Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
Public Education
About Public Education
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      Public EducationAbout Public Education
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      News ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio Channel
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS
Connect
Search
  • RSIS
  • Publication
  • RSIS Publications
  • CO12090 | The Scarborough Shoal Dispute in America’s Asia-Pacific Pivot
  • Annual Reviews
  • Books
  • Bulletins and Newsletters
  • RSIS Commentary Series
  • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
  • Commemorative / Event Reports
  • Future Issues
  • IDSS Papers
  • Interreligious Relations
  • Monographs
  • NTS Insight
  • Policy Reports
  • Working Papers

CO12090 | The Scarborough Shoal Dispute in America’s Asia-Pacific Pivot
Catherine Samaniego

28 May 2012

download pdf

Synopsis

The intensifying tension between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal calls for an impartial intervention from the US. The peaceful resolution of the dispute lies in how the US successfully maneuvers between its traditional ally and its biggest competitor.

Commentary

FRICTION IN China-Philippine relations vis-à-vis the cluster of rock formations in South China Sea, known as “Scarborough Shoal,” has been rekindled not long after the US announced its pivot to the Asia-Pacific. While the Philippine government is actively seeking U.S. support in addressing the issue, China has staunchly discouraged third-party involvement in an attempt to prevent internationalization of the dispute.

Safeguarding the Sea Lines of Communication

In November 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed the US’s landmark return to Asia-Pacific, dubbing the 21st century as “America’s Pacific Century.” For many, this marked the beginning of the reinforcement of US presence in the region; but for some, this was merely a “continuation,” on the premise that the US never departed the region. Nevertheless, the resurgence of US interest in the western Pacific is neither driven solely by its desire to maintain its hegemonic status nor impede the transformation of a China-centered regional system. Rather, part of this strategy is also to assure that the existing maritime disputes do not escalate into an all-out naval warfare that could jeopardize the navigability of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).

The South China Sea is undoubtedly a vital artery of the world economic system and is integral to the pursuit of American objectives in Asia, contributing approximately US$ 1.2 Trillion to the US economy. Since this altercation may only be expected to heat up as interest groups from both sides continue to fan the flames of nationalism, it would not be in the US’ best interest to assume a passive stance and allow this critical stretch of water to turn into a battlefield.

Assumptions and Misperceptions

Although Philippine leaders have publicly claimed that its biggest ally is obliged to provide protection by virtue of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the US has been careful not to release any official statement confirming or denying this. An important underlying issue in this context is the varying interpretations of the stipulations therein. In contrast to the assumptions made by Philippine officials with respect to the MDT, some have come to conclude that this security cover only applies to acts of aggression by a foreign military entity on the main Philippine islands. This notion stems from the fact that the US has offered no indication as to whether or not it fully and officially recognizes Scarborough Shoal as part of Philippine territory.

Therefore, in spite of the deployment of the nuclear-powered fast attack submarine USS North Carolina, there is no concrete guarantee that the US would come to the Philippine’s rescue if push comes to shove. At the moment, this development may only be interpreted as an attempt by the US at appeasing the Filipinos and flexing its political muscle. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that such an action could contribute to the escalation of the conflict by provoking China.

For all its burgeoning military capabilities, China has been exercising great restraint in reacting to Philippine claims, as evidenced by the absence of Chinese warships from the disputed area. China realizes that resorting to force could not only potentially weaken its relations with the rest of ASEAN, but adversely affect its unsettled maritime disputes with Japan and the Koreas as well.

Furthermore, argued analysts, the Chinese government could be using the flare-up as a means of veering attention away from scandals involving one of its top political figures, Bo Xilai, and the blind civil rights activist, Chen Guangcheng. In other words, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may be seizing the opportunity to sustain its credibility by disguising intra-Party challenges with the veil of political unity and patriotism.

The US as a mediator

Preserving US interests in the Asia-Pacific alongside a flourishing China need not be tantamount to conflict. Needless to say, US involvement must fall within certain limits to attest to its supposed neutrality, and to allow tensions in China-Philippine relations to subside. It can do so by promoting peaceful means geared toward compromise as opposed to conflict, as laid out in the ASEAN-China Declaration of the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea 2002 (DOC).

In line with China’s refusal to bring this matter to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), it has been suggested that the US’ ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) might hold the key to the settlement of the dispute, as this would strongly compel China to comply. However such a likelihood can be safely ruled out by two factors: 1) China’s exemption from the provisions of UNCLOS concerning the demarcation of maritime boundaries based on “historic title;” and 2) the foreseen constraints US adherence might inflict on its own strategic mobility.

On that account, the most sensible step would be for the US to refrain from provocative acts so as not to invite a hostile response. Doing so would help diminish the possibility of a naval conflict in the South China Sea that could threaten free access to SLOCs. Given China’s self-restraint in deploying warships to Scarborough Shoal, there should be relatively little concern about an escalation of conflict, provided that the US and the Philippines do not undertake efforts that could be perceived by China as threatening.

Ultimately, both China and the Philippines must realize that they have very little to benefit from treading along the shores of fervent nationalism. Therefore, they have no other option but to engage in collaboration in an increasingly interdependent world.

About the Author

The writer, who is a candidate for Masters in International Relations, is an intern with the Centre for Multilateral Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 

Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Americas / East Asia and Asia Pacific

Synopsis

The intensifying tension between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal calls for an impartial intervention from the US. The peaceful resolution of the dispute lies in how the US successfully maneuvers between its traditional ally and its biggest competitor.

Commentary

FRICTION IN China-Philippine relations vis-à-vis the cluster of rock formations in South China Sea, known as “Scarborough Shoal,” has been rekindled not long after the US announced its pivot to the Asia-Pacific. While the Philippine government is actively seeking U.S. support in addressing the issue, China has staunchly discouraged third-party involvement in an attempt to prevent internationalization of the dispute.

Safeguarding the Sea Lines of Communication

In November 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed the US’s landmark return to Asia-Pacific, dubbing the 21st century as “America’s Pacific Century.” For many, this marked the beginning of the reinforcement of US presence in the region; but for some, this was merely a “continuation,” on the premise that the US never departed the region. Nevertheless, the resurgence of US interest in the western Pacific is neither driven solely by its desire to maintain its hegemonic status nor impede the transformation of a China-centered regional system. Rather, part of this strategy is also to assure that the existing maritime disputes do not escalate into an all-out naval warfare that could jeopardize the navigability of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).

The South China Sea is undoubtedly a vital artery of the world economic system and is integral to the pursuit of American objectives in Asia, contributing approximately US$ 1.2 Trillion to the US economy. Since this altercation may only be expected to heat up as interest groups from both sides continue to fan the flames of nationalism, it would not be in the US’ best interest to assume a passive stance and allow this critical stretch of water to turn into a battlefield.

Assumptions and Misperceptions

Although Philippine leaders have publicly claimed that its biggest ally is obliged to provide protection by virtue of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the US has been careful not to release any official statement confirming or denying this. An important underlying issue in this context is the varying interpretations of the stipulations therein. In contrast to the assumptions made by Philippine officials with respect to the MDT, some have come to conclude that this security cover only applies to acts of aggression by a foreign military entity on the main Philippine islands. This notion stems from the fact that the US has offered no indication as to whether or not it fully and officially recognizes Scarborough Shoal as part of Philippine territory.

Therefore, in spite of the deployment of the nuclear-powered fast attack submarine USS North Carolina, there is no concrete guarantee that the US would come to the Philippine’s rescue if push comes to shove. At the moment, this development may only be interpreted as an attempt by the US at appeasing the Filipinos and flexing its political muscle. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that such an action could contribute to the escalation of the conflict by provoking China.

For all its burgeoning military capabilities, China has been exercising great restraint in reacting to Philippine claims, as evidenced by the absence of Chinese warships from the disputed area. China realizes that resorting to force could not only potentially weaken its relations with the rest of ASEAN, but adversely affect its unsettled maritime disputes with Japan and the Koreas as well.

Furthermore, argued analysts, the Chinese government could be using the flare-up as a means of veering attention away from scandals involving one of its top political figures, Bo Xilai, and the blind civil rights activist, Chen Guangcheng. In other words, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may be seizing the opportunity to sustain its credibility by disguising intra-Party challenges with the veil of political unity and patriotism.

The US as a mediator

Preserving US interests in the Asia-Pacific alongside a flourishing China need not be tantamount to conflict. Needless to say, US involvement must fall within certain limits to attest to its supposed neutrality, and to allow tensions in China-Philippine relations to subside. It can do so by promoting peaceful means geared toward compromise as opposed to conflict, as laid out in the ASEAN-China Declaration of the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea 2002 (DOC).

In line with China’s refusal to bring this matter to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), it has been suggested that the US’ ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) might hold the key to the settlement of the dispute, as this would strongly compel China to comply. However such a likelihood can be safely ruled out by two factors: 1) China’s exemption from the provisions of UNCLOS concerning the demarcation of maritime boundaries based on “historic title;” and 2) the foreseen constraints US adherence might inflict on its own strategic mobility.

On that account, the most sensible step would be for the US to refrain from provocative acts so as not to invite a hostile response. Doing so would help diminish the possibility of a naval conflict in the South China Sea that could threaten free access to SLOCs. Given China’s self-restraint in deploying warships to Scarborough Shoal, there should be relatively little concern about an escalation of conflict, provided that the US and the Philippines do not undertake efforts that could be perceived by China as threatening.

Ultimately, both China and the Philippines must realize that they have very little to benefit from treading along the shores of fervent nationalism. Therefore, they have no other option but to engage in collaboration in an increasingly interdependent world.

About the Author

The writer, who is a candidate for Masters in International Relations, is an intern with the Centre for Multilateral Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 

Categories: RSIS Commentary Series

Popular Links

About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

Connect with Us

rsis.ntu
rsis_ntu
rsisntu
rsisvideocast
school/rsis-ntu
rsis.sg
rsissg
RSIS
RSS
Subscribe to RSIS Publications
Subscribe to RSIS Events

Getting to RSIS

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

Click here for direction to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
    Help us improve

      Rate your experience with this website
      123456
      Not satisfiedVery satisfied
      What did you like?
      0/255 characters
      What can be improved?
      0/255 characters
      Your email
      Please enter a valid email.
      Thank you for your feedback.
      This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
      OK
      Latest Book
      more info