Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • IP23028 | ASEAN Maritime Outlook: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    IP23028 | ASEAN Maritime Outlook: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
    Jane Chan Git Yin, Gilang Kembara

    21 March 2023

    download pdf

    Indonesia recently tabled a concept paper on the ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO), an idea it had mooted last year. GILANG KEMBARA and JANE CHAN note that it may be too ambitious to expect the AMO to be finalised during Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN, but they believe there is much that Indonesia can do to lay the groundwork for the AMO to move forward.

     

    COMMENTARY

    In November 2022, Indonesia’s foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, raised the prospect of an ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO) in a speech at the 25th meeting of the ASEAN Political and Security Council (APSC) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Since then, few details of what the AMO would entail have been revealed. However, FM Marsudi did make clear that the AMO would not only focus on maritime security, which suggests that its scope would be significantly broad ranging. This bodes well for its feasibility, given the multifarious perspectives on maritime issues among ASEAN’s members. The need to develop an AMO was raised again during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Retreat (AMMR) convened in Jakarta in February 2023, when a concept paper that Indonesia tabled was adopted.

    The Concept Paper on the Development of AMO outlines how the AMO could be formulated under the Indonesian chairmanship. It sets out the fundamental aspects of the AMO, including what can be expected of it. Referring to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), the document also sets out to advance priorities already laid out in the AOIP.

    What It May Entail

    Commentators suggest that the AMO will most likely be a stocktake exercise to review ASEAN’s existing maritime-related mechanisms. While it may not be the grand policy or strategy document that critics from within and outside ASEAN had called for, the AMO will still be an important and much-needed endeavour for ASEAN. The last time a review was done on the status of existing ASEAN and ASEAN-led maritime mechanisms and initiatives was in 2008.

    The maritime priorities of individual ASEAN member states differ and have evolved over time. New priorities have emerged in the past two decades, especially as climate and environment matters were finally recognised as urgent and got some attention within the region. Marine plastic, ecotourism, blue economy, just to name a few issues, have led to some discussions about new regional initiatives. But it took a pandemic, and possibly a war, to force states to rethink their maritime policy at the national level, and now at the regional level too.

    The AMO is likely to highlight the significance of each of the maritime issues that ASEAN observes under its various sectoral bodies. Currently, there is no sectoral ministerial body dedicated to maritime affairs. Thus, by underlining the work that ASEAN’s sectoral bodies have done to alleviate various maritime issues, the AMO will help to gain further insight into whether there is a need to streamline several issues into a single overarching topic or add emerging issues into the fray.

    On top of that, the AMO could accentuate maritime cooperation between ASEAN and other multilateral organisations owing to the fluidity of maritime issues that often transcend geopolitical boundaries. In some ways, the AOIP has already laid the path forward for ASEAN to link up with subregional organisations such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). By clearly outlining ASEAN’s maritime priorities, the common maritime agendas will become more apparent. Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific has seen the advent of minilateral groupings that seek to advocate maritime issues, the QUAD – involving the United States, Japan, India, and Australia – being one of them.

    IP23028
    While the ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO) may not be the grand policy or strategy many have called for, it will still be an important endeavour for ASEAN in reviewing existing maritime-related mechanisms, highlighting the maritime issues it observes under its various sectoral bodies and emphasising maritime cooperation with other multilateral organisations. Image from Wikimedia Commons. 

    What It May Not Be

    The AOIP has received strong criticism as to its practical value, with critics usually pointing to the lack of deliverables or tangible outcomes. Supporters counter that critics may have misinterpreted the intent and purpose of the AOIP: the AOIP was by no means intended as a strategy to guide ASEAN through the intricacy of great power rivalry, but rather to establish key areas of cooperation that could be integrated with the Indo-Pacific strategies of ASEAN’s dialogue partners. In line with this view, the same should be expected of the AMO; the document will not provide a blueprint for ASEAN’s maritime strategy.

    ASEAN’s broad maritime perspectives arise from the differing maritime priorities of its member states. The 10, and soon to become 11, ASEAN member states have specific maritime issues that need to be tackled. There are very few issues that can mobilise “whole-of-ASEAN” action. For example, the problem of illegal migration in the Andaman Sea is being managed mainly by its littorals.

    It is also unlikely that the AMO will introduce new mechanisms or platforms to carry out its intended purposes since various maritime-related mechanisms are already in place, such as the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Intersessional Meeting (ARF-ISM) on Maritime Security, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts’ Working Group on Maritime Security.

    Starting on the Right Foot

    It may be too ambitious to expect the AMO to be finalised during Indonesia’s chairmanship. But much can be done by Indonesia to pave the way forward. Indonesia must utilise its chairmanship effectively to communicate to the other ASEAN members its rationale for mooting the AMO. The February 2023 AMMR was a good start to get the idea across the table, especially with the adoption of the Concept Paper on the Development of AMO. As no specific deadline or timeline has been set for the delivery of the first draft, it may be useful to consider setting some tangible milestones even beyond Indonesia’s chairmanship.

    To that end, Indonesia must ensure that the initiative is carried out by the next ASEAN chair, possibly by utilising the Troika mechanism to maintain the momentum of the AMO in the overall ASEAN agenda. Moreover, the AMO would need an existing ASEAN mechanism to push its agenda. The most relevant ASEAN mechanism to host deliberations on the AMO would be the AMF and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (E-AMF) that follows. Discussion of the AMO could provide an impetus to reinvigorate both the AMF and E-AMF processes.

     

    Gilang KEMBARA is Researcher at the Department of International Relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia. Jane CHAN is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).

    Categories: IDSS Papers / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

    Indonesia recently tabled a concept paper on the ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO), an idea it had mooted last year. GILANG KEMBARA and JANE CHAN note that it may be too ambitious to expect the AMO to be finalised during Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN, but they believe there is much that Indonesia can do to lay the groundwork for the AMO to move forward.

     

    COMMENTARY

    In November 2022, Indonesia’s foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, raised the prospect of an ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO) in a speech at the 25th meeting of the ASEAN Political and Security Council (APSC) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Since then, few details of what the AMO would entail have been revealed. However, FM Marsudi did make clear that the AMO would not only focus on maritime security, which suggests that its scope would be significantly broad ranging. This bodes well for its feasibility, given the multifarious perspectives on maritime issues among ASEAN’s members. The need to develop an AMO was raised again during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Retreat (AMMR) convened in Jakarta in February 2023, when a concept paper that Indonesia tabled was adopted.

    The Concept Paper on the Development of AMO outlines how the AMO could be formulated under the Indonesian chairmanship. It sets out the fundamental aspects of the AMO, including what can be expected of it. Referring to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), the document also sets out to advance priorities already laid out in the AOIP.

    What It May Entail

    Commentators suggest that the AMO will most likely be a stocktake exercise to review ASEAN’s existing maritime-related mechanisms. While it may not be the grand policy or strategy document that critics from within and outside ASEAN had called for, the AMO will still be an important and much-needed endeavour for ASEAN. The last time a review was done on the status of existing ASEAN and ASEAN-led maritime mechanisms and initiatives was in 2008.

    The maritime priorities of individual ASEAN member states differ and have evolved over time. New priorities have emerged in the past two decades, especially as climate and environment matters were finally recognised as urgent and got some attention within the region. Marine plastic, ecotourism, blue economy, just to name a few issues, have led to some discussions about new regional initiatives. But it took a pandemic, and possibly a war, to force states to rethink their maritime policy at the national level, and now at the regional level too.

    The AMO is likely to highlight the significance of each of the maritime issues that ASEAN observes under its various sectoral bodies. Currently, there is no sectoral ministerial body dedicated to maritime affairs. Thus, by underlining the work that ASEAN’s sectoral bodies have done to alleviate various maritime issues, the AMO will help to gain further insight into whether there is a need to streamline several issues into a single overarching topic or add emerging issues into the fray.

    On top of that, the AMO could accentuate maritime cooperation between ASEAN and other multilateral organisations owing to the fluidity of maritime issues that often transcend geopolitical boundaries. In some ways, the AOIP has already laid the path forward for ASEAN to link up with subregional organisations such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). By clearly outlining ASEAN’s maritime priorities, the common maritime agendas will become more apparent. Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific has seen the advent of minilateral groupings that seek to advocate maritime issues, the QUAD – involving the United States, Japan, India, and Australia – being one of them.

    IP23028
    While the ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO) may not be the grand policy or strategy many have called for, it will still be an important endeavour for ASEAN in reviewing existing maritime-related mechanisms, highlighting the maritime issues it observes under its various sectoral bodies and emphasising maritime cooperation with other multilateral organisations. Image from Wikimedia Commons. 

    What It May Not Be

    The AOIP has received strong criticism as to its practical value, with critics usually pointing to the lack of deliverables or tangible outcomes. Supporters counter that critics may have misinterpreted the intent and purpose of the AOIP: the AOIP was by no means intended as a strategy to guide ASEAN through the intricacy of great power rivalry, but rather to establish key areas of cooperation that could be integrated with the Indo-Pacific strategies of ASEAN’s dialogue partners. In line with this view, the same should be expected of the AMO; the document will not provide a blueprint for ASEAN’s maritime strategy.

    ASEAN’s broad maritime perspectives arise from the differing maritime priorities of its member states. The 10, and soon to become 11, ASEAN member states have specific maritime issues that need to be tackled. There are very few issues that can mobilise “whole-of-ASEAN” action. For example, the problem of illegal migration in the Andaman Sea is being managed mainly by its littorals.

    It is also unlikely that the AMO will introduce new mechanisms or platforms to carry out its intended purposes since various maritime-related mechanisms are already in place, such as the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Intersessional Meeting (ARF-ISM) on Maritime Security, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts’ Working Group on Maritime Security.

    Starting on the Right Foot

    It may be too ambitious to expect the AMO to be finalised during Indonesia’s chairmanship. But much can be done by Indonesia to pave the way forward. Indonesia must utilise its chairmanship effectively to communicate to the other ASEAN members its rationale for mooting the AMO. The February 2023 AMMR was a good start to get the idea across the table, especially with the adoption of the Concept Paper on the Development of AMO. As no specific deadline or timeline has been set for the delivery of the first draft, it may be useful to consider setting some tangible milestones even beyond Indonesia’s chairmanship.

    To that end, Indonesia must ensure that the initiative is carried out by the next ASEAN chair, possibly by utilising the Troika mechanism to maintain the momentum of the AMO in the overall ASEAN agenda. Moreover, the AMO would need an existing ASEAN mechanism to push its agenda. The most relevant ASEAN mechanism to host deliberations on the AMO would be the AMF and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (E-AMF) that follows. Discussion of the AMO could provide an impetus to reinvigorate both the AMF and E-AMF processes.

     

    Gilang KEMBARA is Researcher at the Department of International Relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia. Jane CHAN is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).

    Categories: IDSS Papers

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info