Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • Indonesia-China Agreement and Jakarta’s Inconsistency on the South China Sea Issue
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO25003 | Indonesia-China Agreement and Jakarta’s Inconsistency on the South China Sea Issue
    Alfin Febrian Basundoro

    10 January 2025

    download pdf

    SYNOPSIS

    Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s agreement with China on joint maritime development in the South China Sea raises concerns over Indonesia’s commitment to national sovereignty and international law. While economically beneficial, it risks legitimising China’s claim in the South China Sea, straining relations within ASEAN, threatening local livelihoods, and undermining Indonesia’s regional reputation and longstanding foreign policy principles.

    Source: Pexels
    Source: Pexels

    COMMENTARY

    On November 9, 2024, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto visited Beijing. He met the President of China, Xi Jinping. The visit resulted in several agreements, ranging from industrial and mining to trade cooperation, valued at US$ 10 billion. One important agreement was on maritime cooperation, in which both sides committed to jointly developing the fishery, oil and gas resources.

    Maritime cooperation has been an ongoing priority for both Indonesia and China. For instance, since 2023, the two countries have collaborated on the fishery industrial development. In the latest agreement, they pledged to further enhance this cooperation by jointly developing the maritime economy in the South China Sea (SCS), including in areas with overlapping claims.

    While this agreement offers significant economic benefits, it might be problematic for Indonesia. Notably, it suggests an inconsistency in Indonesia’s stance on international maritime law in Southeast Asia and appears to be in conflict with its commitment to uphold national sovereignty.

    Commitment to UNCLOS

    By agreeing to economic development in the “overlapping claims” area of the SCS, Indonesia could be perceived as tacitly recognising China’s claim over those parts which contradicts its commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s claim in the SCS, which relies on a historical basis rather than on UNCLOS-defined Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) boundaries, has long been contested as a violation of international law. This agreement may, therefore, provoke negative responses from other ASEAN countries with competing claims in the SCS, i.e., the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam.

    Previously, Indonesia had always maintained a firm stance against China’s unilateral claims. Since 2016, it has consistently rejected China’s assertion of historical fishing rights in the SCS, which does not align with the UNCLOS, as a basis for its claim. China’s claim encompasses areas extending beyond the 200-nautical-mile EEZ measured from its outermost territory, Hainan. In May 2020, Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York reiterated this rejection, emphasising the lack of legal basis for China’s “nine-dash line” claim.

    Furthermore, Indonesia has actively supported regional stability efforts, notably through its involvement in developing and introducing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in 2019. As highlighted by Joanne Lin, Coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, the AOIP, although primarily normative, reflects ASEAN’s vision of a “safe, stable, and free Indo-Pacific” based on UNCLOS principles. It also prioritises dialogue for resolving regional disputes, including the SCS. Indonesia’s implicit acknowledgement of China’s SCS claim – without engaging in dialogue with other ASEAN states – appears ironic, given Indonesia’s continuous advocacy for dialogue-based Indo-Pacific stability.

    Indonesia’s Reputation and “Good Neighbour Policy”

    This agreement also contradicted Prabowo’s speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta on November 13, 2023, during his candidacy for the presidential office. The speech emphasised the “good neighbour policy”, a pillar of Indonesia’s foreign policy that promotes harmonious relations with Southeast Asian countries. Endorsing China’s unilateral claim would likely undermine this principle as it would sacrifice Indonesia’s robust ties and regional reputation vis-à-vis the other ASEAN claimants, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia.

    This agreement also undermines Indonesia’s territorial interests. Besides Indonesia’s official rejection of China’s claim, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) has frequently protested and demanded clarification from China regarding incidents in the North Natuna Sea, such as the frequent presence of Chinese coast guard vessels. A significant incident occurred in 2021 when Chinese coast guard vessels entered the Tuna Block, an area of natural gas exploration, prompting strong protests from Indonesia.

    Threats to Local Economies

    Under this new agreement, Indonesia could face increased pressure to negotiate with China over its sovereign rights in the North Natuna Sea. Moreover, this implicit acceptance of China’s claim could further legitimise the operations of Chinese military and coast guard vessels in the contested waters. This poses a significant threat to local fishermen in Natuna and the Riau Islands Province, whose catches have already been impacted by the rising presence of larger, more competitive Chinese fishing vessels. An increase in Chinese maritime activity will likely reduce the income of local fishermen, contradicting Prabowo’s stated vision of societal economic sovereignty and community welfare.

    Under Prabowo’s leadership, Indonesia must carefully reconsider its foreign policy approach. Active involvement in the global arena and strengthening bilateral ties are important responsibilities for the President. However, this proactive stance should be balanced with a commitment to protecting Indonesia’s regional reputation, particularly in areas prioritised in its foreign policy. Furthermore, a focus on safeguarding territorial integrity and the welfare of all Indonesians must guide Indonesia’s engagements on the international stage.

    Lessons Learned

    Two days after the joint statement, Kemlu issued a press release clarifying that the cooperation “[s]hould not be construed as recognition of China’s unilateral claims in the South China Sea”. However, this poses risks for Indonesia, as the press release was released unilaterally, which allows Beijing to hold to the interpretation presented in the earlier joint statement – therefore, not fixing the situation.

    Based on this experience, there are some policy measures Jakarta should consider.

    First, Jakarta could direct such initiatives to non-contentious areas instead of granting concessions to Beijing in contested areas. For instance, since 2022, Indonesia and China have collaborated on industrial developments in Central Java and Bintan under the “Two Countries Twin Parks” framework, which serves as a model for future industrial cooperation.

    Secondly, both parties should prioritise reaching an agreement on the ASEAN-China South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC), which remains under negotiation. This process would not only establish a more equitable framework but also reinforce Indonesia’s commitment to the principles of UNCLOS.

    About the Author

    Alfin Febrian Basundoro is a Master of Strategic Studies (advanced) student at the Australian National University.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / International Political Economy / International Politics and Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN / Global
    comments powered by Disqus

    SYNOPSIS

    Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s agreement with China on joint maritime development in the South China Sea raises concerns over Indonesia’s commitment to national sovereignty and international law. While economically beneficial, it risks legitimising China’s claim in the South China Sea, straining relations within ASEAN, threatening local livelihoods, and undermining Indonesia’s regional reputation and longstanding foreign policy principles.

    Source: Pexels
    Source: Pexels

    COMMENTARY

    On November 9, 2024, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto visited Beijing. He met the President of China, Xi Jinping. The visit resulted in several agreements, ranging from industrial and mining to trade cooperation, valued at US$ 10 billion. One important agreement was on maritime cooperation, in which both sides committed to jointly developing the fishery, oil and gas resources.

    Maritime cooperation has been an ongoing priority for both Indonesia and China. For instance, since 2023, the two countries have collaborated on the fishery industrial development. In the latest agreement, they pledged to further enhance this cooperation by jointly developing the maritime economy in the South China Sea (SCS), including in areas with overlapping claims.

    While this agreement offers significant economic benefits, it might be problematic for Indonesia. Notably, it suggests an inconsistency in Indonesia’s stance on international maritime law in Southeast Asia and appears to be in conflict with its commitment to uphold national sovereignty.

    Commitment to UNCLOS

    By agreeing to economic development in the “overlapping claims” area of the SCS, Indonesia could be perceived as tacitly recognising China’s claim over those parts which contradicts its commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s claim in the SCS, which relies on a historical basis rather than on UNCLOS-defined Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) boundaries, has long been contested as a violation of international law. This agreement may, therefore, provoke negative responses from other ASEAN countries with competing claims in the SCS, i.e., the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam.

    Previously, Indonesia had always maintained a firm stance against China’s unilateral claims. Since 2016, it has consistently rejected China’s assertion of historical fishing rights in the SCS, which does not align with the UNCLOS, as a basis for its claim. China’s claim encompasses areas extending beyond the 200-nautical-mile EEZ measured from its outermost territory, Hainan. In May 2020, Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York reiterated this rejection, emphasising the lack of legal basis for China’s “nine-dash line” claim.

    Furthermore, Indonesia has actively supported regional stability efforts, notably through its involvement in developing and introducing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in 2019. As highlighted by Joanne Lin, Coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, the AOIP, although primarily normative, reflects ASEAN’s vision of a “safe, stable, and free Indo-Pacific” based on UNCLOS principles. It also prioritises dialogue for resolving regional disputes, including the SCS. Indonesia’s implicit acknowledgement of China’s SCS claim – without engaging in dialogue with other ASEAN states – appears ironic, given Indonesia’s continuous advocacy for dialogue-based Indo-Pacific stability.

    Indonesia’s Reputation and “Good Neighbour Policy”

    This agreement also contradicted Prabowo’s speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta on November 13, 2023, during his candidacy for the presidential office. The speech emphasised the “good neighbour policy”, a pillar of Indonesia’s foreign policy that promotes harmonious relations with Southeast Asian countries. Endorsing China’s unilateral claim would likely undermine this principle as it would sacrifice Indonesia’s robust ties and regional reputation vis-à-vis the other ASEAN claimants, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia.

    This agreement also undermines Indonesia’s territorial interests. Besides Indonesia’s official rejection of China’s claim, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) has frequently protested and demanded clarification from China regarding incidents in the North Natuna Sea, such as the frequent presence of Chinese coast guard vessels. A significant incident occurred in 2021 when Chinese coast guard vessels entered the Tuna Block, an area of natural gas exploration, prompting strong protests from Indonesia.

    Threats to Local Economies

    Under this new agreement, Indonesia could face increased pressure to negotiate with China over its sovereign rights in the North Natuna Sea. Moreover, this implicit acceptance of China’s claim could further legitimise the operations of Chinese military and coast guard vessels in the contested waters. This poses a significant threat to local fishermen in Natuna and the Riau Islands Province, whose catches have already been impacted by the rising presence of larger, more competitive Chinese fishing vessels. An increase in Chinese maritime activity will likely reduce the income of local fishermen, contradicting Prabowo’s stated vision of societal economic sovereignty and community welfare.

    Under Prabowo’s leadership, Indonesia must carefully reconsider its foreign policy approach. Active involvement in the global arena and strengthening bilateral ties are important responsibilities for the President. However, this proactive stance should be balanced with a commitment to protecting Indonesia’s regional reputation, particularly in areas prioritised in its foreign policy. Furthermore, a focus on safeguarding territorial integrity and the welfare of all Indonesians must guide Indonesia’s engagements on the international stage.

    Lessons Learned

    Two days after the joint statement, Kemlu issued a press release clarifying that the cooperation “[s]hould not be construed as recognition of China’s unilateral claims in the South China Sea”. However, this poses risks for Indonesia, as the press release was released unilaterally, which allows Beijing to hold to the interpretation presented in the earlier joint statement – therefore, not fixing the situation.

    Based on this experience, there are some policy measures Jakarta should consider.

    First, Jakarta could direct such initiatives to non-contentious areas instead of granting concessions to Beijing in contested areas. For instance, since 2022, Indonesia and China have collaborated on industrial developments in Central Java and Bintan under the “Two Countries Twin Parks” framework, which serves as a model for future industrial cooperation.

    Secondly, both parties should prioritise reaching an agreement on the ASEAN-China South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC), which remains under negotiation. This process would not only establish a more equitable framework but also reinforce Indonesia’s commitment to the principles of UNCLOS.

    About the Author

    Alfin Febrian Basundoro is a Master of Strategic Studies (advanced) student at the Australian National University.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / International Political Economy / International Politics and Security

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info