Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • IP22032 | China’s Maritime Militia in the South China Sea: Myths and Realities
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    IP22032 | China’s Maritime Militia in the South China Sea: Myths and Realities
    Hu Bo

    30 May 2022

    download pdf

    How might we view the role of China’s maritime militia objectively? Reviewing the historical background and reasons for this militia’s important role in the past, HU BO argues that because the background and reasons have more lately been subject to fundamental change, the strategic significance of China’s maritime militia is declining rapidly, which is contrary to external popular perception.

    COMMENTARY

    The militia is one of three parts of China’s armed forces and China has never denied its existence. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense states, “The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China [PRC] consist of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [PLA], the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, and the militia.” However, the official documents from China’s central government and Central Military Commission have rarely mentioned the maritime militia; instead, the maritime militia tends to be mentioned in the documents of local governments and related departments.

    Towards a Definition of “Maritime Militia”

    It is no secret that China has the maritime militia; however, the number, role and influence of China’s maritime militia have been too far exaggerated. There are two groups of actors responsible for this: one group comprises some Chinese local governments and media wanting to highlight their accomplishments; the second includes certain US scholars with a tendency to exaggerate the “China Threat”, who have cited a great deal of the less than authoritative literature produced by the first group, while never having made the necessary field studies.

    These two kinds of literature on China’s maritime militia share a common problem of methodology, and the failure to provide a precise definition of what exactly constitutes a maritime militia. This being the case, all fishermen could be considered as maritime militia if observed through these coloured glasses.

    A more objective way to judge the nature of a fishing boat would be by its behaviour rather than its national affiliation. It need not surprise that Chinese fishing boats appear in disputed waters or others’ traditional fishing grounds, nor are these new phenomena. In fact, they are commercial issues best debated within the World Trade Organization. As long as fishing boats do not interfere with the freedom of navigation of other vessels, and conduct no military activities, they should not be viewed as constituting maritime militia. Moreover, it is a common practice around the world for governments to provide subsidies for their countries’ fishing industries, which in itself should not be taken as evidence of maritime militia.

    A Brief History of China’s Maritime Militia

    Before the 1990s, China’s maritime militia had played important roles during times of both war and peace, for three reasons.

    First, for a long time after the PRC’s founding, China’s navy and maritime law enforcers were too weak, even compared with most of its neighbouring countries. As such, China’s maritime security agencies could not properly perform their essential duties without being dependent on the support of civilian forces such as fishing vessels operating in the South China Sea. For instance, the Chinese maritime militia would play important roles in reconnaissance and logistics in the 1974 campaign against South Vietnam. Generally, Chinese maritime militia provided for general coastal defence against any hostile incursions.

    Second, China’s tradition of People’s War had blurred the line between the regular armed forces and the people. This tradition had been reinforced by military doctrine deriving from China’s history: the people’s support, cherished by Chinese leadership, especially Mao Zedong, was one of the essential factors in the PLA’s defeat of the Kuomintang regime. Thus, People’s War had long been a major principle and feature of China’s national defence. For the Chinese, it was very popular and natural to mobilise all available forces to defend their country, which certainly included China’s fleet of fishing boats.

    Third, in the era when central planning was the main economic basis, all assets, including fishing companies and fishing boats, had to conform exactly to government dictates. Before economic reform and China’s opening-up to the world, national and collective interests reigned above all else, including individual interests.

    The Declining Strategic Significance of the Maritime Militia

    Today, all of these conditions have changed fundamentally. With the Chinese navy and coastguard being sufficiently powerful, there is not much need to use maritime militia. China’s navy is catching up qualitatively with the United States Navy (USN); it already deploys more vessels in the western Pacific than other military forces including the USN. Thus, based on rational inference, the role and influence of the maritime militia should decline. As China modernises its military, it increasingly emphasises the professionalism of its forces at the military, police and civilian levels. In addition, the principles of market economics have made the fishing industry more and more unattractive to China’s younger generations, resulting in an overall shrinking of China’s fishing fleets in the South China Sea.

     

    IP22032 Skipper
    After the glory days of the Chinese maritime militia. A fishing boat skipper looks out from his vessel’s pilot house. The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.

     

    Against this background, the maritime militia’s moment of glory has passed, at least in peacetime, with its role becoming progressively limited. Unlike Vietnam, China no longer has armed maritime militia in peacetime, and is relying decreasingly on its maritime militia for use against other countries. Despite frequent US accusations that China uses maritime militia, even the US Navy has found no definitive evidence of encounters with Chinese maritime militia for at least the recent decade, which is also confirmed in my private exchanges with some US officials and scholars familiar with the situation.

    There are also some signals of change in Chinese military statements. China’s National Defense in the New Era (2019) declared, “China is streamlining the number of primary militia nationwide, driving deeper reform of militia and reserve forces in their size, structure and composition.” Professionalisation, after all, is the only way for a great power to come of age.

    In the future, China’s maritime militia will not disappear. To a certain degree, China’s militia is a historical phenomenon and a manifestation of the “people’s army”, relating to China’s defence traditions and a particular period of China’s military history. The historical experience cannot fully apply to the realities of today and the future. Nonetheless, China’s historical reliance on its militia is not unique; even America’s independence was achieved by its militia.

    About the Author

    HU Bo is Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University. He contributed this paper as part of a workshop on Grey Zone Operations in the South China Sea, organised by the China Programme of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS. He may be contacted at [email protected].

    Categories: IDSS Papers / International Politics and Security / Maritime Security / General / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Political Economy / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Southeast Asia and ASEAN
    comments powered by Disqus

    How might we view the role of China’s maritime militia objectively? Reviewing the historical background and reasons for this militia’s important role in the past, HU BO argues that because the background and reasons have more lately been subject to fundamental change, the strategic significance of China’s maritime militia is declining rapidly, which is contrary to external popular perception.

    COMMENTARY

    The militia is one of three parts of China’s armed forces and China has never denied its existence. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense states, “The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China [PRC] consist of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [PLA], the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, and the militia.” However, the official documents from China’s central government and Central Military Commission have rarely mentioned the maritime militia; instead, the maritime militia tends to be mentioned in the documents of local governments and related departments.

    Towards a Definition of “Maritime Militia”

    It is no secret that China has the maritime militia; however, the number, role and influence of China’s maritime militia have been too far exaggerated. There are two groups of actors responsible for this: one group comprises some Chinese local governments and media wanting to highlight their accomplishments; the second includes certain US scholars with a tendency to exaggerate the “China Threat”, who have cited a great deal of the less than authoritative literature produced by the first group, while never having made the necessary field studies.

    These two kinds of literature on China’s maritime militia share a common problem of methodology, and the failure to provide a precise definition of what exactly constitutes a maritime militia. This being the case, all fishermen could be considered as maritime militia if observed through these coloured glasses.

    A more objective way to judge the nature of a fishing boat would be by its behaviour rather than its national affiliation. It need not surprise that Chinese fishing boats appear in disputed waters or others’ traditional fishing grounds, nor are these new phenomena. In fact, they are commercial issues best debated within the World Trade Organization. As long as fishing boats do not interfere with the freedom of navigation of other vessels, and conduct no military activities, they should not be viewed as constituting maritime militia. Moreover, it is a common practice around the world for governments to provide subsidies for their countries’ fishing industries, which in itself should not be taken as evidence of maritime militia.

    A Brief History of China’s Maritime Militia

    Before the 1990s, China’s maritime militia had played important roles during times of both war and peace, for three reasons.

    First, for a long time after the PRC’s founding, China’s navy and maritime law enforcers were too weak, even compared with most of its neighbouring countries. As such, China’s maritime security agencies could not properly perform their essential duties without being dependent on the support of civilian forces such as fishing vessels operating in the South China Sea. For instance, the Chinese maritime militia would play important roles in reconnaissance and logistics in the 1974 campaign against South Vietnam. Generally, Chinese maritime militia provided for general coastal defence against any hostile incursions.

    Second, China’s tradition of People’s War had blurred the line between the regular armed forces and the people. This tradition had been reinforced by military doctrine deriving from China’s history: the people’s support, cherished by Chinese leadership, especially Mao Zedong, was one of the essential factors in the PLA’s defeat of the Kuomintang regime. Thus, People’s War had long been a major principle and feature of China’s national defence. For the Chinese, it was very popular and natural to mobilise all available forces to defend their country, which certainly included China’s fleet of fishing boats.

    Third, in the era when central planning was the main economic basis, all assets, including fishing companies and fishing boats, had to conform exactly to government dictates. Before economic reform and China’s opening-up to the world, national and collective interests reigned above all else, including individual interests.

    The Declining Strategic Significance of the Maritime Militia

    Today, all of these conditions have changed fundamentally. With the Chinese navy and coastguard being sufficiently powerful, there is not much need to use maritime militia. China’s navy is catching up qualitatively with the United States Navy (USN); it already deploys more vessels in the western Pacific than other military forces including the USN. Thus, based on rational inference, the role and influence of the maritime militia should decline. As China modernises its military, it increasingly emphasises the professionalism of its forces at the military, police and civilian levels. In addition, the principles of market economics have made the fishing industry more and more unattractive to China’s younger generations, resulting in an overall shrinking of China’s fishing fleets in the South China Sea.

     

    IP22032 Skipper
    After the glory days of the Chinese maritime militia. A fishing boat skipper looks out from his vessel’s pilot house. The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.

     

    Against this background, the maritime militia’s moment of glory has passed, at least in peacetime, with its role becoming progressively limited. Unlike Vietnam, China no longer has armed maritime militia in peacetime, and is relying decreasingly on its maritime militia for use against other countries. Despite frequent US accusations that China uses maritime militia, even the US Navy has found no definitive evidence of encounters with Chinese maritime militia for at least the recent decade, which is also confirmed in my private exchanges with some US officials and scholars familiar with the situation.

    There are also some signals of change in Chinese military statements. China’s National Defense in the New Era (2019) declared, “China is streamlining the number of primary militia nationwide, driving deeper reform of militia and reserve forces in their size, structure and composition.” Professionalisation, after all, is the only way for a great power to come of age.

    In the future, China’s maritime militia will not disappear. To a certain degree, China’s militia is a historical phenomenon and a manifestation of the “people’s army”, relating to China’s defence traditions and a particular period of China’s military history. The historical experience cannot fully apply to the realities of today and the future. Nonetheless, China’s historical reliance on its militia is not unique; even America’s independence was achieved by its militia.

    About the Author

    HU Bo is Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University. He contributed this paper as part of a workshop on Grey Zone Operations in the South China Sea, organised by the China Programme of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS. He may be contacted at [email protected].

    Categories: IDSS Papers / International Politics and Security / Maritime Security / General / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Political Economy

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info