Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • CO12078 | Asian Diplomatic Ambiguity – Calming the South China Sea?
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO12078 | Asian Diplomatic Ambiguity – Calming the South China Sea?
    Alan Chong,

    03 May 2012

    download pdf

    Synopsis

    The ongoing standoff between Beijing and Manila over their rival claims in the Spratlys may never be resolved through standard frameworks of international law. The best way forward may lie in the Asian way of diplomatic ambiguity.

    Commentary

    RECENT ATTEMPTS to prescribe solutions to the ongoing standoff between Beijing and Manila over their rival claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea combine large doses of good intentions with a clinical approach to international law. These are unlikely to be taken seriously simply because they ignore the thick political contexts entangling the rival claimants.

    For starters, some international legal consultants have suggested that Chinese positions may well be untenable according to baselines asserted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that are drawn from a submerged “Macclesfield Bank”. Likewise, Filipino claims to Scarborough Shoal via the argument of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending from the Republic’s main islands are equally contestable in a court of international law. Then, in late April, an International Crisis Group report attributed Chinese aggression to severely inadequate inter-ministry coordination and the political exploitation of nationalism by the Chinese Communist Party.

    All these prognoses assume, dangerously, that history, memory and informal maritime practices on the ground are marginal to the current standoff. The reality is that these non-litigable and non-technical factors loom very large in the daily practice of Asian international relations.

    History and memory in Asian international politics

    Many policy circles forget that 21st century Asia still grapples with the crippling legacies of past centuries. The traumas of alien jurisdiction imported under colonial conditions from the West have left scars etched deeply into both psychological mindscapes and political landscapes.

    China, expressed in terms of the collective destiny of a People’s Republic unified in 1949, was heir to a grand nationalist revitalisation project. Commencing in the late 1880s with Sun Yat-sen’s global outreach to rally the Chinese diaspora towards a modern political awakening, such nationalism brooked no compromise in pursuing a restoration of unity to the Chinese people. It was emphatically territorial: from the xenophobic attempts to regain sovereignty conceded from opium wars, gunboat diplomacy and unequal treaties over a “century of humiliation”; through the studied obstinacy of Chinese communist officialdom towards Chris Patten’s policies in the run-up to Hong Kong’s handover; to the non-negotiable goal of “recovering” Taiwan.

    The Filipino struggle, expressed militarily and intellectually, first against Spain and then the United States, was about proving themselves ready for national independence. Ironically perhaps, it would take José Rizal’s writings to demonstrate how a Chinese-Filipino mestizo could become the equivalent of a Johann-Gottfried Herder of the Filipinos, awakening a spiritual nationalism that located its homeland in the Philippine archipelago.

    For Filipino and Chinese nationalist alike, World War Two was significantly about fighting a just war for one’s pride and home against an imperial foreign power. The Cold War reiterated the territoriality of Philippine nationalism when the United States concentrated a vital part of its Cold War containment facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. The US military had to evacuate those bases by 1992 owing to resurgent Philippine nationalism in a more fluid post-Cold War order. Both the Chinese and Philippine nation-states would thereby embody a collective spiritual need to defend or recover “lost” territories.

    Porous borders, fluid frontiers

    The collective nationalist urges to dominate and demarcate territory notwithstanding, history has also yielded boundary-defying patterns of social commingling between peoples on the ground. Before the militarisation of rival claims in the mid-1970s, virtually all reports on the Spratlys indicate that fisherfolk from claimant countries availed themselves regularly of the abundant fish stock in these waters without heeding the maritime boundaries. Commercial vessels of all sizes and flags have transited the disputed waters on their cargo routes.

    Significantly, Beijing and Manila have both promoted tourism in the disputed zone, even though both governments argued simultaneously that such activities reinforce territorial sovereignty. It emerges that the nature of human social activity has added a seemingly universalistic layer of virtual claim on a “regional commons,” thereby defying any straightforward assertion of sovereignty.

    Yet such mixed-usage, boundary-defying patterns of human activity are rooted historically in Asian political cultures, pre-dating even the Western import labelled as the nation-state. Itinerant traders, nomadic fisherfolk, international tourists and pan-Asian missionaries of every religious persuasion have crisscrossed Asian maritime frontiers without regard to sovereignty as we know it. Occasionally, these travellers and traffickers were subjected to piratical attack, but just as frequently, they put into ports along their transit routes in the South China Sea and Malacca Strait on the basis of the port’s reputation for just governance, religious piety, and “value added” commercial services.

    An informal variant of “proto-soft power,” to use today’s fashionable term, thus attracted respect for territoriality on the open maritime commons since ancient times. It is hardly surprising that the sources of piracy in Asian waters continue to baffle modern Asian governments.

    Virtue of diplomatic ambiguity

    The current impasse in the Spratly Islands dispute is therefore unlikely to be resolved through neo-Westphalian, legalistic frameworks. Both Beijing and Manila, alongside the remaining four claimants, will need to reconcile the conjoined histories and memories that drive their sovereign territorial nationalisms with the informal maritime practices on the ground.

    There is already a guide to handling this – the structural face-saving ambiguity inherent in the ASEAN Way. Both Manila and Beijing could find some non-political reason such as maritime safety (or specifically, safety of fishermen on the open seas) to produce a common reason to stand down. Even the ongoing third party- involved joint oil exploration and extraction ventures could be considered a continuation of the time-honoured practice of sharing an Asian commons.

    Ambiguity is not necessarily a political taboo, much less a sin against national public opinion. Rather, it presents an alternative way out of complex entanglement that cannot be unravelled through legal technicalities. Indeed, the Chinese would do well to heed their own peaceful slogan – “shelf disputes, jointly develop” – thus laying to rest the spectre of a gunboat diplomacy that recalls their own troubled past.

    About the Authors

    Alan Chong is Associate Professor of International Relations and Emrys Chew is Assistant Professor of History at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Both contributors are about to publish, respectively, an article and a book emphasising the centrality of Asian maritime politics in international maritime affairs.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Conflict and Stability / Maritime Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

    Synopsis

    The ongoing standoff between Beijing and Manila over their rival claims in the Spratlys may never be resolved through standard frameworks of international law. The best way forward may lie in the Asian way of diplomatic ambiguity.

    Commentary

    RECENT ATTEMPTS to prescribe solutions to the ongoing standoff between Beijing and Manila over their rival claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea combine large doses of good intentions with a clinical approach to international law. These are unlikely to be taken seriously simply because they ignore the thick political contexts entangling the rival claimants.

    For starters, some international legal consultants have suggested that Chinese positions may well be untenable according to baselines asserted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that are drawn from a submerged “Macclesfield Bank”. Likewise, Filipino claims to Scarborough Shoal via the argument of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending from the Republic’s main islands are equally contestable in a court of international law. Then, in late April, an International Crisis Group report attributed Chinese aggression to severely inadequate inter-ministry coordination and the political exploitation of nationalism by the Chinese Communist Party.

    All these prognoses assume, dangerously, that history, memory and informal maritime practices on the ground are marginal to the current standoff. The reality is that these non-litigable and non-technical factors loom very large in the daily practice of Asian international relations.

    History and memory in Asian international politics

    Many policy circles forget that 21st century Asia still grapples with the crippling legacies of past centuries. The traumas of alien jurisdiction imported under colonial conditions from the West have left scars etched deeply into both psychological mindscapes and political landscapes.

    China, expressed in terms of the collective destiny of a People’s Republic unified in 1949, was heir to a grand nationalist revitalisation project. Commencing in the late 1880s with Sun Yat-sen’s global outreach to rally the Chinese diaspora towards a modern political awakening, such nationalism brooked no compromise in pursuing a restoration of unity to the Chinese people. It was emphatically territorial: from the xenophobic attempts to regain sovereignty conceded from opium wars, gunboat diplomacy and unequal treaties over a “century of humiliation”; through the studied obstinacy of Chinese communist officialdom towards Chris Patten’s policies in the run-up to Hong Kong’s handover; to the non-negotiable goal of “recovering” Taiwan.

    The Filipino struggle, expressed militarily and intellectually, first against Spain and then the United States, was about proving themselves ready for national independence. Ironically perhaps, it would take José Rizal’s writings to demonstrate how a Chinese-Filipino mestizo could become the equivalent of a Johann-Gottfried Herder of the Filipinos, awakening a spiritual nationalism that located its homeland in the Philippine archipelago.

    For Filipino and Chinese nationalist alike, World War Two was significantly about fighting a just war for one’s pride and home against an imperial foreign power. The Cold War reiterated the territoriality of Philippine nationalism when the United States concentrated a vital part of its Cold War containment facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. The US military had to evacuate those bases by 1992 owing to resurgent Philippine nationalism in a more fluid post-Cold War order. Both the Chinese and Philippine nation-states would thereby embody a collective spiritual need to defend or recover “lost” territories.

    Porous borders, fluid frontiers

    The collective nationalist urges to dominate and demarcate territory notwithstanding, history has also yielded boundary-defying patterns of social commingling between peoples on the ground. Before the militarisation of rival claims in the mid-1970s, virtually all reports on the Spratlys indicate that fisherfolk from claimant countries availed themselves regularly of the abundant fish stock in these waters without heeding the maritime boundaries. Commercial vessels of all sizes and flags have transited the disputed waters on their cargo routes.

    Significantly, Beijing and Manila have both promoted tourism in the disputed zone, even though both governments argued simultaneously that such activities reinforce territorial sovereignty. It emerges that the nature of human social activity has added a seemingly universalistic layer of virtual claim on a “regional commons,” thereby defying any straightforward assertion of sovereignty.

    Yet such mixed-usage, boundary-defying patterns of human activity are rooted historically in Asian political cultures, pre-dating even the Western import labelled as the nation-state. Itinerant traders, nomadic fisherfolk, international tourists and pan-Asian missionaries of every religious persuasion have crisscrossed Asian maritime frontiers without regard to sovereignty as we know it. Occasionally, these travellers and traffickers were subjected to piratical attack, but just as frequently, they put into ports along their transit routes in the South China Sea and Malacca Strait on the basis of the port’s reputation for just governance, religious piety, and “value added” commercial services.

    An informal variant of “proto-soft power,” to use today’s fashionable term, thus attracted respect for territoriality on the open maritime commons since ancient times. It is hardly surprising that the sources of piracy in Asian waters continue to baffle modern Asian governments.

    Virtue of diplomatic ambiguity

    The current impasse in the Spratly Islands dispute is therefore unlikely to be resolved through neo-Westphalian, legalistic frameworks. Both Beijing and Manila, alongside the remaining four claimants, will need to reconcile the conjoined histories and memories that drive their sovereign territorial nationalisms with the informal maritime practices on the ground.

    There is already a guide to handling this – the structural face-saving ambiguity inherent in the ASEAN Way. Both Manila and Beijing could find some non-political reason such as maritime safety (or specifically, safety of fishermen on the open seas) to produce a common reason to stand down. Even the ongoing third party- involved joint oil exploration and extraction ventures could be considered a continuation of the time-honoured practice of sharing an Asian commons.

    Ambiguity is not necessarily a political taboo, much less a sin against national public opinion. Rather, it presents an alternative way out of complex entanglement that cannot be unravelled through legal technicalities. Indeed, the Chinese would do well to heed their own peaceful slogan – “shelf disputes, jointly develop” – thus laying to rest the spectre of a gunboat diplomacy that recalls their own troubled past.

    About the Authors

    Alan Chong is Associate Professor of International Relations and Emrys Chew is Assistant Professor of History at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Both contributors are about to publish, respectively, an article and a book emphasising the centrality of Asian maritime politics in international maritime affairs.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Conflict and Stability / Maritime Security

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info