nations (UN) and for countries to abide by the UN laws. While China’s rise has caused anxiety in many countries, China’s participation and support for the UN were said to be key indicators of its willingness to help and cooperate with others, a sentiment particularly widespread among those in the developing world.
IV. Given China’s prominence, it is likely that American unipolarity is no longer sustainable in the long run and that a multipolar order will emerge as a result. However, many countries view China’s rise with anxiety and, as such, seek to constrain Beijing’s power. On China’s part, the country wants to dominate Asia and establish itself as the region’s primary power.
V. At the same time, small states are not without agency as great powers are unable to fully impose their will and preference on regional governance, no matter how strong they are. Through plurilateral arrangements, small states can obtain greater flexibility and choice in their external engagements, and contribute to regional governance while achieving their own national interests.
VI. While China’s increased material capabilities has brought with it the means to play a leading role in international affairs, it is not ready to lead globally in the same comprehensive manner as the United States has, given China’s primary focus on domestic developments. The United States is currently perceived as being less interested in global affairs, and as China is not prepared to fully assume the responsibilities of a global leader, other countries have to step in and bear the greater burdens of global leadership and governance.
VII. China is likely to utilise the United Nations to further its international objectives and project its global influence. It will continue to champion the rights and voice of the Global South and challenge Western dominance and influence. The challenge for China’s leadership is to pursue its international objectives without compromising its domestic interests.
Executive Summary
I. The next 20 years is likely to witness significant changes, particularly in the overall configuration of the international order. One key challenge lies in the issue of global leadership. With the United States’ international primacy increasingly challenged and questioned, and the rise of China’s geopolitical influence generating considerable anxiety, smaller states have to carefully consider how best to navigate the new international environment. With a more polycentric global structure as the likely outcome, issues of international leadership and the rules and norms governing the global order are likely to come under heightened stress and challenge in the medium to long term. This workshop seeks to provide important insights into the structural shifts in the global order by identifying the key drivers, players (or countries), and emerging theatres of conflict (either regionally or globally). Specifically, it will consider new threats and opportunities that smaller states will have to confront in the international operating environment in the coming two decades and chart out possible strategies to respond. These points were the focus of the China Programme’s November 2021 workshop, which brought together a diverse group of scholars from China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The meeting was conducted online with about 40 other participants.
II. It was shared that China’s view of global governance is very much related to its ability to lead, which at present remains somewhat partial. While China is likely to want to take a more active role in global economic issues, it is reluctant to assume the same mandate as the United States’ in dealing with security issues. And although China could potentially be a leader in multilateral forums, a global leadership transition from Washington to Beijing still remains unlikely. Moreover, it seems that China’s present goal is to secure regional leadership instead of pursuing global leadership.
III. It was also observed that China seeks global governance as a shared responsibility, one that all major powers contribute to. China’s preference is for decisions to be made at the United Nations (UN) and for countries to abide by the UN laws. While China’s rise has caused anxiety in many countries, China’s participation and support for the UN were said to be key indicators of its willingness to help and cooperate with others, a sentiment particularly widespread among those in the developing world.
IV. Given China’s prominence, it is likely that American unipolarity is no longer sustainable in the long run and that a multipolar order will emerge as a result. However, many countries view China’s rise with anxiety and, as such, seek to constrain Beijing’s power. On China’s part, the country wants to dominate Asia and establish itself as the region’s primary power.
V. At the same time, small states are not without agency as great powers are unable to fully impose their will and preference on regional governance, no matter how strong they are. Through plurilateral arrangements, small states can obtain greater flexibility and choice in their external engagements, and contribute to regional governance while achieving their own national interests.
VI. While China’s increased material capabilities has brought with it the means to play a leading role in international affairs, it is not ready to lead globally in the same comprehensive manner as the United States has, given China’s primary focus on domestic developments. The United States is currently perceived as being less interested in global affairs, and as China is not prepared to fully assume the responsibilities of a global leader, other countries have to step in and bear the greater burdens of global leadership and governance.
VII. China is likely to utilise the United Nations to further its international objectives and project its global influence. It will continue to champion the rights and voice of the Global South and challenge Western dominance and influence. The challenge for China’s leadership is to pursue its international objectives without compromising its domestic interests.
