Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • IP22056 | Benign Defence Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    IP22056 | Benign Defence Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers
    Chang Jun Yan

    14 October 2022

    download pdf

    What is defence diplomacy, and to what extent does it achieve its aims? Competition associated with its activities may undermine their intended cooperative effects, requiring that such activities be cautiously crafted, as exemplified by the Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers, or APPSMO. CHANG JUN YAN makes the case.

    COMMENTARY

    On the face of it, defence diplomacy or defence cooperation, defined by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster as “the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy”, is meant to build trust and confidence among different countries with a view to lessening the possibility of armed conflict.

    Defence diplomacy activities include military exercises or exchanges and defence cooperation agreements or defence aid, besides a whole range of multilateral military operations such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

    As Singapore’s then second minister for defence, Chan Chun Sing — a major-general in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) before joining politics — put it during a speech at the 2014 Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers, the “job of the military is to preempt crises and not just manage crises”. He observed, the “military community has the unique advantage of growing up together and knowing each other for many years, often for more than the number of years that political leaders get to know each other”, which enables “added channels of communication for the political masters” to  “reduce misunderstanding”.

    Such cooperation in defence diplomacy allows trust to consolidate and enabling norms and regimes of security cooperation to strengthen and proliferate.

     

    IP 22056 2 APPSMO Montage
    APPSMO: creating a spirit of camaraderie to build and strengthen trust among militaries. Images by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; montage by Rachel L. Choo.

     

    In this manner, defence diplomacy is not quite the paradox the phrase itself implies in merging cooperation with the conventional coercive role of the military in defence, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering. Singapore’s defence policy is thus predicated on “the twin pillars of deterrence and diplomacy”, in developing both “a strong and capable SAF and a resilient Singapore”, alongside “establishing strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation, with defence establishments and armed forces in the region and around the world.”

    If defence diplomacy is not an oxymoron, the question then becomes, to what extent does it work?

    Where mistrust, rivalry, or misperceptions already exist, defence diplomacy clearly has a steeper hill to climb. At the same time, defence diplomacy activities may also be cut to signal displeasure. When relations between the United States and China further soured following US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, one of Beijing’s first reactions was to cut military cooperation with Washington. Trust and confidence are evidently not easy to build, therefore necessitating iteration and transparency.

    Furthermore, defence diplomacy activities may not be solely cooperative or seen as totally benign. Rather, they may also serve or signal competition and coercion. For instance, China condemns the AUKUS multilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States as provocative and destabilising.

    Fundamentally, defence diplomacy activities also illustrate a military’s capabilities, whether as a show of force or a means of boosting a country’s standing. They may also be intended to learn more about another military to be able to exploit such knowledge in any potential conflict.

    To be sure, this is not to say that defence diplomacy is only a front for such nefarious purposes of competition. Clearly, the main objective of defence diplomacy is to build confidence “through military exercises and exchanges which facilitate information sharing and enhance transparency”, as well as to “build up personal ties amongst regional militaries and reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding or miscalculation”, as Singapore’s defence minister, Ng Eng Hen, highlighted in his speech during the 2011 International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue.

    Instead, the point here is that on top of cooperation, defence diplomacy involves competition too, which may then generate the unintended effects of reinforcing norms and regimes of competition, thereby undermining cooperation.

    This then implies that to effect the intended trust and confidence building, defence diplomacy activities have to be carefully considered and crafted to minimise the incentives for competition in shows of force, swaggering, and secrecy. For example, in the case of HADR missions, the foremost principle should be the most efficient way of doing the most good in a transparent manner, rather than other accompanying interests like building reputation.

    A case in point is APPSMO, an annual forum for military officers from the Asia-Pacific and beyond, organised by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and its component Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which is arguably a defence diplomacy activity par excellence.

    APPSMO, in its 23rd iteration this year, enables leading senior military officers to meet and establish personal relationships, as well as share knowledge about military and security developments of professional interest. This is done through various activities: lectures on matters of international relations and strategic studies by established experts, renowned academics, and prominent practitioners; informal discussions on these lectures to further facilitate dialogue on defence and security-related issues; and social and networking events to accelerate such pan-regional interaction and relationships in a relaxed atmosphere.

    These activities create a spirit of camaraderie to build and reinforce trust and confidence among the participants of APPSMO, curtailing the traditional coercive or competitive impetus of armed forces.

    Ultimately, defence and diplomacy often go hand in hand, just like using traditional forms of diplomacy to reduce insecurity when defence is boosted, to circumvent the archetypal security dilemma. Defence diplomacy is likewise as much about defence, as it is about diplomacy. To realise its intended benefits, its activities need to be judiciously balanced in favour of cooperation rather than competition.

    About the Author

    CHANG Jun Yan is Head of the Military Studies Programme and a Research Fellow with the United States Programme, both at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS.

    Categories: IDSS Papers / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Southeast Asia and ASEAN / Global
    comments powered by Disqus

    What is defence diplomacy, and to what extent does it achieve its aims? Competition associated with its activities may undermine their intended cooperative effects, requiring that such activities be cautiously crafted, as exemplified by the Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers, or APPSMO. CHANG JUN YAN makes the case.

    COMMENTARY

    On the face of it, defence diplomacy or defence cooperation, defined by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster as “the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy”, is meant to build trust and confidence among different countries with a view to lessening the possibility of armed conflict.

    Defence diplomacy activities include military exercises or exchanges and defence cooperation agreements or defence aid, besides a whole range of multilateral military operations such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

    As Singapore’s then second minister for defence, Chan Chun Sing — a major-general in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) before joining politics — put it during a speech at the 2014 Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers, the “job of the military is to preempt crises and not just manage crises”. He observed, the “military community has the unique advantage of growing up together and knowing each other for many years, often for more than the number of years that political leaders get to know each other”, which enables “added channels of communication for the political masters” to  “reduce misunderstanding”.

    Such cooperation in defence diplomacy allows trust to consolidate and enabling norms and regimes of security cooperation to strengthen and proliferate.

     

    IP 22056 2 APPSMO Montage
    APPSMO: creating a spirit of camaraderie to build and strengthen trust among militaries. Images by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; montage by Rachel L. Choo.

     

    In this manner, defence diplomacy is not quite the paradox the phrase itself implies in merging cooperation with the conventional coercive role of the military in defence, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering. Singapore’s defence policy is thus predicated on “the twin pillars of deterrence and diplomacy”, in developing both “a strong and capable SAF and a resilient Singapore”, alongside “establishing strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation, with defence establishments and armed forces in the region and around the world.”

    If defence diplomacy is not an oxymoron, the question then becomes, to what extent does it work?

    Where mistrust, rivalry, or misperceptions already exist, defence diplomacy clearly has a steeper hill to climb. At the same time, defence diplomacy activities may also be cut to signal displeasure. When relations between the United States and China further soured following US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, one of Beijing’s first reactions was to cut military cooperation with Washington. Trust and confidence are evidently not easy to build, therefore necessitating iteration and transparency.

    Furthermore, defence diplomacy activities may not be solely cooperative or seen as totally benign. Rather, they may also serve or signal competition and coercion. For instance, China condemns the AUKUS multilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States as provocative and destabilising.

    Fundamentally, defence diplomacy activities also illustrate a military’s capabilities, whether as a show of force or a means of boosting a country’s standing. They may also be intended to learn more about another military to be able to exploit such knowledge in any potential conflict.

    To be sure, this is not to say that defence diplomacy is only a front for such nefarious purposes of competition. Clearly, the main objective of defence diplomacy is to build confidence “through military exercises and exchanges which facilitate information sharing and enhance transparency”, as well as to “build up personal ties amongst regional militaries and reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding or miscalculation”, as Singapore’s defence minister, Ng Eng Hen, highlighted in his speech during the 2011 International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue.

    Instead, the point here is that on top of cooperation, defence diplomacy involves competition too, which may then generate the unintended effects of reinforcing norms and regimes of competition, thereby undermining cooperation.

    This then implies that to effect the intended trust and confidence building, defence diplomacy activities have to be carefully considered and crafted to minimise the incentives for competition in shows of force, swaggering, and secrecy. For example, in the case of HADR missions, the foremost principle should be the most efficient way of doing the most good in a transparent manner, rather than other accompanying interests like building reputation.

    A case in point is APPSMO, an annual forum for military officers from the Asia-Pacific and beyond, organised by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and its component Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which is arguably a defence diplomacy activity par excellence.

    APPSMO, in its 23rd iteration this year, enables leading senior military officers to meet and establish personal relationships, as well as share knowledge about military and security developments of professional interest. This is done through various activities: lectures on matters of international relations and strategic studies by established experts, renowned academics, and prominent practitioners; informal discussions on these lectures to further facilitate dialogue on defence and security-related issues; and social and networking events to accelerate such pan-regional interaction and relationships in a relaxed atmosphere.

    These activities create a spirit of camaraderie to build and reinforce trust and confidence among the participants of APPSMO, curtailing the traditional coercive or competitive impetus of armed forces.

    Ultimately, defence and diplomacy often go hand in hand, just like using traditional forms of diplomacy to reduce insecurity when defence is boosted, to circumvent the archetypal security dilemma. Defence diplomacy is likewise as much about defence, as it is about diplomacy. To realise its intended benefits, its activities need to be judiciously balanced in favour of cooperation rather than competition.

    About the Author

    CHANG Jun Yan is Head of the Military Studies Programme and a Research Fellow with the United States Programme, both at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS.

    Categories: IDSS Papers / Conflict and Stability / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info