03 June 2026
- RSIS
- Publication
- RSIS Publications
- Caught Between, Embedded Within: Gulf Hedging in an Interlocking Regional Order
Abstract
Gulf hedging reflects a structured and layered approach to navigating a regional environment defined by overlapping rivalries, asymmetries of power and deep interdependence. Rather than operating as a flexible strategy, it unfolds within an interlocking architecture of relationships in which rivalry, cooperation and engagement coexist. This embeds the Arab states in the Gulf within the very tensions they seek to manage.
The 2026 US-Israel confrontation with Iran brings these dynamics into sharper relief. The Gulf states’ direct exposure to conflict reveals how relationships that provide deterrence can also generate vulnerability, narrowing their room for manoeuvre. While reliance on external security guarantees remains central, continued engagement across competing actors reflects efforts to contain escalation rather than resolve it.
Gulf hedging, therefore, persists not as an optimal or fully autonomous strategy, but as a constrained necessity. It does not remove the Gulf from conflict. It enables it to endure within it.

Abstract
Gulf hedging reflects a structured and layered approach to navigating a regional environment defined by overlapping rivalries, asymmetries of power and deep interdependence. Rather than operating as a flexible strategy, it unfolds within an interlocking architecture of relationships in which rivalry, cooperation and engagement coexist. This embeds the Arab states in the Gulf within the very tensions they seek to manage.
The 2026 US-Israel confrontation with Iran brings these dynamics into sharper relief. The Gulf states’ direct exposure to conflict reveals how relationships that provide deterrence can also generate vulnerability, narrowing their room for manoeuvre. While reliance on external security guarantees remains central, continued engagement across competing actors reflects efforts to contain escalation rather than resolve it.
Gulf hedging, therefore, persists not as an optimal or fully autonomous strategy, but as a constrained necessity. It does not remove the Gulf from conflict. It enables it to endure within it.



