Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
Public Education
About Public Education
RSIS Alumni
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Video Channel
Podcasts
News Releases
Speeches
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global Networks
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      Public EducationAbout Public Education
  • RSIS Alumni
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Video ChannelPodcastsNews ReleasesSpeeches
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS
Connect
Search
  • RSIS
  • Publication
  • RSIS Publications
  • IP25112 | International Regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Realistic Shift in Diplomatic Efforts
  • Annual Reviews
  • Books
  • Bulletins and Newsletters
  • RSIS Commentary Series
  • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
  • Commemorative / Event Reports
  • Future Issues
  • IDSS Papers
  • Interreligious Relations
  • Monographs
  • NTS Insight
  • Policy Reports
  • Working Papers

IP25112 | International Regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Realistic Shift in Diplomatic Efforts
Mei Ching Liu

03 December 2025

download pdf

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• On 6 November 2025, the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee passed its third consecutive resolution on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS).

• Observers have criticised the 2025 resolution on LAWS as lacking ambition because it did not call on states to negotiate a legally binding arms control treaty and, unlike previous resolutions, it lacks a tangible outcome, such as organising informal consultations.

• Rather than viewing the 2025 resolution as unambitious, it should instead be seen as a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term future regulation of LAWS.

COMMENTARY

On 6 November 2025, the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee passed a resolution on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). This is the third consecutive resolution on LAWS passed by the First Committee.

A total of 156 states voted in favour of the resolution, while five states – the United States, Israel, Belarus, Russia and North Korea – voted against it. The resolution was tabled by Austria and co-sponsored by 30 states.

The resolution underscored the importance of a “comprehensive and inclusive multilateral approach” to address the challenges posed by LAWS, encompassing legal, technological, ethical, humanitarian and security considerations. It also noted the UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ call for states to commence negotiations on a legally binding arms control treaty on LAWS.

However, this year’s resolution did not call on states to commence negotiations and mandate informal consultations, unlike past resolutions. Instead, it encouraged states to “conduct further exchanges” without specifying the details of how they should be undertaken. In response, the Stop Killer Robots Campaign, a non-governmental organisation advocating for a legally binding arms control treaty on LAWS, expressed disappointment and characterised the resolution as lacking ambition.

Rather than viewing the 2025 resolution as unambitious, it should instead be seen as a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term future regulation of LAWS.

By not calling on states to immediately begin negotiating a legally binding arms control treaty on LAWS, the resolution has created room to develop a middle ground between states calling for such a treaty and those resisting it. There is also an opportunity to secure buy-in among states that previously abstained from voting on the 2024 resolution, while retaining the support of states that backed previous LAWS resolutions.

The 2025 resolution created a middle ground between advocates and sceptics, and should be seen as a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term regulation of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). Image source: United Nations Photo, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
The 2025 resolution created a middle ground between advocates and sceptics, and should be seen as a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term regulation of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). Image source: United Nations Photo, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Furthermore, by not mandating informal consultations, the resolution has addressed concerns regarding parallel diplomatic efforts on LAWS. States can now focus on upcoming discussions in 2026 at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS, the primary focal point so far for LAWS discussions.

A New Strategy to Achieve Multilateral Regulation of LAWS

The GGE on LAWS has been convened since 2016 under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), a key international humanitarian law instrument. Despite nearly a decade of meetings, progress has been slow, even on foundational issues. For instance, during this year’s GGE meetings, the group was still deliberating on how to define LAWS.

The GGE’s slow progress can be attributed to several factors, such as geopolitical friction and resistance to proposed measures intended to regulate LAWS. However, these are not unique to the GGE on LAWS and pose a challenge for several other multilateral fora as well.

Frustration with the GGE’s lack of progress has nevertheless led some states to believe that the group will fail to deliver on its mandate. Consequently, this prompted a desire to find a new avenue to discuss the regulation of LAWS. Austria has led these efforts through resolutions tabled at the UN General Assembly’s First Committee. For example, the 2024 resolution mandated informal consultations on LAWS to be held in New York in 2025. That resolution drew votes in favour from 161 states. However, during the informal consultations, Australia delivered a statement on behalf of 21 states, stating that “a process outside the GGE would take us backwards rather than forwards.”

The 2025 resolution, therefore, signals that the effort to find an alternative platform has not garnered sufficient support and that states prefer to use the GGE as the primary venue for LAWS discussions.

Moreover, by not calling on states to immediately begin negotiating a legally binding arms control treaty on LAWS, the resolution gained support from several states that had previously abstained from voting on the 2024 resolution, such as India, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania (Table 1).

The Baltic states’ support for the 2025 resolution is significant given that they face a common threat from Russia and have observed firsthand the growing importance of autonomy on the battlefield in Ukraine. India previously abstained from voting on the 2024 resolution due to concerns about parallel diplomatic efforts. The 2025 resolution alleviated this concern. Ukraine, on the other hand, did not vote on the 2025 resolution.

Despite objections against parallel diplomatic efforts concerning LAWS, the United States has consistently supported LAWS resolutions. Therefore, its decision to vote against the 2025 resolution marks a surprising departure from its previous stance. In explaining its vote, the United States stated that some of the language in the resolution did not reflect the consensus reached in the CCW. It described the informal consultation in New York as “not helpful” (despite its support for the 2024 resolution) and objected to the proposal to table a resolution on LAWS next year.

Looking Ahead to 2026

The GGE has to agree on a set of elements that could potentially form the basis of a future arms control treaty on LAWS as part of its report to the upcoming Seventh Review Conference of the CCW in November 2026.

Should the GGE fail to achieve this, the 2026 resolution on LAWS may see a return of efforts to seek a new avenue for LAWS discussions. Furthermore, it may call upon states to commence negotiating an international arms control treaty on LAWS outside of the CCW framework. A UN resolution on LAWS passed by the General Assembly could pave the way for a standalone arms control treaty, following the path set by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Such a treaty could preserve the efforts made by the GGE, for instance, by incorporating the set of elements into the treaty text. However, establishing such a treaty may be challenging as it might not secure buy-in from states that have consistently maintained that the CCW is the most appropriate framework.

 

Mei Ching Liu is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Transformations Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).

Categories: IDSS Papers / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN / Global

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• On 6 November 2025, the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee passed its third consecutive resolution on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS).

• Observers have criticised the 2025 resolution on LAWS as lacking ambition because it did not call on states to negotiate a legally binding arms control treaty and, unlike previous resolutions, it lacks a tangible outcome, such as organising informal consultations.

• Rather than viewing the 2025 resolution as unambitious, it should instead be seen as a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term future regulation of LAWS.

COMMENTARY

On 6 November 2025, the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee passed a resolution on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). This is the third consecutive resolution on LAWS passed by the First Committee.

A total of 156 states voted in favour of the resolution, while five states – the United States, Israel, Belarus, Russia and North Korea – voted against it. The resolution was tabled by Austria and co-sponsored by 30 states.

The resolution underscored the importance of a “comprehensive and inclusive multilateral approach” to address the challenges posed by LAWS, encompassing legal, technological, ethical, humanitarian and security considerations. It also noted the UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ call for states to commence negotiations on a legally binding arms control treaty on LAWS.

However, this year’s resolution did not call on states to commence negotiations and mandate informal consultations, unlike past resolutions. Instead, it encouraged states to “conduct further exchanges” without specifying the details of how they should be undertaken. In response, the Stop Killer Robots Campaign, a non-governmental organisation advocating for a legally binding arms control treaty on LAWS, expressed disappointment and characterised the resolution as lacking ambition.

Rather than viewing the 2025 resolution as unambitious, it should instead be seen as a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term future regulation of LAWS.

By not calling on states to immediately begin negotiating a legally binding arms control treaty on LAWS, the resolution has created room to develop a middle ground between states calling for such a treaty and those resisting it. There is also an opportunity to secure buy-in among states that previously abstained from voting on the 2024 resolution, while retaining the support of states that backed previous LAWS resolutions.

The 2025 resolution created a middle ground between advocates and sceptics, and should be seen as a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term regulation of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). Image source: United Nations Photo, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
The 2025 resolution created a middle ground between advocates and sceptics, and should be seen as a realistic shift in diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the long-term regulation of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). Image source: United Nations Photo, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Furthermore, by not mandating informal consultations, the resolution has addressed concerns regarding parallel diplomatic efforts on LAWS. States can now focus on upcoming discussions in 2026 at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS, the primary focal point so far for LAWS discussions.

A New Strategy to Achieve Multilateral Regulation of LAWS

The GGE on LAWS has been convened since 2016 under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), a key international humanitarian law instrument. Despite nearly a decade of meetings, progress has been slow, even on foundational issues. For instance, during this year’s GGE meetings, the group was still deliberating on how to define LAWS.

The GGE’s slow progress can be attributed to several factors, such as geopolitical friction and resistance to proposed measures intended to regulate LAWS. However, these are not unique to the GGE on LAWS and pose a challenge for several other multilateral fora as well.

Frustration with the GGE’s lack of progress has nevertheless led some states to believe that the group will fail to deliver on its mandate. Consequently, this prompted a desire to find a new avenue to discuss the regulation of LAWS. Austria has led these efforts through resolutions tabled at the UN General Assembly’s First Committee. For example, the 2024 resolution mandated informal consultations on LAWS to be held in New York in 2025. That resolution drew votes in favour from 161 states. However, during the informal consultations, Australia delivered a statement on behalf of 21 states, stating that “a process outside the GGE would take us backwards rather than forwards.”

The 2025 resolution, therefore, signals that the effort to find an alternative platform has not garnered sufficient support and that states prefer to use the GGE as the primary venue for LAWS discussions.

Moreover, by not calling on states to immediately begin negotiating a legally binding arms control treaty on LAWS, the resolution gained support from several states that had previously abstained from voting on the 2024 resolution, such as India, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania (Table 1).

The Baltic states’ support for the 2025 resolution is significant given that they face a common threat from Russia and have observed firsthand the growing importance of autonomy on the battlefield in Ukraine. India previously abstained from voting on the 2024 resolution due to concerns about parallel diplomatic efforts. The 2025 resolution alleviated this concern. Ukraine, on the other hand, did not vote on the 2025 resolution.

Despite objections against parallel diplomatic efforts concerning LAWS, the United States has consistently supported LAWS resolutions. Therefore, its decision to vote against the 2025 resolution marks a surprising departure from its previous stance. In explaining its vote, the United States stated that some of the language in the resolution did not reflect the consensus reached in the CCW. It described the informal consultation in New York as “not helpful” (despite its support for the 2024 resolution) and objected to the proposal to table a resolution on LAWS next year.

Looking Ahead to 2026

The GGE has to agree on a set of elements that could potentially form the basis of a future arms control treaty on LAWS as part of its report to the upcoming Seventh Review Conference of the CCW in November 2026.

Should the GGE fail to achieve this, the 2026 resolution on LAWS may see a return of efforts to seek a new avenue for LAWS discussions. Furthermore, it may call upon states to commence negotiating an international arms control treaty on LAWS outside of the CCW framework. A UN resolution on LAWS passed by the General Assembly could pave the way for a standalone arms control treaty, following the path set by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Such a treaty could preserve the efforts made by the GGE, for instance, by incorporating the set of elements into the treaty text. However, establishing such a treaty may be challenging as it might not secure buy-in from states that have consistently maintained that the CCW is the most appropriate framework.

 

Mei Ching Liu is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Transformations Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).

Categories: IDSS Papers / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security

Popular Links

About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersRSIS Intranet

Connect with Us

rsis.ntu
rsis_ntu
rsisntu
rsisvideocast
school/rsis-ntu
rsis.sg
rsissg
RSIS
RSS
Subscribe to RSIS Publications
Subscribe to RSIS Events

Getting to RSIS

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

Click here for direction to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
    Help us improve

      Rate your experience with this website
      123456
      Not satisfiedVery satisfied
      What did you like?
      0/255 characters
      What can be improved?
      0/255 characters
      Your email
      Please enter a valid email.
      Thank you for your feedback.
      This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
      OK
      Latest Book
      more info