Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • CO11035 | Humanitarian Intervention From Above:‘No-fly Zone’ Over Libya?
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO11035 | Humanitarian Intervention From Above:‘No-fly Zone’ Over Libya?
    Ong Wei Chong

    04 March 2011

    download pdf

    Synopsis

    The complexities and challenges of establishing a No-fly Zone over Libya are immense. Any attempt to do so without due consideration of its operational and strategic implications will unnecessarily put lives at risk.

    Commentary

    AMID FEARS of further air strikes on civilian targets by Libyan Air Force crews loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, calls for an establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya is slowly gaining political momentum in the United States and the United Kingdom. In theory, “humanitarian intervention from above” in the form of a no-fly zone secured by coalition air forces can protect civilians from the violent excesses of Gaddafi loyalists. In practice, however, there are immense difficulties in the implementation, enforcement and efficacy of such a mission across the international, strategic and operational levels.

    Such concerns have been voiced by serving and retired military officers in the US and UK – including Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General James Mattis, Commander, US CENTCOM; and Admiral Alan West, former First Sea Lord. In the current geopolitical climate where the US is already at war in the region, these difficulties will be further magnified if the no-fly zone initiative is perceived by the international community as a US-led venture.

    Need for International Legitimacy

    For a start, any lack of support from even a single permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is sufficient to derail any hope of a UNSC resolution on the issue. Short of a significant upsurge in violence or a rapid deterioration of conditions leading to a major humanitarian crisis, it is highly unlikely that a UNSC resolution authorising the establishment of a no-fly zone will be passed. A UNSC resolution is a badge of international legitimacy which in this case directly translates into tangible steps towards mission success.

    Hundreds of aircraft, including fighters, aerial refuelling tankers and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft will be required to enforce and sustain the no-fly zone over Libya. The immense requirements of such a large-scale operation preclude the possibility of sustaining the no-fly zone from US Navy Carrier Battle Groups alone. Hence, the bulk of air assets will have to be US Air Force (USAF), Royal Air Force (RAF) and other coalition land-based aircraft operating from Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Malta, Spain and possibly Tunisia and Egypt.

    However, without a clear mandate from the UNSC, it is unlikely that the necessary approval will be given by the host countries in the Mediterranean. At the very least, NATO endorsement of some sort is required to lend the mission a sense of international legitimacy. With the US already at war in the region, international consensus for such an operation is vital to mission success.

    Operational Complexities

    Operation Deny Flight, the enforcement of a UN-authorised no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1993 to 1995 by NATO, is likely to be the no-fly zone template for both coalition forces and Gaddafi loyalists. Even in this rather clear-cut UN authorised mission supported by aircraft from twelve NATO members, the operational complexities of sustaining and enforcing the no-fly zone were immense.

    Rather than challenge the overwhelming superiority of the NATO air armada in the air, Bosnian Serb forces preferred to engage NATO aircraft from concealed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. On June 2, 1995, a USAF F-16 piloted by Captain Scott O’Grady was shot down by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 SAM system. Similar tactics were adopted by the Yugoslav Army in 1999 during Operation Allied Force with remarkable success – including the detection and downing of a USAF F-117 Stealth Fighter by an ‘obsolete’ but modified 1960s era SA-3 SAM system.

    On the other hand, attempts by Yugoslav Mig-29s to engage NATO fighters in aerial combat resulted in the loss of all Yugoslav aircraft. Moreover, low-flying aircraft such as sub-sonic jets and helicopters were able to fly successful sorties beneath the NATO air umbrella. Considering that the Migs and Sukhois of the Libyan Air Force are even more outdated than the Mig-29s flown by the Yugoslav Air Force, it is unlikely that the Libyan fighters will contest coalition fighters in the air. Nonetheless, like in the Balkans, ‘flying low and slow’ sub-sonic jets and helicopters have the ability to successfully sortie out and avoid the hi-tech fast jets of Western air forces.

    What the Libyan Air Defence Command does possess in the hundreds, however, are SA-3, SA-5, SA-6 and SA-8 SAM systems – many of them self-propelled. As demonstrated in the Balkans, these highly mobile SAM systems are a clear danger to coalition aircraft enforcing any proposed no-fly zone.

    On 2 March 2011, General James Mattis informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that setting up a no- fly zone over Libya would first require disabling Libya’s air defence system. However, there is no consensus among NATO partners on this issue. For example, do coalition aircraft attempt to take out all SAM systems with active radars or should they do so only if illuminated by the fire-controlled radar from the SAM systems? In the absence of any joint agreement on the use of military force, complications in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) will arise.

    Strategic Implications

    It must be remembered that the commitment of US air assets in support of humanitarian intervention in the Balkans was pre-911. Currently, there are about 100,000 US troops committed to operations in Afghanistan – many of whom depend on air support to do their job and stay alive. To move vital air assets away from the Afghan theatre of operations will have dire consequences for the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan and put the lives of servicemen and women at risk. Transfer of air assets from other theatre of operations such as the Pacific is a possibility. Such a transfer, however, will send the wrong signal to key US allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

    A humanitarian disaster in Libya should not be allowed to happen. Nonetheless, there are better ways of preventing a humanitarian crisis than implementing an unsustainable no-fly zone in extremely challenging conditions. In sum, an ill-conceived no-fly zone contingency put into action will not only unnecessarily put lives at risk, but also backfire strategically.

    About the Author

    Ong Weichong is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is attached to the Military Transformations Programme at the school’s constituent unit, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. 

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / General / Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

    Synopsis

    The complexities and challenges of establishing a No-fly Zone over Libya are immense. Any attempt to do so without due consideration of its operational and strategic implications will unnecessarily put lives at risk.

    Commentary

    AMID FEARS of further air strikes on civilian targets by Libyan Air Force crews loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, calls for an establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya is slowly gaining political momentum in the United States and the United Kingdom. In theory, “humanitarian intervention from above” in the form of a no-fly zone secured by coalition air forces can protect civilians from the violent excesses of Gaddafi loyalists. In practice, however, there are immense difficulties in the implementation, enforcement and efficacy of such a mission across the international, strategic and operational levels.

    Such concerns have been voiced by serving and retired military officers in the US and UK – including Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General James Mattis, Commander, US CENTCOM; and Admiral Alan West, former First Sea Lord. In the current geopolitical climate where the US is already at war in the region, these difficulties will be further magnified if the no-fly zone initiative is perceived by the international community as a US-led venture.

    Need for International Legitimacy

    For a start, any lack of support from even a single permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is sufficient to derail any hope of a UNSC resolution on the issue. Short of a significant upsurge in violence or a rapid deterioration of conditions leading to a major humanitarian crisis, it is highly unlikely that a UNSC resolution authorising the establishment of a no-fly zone will be passed. A UNSC resolution is a badge of international legitimacy which in this case directly translates into tangible steps towards mission success.

    Hundreds of aircraft, including fighters, aerial refuelling tankers and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft will be required to enforce and sustain the no-fly zone over Libya. The immense requirements of such a large-scale operation preclude the possibility of sustaining the no-fly zone from US Navy Carrier Battle Groups alone. Hence, the bulk of air assets will have to be US Air Force (USAF), Royal Air Force (RAF) and other coalition land-based aircraft operating from Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Malta, Spain and possibly Tunisia and Egypt.

    However, without a clear mandate from the UNSC, it is unlikely that the necessary approval will be given by the host countries in the Mediterranean. At the very least, NATO endorsement of some sort is required to lend the mission a sense of international legitimacy. With the US already at war in the region, international consensus for such an operation is vital to mission success.

    Operational Complexities

    Operation Deny Flight, the enforcement of a UN-authorised no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1993 to 1995 by NATO, is likely to be the no-fly zone template for both coalition forces and Gaddafi loyalists. Even in this rather clear-cut UN authorised mission supported by aircraft from twelve NATO members, the operational complexities of sustaining and enforcing the no-fly zone were immense.

    Rather than challenge the overwhelming superiority of the NATO air armada in the air, Bosnian Serb forces preferred to engage NATO aircraft from concealed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. On June 2, 1995, a USAF F-16 piloted by Captain Scott O’Grady was shot down by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 SAM system. Similar tactics were adopted by the Yugoslav Army in 1999 during Operation Allied Force with remarkable success – including the detection and downing of a USAF F-117 Stealth Fighter by an ‘obsolete’ but modified 1960s era SA-3 SAM system.

    On the other hand, attempts by Yugoslav Mig-29s to engage NATO fighters in aerial combat resulted in the loss of all Yugoslav aircraft. Moreover, low-flying aircraft such as sub-sonic jets and helicopters were able to fly successful sorties beneath the NATO air umbrella. Considering that the Migs and Sukhois of the Libyan Air Force are even more outdated than the Mig-29s flown by the Yugoslav Air Force, it is unlikely that the Libyan fighters will contest coalition fighters in the air. Nonetheless, like in the Balkans, ‘flying low and slow’ sub-sonic jets and helicopters have the ability to successfully sortie out and avoid the hi-tech fast jets of Western air forces.

    What the Libyan Air Defence Command does possess in the hundreds, however, are SA-3, SA-5, SA-6 and SA-8 SAM systems – many of them self-propelled. As demonstrated in the Balkans, these highly mobile SAM systems are a clear danger to coalition aircraft enforcing any proposed no-fly zone.

    On 2 March 2011, General James Mattis informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that setting up a no- fly zone over Libya would first require disabling Libya’s air defence system. However, there is no consensus among NATO partners on this issue. For example, do coalition aircraft attempt to take out all SAM systems with active radars or should they do so only if illuminated by the fire-controlled radar from the SAM systems? In the absence of any joint agreement on the use of military force, complications in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) will arise.

    Strategic Implications

    It must be remembered that the commitment of US air assets in support of humanitarian intervention in the Balkans was pre-911. Currently, there are about 100,000 US troops committed to operations in Afghanistan – many of whom depend on air support to do their job and stay alive. To move vital air assets away from the Afghan theatre of operations will have dire consequences for the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan and put the lives of servicemen and women at risk. Transfer of air assets from other theatre of operations such as the Pacific is a possibility. Such a transfer, however, will send the wrong signal to key US allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

    A humanitarian disaster in Libya should not be allowed to happen. Nonetheless, there are better ways of preventing a humanitarian crisis than implementing an unsustainable no-fly zone in extremely challenging conditions. In sum, an ill-conceived no-fly zone contingency put into action will not only unnecessarily put lives at risk, but also backfire strategically.

    About the Author

    Ong Weichong is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is attached to the Military Transformations Programme at the school’s constituent unit, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. 

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / General

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info