05 January 2016
Reshaping the People’s Liberation Army since the 18th Party Congress
Executive Summary
On 1-2 October 2015, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) organised a conference on “Reshaping the People’s Liberation Army Since the 18th Party Congress”. In keeping with the noticeable shift in Beijing’s security posture towards a more muscular approach, China’s commander-in-chief, President Xi Jinping, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took the opportunity at the recent military parade marking the 70th anniversary of Chinese victory in World War II, to flaunt the achievements of more than two decades of military transformations. While the event was portrayed by China’s state media as further testament to Beijing’s commitment to peace, the prevailing analyses have suggested that the reforms proposed at the parade have the opposite effect of honing China’s offensive capabilities.
It is with the above in mind that the conference dedicated itself to the motif of the subtle recalibration of the PLA’s status in Beijing’s domestic and international calculus since the rise of Xi Jinping to the top of the nexus of China’s ruling party, the state and military. The first panel addressed the emergent thinking of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the 2012 leadership transition on the roles and missions of its coercive forces. Alongside changes to the PLA’s duties in crisis management mechanisms following the 18th Party Congress, there has been a considerable reorientation of its elite decision-making with Xi’s swift manoeuvres to reform the PLA’s organisational structure. This has been achieved by a combination of personnel reshuffles in its top brass and his signature anti-graft campaign. In so doing, the reforms that are taking shape have already begun to shift the delicate balance of power between China’s civilian and military elites.
Contributors to the two panels that followed focused on what appears to be the increasing prominence of the PLA in China’s international calculus, and the prospects for it to play an even greater role in Beijing’s relations with other regional strategic actors. Specifically, these include an assessment of the PLA’s worldview of the current international system, its likely role in the Central National Security Commission, and its growing involvement in Chinese diplomacy. Additionally, the presenters sought to situate the position of the PLA in Beijing’s “major country” diplomacy with Washington, as well as identified Chinese military leaders’ roles in formulating policy on core national interests. Overall, they concurred that even as PLA attitudes towards its American counterpart seemed to have improved, such overtures are largely driven by the CCP’s desire to maintain stable relations with Washington. Consensus between civilian elites, similarly, leads to PLA leaders concurring with the former’s assessment of China’s security environment.
The fourth panel then analysed the economics behind Beijing’s efforts at balancing its national interests and military combat readiness by taking stock of the progress made by the PLA following the initial reforms instituted in the 1990s. While the presenters noted that a significantly expanding budget has undeniably led to progress in the PLA’s defence-technology base where the production of sophisticated weapons systems is concerned, defence manufacturing in China remains suboptimal with innovation in this sector still largely lagging behind that of the U.S. and other advanced Western countries. Nevertheless, Beijing’s defence technology base is likely to see the continued supply of foreign technology, the prevailing analysis on the evidence hitherto nevertheless suggests that the PLA leadership has emphasised the development of Chinese defence-industrial autarky and has been working towards developing its own indigenous innovation capabilities.
Panel Five next evaluated the progress made by the PLA in its military modernisation. With jointness considered a key aspect of modern combat operations, the presenters assessed the security reconfiguration in the Asia-Pacific region with regard to how the Chinese military has integrated its services and military command areas following the CCP’s declaration to develop China into a major maritime power. In light of the regime’s increasingly muscular approach with its island building activities in the South China Sea, the presentations also built on the current assessment of Beijing’s emerging naval capabilities and its implications on the PLA’s interactions with other key strategic actors in the region. While acknowledging that there have indeed been marked improvements in the PLA’s capabilities, the panelists nevertheless agreed that its transformation ought to be understood as an ongoing multi-generational process that remains a work in progress.
The final panel looked into the future by examining the PLA’s adaptations to new domains of war by scrutinising the lesser-known aspects of its overall force development. Regarding the likelihood of greater potential Sino-U.S. rivalry in cyber and outer space, the presenters made their cases as to where the military’s priorities in these new theatres of war lie, and examined the progress it has made in meeting its strategic objectives in these new zones of war. Especially in view of Beijing’s growing sophistication in these state-of-the-art military operations, the session also shed light on the increasing significance of advancements in information and communications technology on China’s domestic stability and foreign relations. They then discussed how the PLA’s assessment of the changing international environment would likewise have an impact on the future trends of Beijing’s evolving military capabilities.
Executive Summary
On 1-2 October 2015, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) organised a conference on “Reshaping the People’s Liberation Army Since the 18th Party Congress”. In keeping with the noticeable shift in Beijing’s security posture towards a more muscular approach, China’s commander-in-chief, President Xi Jinping, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took the opportunity at the recent military parade marking the 70th anniversary of Chinese victory in World War II, to flaunt the achievements of more than two decades of military transformations. While the event was portrayed by China’s state media as further testament to Beijing’s commitment to peace, the prevailing analyses have suggested that the reforms proposed at the parade have the opposite effect of honing China’s offensive capabilities.
It is with the above in mind that the conference dedicated itself to the motif of the subtle recalibration of the PLA’s status in Beijing’s domestic and international calculus since the rise of Xi Jinping to the top of the nexus of China’s ruling party, the state and military. The first panel addressed the emergent thinking of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the 2012 leadership transition on the roles and missions of its coercive forces. Alongside changes to the PLA’s duties in crisis management mechanisms following the 18th Party Congress, there has been a considerable reorientation of its elite decision-making with Xi’s swift manoeuvres to reform the PLA’s organisational structure. This has been achieved by a combination of personnel reshuffles in its top brass and his signature anti-graft campaign. In so doing, the reforms that are taking shape have already begun to shift the delicate balance of power between China’s civilian and military elites.
Contributors to the two panels that followed focused on what appears to be the increasing prominence of the PLA in China’s international calculus, and the prospects for it to play an even greater role in Beijing’s relations with other regional strategic actors. Specifically, these include an assessment of the PLA’s worldview of the current international system, its likely role in the Central National Security Commission, and its growing involvement in Chinese diplomacy. Additionally, the presenters sought to situate the position of the PLA in Beijing’s “major country” diplomacy with Washington, as well as identified Chinese military leaders’ roles in formulating policy on core national interests. Overall, they concurred that even as PLA attitudes towards its American counterpart seemed to have improved, such overtures are largely driven by the CCP’s desire to maintain stable relations with Washington. Consensus between civilian elites, similarly, leads to PLA leaders concurring with the former’s assessment of China’s security environment.
The fourth panel then analysed the economics behind Beijing’s efforts at balancing its national interests and military combat readiness by taking stock of the progress made by the PLA following the initial reforms instituted in the 1990s. While the presenters noted that a significantly expanding budget has undeniably led to progress in the PLA’s defence-technology base where the production of sophisticated weapons systems is concerned, defence manufacturing in China remains suboptimal with innovation in this sector still largely lagging behind that of the U.S. and other advanced Western countries. Nevertheless, Beijing’s defence technology base is likely to see the continued supply of foreign technology, the prevailing analysis on the evidence hitherto nevertheless suggests that the PLA leadership has emphasised the development of Chinese defence-industrial autarky and has been working towards developing its own indigenous innovation capabilities.
Panel Five next evaluated the progress made by the PLA in its military modernisation. With jointness considered a key aspect of modern combat operations, the presenters assessed the security reconfiguration in the Asia-Pacific region with regard to how the Chinese military has integrated its services and military command areas following the CCP’s declaration to develop China into a major maritime power. In light of the regime’s increasingly muscular approach with its island building activities in the South China Sea, the presentations also built on the current assessment of Beijing’s emerging naval capabilities and its implications on the PLA’s interactions with other key strategic actors in the region. While acknowledging that there have indeed been marked improvements in the PLA’s capabilities, the panelists nevertheless agreed that its transformation ought to be understood as an ongoing multi-generational process that remains a work in progress.
The final panel looked into the future by examining the PLA’s adaptations to new domains of war by scrutinising the lesser-known aspects of its overall force development. Regarding the likelihood of greater potential Sino-U.S. rivalry in cyber and outer space, the presenters made their cases as to where the military’s priorities in these new theatres of war lie, and examined the progress it has made in meeting its strategic objectives in these new zones of war. Especially in view of Beijing’s growing sophistication in these state-of-the-art military operations, the session also shed light on the increasing significance of advancements in information and communications technology on China’s domestic stability and foreign relations. They then discussed how the PLA’s assessment of the changing international environment would likewise have an impact on the future trends of Beijing’s evolving military capabilities.
