24 March 2014
India’s Nuclear Deterrent: The More Things Change…
Executive Summary
India’s complex security environment requires a credible nuclear deterrence strategy. Over the years, three factors have produced a somewhat tentative and uncertain strategy. First, the management paradigm has been shaped by the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and by the prominent role of the scientific enclave, which has marginalised the military. Second, Indian strategy has been circumscribed by a preference for existential deterrence, which again has kept the military out of decision-making and detracted from the credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine and posture. And third, the civilian bureaucracy has resisted organisational reform and perpetuated the deficit in deterrence credibility. A series of changes are necessary in order to facilitate a more efficacious nuclear strategy.
Desirable changes include:
- Development of a strong naval leg of the nuclear triad with nuclear submarine-based missiles that have a striking range of 5,000-8,000 km,
- Consideration of the option to develop tactical/theatre nuclear weapons in order to achieve escalation dominance and retaliate against conventional force attacks,
- Integration of the military in India’s national security decision-making process, and
- Shifting towards a more transparent nuclear posture that is both reassuring to the Indian public and more credible vis-à-vis adversaries.
About the Author
Admiral Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Naval Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff in end-2006.
A pilot by specialisation, he is a graduate of the Indian Air Force Test Pilots School, the Defence Services Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College. He was awarded a Vir Chakra for gallantry while flying with an Air Force fighter-bomber squadron during the 1971 war. During his 40-year career, he commanded two air squadrons and a naval air station. His commands at sea include a missile-boat, two frigates and the aircraft-carrier INS Viraat. As a Flag Officer, he commanded India’s Eastern Fleet, the National Defence Academy, the Andaman & Nicobar Joint Command, and the Western Naval Command. During his tenure as Chief, the Indian Navy saw many initiatives, including a disaster relief operation during the 2004 tsunami that rendered help not only on India’s eastern seaboard, but also to neighbouring Indonesia, Maldives and Sri Lanka.
Post-retirement, he writes and speaks on strategic and defence-related topics. He has published a compendium of speeches and writings on maritime and security issues entitled From the Crow’s Nest (2008). He recently completed a second two-year term as member of India’s National Security Advisory Board.
Executive Summary
India’s complex security environment requires a credible nuclear deterrence strategy. Over the years, three factors have produced a somewhat tentative and uncertain strategy. First, the management paradigm has been shaped by the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and by the prominent role of the scientific enclave, which has marginalised the military. Second, Indian strategy has been circumscribed by a preference for existential deterrence, which again has kept the military out of decision-making and detracted from the credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine and posture. And third, the civilian bureaucracy has resisted organisational reform and perpetuated the deficit in deterrence credibility. A series of changes are necessary in order to facilitate a more efficacious nuclear strategy.
Desirable changes include:
- Development of a strong naval leg of the nuclear triad with nuclear submarine-based missiles that have a striking range of 5,000-8,000 km,
- Consideration of the option to develop tactical/theatre nuclear weapons in order to achieve escalation dominance and retaliate against conventional force attacks,
- Integration of the military in India’s national security decision-making process, and
- Shifting towards a more transparent nuclear posture that is both reassuring to the Indian public and more credible vis-à-vis adversaries.
About the Author
Admiral Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Naval Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff in end-2006.
A pilot by specialisation, he is a graduate of the Indian Air Force Test Pilots School, the Defence Services Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College. He was awarded a Vir Chakra for gallantry while flying with an Air Force fighter-bomber squadron during the 1971 war. During his 40-year career, he commanded two air squadrons and a naval air station. His commands at sea include a missile-boat, two frigates and the aircraft-carrier INS Viraat. As a Flag Officer, he commanded India’s Eastern Fleet, the National Defence Academy, the Andaman & Nicobar Joint Command, and the Western Naval Command. During his tenure as Chief, the Indian Navy saw many initiatives, including a disaster relief operation during the 2004 tsunami that rendered help not only on India’s eastern seaboard, but also to neighbouring Indonesia, Maldives and Sri Lanka.
Post-retirement, he writes and speaks on strategic and defence-related topics. He has published a compendium of speeches and writings on maritime and security issues entitled From the Crow’s Nest (2008). He recently completed a second two-year term as member of India’s National Security Advisory Board.
