27 March 2014
Re-thinking the Political Strategy for Nuclear Disarmament
Executive Summary
Since 2007, four icons of the U.S. policy establishment – Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, labelled the Four Horsemen by some and the Four Statesmen by others – have pressed the thesis that it would be in the U.S. interest to see the abolition of nuclear weapons globally. Barack Obama joined them when he assumed the Presidency in 2009, by which time Lawrence Freedman felt able to note that “key members of the international policy-making elite have come to take [nuclear disarmament] seriously”. That momentum has essentially been lost. This brief suggests that the political strategy currently being followed to advance this thesis has been overtaken. Circumstances have changed and a rethink is called for. The current strategy involves the U.S. and Russia continuing to view their nuclear arsenals through arms control lenses in the expectation that this process can somehow and at some point be recast to deliver universal nuclear disarmament. The recommendation here is that we need to ascertain the true interest of all the states with nuclear weapons in becoming substantively involved in this quest and to explicitly making disarmament subordinate to arms control. Is there really a bandwagon behind the U.S. and Russia or just rhetorical support for an ideal considered unachievable? This approach clearly runs the risk of encountering a decisive ‘no’ to abandoning the current political strategy. It is also clear, however, that the current strategy is not going to carry us to a point at which an attempt to transition to a disarmament track will have any prospect whatever of success. The approach being recommended here is to commit now to a formal and overt process designed to ascertain the strength of the commitment to nuclear disarmament and to establish which states with nuclear weapons are prepared to get involved in substantive and accountable ways. This process will involve, inter alia, clarifying and sharpening understandings on when particular states should join negotiations on nuclear diminution; identifying preparatory steps that states could and should consider prior to joining the formal negotiations; developing a common position on core issues like nuclear proliferation and ballistic missile defence; and building a willingness to ensure that wider foreign and security policies are supportive of the goal of nuclear disarmament.
Executive Summary
Since 2007, four icons of the U.S. policy establishment – Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, labelled the Four Horsemen by some and the Four Statesmen by others – have pressed the thesis that it would be in the U.S. interest to see the abolition of nuclear weapons globally. Barack Obama joined them when he assumed the Presidency in 2009, by which time Lawrence Freedman felt able to note that “key members of the international policy-making elite have come to take [nuclear disarmament] seriously”. That momentum has essentially been lost. This brief suggests that the political strategy currently being followed to advance this thesis has been overtaken. Circumstances have changed and a rethink is called for. The current strategy involves the U.S. and Russia continuing to view their nuclear arsenals through arms control lenses in the expectation that this process can somehow and at some point be recast to deliver universal nuclear disarmament. The recommendation here is that we need to ascertain the true interest of all the states with nuclear weapons in becoming substantively involved in this quest and to explicitly making disarmament subordinate to arms control. Is there really a bandwagon behind the U.S. and Russia or just rhetorical support for an ideal considered unachievable? This approach clearly runs the risk of encountering a decisive ‘no’ to abandoning the current political strategy. It is also clear, however, that the current strategy is not going to carry us to a point at which an attempt to transition to a disarmament track will have any prospect whatever of success. The approach being recommended here is to commit now to a formal and overt process designed to ascertain the strength of the commitment to nuclear disarmament and to establish which states with nuclear weapons are prepared to get involved in substantive and accountable ways. This process will involve, inter alia, clarifying and sharpening understandings on when particular states should join negotiations on nuclear diminution; identifying preparatory steps that states could and should consider prior to joining the formal negotiations; developing a common position on core issues like nuclear proliferation and ballistic missile defence; and building a willingness to ensure that wider foreign and security policies are supportive of the goal of nuclear disarmament.
