Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • ASEAN and The Principle of Non-Intervention
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO24172 | ASEAN and The Principle of Non-Intervention
    R. M. Michael Tene

    12 November 2024

    download pdf

    SYNOPSIS

    Some critics have attributed adherence to the principle of non-intervention as one of the main reasons for ASEAN’s inability to address the situation in Myanmar. However, the fact is ASEAN Leaders – including the Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing – met at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta on 24 April 2021 and issued the Five-Point Consensus to address the situation in Myanmar. This is a framework, signed on by all ten ASEAN Leaders, to end violence; begin dialogue among all parties for a peaceful solution; allow humanitarian assistance; appoint an ASEAN Special Envoy; and enable this Special Envoy to visit Myanmar and meet all parties. Min Aung Hlaing reneged on this Consensus and undermined the confidence and trust among ASEAN member states.

    COMMENTARY

    The ongoing situation in Myanmar has raised questions about its implications for the principle of non-intervention for ASEAN. Some observers attributed ASEAN’s inability to persuade the military regime in Myanmar to comply with decisions by ASEAN Leaders, including the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), among others, to the organisation’s adherence to the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. This principle is considered a limiting factor in ASEAN’s ability to take stronger measures regarding the military regime’s non-compliance with the 5PC. The 5PC was agreed by all ASEAN Leaders, including General Min Aung Hlaing from Myanmar, at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting held in Jakarta on 24 April 2021.

    The non-intervention principle is not unique to ASEAN. It is widely considered part of customary international law and reflected in Article 2 of the UN Charter. The UN General Assembly, in December 1965, adopted Resolution 2131(XX) on Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty. It is also explicitly expressed in the Charters of various regional organisations, including ASEAN.

    For many decades after its inception in 1967, the main objective of ASEAN has been to promote, establish, and preserve peace and stability in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s adherence to the non-intervention principle provides a strong basis for developing confidence and trust among its members to coexist peacefully and cooperate in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity among them.

    In the case of Myanmar, doing away with the non-intervention principle may not be a sound policy. Circumventing the non-intervention principle, in this case, will most likely involve increasing Myanmar’s isolation in ASEAN and/or applying sanctions. Isolation means expanding Myanmar’s exclusion from participating in ASEAN’s meetings beyond the ASEAN Summit. These policies of wider isolation and sanctions could allow ASEAN to put greater pressure on the Myanmar military regime to comply with the 5PC. Such policies are considered as “interventionist” as they may also be adopted without the consent of Myanmar and for their “forceful” nature. Since ASEAN’s main objectives in addressing the situation in Myanmar consist of a cessation of violence and negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, then the main question will be whether isolation and sanctions can achieve those objectives.

    Not Enough to Use Isolation and Sanctions

    Sanctions and increased isolation of Myanmar within ASEAN are unlikely to end the ongoing armed conflict and promote negotiations or other avenues to peace. Even if ASEAN agrees to this course of action, which is not the case, it is unlikely that all ASEAN member states will apply sanctions unequivocally and severely limit their bilateral relations with Myanmar. Another important fact is Myanmar’s extensive geography: it has a land area of more than 676,500 square km, a land border with several countries extending over 6,500 km, and a coastline of more than 2,200 km which will make it difficult to effectively enforce sanctions.

    The neighbouring countries of Myanmar will also continue to preserve their respective relationships with Myanmar for various reasons, including the need to prevent transboundary issues from arising or worsening from the ongoing conflict inside Myanmar. Further isolation of Myanmar within ASEAN will also make it more difficult for ASEAN and its Special Envoy to engage and persuade the conflicting parties in Myanmar to renounce violence and enter peaceful negotiations.

    Myanmar has faced considerable challenges even in peace time with non-traditional security threats, especially natural disasters and health pandemics. Recent climate-induced floodings have resulted in severe damage to the country’s failed economy, limited public infrastructure, and rudimentary health care in urban centres. It is almost impossible to provide any humanitarian assistance to those in distress as humanitarian relief groups cannot move easily into affected areas. Any sanctions should take into consideration the possible worsening of the humanitarian situation in the country.

    While sanctions and isolation may not be effective, this “interventionist” policy may also raise a more serious problem for ASEAN. Once ASEAN sets a precedent to circumvent its non-intervention principle, it may adversely affect confidence and trust among ASEAN member states. It will deprive member states of the so-called “ironclad guarantee” that ASEAN members will not interfere in the domestic situation of another member. In the worst-case scenario, circumventing the non-intervention principle may fail to achieve ASEAN’s objectives as agreed in the 5PC while creating new problems in reduced confidence and trust.

    Pressing On With Five-Point Consensus

    To address the situation in Myanmar and implement the 5PC, ASEAN must enhance the effectiveness of its engagement with all the conflicting parties. ASEAN member states need to review the effective implementation of the 5PC, including the arrangement for the Special Envoy, who has a crucial role in promoting peaceful negotiations and ending violence among the parties in Myanmar. Enhanced engagement cannot be pursued with increased isolation and sanctions. The key is more political will on the part of Myanmar’s immediate neighbours to work purposefully with ASEAN in making the 5PC operational and sustainable.

    About the Author

    The author is a senior Indonesian diplomat. The views expressed are his own.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / Regionalism and Multilateralism / East Asia and Asia Pacific / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN / Global
    comments powered by Disqus

    SYNOPSIS

    Some critics have attributed adherence to the principle of non-intervention as one of the main reasons for ASEAN’s inability to address the situation in Myanmar. However, the fact is ASEAN Leaders – including the Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing – met at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta on 24 April 2021 and issued the Five-Point Consensus to address the situation in Myanmar. This is a framework, signed on by all ten ASEAN Leaders, to end violence; begin dialogue among all parties for a peaceful solution; allow humanitarian assistance; appoint an ASEAN Special Envoy; and enable this Special Envoy to visit Myanmar and meet all parties. Min Aung Hlaing reneged on this Consensus and undermined the confidence and trust among ASEAN member states.

    COMMENTARY

    The ongoing situation in Myanmar has raised questions about its implications for the principle of non-intervention for ASEAN. Some observers attributed ASEAN’s inability to persuade the military regime in Myanmar to comply with decisions by ASEAN Leaders, including the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), among others, to the organisation’s adherence to the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. This principle is considered a limiting factor in ASEAN’s ability to take stronger measures regarding the military regime’s non-compliance with the 5PC. The 5PC was agreed by all ASEAN Leaders, including General Min Aung Hlaing from Myanmar, at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting held in Jakarta on 24 April 2021.

    The non-intervention principle is not unique to ASEAN. It is widely considered part of customary international law and reflected in Article 2 of the UN Charter. The UN General Assembly, in December 1965, adopted Resolution 2131(XX) on Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty. It is also explicitly expressed in the Charters of various regional organisations, including ASEAN.

    For many decades after its inception in 1967, the main objective of ASEAN has been to promote, establish, and preserve peace and stability in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s adherence to the non-intervention principle provides a strong basis for developing confidence and trust among its members to coexist peacefully and cooperate in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity among them.

    In the case of Myanmar, doing away with the non-intervention principle may not be a sound policy. Circumventing the non-intervention principle, in this case, will most likely involve increasing Myanmar’s isolation in ASEAN and/or applying sanctions. Isolation means expanding Myanmar’s exclusion from participating in ASEAN’s meetings beyond the ASEAN Summit. These policies of wider isolation and sanctions could allow ASEAN to put greater pressure on the Myanmar military regime to comply with the 5PC. Such policies are considered as “interventionist” as they may also be adopted without the consent of Myanmar and for their “forceful” nature. Since ASEAN’s main objectives in addressing the situation in Myanmar consist of a cessation of violence and negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, then the main question will be whether isolation and sanctions can achieve those objectives.

    Not Enough to Use Isolation and Sanctions

    Sanctions and increased isolation of Myanmar within ASEAN are unlikely to end the ongoing armed conflict and promote negotiations or other avenues to peace. Even if ASEAN agrees to this course of action, which is not the case, it is unlikely that all ASEAN member states will apply sanctions unequivocally and severely limit their bilateral relations with Myanmar. Another important fact is Myanmar’s extensive geography: it has a land area of more than 676,500 square km, a land border with several countries extending over 6,500 km, and a coastline of more than 2,200 km which will make it difficult to effectively enforce sanctions.

    The neighbouring countries of Myanmar will also continue to preserve their respective relationships with Myanmar for various reasons, including the need to prevent transboundary issues from arising or worsening from the ongoing conflict inside Myanmar. Further isolation of Myanmar within ASEAN will also make it more difficult for ASEAN and its Special Envoy to engage and persuade the conflicting parties in Myanmar to renounce violence and enter peaceful negotiations.

    Myanmar has faced considerable challenges even in peace time with non-traditional security threats, especially natural disasters and health pandemics. Recent climate-induced floodings have resulted in severe damage to the country’s failed economy, limited public infrastructure, and rudimentary health care in urban centres. It is almost impossible to provide any humanitarian assistance to those in distress as humanitarian relief groups cannot move easily into affected areas. Any sanctions should take into consideration the possible worsening of the humanitarian situation in the country.

    While sanctions and isolation may not be effective, this “interventionist” policy may also raise a more serious problem for ASEAN. Once ASEAN sets a precedent to circumvent its non-intervention principle, it may adversely affect confidence and trust among ASEAN member states. It will deprive member states of the so-called “ironclad guarantee” that ASEAN members will not interfere in the domestic situation of another member. In the worst-case scenario, circumventing the non-intervention principle may fail to achieve ASEAN’s objectives as agreed in the 5PC while creating new problems in reduced confidence and trust.

    Pressing On With Five-Point Consensus

    To address the situation in Myanmar and implement the 5PC, ASEAN must enhance the effectiveness of its engagement with all the conflicting parties. ASEAN member states need to review the effective implementation of the 5PC, including the arrangement for the Special Envoy, who has a crucial role in promoting peaceful negotiations and ending violence among the parties in Myanmar. Enhanced engagement cannot be pursued with increased isolation and sanctions. The key is more political will on the part of Myanmar’s immediate neighbours to work purposefully with ASEAN in making the 5PC operational and sustainable.

    About the Author

    The author is a senior Indonesian diplomat. The views expressed are his own.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / Regionalism and Multilateralism

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info