Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • CO10028 | Riding Shotgun: Armed Security Guards onboard Merchant Ships
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO10028 | Riding Shotgun: Armed Security Guards onboard Merchant Ships
    Sam Bateman

    05 March 2010

    download pdf

    Commentary

    The use of armed security guard onboard merchant ships in high-risk piracy areas is hotly debated within the international shipping industry. While their use has been mostly opposed, ongoing pirate activity off the Horn of Africa is causing some rethink.

    IN AMERICAN PIONEER history, “riding shotgun” meant to ride as an armed guard next to the driver of a stage coach to protect its cargo and passengers. Now after an upsurge of piracy off Somalia and apparent difficulties with controlling the situation, the United States has advocated that merchant ships passing through the area embark armed security guards.

    This move has been opposed by much of the international shipping industry. This begs the questions whether armed security guards are really necessary – or is the move just an extension of the US gun culture to the maritime domain? The right to own weapons is strongly entrenched in early American frontier and revolutionary history. It is strongly defended despite the evidence that gun violence in the US is much higher than in most other countries.

    Hiring Private Armed Guards

    The US has made armed security guards a requirement for US-flag vessels passing off Somalia, and is encouraging the practice more widely. After a second attack on the US-flag container ship, Maersk Alabama, in November 2009, the admiral in command of US naval forces in the Middle East praised the security guards onboard the ship for firing on the pirates and preventing the attack.

    Several private security companies (PSCs), mainly American and British, are now offering protection services, including the provision of armed security guards, for ships transiting high-risk piracy areas off the Horn of Africa. The costs of these services are high, typically around US$21,000 a day for a three-person detachment. The Yemeni navy is also charging up to US$55,000 per ship under a contract managed by a UK-based company to guarantee a vessel’s safe transit through the Gulf of Aden.

    The controversy is over the carriage of firearms onboard ship rather than the employment of PSCs themselves. It is understandable that owners of high value and vulnerable assets passing through risky areas would wish to supplement crews with additional security personnel. More vulnerable, high-value vessels include dredgers, slow moving tugs and barges, oil rigs and luxury motor yachts. The vexed questions are whether or not these personnel are armed, and if armed personnel are employed, should they be private security contractors.

    The international shipping industry and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) mostly agree that arming ships or placing armed guards onboard is undesirable. It could lead to an escalation of violence. However, the IMO and industry associations strongly support the use of non-lethal measures, such as acoustic devices and high pressure fire hoses, to deter and prevent a piracy attack.

    Firearms onboard Ship

    There are strong legal and practical arguments against firearms onboard a commercial vessel. The use and handling of lethal weaponry requires special training and precise rules of engagement (ROE), normally only practised by disciplined military forces acting under governmental authority. The use of firearms onboard oil tankers, LNG and LPG carriers and other vessels with volatile cargoes is especially dangerous.

    The carriage of firearms onboard merchant ships poses legal questions. Most states, including Singapore, have legislation preventing ships from having weapons onboard in their territorial waters. Under many jurisdictions, the consequences of mistaken identity and the injury or death of a person may be severe, not only for the person who fired the weapon but also for the ship master and ship owner, even though these parties may have believed they were acting with justification.

    The carriage of weapons and the use of deadly force by PSCs must be covered under legislation of the flag State, but few flag States have such legislation. It is also essential that armed guards be appropriately trained and experienced. Many of the guards being used come from Army backgrounds, including ex-Gurkhas, who may not be familiar with conditions at sea, including what constitutes abnormal or normal behaviour of small craft in risky areas. Blanket authorisations to open fire when approached by small craft are especially dangerous.

    The legal and practical questions against arming merchant ships generally do not apply if the personnel involved are military. Operation Atalanta, the anti-piracy mission of the EU in the Gulf of Aden, offers the opportunity for merchant vessels to engage trained military personnel, armed or unarmed. These personnel embark before the transit and disembark afterwards. Cruise liners, in particular, are believed to regularly avail themselves of this offer.

    Situation in Southeast Asia

    The use of PSCs onboard vessels in the Malacca and Singapore Straits has been debated over the years. The littoral countries have adopted varying approaches. Singapore has a pragmatic approach that acknowledges the use of PSCs, even armed personnel, in certain circumstances, but Indonesia and Malaysia have been against using them, particularly in their territorial waters.

    Rather than pursuing different approaches, it would be helpful if the littoral States were to agree on guidelines for the employment of PSCs. These guidelines might cover issues such as legal authorities, self defence, liaison with law enforcement agencies, training and security vetting of personnel, the use of weapons, communications with sovereign authorities, record-taking and evidence.

    The Need for Guidelines

    Even better than this regional approach, as the use of PSCs is increasing, the IMO should develop global guidelines for the employment of PSCs and armed security guards at sea. Along with various shipping industry associations, the IMO already has best practice guidelines on how ships might deter, avoid and prevent a pirate attack, but at present these caution against the use of armed guards.

    The current situation requires clarification. The IMO and much of the international shipping industry oppose the use of armed guards, but this approach has its problems. It ignores the reality that in certain circumstances, albeit limited, armed guards might be appropriate, and are already being used at sea. Internationally agreed guidelines would help clarify this confused situation.

    About the Author

    Sam Bateman is Senior Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a former Australian naval officer with a keen research interest in practical aspects of shipping security. 

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Maritime Security / Global

    Commentary

    The use of armed security guard onboard merchant ships in high-risk piracy areas is hotly debated within the international shipping industry. While their use has been mostly opposed, ongoing pirate activity off the Horn of Africa is causing some rethink.

    IN AMERICAN PIONEER history, “riding shotgun” meant to ride as an armed guard next to the driver of a stage coach to protect its cargo and passengers. Now after an upsurge of piracy off Somalia and apparent difficulties with controlling the situation, the United States has advocated that merchant ships passing through the area embark armed security guards.

    This move has been opposed by much of the international shipping industry. This begs the questions whether armed security guards are really necessary – or is the move just an extension of the US gun culture to the maritime domain? The right to own weapons is strongly entrenched in early American frontier and revolutionary history. It is strongly defended despite the evidence that gun violence in the US is much higher than in most other countries.

    Hiring Private Armed Guards

    The US has made armed security guards a requirement for US-flag vessels passing off Somalia, and is encouraging the practice more widely. After a second attack on the US-flag container ship, Maersk Alabama, in November 2009, the admiral in command of US naval forces in the Middle East praised the security guards onboard the ship for firing on the pirates and preventing the attack.

    Several private security companies (PSCs), mainly American and British, are now offering protection services, including the provision of armed security guards, for ships transiting high-risk piracy areas off the Horn of Africa. The costs of these services are high, typically around US$21,000 a day for a three-person detachment. The Yemeni navy is also charging up to US$55,000 per ship under a contract managed by a UK-based company to guarantee a vessel’s safe transit through the Gulf of Aden.

    The controversy is over the carriage of firearms onboard ship rather than the employment of PSCs themselves. It is understandable that owners of high value and vulnerable assets passing through risky areas would wish to supplement crews with additional security personnel. More vulnerable, high-value vessels include dredgers, slow moving tugs and barges, oil rigs and luxury motor yachts. The vexed questions are whether or not these personnel are armed, and if armed personnel are employed, should they be private security contractors.

    The international shipping industry and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) mostly agree that arming ships or placing armed guards onboard is undesirable. It could lead to an escalation of violence. However, the IMO and industry associations strongly support the use of non-lethal measures, such as acoustic devices and high pressure fire hoses, to deter and prevent a piracy attack.

    Firearms onboard Ship

    There are strong legal and practical arguments against firearms onboard a commercial vessel. The use and handling of lethal weaponry requires special training and precise rules of engagement (ROE), normally only practised by disciplined military forces acting under governmental authority. The use of firearms onboard oil tankers, LNG and LPG carriers and other vessels with volatile cargoes is especially dangerous.

    The carriage of firearms onboard merchant ships poses legal questions. Most states, including Singapore, have legislation preventing ships from having weapons onboard in their territorial waters. Under many jurisdictions, the consequences of mistaken identity and the injury or death of a person may be severe, not only for the person who fired the weapon but also for the ship master and ship owner, even though these parties may have believed they were acting with justification.

    The carriage of weapons and the use of deadly force by PSCs must be covered under legislation of the flag State, but few flag States have such legislation. It is also essential that armed guards be appropriately trained and experienced. Many of the guards being used come from Army backgrounds, including ex-Gurkhas, who may not be familiar with conditions at sea, including what constitutes abnormal or normal behaviour of small craft in risky areas. Blanket authorisations to open fire when approached by small craft are especially dangerous.

    The legal and practical questions against arming merchant ships generally do not apply if the personnel involved are military. Operation Atalanta, the anti-piracy mission of the EU in the Gulf of Aden, offers the opportunity for merchant vessels to engage trained military personnel, armed or unarmed. These personnel embark before the transit and disembark afterwards. Cruise liners, in particular, are believed to regularly avail themselves of this offer.

    Situation in Southeast Asia

    The use of PSCs onboard vessels in the Malacca and Singapore Straits has been debated over the years. The littoral countries have adopted varying approaches. Singapore has a pragmatic approach that acknowledges the use of PSCs, even armed personnel, in certain circumstances, but Indonesia and Malaysia have been against using them, particularly in their territorial waters.

    Rather than pursuing different approaches, it would be helpful if the littoral States were to agree on guidelines for the employment of PSCs. These guidelines might cover issues such as legal authorities, self defence, liaison with law enforcement agencies, training and security vetting of personnel, the use of weapons, communications with sovereign authorities, record-taking and evidence.

    The Need for Guidelines

    Even better than this regional approach, as the use of PSCs is increasing, the IMO should develop global guidelines for the employment of PSCs and armed security guards at sea. Along with various shipping industry associations, the IMO already has best practice guidelines on how ships might deter, avoid and prevent a pirate attack, but at present these caution against the use of armed guards.

    The current situation requires clarification. The IMO and much of the international shipping industry oppose the use of armed guards, but this approach has its problems. It ignores the reality that in certain circumstances, albeit limited, armed guards might be appropriate, and are already being used at sea. Internationally agreed guidelines would help clarify this confused situation.

    About the Author

    Sam Bateman is Senior Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a former Australian naval officer with a keen research interest in practical aspects of shipping security. 

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Maritime Security

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info