Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • The Big Battle for Java: Key in Struggle for Power
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO19078 | The Big Battle for Java: Key in Struggle for Power
    Irman G. Lanti

    23 April 2019

    download pdf

    SYNOPSIS

    Indonesia has just concluded the third direct presidential election in the country’s history. Exit polls projected Jokowi’s victory with an increased proportion of votes compared to 2014. Central to this victory were Central and East Java where Jokowi enjoyed a huge jump in vote proportion despite Prabowo making inroads in other provinces. Interestingly, this year’s election mirrored the first Indonesian election in 1955.

    COMMENTARY

    INDONESIA’S SIMULTANEOUS elections to pick the country’s president as well as legislators for the new term have just ended. While official results are not due until 22 May 2019, “quick count” projections by a number of pollsters have pointed to tentative results:

    Incumbent president Joko Widodo (‘Jokowi’) was projected to win with a vote difference of between 8-10 percent. This is contrary to some predictions of a close fight, but it is equally inconsistent with some pre-election polls that put Jokowi winning by some 20 percent. Nonetheless, it is important to note that while pre-election polls were often off-the-mark, quick counts or exit polls have traditionally proven to be generally accurate.

    Vote Jump in Central and East Java

    The most decisive factor that gave Jokowi his projected victory was the huge increase in the proportion of votes he attained compared to the 2014 presidential election in two major provinces: Central Java and East Java. In that last election in Central Java, Jokowi’s home province, he enjoyed a comfortable margin with 67% of the votes over Prabowo’s 33%.

    For last week’s election, the exit polls showed an increase in Jokowi’s vote to around 77% compared with Prabowo’s 23%. The difference between the two candidates is now 20% larger. With 28 million voters in Central Java, Jokowi can be said to have attained a big jump in additional votes in this province.

    A similar picture can be seen in East Java. Here the two contenders only had a vote difference of around 6% in 2014 in favour of Jokowi. In last week’s election, the difference jumped to around 33%, according to exit polls. As East Java has a register of 31 million voters, it means Jokowi has reaped a significant increase in votes in this province.

    Return of the Abangan and Traditionalists?

    What explains this vote jump for Jokowi in the two provinces of Java, Indonesia’s most populous island? In recent years, Islamist groups seem to have made a lot of headway, dominating the discourse in the social media, and growing more assertive in politics. This is seen in the emergence of the Aksi Bela Islam 212 (212 Defending Islam movement), spawned out of a massive gathering in Jakarta on 2 December 2016, and the election of Anies Baswedan as Governor of Jakarta, triggered by provocative statements by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (‘Ahok’).

    While the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the traditionalist Muslim organisation) seems to attempt a number of initiatives to stem the growth of the Islamists, the abangan (nominal Muslims that usually support the nationalist platform) seem to be silent.

    So much so, Indonesianists like Robert Hefner, writing in his 2011 book on religion and politics in Indonesia, asked: “Where have all the abangan gone?” The abangan’s heartland is located in much of Central Java and parts of East Java. The vote jump in Central and East Java for the nationalist Jokowi may partly provide the answer. Have the abangan returned? More thorough research is, however, needed to investigate if this hypothesis has basis.

    At the same time, another factor may have been at play. In the past, the traditionalists have rarely voted as a block. Their votes were distributed among a number of political parties and candidates. In this year’s election, this seemed to have changed. The traditionalists seemed to have been relatively unified in their voting. This is perhaps due to the growth of the Islamists, whom many traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia see as contrary to their approach to Islam.

    Prabowo’s Achievements

    While Prabowo has not made inroads in the two Java provinces, he has actually been quite successful in the other regions, especially outside the key island. He was able to double the number of provinces in Sumatra where he won from just four to six out of 10 provinces in the island. He was also able to retain his comfortable lead in West Java and Banten which he also won in 2014. This is in spite of Jokowi’s major offensives in West Java and Banten, where, significantly, Ma’ruf Amin (Jokowi’s VP running mate) hailed from.

    The exit of Jusuf Kalla as vice-president has also hurt Jokowi in Sulawesi where Kalla comes from. In the south of that East Indonesian island, Jokowi received 71% of the votes in 2014, while Prabowo received only 29%. Prabowo was successful in turning this around. In last week’s election, exit polls projected him to have almost doubled his share of the votes with 58% as opposed to 42% for Jokowi. A similar situation can also be seen in Southeast and West Sulawesi.

    Despite these achievements, Prabowo could not defeat the tyranny of demographics in Indonesia. Most of the population of Indonesia reside in Java. The two provinces of Central and East Java combined have around 60 million registered voters, whereas the largest province in Sumatra − North Sumatra − only have around 10 million registered voters; South Sulawesi where Prabowo has made a huge inroad, has only six million registered voters. The largest province that Prabowo enjoyed support from is West Java with 33 million voters, but it did not seem sufficient to lift him up to overtake Jokowi.

    What happened in Jakarta?

    Another interesting phenomenon from last week’s election is the electoral fight in Jakarta. The capital city is often called the “barometer” of Indonesia. The 212 demonstration and the election of Anies seemed to be widely regarded as marking a sea-change in Indonesian politics and signified a major progress of the Islamists in politics.

    According to exit polls, Prabowo was able to increase the vote share by 2% from 2014 election in Jakarta. However, he was not able to retain the momentum secured from the election of Anies. In the gubernatorial election in 2017 Anie received 58% of the votes but last week, Prabowo, garnered only 49% of the votes.

    The difference of 9% suggests that the proportion of Jakarta voters who voted for Anies in 2017 may not have voted for Prabowo this year. It would be very interesting to analyse the factors that caused this voter migration in Jakarta.

    The Electoral Landscape: Back to the Future?

    There is an unmistakable parallel between this year’s presidential election and Indonesia’s first election in 1955. Sixty-four years ago, the modernist Islamist party of Masyumi dominated West Java and the outer island (non-Java) provinces, except for the Christian-majority areas in Eastern Indonesia; the nationalist party PNI and the traditionalist NU gained most votes in Central and East Java.

    This resulted in the PNI being the victor of that election, with Masyumi coming in second. This year’s election seemed to have produced the same voting pattern, with Jokowi winning big in Central and East Java while Prabowo was victorious in West Java and Sumatra. Despite the 64 years, Indonesian politics seemed to have returned to its “natural” state, which sees the political aliran vie for power. Will this be the new political equilibrium in Indonesian politics?

    About the Author

    Dr Irman G. Lanti is a Visiting Senior Fellow with the Indonesia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is a Senior Associate with the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Padjadjaran University, Indonesia. This is part of an RSIS series on the 2019 Indonesian presidential election.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / General / Country and Region Studies / International Political Economy / International Politics and Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN / Global
    comments powered by Disqus

    SYNOPSIS

    Indonesia has just concluded the third direct presidential election in the country’s history. Exit polls projected Jokowi’s victory with an increased proportion of votes compared to 2014. Central to this victory were Central and East Java where Jokowi enjoyed a huge jump in vote proportion despite Prabowo making inroads in other provinces. Interestingly, this year’s election mirrored the first Indonesian election in 1955.

    COMMENTARY

    INDONESIA’S SIMULTANEOUS elections to pick the country’s president as well as legislators for the new term have just ended. While official results are not due until 22 May 2019, “quick count” projections by a number of pollsters have pointed to tentative results:

    Incumbent president Joko Widodo (‘Jokowi’) was projected to win with a vote difference of between 8-10 percent. This is contrary to some predictions of a close fight, but it is equally inconsistent with some pre-election polls that put Jokowi winning by some 20 percent. Nonetheless, it is important to note that while pre-election polls were often off-the-mark, quick counts or exit polls have traditionally proven to be generally accurate.

    Vote Jump in Central and East Java

    The most decisive factor that gave Jokowi his projected victory was the huge increase in the proportion of votes he attained compared to the 2014 presidential election in two major provinces: Central Java and East Java. In that last election in Central Java, Jokowi’s home province, he enjoyed a comfortable margin with 67% of the votes over Prabowo’s 33%.

    For last week’s election, the exit polls showed an increase in Jokowi’s vote to around 77% compared with Prabowo’s 23%. The difference between the two candidates is now 20% larger. With 28 million voters in Central Java, Jokowi can be said to have attained a big jump in additional votes in this province.

    A similar picture can be seen in East Java. Here the two contenders only had a vote difference of around 6% in 2014 in favour of Jokowi. In last week’s election, the difference jumped to around 33%, according to exit polls. As East Java has a register of 31 million voters, it means Jokowi has reaped a significant increase in votes in this province.

    Return of the Abangan and Traditionalists?

    What explains this vote jump for Jokowi in the two provinces of Java, Indonesia’s most populous island? In recent years, Islamist groups seem to have made a lot of headway, dominating the discourse in the social media, and growing more assertive in politics. This is seen in the emergence of the Aksi Bela Islam 212 (212 Defending Islam movement), spawned out of a massive gathering in Jakarta on 2 December 2016, and the election of Anies Baswedan as Governor of Jakarta, triggered by provocative statements by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (‘Ahok’).

    While the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the traditionalist Muslim organisation) seems to attempt a number of initiatives to stem the growth of the Islamists, the abangan (nominal Muslims that usually support the nationalist platform) seem to be silent.

    So much so, Indonesianists like Robert Hefner, writing in his 2011 book on religion and politics in Indonesia, asked: “Where have all the abangan gone?” The abangan’s heartland is located in much of Central Java and parts of East Java. The vote jump in Central and East Java for the nationalist Jokowi may partly provide the answer. Have the abangan returned? More thorough research is, however, needed to investigate if this hypothesis has basis.

    At the same time, another factor may have been at play. In the past, the traditionalists have rarely voted as a block. Their votes were distributed among a number of political parties and candidates. In this year’s election, this seemed to have changed. The traditionalists seemed to have been relatively unified in their voting. This is perhaps due to the growth of the Islamists, whom many traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia see as contrary to their approach to Islam.

    Prabowo’s Achievements

    While Prabowo has not made inroads in the two Java provinces, he has actually been quite successful in the other regions, especially outside the key island. He was able to double the number of provinces in Sumatra where he won from just four to six out of 10 provinces in the island. He was also able to retain his comfortable lead in West Java and Banten which he also won in 2014. This is in spite of Jokowi’s major offensives in West Java and Banten, where, significantly, Ma’ruf Amin (Jokowi’s VP running mate) hailed from.

    The exit of Jusuf Kalla as vice-president has also hurt Jokowi in Sulawesi where Kalla comes from. In the south of that East Indonesian island, Jokowi received 71% of the votes in 2014, while Prabowo received only 29%. Prabowo was successful in turning this around. In last week’s election, exit polls projected him to have almost doubled his share of the votes with 58% as opposed to 42% for Jokowi. A similar situation can also be seen in Southeast and West Sulawesi.

    Despite these achievements, Prabowo could not defeat the tyranny of demographics in Indonesia. Most of the population of Indonesia reside in Java. The two provinces of Central and East Java combined have around 60 million registered voters, whereas the largest province in Sumatra − North Sumatra − only have around 10 million registered voters; South Sulawesi where Prabowo has made a huge inroad, has only six million registered voters. The largest province that Prabowo enjoyed support from is West Java with 33 million voters, but it did not seem sufficient to lift him up to overtake Jokowi.

    What happened in Jakarta?

    Another interesting phenomenon from last week’s election is the electoral fight in Jakarta. The capital city is often called the “barometer” of Indonesia. The 212 demonstration and the election of Anies seemed to be widely regarded as marking a sea-change in Indonesian politics and signified a major progress of the Islamists in politics.

    According to exit polls, Prabowo was able to increase the vote share by 2% from 2014 election in Jakarta. However, he was not able to retain the momentum secured from the election of Anies. In the gubernatorial election in 2017 Anie received 58% of the votes but last week, Prabowo, garnered only 49% of the votes.

    The difference of 9% suggests that the proportion of Jakarta voters who voted for Anies in 2017 may not have voted for Prabowo this year. It would be very interesting to analyse the factors that caused this voter migration in Jakarta.

    The Electoral Landscape: Back to the Future?

    There is an unmistakable parallel between this year’s presidential election and Indonesia’s first election in 1955. Sixty-four years ago, the modernist Islamist party of Masyumi dominated West Java and the outer island (non-Java) provinces, except for the Christian-majority areas in Eastern Indonesia; the nationalist party PNI and the traditionalist NU gained most votes in Central and East Java.

    This resulted in the PNI being the victor of that election, with Masyumi coming in second. This year’s election seemed to have produced the same voting pattern, with Jokowi winning big in Central and East Java while Prabowo was victorious in West Java and Sumatra. Despite the 64 years, Indonesian politics seemed to have returned to its “natural” state, which sees the political aliran vie for power. Will this be the new political equilibrium in Indonesian politics?

    About the Author

    Dr Irman G. Lanti is a Visiting Senior Fellow with the Indonesia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is a Senior Associate with the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Padjadjaran University, Indonesia. This is part of an RSIS series on the 2019 Indonesian presidential election.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / General / Country and Region Studies / International Political Economy / International Politics and Security

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info