Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • CO13062 | Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia: The End of Special Detachment 88?
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO13062 | Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia: The End of Special Detachment 88?

    11 April 2013

    download pdf

    Synopsis

    There is an ongoing debate between the Indonesian government and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) whether to discharge the increasingly controversial anti-terrorism Special Detachment 88 unit. This is in light of several human rights violations during the unit’s missions.

    Commentary

    THERE HAS been a sudden demand from the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) and other Islamic organisations for investigations and even to dismiss, if necessary, the counter-terrorism Special Detachment 88 due to alleged human rights abuses. Apparently, the trigger was the emergence of a video of terrorist suspects being tortured by Indonesian police officers that went viral.

    This turn of events has led to the vice president of the MUI and also the chairman of the Muhamadiyah organisation, Din Syamsudin, to launch a special request to the Indonesian police (POLRI) to investigate the activities of the Special Detachment 88, better known by its local acronym Densus 88. Din Syamsudin also hinted of a possible dismissal of the unit if it is found guilty of these charges. In replacement, he asked the Indonesian government to create a new institution.

    Criticism of Densus 88

    Densus 88 has been doing a marvellous job in countering the terrorist threat in Indonesia. The detachment also played an integral part in penetrating the Jemaah Islamiyah network in the Indonesian archipelago. Despite these achievements, some of the fundamentalist groups often accused the detachment’s effort in combating terrorists as un-Islamic or an attack on the religion. The urgency to neutralise the terrorist threat has put Densus 88 in a very delicate position, frequently treading a fine-line between being a hero and a villain.

    Not surprisingly, Densus 88 has come under scrutiny and criticism several times because of its activities. Previously, the detachment made an error in identifying terrorist suspects during the raid in Karanganyar, Central Java in 2012. There were also other blunders committed by the detachment unit in its history. In an operation in August 2009, Densus 88 raided alleged terrorist ring leader Noordin M. Top’s safe-house but failed to capture him, even though Noordin was eventually killed in their next operation in September 2009. These few incidents had led to major questions being asked, chief of which is this: Is Densus 88 in need of a revamp? Should the detachment unit be retained or should the Indonesian government create a new institution in place of it?

    To tackle those questions, the Indonesian government needs to review the unit’s performance and come up with a mechanism to evaluate it, especially its methodology in combating a potential terrorist.

    Defending the defender

    MUI was also for the idea of replacing Densus 88 with a new institution but performing almost the same duties. This idea however needs to be assessed carefully. The creation of a new establishment could lead to even more problems if hastily implemented. Evidently, there could be a question of continuity in authority, the most crucial beingcontinuity from the previous organisation to the new one.

    Counter-terrorism is a never-ending process more akin to a marathon than a sprint contest. If there is any interruption in the process, counter-terrorism efforts could be jeopardised. Moreover, such activities do not always end with arrests or the punishment of the convicted terrorist but are implemented to prevent any subsequent attacks so as to disrupt the terrorist network. There must inevitably be a provision for continuity in the new counter-terrorism outfit.

    The existence of Densus 88 is still of great importance as they have to respond to and avert any terrorist attacks in the shortest possible time. Likewise, the creation of a new agency could create new difficulties or even hold back counter-terrorism efforts because its implementation will take extra time, effort and money.

    What needs to be done?

    It would be impractical to regulate the behaviour of Densus 88 through a rigid operating procedure especially when responding to potential terrorist threats. On the other hand, it would be better to focus the evaluation based on the operations of the detachment comprising the following steps:

    Firstly, it is necessary to establish an evaluation mechanism which is led by elements within Densus 88. This evaluation mechanism should focus on analysing the efficacy of the detachment’s missions. Such a mechanism will provide timely analysis and feedback on the delicate context and environment in which Densus 88 carries out its missions. It will also be very useful in reassessing and improving its next operation or during follow-up missions.

    An experienced personnel within the detachment will be equipped with more insightswhen scrutinising the unit’s accomplished missions as this person would already know the field situation better than an outsider.

    Secondly, Densus 88 needs to improve the coordination of operations with the local police. The local knowledge of the regional police is critical in achieving a successful mission. Additionally, the efficacy of the operation could reduce the number of casualties. This is crucial since mass casualties could create martyrdom among the terrorists which will only serve their cause to attract new followers. Furthermore, effective tracking and detection of the scattered and dispersed terrorists will require sufficient local information which can be obtained largely from the local police.

    Balancing the assessment

    Densus 88’s core mission to defeat terrorism in Indonesia should not be confused with its technical weaknesses, such as faults in the unit’s methods to restrain and detain terrorist suspects. Therefore, the evaluation should be on the detachment’s methods in combating the terrorist rather than the existence of the counterterrorism agency per se.

    In addition, we should keep in mind the detachment’s remarkable achievements in countering the terrorist threat in the country. The assessment of the unit should be done in terms of its overall performance, not just its recent shortcomings.

    About the Author

    Adhi Priamarizki is a Research Analyst with the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / Terrorism Studies / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

    Synopsis

    There is an ongoing debate between the Indonesian government and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) whether to discharge the increasingly controversial anti-terrorism Special Detachment 88 unit. This is in light of several human rights violations during the unit’s missions.

    Commentary

    THERE HAS been a sudden demand from the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) and other Islamic organisations for investigations and even to dismiss, if necessary, the counter-terrorism Special Detachment 88 due to alleged human rights abuses. Apparently, the trigger was the emergence of a video of terrorist suspects being tortured by Indonesian police officers that went viral.

    This turn of events has led to the vice president of the MUI and also the chairman of the Muhamadiyah organisation, Din Syamsudin, to launch a special request to the Indonesian police (POLRI) to investigate the activities of the Special Detachment 88, better known by its local acronym Densus 88. Din Syamsudin also hinted of a possible dismissal of the unit if it is found guilty of these charges. In replacement, he asked the Indonesian government to create a new institution.

    Criticism of Densus 88

    Densus 88 has been doing a marvellous job in countering the terrorist threat in Indonesia. The detachment also played an integral part in penetrating the Jemaah Islamiyah network in the Indonesian archipelago. Despite these achievements, some of the fundamentalist groups often accused the detachment’s effort in combating terrorists as un-Islamic or an attack on the religion. The urgency to neutralise the terrorist threat has put Densus 88 in a very delicate position, frequently treading a fine-line between being a hero and a villain.

    Not surprisingly, Densus 88 has come under scrutiny and criticism several times because of its activities. Previously, the detachment made an error in identifying terrorist suspects during the raid in Karanganyar, Central Java in 2012. There were also other blunders committed by the detachment unit in its history. In an operation in August 2009, Densus 88 raided alleged terrorist ring leader Noordin M. Top’s safe-house but failed to capture him, even though Noordin was eventually killed in their next operation in September 2009. These few incidents had led to major questions being asked, chief of which is this: Is Densus 88 in need of a revamp? Should the detachment unit be retained or should the Indonesian government create a new institution in place of it?

    To tackle those questions, the Indonesian government needs to review the unit’s performance and come up with a mechanism to evaluate it, especially its methodology in combating a potential terrorist.

    Defending the defender

    MUI was also for the idea of replacing Densus 88 with a new institution but performing almost the same duties. This idea however needs to be assessed carefully. The creation of a new establishment could lead to even more problems if hastily implemented. Evidently, there could be a question of continuity in authority, the most crucial beingcontinuity from the previous organisation to the new one.

    Counter-terrorism is a never-ending process more akin to a marathon than a sprint contest. If there is any interruption in the process, counter-terrorism efforts could be jeopardised. Moreover, such activities do not always end with arrests or the punishment of the convicted terrorist but are implemented to prevent any subsequent attacks so as to disrupt the terrorist network. There must inevitably be a provision for continuity in the new counter-terrorism outfit.

    The existence of Densus 88 is still of great importance as they have to respond to and avert any terrorist attacks in the shortest possible time. Likewise, the creation of a new agency could create new difficulties or even hold back counter-terrorism efforts because its implementation will take extra time, effort and money.

    What needs to be done?

    It would be impractical to regulate the behaviour of Densus 88 through a rigid operating procedure especially when responding to potential terrorist threats. On the other hand, it would be better to focus the evaluation based on the operations of the detachment comprising the following steps:

    Firstly, it is necessary to establish an evaluation mechanism which is led by elements within Densus 88. This evaluation mechanism should focus on analysing the efficacy of the detachment’s missions. Such a mechanism will provide timely analysis and feedback on the delicate context and environment in which Densus 88 carries out its missions. It will also be very useful in reassessing and improving its next operation or during follow-up missions.

    An experienced personnel within the detachment will be equipped with more insightswhen scrutinising the unit’s accomplished missions as this person would already know the field situation better than an outsider.

    Secondly, Densus 88 needs to improve the coordination of operations with the local police. The local knowledge of the regional police is critical in achieving a successful mission. Additionally, the efficacy of the operation could reduce the number of casualties. This is crucial since mass casualties could create martyrdom among the terrorists which will only serve their cause to attract new followers. Furthermore, effective tracking and detection of the scattered and dispersed terrorists will require sufficient local information which can be obtained largely from the local police.

    Balancing the assessment

    Densus 88’s core mission to defeat terrorism in Indonesia should not be confused with its technical weaknesses, such as faults in the unit’s methods to restrain and detain terrorist suspects. Therefore, the evaluation should be on the detachment’s methods in combating the terrorist rather than the existence of the counterterrorism agency per se.

    In addition, we should keep in mind the detachment’s remarkable achievements in countering the terrorist threat in the country. The assessment of the unit should be done in terms of its overall performance, not just its recent shortcomings.

    About the Author

    Adhi Priamarizki is a Research Analyst with the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / Terrorism Studies

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info