Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      News ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio Channel
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS
Connect
Search
  • RSIS
  • Publication
  • RSIS Publications
  • How a Network of Inauthentic Websites Could Be a Threat to Singapore
  • Annual Reviews
  • Books
  • Bulletins and Newsletters
  • RSIS Commentary Series
  • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
  • Commemorative / Event Reports
  • Future Issues
  • IDSS Papers
  • Interreligious Relations
  • Monographs
  • NTS Insight
  • Policy Reports
  • Working Papers

CO24162 | How a Network of Inauthentic Websites Could Be a Threat to Singapore
Benjamin Ang, Dymples Leong

23 October 2024

download pdf

SYNOPSIS

On 22 October 2024, the Singapore Government issued directions to Singapore Internet service providers to disable access by its Singapore users to websites found to be “inauthentic”. Such inauthentic websites are part of the new tactics being used in hostile information campaigns around the world, which could also be used against Singapore.

Source: Unsplash

COMMENTARY

In recent years, as authorities and platforms worldwide take action against inauthentic social media accounts and websites that spread falsehoods and hate speeches, the threat actors behind them have changed their techniques to avoid detection.

One technique is to use networks of “inauthentic news” websites that “present themselves primarily as independent news outlets from different regions across the world” – as the cybersecurity and threat intelligence company Mandiant has put it – but are owned or operated in one location. This tactic was exposed in several reports by Mandiant, Citizen Lab (an academic research laboratory), and South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, which identified several such networks used in foreign influence campaigns.

The threat posed by such websites has surfaced in Singapore, which could be used by foreign actors behind them to mount hostile information campaigns (HICs) here. Hence, the issuance of instructions on 22 October by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) to Internet service providers to disable access by users in Singapore to ten websites identified as inauthentic.

The Threat Posed by Inauthentic Websites

These sites appear innocuous as they mostly feature non-controversial news on lifestyle and entertainment, but they are insidious for precisely that very reason. When the sites are used to spread disinformation or content serving the interest of foreign governments and agencies, the casual presence of non-controversial news gives them the cover that they need, i.e., the appearance of authenticity or credibility. The presence of a network comprising dozens of such sites, all repeating the same news stories, suggests corroboration to the unwary. It creates the “illusory truth effect”, where repeated exposure to the same information increases its likelihood of being perceived as true, even when it is not.

Usually, most people are wary of websites that carry biased or unreliable information, such as those about vaccine conspiracies, climate change, or extreme ideologies. This is partly because of our sceptical nature and partly because of critical thinking and media literacy education programmes that teach us to evaluate the sources and reliability of information provided. However, website visitors could still be deceived into trusting inauthentic news sites, as most of the information they display is not obviously biased nor unreliable.

The action by MHA/IMDA to block access to inauthentic websites was not unexpected. Even before the issuance of the blocking order, an RSIS’ team from the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) had been observing dozens of sites in various networks with a view to publishing policy reports about them.

We found several suspicious news sites which falsely presented themselves as news outlets from Singapore and other Asian countries when they were found – as determined through open-source investigation methods and tools – to have links to a public relations company in Shanghai, which Mandiant had reported as being used for foreign influence campaigns.

There were other sites linked to a news distribution company (not registered in Singapore), with strategic links to a network of inauthentic news sites named in the South Korean and Citizen Lab reports as being used by foreign actors. Although there was one website where we could not identify the owner and the authors of the articles posted, we could tell from the online evidence that it was not from Singapore.

We found networks that were used to boost commercial press releases artificially. In one instance, a cryptocurrency business falsely claimed it had been cited in over a hundred news articles worldwide. In fact, it was a story replicated on a hundred sites in one of the networks to create the illusion of its global reach.

The inauthentic nature of these networks and sites allows a foreign actor to post a story, surround it with noncontroversial lifestyle or entertainment news, and make it appear to originate from different agencies and countries, even though it comes from a single source.

Our team focused on sites that presented themselves as Singapore-based, as they could be used by threat actors, either for HICs targeting Singaporeans or for information operations appearing to represent the views of Singaporeans. Both of these pose national security concerns. During sensitive occasions like an election campaign or a dispute with a foreign government, a threat actor could use its nefarious network to influence Singaporeans with disinformation or propaganda, potentially swaying sentiments and opinions.

RSIS’ study did not detect any use of networks and sites in HICs against Singapore. However, such networks and sites are like stores of digital ammunition that can be used when the time is right. Previous reports of alleged Russian and Iranian information operations, “Doppelganger” and “Endless Mayfly”, respectively, suggest that inauthentic social media accounts would be the means of launching inauthentic news sites to the public.

Countermeasures Needed

Since reports by Mandiant, Citizen Lab, and the South Korean intelligence agency have pointed to the use of inauthentic websites in foreign influence campaigns around the world, the Singapore Government is prudent in restricting them before they can be used to launch HICs against Singapore.

Hence, on 22 October, MHA and IMDA issued directions under Section 16 of the Broadcasting Act 1994 to Internet service providers to disable access to ten inauthentic websites for users in Singapore. Other laws, like the Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act, which presently do not cover such scenarios, might need to be updated.

Besides legislation, enhancing public awareness about the potential of inauthentic websites being used in HICs is also crucial. For instance, there is a need to instil greater awareness of the deceptive goals and tactics used in seemingly benign news on entertainment and lifestyle. This objective can be incorporated into existing digital and information literacy initiatives. Continued efforts in this area – such as the Source, Understand, Research, and Evaluate (S.U.R.E) campaign by the National Library Board – can further nurture the information literacy skills of Singapore netizens.

As an open, diverse and digitally connected society, Singapore is vulnerable to foreign interference through online HICs. As the tactics of foreign threat actors continue to evolve, we need to be vigilant and circumspective about online sources of news or information, especially those that portray themselves as originating from Singapore.

About the Authors

Benjamin Ang is a Senior Fellow and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also the Head of Digital Impact Research at RSIS and leads the Future Issues in Technology programme. Dymples Leong is an Associate Research Fellow at CENS.

Other publications on this topic

How a Network of Inauthentic Websites Could Be a Threat to Singapore

Networks of Inauthentic News Sites and the Risk of Hostile Information Campaigns in Singapore

Inauthentic Local Lifestyle and News Websites and the Challenge for Media Literacy

Blocked but Not Gone: Inauthentic News Site Alamak.io Resurfaces Under New Branding

ANNEX: RSIS Commentary “Blocked but Not Gone: Inauthentic News Site Alamak.io Resurfaces Under New Branding”

 

Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / Non-Traditional Security / Singapore and Homeland Security / Central Asia / East Asia and Asia Pacific / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN / Global
comments powered by Disqus

SYNOPSIS

On 22 October 2024, the Singapore Government issued directions to Singapore Internet service providers to disable access by its Singapore users to websites found to be “inauthentic”. Such inauthentic websites are part of the new tactics being used in hostile information campaigns around the world, which could also be used against Singapore.

Source: Unsplash

COMMENTARY

In recent years, as authorities and platforms worldwide take action against inauthentic social media accounts and websites that spread falsehoods and hate speeches, the threat actors behind them have changed their techniques to avoid detection.

One technique is to use networks of “inauthentic news” websites that “present themselves primarily as independent news outlets from different regions across the world” – as the cybersecurity and threat intelligence company Mandiant has put it – but are owned or operated in one location. This tactic was exposed in several reports by Mandiant, Citizen Lab (an academic research laboratory), and South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, which identified several such networks used in foreign influence campaigns.

The threat posed by such websites has surfaced in Singapore, which could be used by foreign actors behind them to mount hostile information campaigns (HICs) here. Hence, the issuance of instructions on 22 October by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) to Internet service providers to disable access by users in Singapore to ten websites identified as inauthentic.

The Threat Posed by Inauthentic Websites

These sites appear innocuous as they mostly feature non-controversial news on lifestyle and entertainment, but they are insidious for precisely that very reason. When the sites are used to spread disinformation or content serving the interest of foreign governments and agencies, the casual presence of non-controversial news gives them the cover that they need, i.e., the appearance of authenticity or credibility. The presence of a network comprising dozens of such sites, all repeating the same news stories, suggests corroboration to the unwary. It creates the “illusory truth effect”, where repeated exposure to the same information increases its likelihood of being perceived as true, even when it is not.

Usually, most people are wary of websites that carry biased or unreliable information, such as those about vaccine conspiracies, climate change, or extreme ideologies. This is partly because of our sceptical nature and partly because of critical thinking and media literacy education programmes that teach us to evaluate the sources and reliability of information provided. However, website visitors could still be deceived into trusting inauthentic news sites, as most of the information they display is not obviously biased nor unreliable.

The action by MHA/IMDA to block access to inauthentic websites was not unexpected. Even before the issuance of the blocking order, an RSIS’ team from the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) had been observing dozens of sites in various networks with a view to publishing policy reports about them.

We found several suspicious news sites which falsely presented themselves as news outlets from Singapore and other Asian countries when they were found – as determined through open-source investigation methods and tools – to have links to a public relations company in Shanghai, which Mandiant had reported as being used for foreign influence campaigns.

There were other sites linked to a news distribution company (not registered in Singapore), with strategic links to a network of inauthentic news sites named in the South Korean and Citizen Lab reports as being used by foreign actors. Although there was one website where we could not identify the owner and the authors of the articles posted, we could tell from the online evidence that it was not from Singapore.

We found networks that were used to boost commercial press releases artificially. In one instance, a cryptocurrency business falsely claimed it had been cited in over a hundred news articles worldwide. In fact, it was a story replicated on a hundred sites in one of the networks to create the illusion of its global reach.

The inauthentic nature of these networks and sites allows a foreign actor to post a story, surround it with noncontroversial lifestyle or entertainment news, and make it appear to originate from different agencies and countries, even though it comes from a single source.

Our team focused on sites that presented themselves as Singapore-based, as they could be used by threat actors, either for HICs targeting Singaporeans or for information operations appearing to represent the views of Singaporeans. Both of these pose national security concerns. During sensitive occasions like an election campaign or a dispute with a foreign government, a threat actor could use its nefarious network to influence Singaporeans with disinformation or propaganda, potentially swaying sentiments and opinions.

RSIS’ study did not detect any use of networks and sites in HICs against Singapore. However, such networks and sites are like stores of digital ammunition that can be used when the time is right. Previous reports of alleged Russian and Iranian information operations, “Doppelganger” and “Endless Mayfly”, respectively, suggest that inauthentic social media accounts would be the means of launching inauthentic news sites to the public.

Countermeasures Needed

Since reports by Mandiant, Citizen Lab, and the South Korean intelligence agency have pointed to the use of inauthentic websites in foreign influence campaigns around the world, the Singapore Government is prudent in restricting them before they can be used to launch HICs against Singapore.

Hence, on 22 October, MHA and IMDA issued directions under Section 16 of the Broadcasting Act 1994 to Internet service providers to disable access to ten inauthentic websites for users in Singapore. Other laws, like the Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act, which presently do not cover such scenarios, might need to be updated.

Besides legislation, enhancing public awareness about the potential of inauthentic websites being used in HICs is also crucial. For instance, there is a need to instil greater awareness of the deceptive goals and tactics used in seemingly benign news on entertainment and lifestyle. This objective can be incorporated into existing digital and information literacy initiatives. Continued efforts in this area – such as the Source, Understand, Research, and Evaluate (S.U.R.E) campaign by the National Library Board – can further nurture the information literacy skills of Singapore netizens.

As an open, diverse and digitally connected society, Singapore is vulnerable to foreign interference through online HICs. As the tactics of foreign threat actors continue to evolve, we need to be vigilant and circumspective about online sources of news or information, especially those that portray themselves as originating from Singapore.

About the Authors

Benjamin Ang is a Senior Fellow and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also the Head of Digital Impact Research at RSIS and leads the Future Issues in Technology programme. Dymples Leong is an Associate Research Fellow at CENS.

Other publications on this topic

How a Network of Inauthentic Websites Could Be a Threat to Singapore

Networks of Inauthentic News Sites and the Risk of Hostile Information Campaigns in Singapore

Inauthentic Local Lifestyle and News Websites and the Challenge for Media Literacy

Blocked but Not Gone: Inauthentic News Site Alamak.io Resurfaces Under New Branding

ANNEX: RSIS Commentary “Blocked but Not Gone: Inauthentic News Site Alamak.io Resurfaces Under New Branding”

 

Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / Non-Traditional Security / Singapore and Homeland Security

Popular Links

About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

Connect with Us

rsis.ntu
rsis_ntu
rsisntu
rsisvideocast
school/rsis-ntu
rsis.sg
rsissg
RSIS
RSS
Subscribe to RSIS Publications
Subscribe to RSIS Events

Getting to RSIS

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

Click here for direction to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
    Help us improve

      Rate your experience with this website
      123456
      Not satisfiedVery satisfied
      What did you like?
      0/255 characters
      What can be improved?
      0/255 characters
      Your email
      Please enter a valid email.
      Thank you for your feedback.
      This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
      OK
      Latest Book
      more info