Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • IP24068 | The “Community with a Shared Future”: China’s Order of “Harmonious” Relations
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    IP24068 | The “Community with a Shared Future”: China’s Order of “Harmonious” Relations
    Tsjeng Zhizhao Henrick

    04 September 2024

    download pdf

    China’s “community with a shared future” – President Xi Jinping’s signature vision for a global order – is deeply embedded in Beijing’s multilateral diplomacy, as shown in recent Chinese engagements with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism. What does such a “community” entail for small and medium-sized countries when they engage with China?

       

     

     

    COMMENTARY

    At the forefront of China’s multilateral diplomacy towards small and medium-sized countries is its all-out push of the “community with a shared future” – Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature vision for a future global order. China’s most recent engagements in Central and Southeast Asia amply demonstrate this vision at work. The pattern is clear: emphasise cooperation with China’s partners and sweep all tensions and issues under the rug, while expecting its counterparts to do likewise.

    IP24068
    Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision for a future global order – “community with a shared future” – might require countries to adopt a more flexible diplomacy with China in order to retain ties while upholding their own national interests. Image from Pixabay.

    A Chinese-led Order of Carrots and Sticks

    China seeks to promote a new kind of international order – one in which Chinese preferences for “harmonious” interstate relationships and the respect for sovereignty are the norm. The document “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions”, released by China’s State Council Information Office in September 2023, makes clear that China’s vision “stands on the right side of history and on the side of human progress. It introduces a new approach for international relations, provides new ideas for global governance … and draws a new blueprint for a better world.”

    Compared to the US-led order where “[s]ome countries’ hegemonic … actions against others … are causing great harm”, the document proclaims that “China has been committed to fulfilling its role as a responsible major country, pushing for the resolution of international and regional flashpoints”. It stresses that China stands ready to lead a “better” global order, respecting countries’ sovereignty and governance preferences.

    When it comes to territorial disputes, the key source of friction between China and its neighbours, the document glosses over the subject by simply mentioning that the way forward would be to peacefully manage and resolve disputes through “dialogue and consultation”. What is left unsaid is that any country that falls out of line by directly confronting Beijing or bandwagoning with the United States can expect reprisals.

    This view of how “harmonious” international relations should be conducted is strongly reflected in China’s approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism.

    The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

    In early July, Xi travelled to Kazakhstan, where he also attended the 24th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO. The Astana Declaration furnished a long list of accomplishments and commitments by the SCO and affirmed that member states formed “a shared vision of the idea of creating a community of common destiny for mankind”, a formulation clearly pushed by China and endorsed by all SCO member states.

    However, there were obvious issues missing from the discussions. Bilateral spats were left out, such as the ongoing China-India and India-Pakistan tensions, apart from a vague affirmation by member states of their commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes through dialogue. In a sideline meeting between Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and his Indian counterpart, S. Jaishankar, in Astana, the former insisted on “properly handling … the situation in the border areas, while actively resuming normal exchanges” – demonstrating China’s attitude that disputes are best shelved.

    The Mekong Sub-region

    In August, Wang visited Thailand, where he co-chaired the 9th LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. As with the SCO meeting, the joint press communiqué issued at the end of the LMC meeting stated that the member states had agreed to jointly build “a Community of Shared Future of Peace and Prosperity among Lancang-Mekong Countries”.

    While the meeting garnered little attention in international media outlets, Wang was reported in China-based media to have pushed for cooperation in various fields beyond riparian and environmental issues that the LMC is traditionally associated with, such as capacity building in artificial intelligence and digitalisation.

    Predictably, controversial issues were sidestepped. Although sustainable management of water resources and dam safety were discussed, neither the meeting documents nor the joint press communiqué mentioned the negative impacts of China’s dam building in the upper sections of the Mekong. Nor was there any such mention in the official media of member countries.

    Moreover, with the attendance of Myanmar’s junta-appointed foreign minister – who has been barred from attending high-level ASEAN meetings – the LMC meeting acted as if nothing was amiss in the country, nor was there any mention of how the civil war might impact Myanmar’s section of the Mekong. Importantly, just before the LMC meeting, Wang visited Naypyidaw, where he expressed friendship and support for the junta leaders.

    What a “Shared Future” with China Entails

    Harmonious relationships, in China’s view, should consist of cooperation for mutual benefit, while bilateral tensions and difficulties should be set aside and preferably out of sight. This in practice also means that other countries, no matter big or small, should never make China “lose face” in the international arena, or confront it on issues seen to be impinging on its core interests. To criticise or confront Beijing is to invite varying levels of Chinese retaliation, depending on the severity of the infringement.

    Should any country go too far, such as by inviting US support in any bilateral territorial dispute with China – a matter that Beijing is highly sensitive about – China may impose measures beyond economic retaliation, including harassment by military and law enforcement authorities, as the Philippines has recently experienced in the South China Sea.

    Other countries too have experienced “punishment”. In 2017, South Korea faced Chinese boycotts and unofficial sanctions after its decision to deploy the THAAD anti–ballistic missile defence system. In 2010, Beijing blocked exports of rare earths to Japan to coerce the country into releasing the captain of a Chinese fishing vessel who had been arrested after a collision in waters near disputed islands in the East China Sea.

    On the other hand, China is far more conciliatory towards countries that pay due respect to, and make concessions in favour of, Chinese interests, even when confronted with contentious bilateral disputes, as can be seen in the SCO or LMC. The Mekong sub-region countries often do not voice their concerns regarding the upstream dams constructed by China, with China often providing them with infrastructure investments and proclamations of friendship in return.

    Similarly, when Chinese authorities began their harsh crackdown against the ethnic Uyghur population in Xinjiang – which also resulted in the detention of ethnic Kazakhs – neighbouring Kazakhstan, unwilling to anger China, chose to stay silent. In return for this silence, Astana has been given assurances that Beijing will respect Kazakhstan’s sovereignty as well as continued investments through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

    It is possible for a country to get away without being “punished” for perceived infractions against Beijing’s interests if the overall relationship is carefully managed by giving “face” to China in other areas, as Vietnam has done in recent months. Hanoi has agreed to support China’s vision of “a community of shared future” and signed numerous cooperative agreements with Beijing. These steps took place alongside Hanoi’s elevation of its relationship with the United States to a comprehensive strategic partnership, its pushback against China’s overlapping maritime claims, and, most recently, its deepening of ties, including in the defence and military arenas, with the Philippines.

    Engagement with China Will Only Get Tougher

    Vietnam has shown that it is possible for small and medium-sized countries to manage China’s assertiveness through flexible diplomacy, but doing so will be a major challenge that regional countries, especially those that are treaty allies with the United States, will have to struggle with.

    One way they could do so would be to engage with Beijing through multilateral institutions not led by China, such as ASEAN or the Mekong River Commission, but doing so is easier said than done, especially if Chinese influence over these institutions continues to grow or if Chinese-led institutions overshadow them.  In the years ahead, small and medium-sized countries will need careful management and balancing in their relations with China as they uphold their own national interests.

     

    Henrick TSJENG is Associate Research Fellow with the Regional Security Architecture Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

    Categories: IDSS Papers / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Global

    China’s “community with a shared future” – President Xi Jinping’s signature vision for a global order – is deeply embedded in Beijing’s multilateral diplomacy, as shown in recent Chinese engagements with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism. What does such a “community” entail for small and medium-sized countries when they engage with China?

       

     

     

    COMMENTARY

    At the forefront of China’s multilateral diplomacy towards small and medium-sized countries is its all-out push of the “community with a shared future” – Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature vision for a future global order. China’s most recent engagements in Central and Southeast Asia amply demonstrate this vision at work. The pattern is clear: emphasise cooperation with China’s partners and sweep all tensions and issues under the rug, while expecting its counterparts to do likewise.

    IP24068
    Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision for a future global order – “community with a shared future” – might require countries to adopt a more flexible diplomacy with China in order to retain ties while upholding their own national interests. Image from Pixabay.

    A Chinese-led Order of Carrots and Sticks

    China seeks to promote a new kind of international order – one in which Chinese preferences for “harmonious” interstate relationships and the respect for sovereignty are the norm. The document “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions”, released by China’s State Council Information Office in September 2023, makes clear that China’s vision “stands on the right side of history and on the side of human progress. It introduces a new approach for international relations, provides new ideas for global governance … and draws a new blueprint for a better world.”

    Compared to the US-led order where “[s]ome countries’ hegemonic … actions against others … are causing great harm”, the document proclaims that “China has been committed to fulfilling its role as a responsible major country, pushing for the resolution of international and regional flashpoints”. It stresses that China stands ready to lead a “better” global order, respecting countries’ sovereignty and governance preferences.

    When it comes to territorial disputes, the key source of friction between China and its neighbours, the document glosses over the subject by simply mentioning that the way forward would be to peacefully manage and resolve disputes through “dialogue and consultation”. What is left unsaid is that any country that falls out of line by directly confronting Beijing or bandwagoning with the United States can expect reprisals.

    This view of how “harmonious” international relations should be conducted is strongly reflected in China’s approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism.

    The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

    In early July, Xi travelled to Kazakhstan, where he also attended the 24th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO. The Astana Declaration furnished a long list of accomplishments and commitments by the SCO and affirmed that member states formed “a shared vision of the idea of creating a community of common destiny for mankind”, a formulation clearly pushed by China and endorsed by all SCO member states.

    However, there were obvious issues missing from the discussions. Bilateral spats were left out, such as the ongoing China-India and India-Pakistan tensions, apart from a vague affirmation by member states of their commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes through dialogue. In a sideline meeting between Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and his Indian counterpart, S. Jaishankar, in Astana, the former insisted on “properly handling … the situation in the border areas, while actively resuming normal exchanges” – demonstrating China’s attitude that disputes are best shelved.

    The Mekong Sub-region

    In August, Wang visited Thailand, where he co-chaired the 9th LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. As with the SCO meeting, the joint press communiqué issued at the end of the LMC meeting stated that the member states had agreed to jointly build “a Community of Shared Future of Peace and Prosperity among Lancang-Mekong Countries”.

    While the meeting garnered little attention in international media outlets, Wang was reported in China-based media to have pushed for cooperation in various fields beyond riparian and environmental issues that the LMC is traditionally associated with, such as capacity building in artificial intelligence and digitalisation.

    Predictably, controversial issues were sidestepped. Although sustainable management of water resources and dam safety were discussed, neither the meeting documents nor the joint press communiqué mentioned the negative impacts of China’s dam building in the upper sections of the Mekong. Nor was there any such mention in the official media of member countries.

    Moreover, with the attendance of Myanmar’s junta-appointed foreign minister – who has been barred from attending high-level ASEAN meetings – the LMC meeting acted as if nothing was amiss in the country, nor was there any mention of how the civil war might impact Myanmar’s section of the Mekong. Importantly, just before the LMC meeting, Wang visited Naypyidaw, where he expressed friendship and support for the junta leaders.

    What a “Shared Future” with China Entails

    Harmonious relationships, in China’s view, should consist of cooperation for mutual benefit, while bilateral tensions and difficulties should be set aside and preferably out of sight. This in practice also means that other countries, no matter big or small, should never make China “lose face” in the international arena, or confront it on issues seen to be impinging on its core interests. To criticise or confront Beijing is to invite varying levels of Chinese retaliation, depending on the severity of the infringement.

    Should any country go too far, such as by inviting US support in any bilateral territorial dispute with China – a matter that Beijing is highly sensitive about – China may impose measures beyond economic retaliation, including harassment by military and law enforcement authorities, as the Philippines has recently experienced in the South China Sea.

    Other countries too have experienced “punishment”. In 2017, South Korea faced Chinese boycotts and unofficial sanctions after its decision to deploy the THAAD anti–ballistic missile defence system. In 2010, Beijing blocked exports of rare earths to Japan to coerce the country into releasing the captain of a Chinese fishing vessel who had been arrested after a collision in waters near disputed islands in the East China Sea.

    On the other hand, China is far more conciliatory towards countries that pay due respect to, and make concessions in favour of, Chinese interests, even when confronted with contentious bilateral disputes, as can be seen in the SCO or LMC. The Mekong sub-region countries often do not voice their concerns regarding the upstream dams constructed by China, with China often providing them with infrastructure investments and proclamations of friendship in return.

    Similarly, when Chinese authorities began their harsh crackdown against the ethnic Uyghur population in Xinjiang – which also resulted in the detention of ethnic Kazakhs – neighbouring Kazakhstan, unwilling to anger China, chose to stay silent. In return for this silence, Astana has been given assurances that Beijing will respect Kazakhstan’s sovereignty as well as continued investments through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

    It is possible for a country to get away without being “punished” for perceived infractions against Beijing’s interests if the overall relationship is carefully managed by giving “face” to China in other areas, as Vietnam has done in recent months. Hanoi has agreed to support China’s vision of “a community of shared future” and signed numerous cooperative agreements with Beijing. These steps took place alongside Hanoi’s elevation of its relationship with the United States to a comprehensive strategic partnership, its pushback against China’s overlapping maritime claims, and, most recently, its deepening of ties, including in the defence and military arenas, with the Philippines.

    Engagement with China Will Only Get Tougher

    Vietnam has shown that it is possible for small and medium-sized countries to manage China’s assertiveness through flexible diplomacy, but doing so will be a major challenge that regional countries, especially those that are treaty allies with the United States, will have to struggle with.

    One way they could do so would be to engage with Beijing through multilateral institutions not led by China, such as ASEAN or the Mekong River Commission, but doing so is easier said than done, especially if Chinese influence over these institutions continues to grow or if Chinese-led institutions overshadow them.  In the years ahead, small and medium-sized countries will need careful management and balancing in their relations with China as they uphold their own national interests.

     

    Henrick TSJENG is Associate Research Fellow with the Regional Security Architecture Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

    Categories: IDSS Papers / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info