Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • Responding to North Korea’s “Tactical Nuclear Attack Submarine”
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO23144 | Responding to North Korea’s “Tactical Nuclear Attack Submarine”
    Sukjoon Yoon

    11 October 2023

    download pdf

    SYNOPSIS

    North Korea has launched an indigenous submarine. It demonstrates Kim Jong Un’s intention to develop strategic underwater assets, and ultimately nuclear-powered submarines. How should the US and its allies, especially South Korea, respond to this new threat?

    231012 CO23144 Responding to North Koreas Tactical Nuclear Attack Submarine
    Source: Wikimedia

    COMMENTARY

    On 6 September 2023, at North Korea’s Sinpho Shipyard, the North Korean Navy (KWA-Navy) launched a new type of submarine, described as a “tactical nuclear attack submarine” and named “Hero Kim Kun Ok” after a historical figure.

    At the launch, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared that the KWA-Navy, currently rather small and weak, by becoming “nuclearised” would be much more powerful and capable of resisting its enemies, the United States (US), Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Kim is already boasting that this submarine provides a second-strike attack capability, but there are good reasons to doubt such a claim.

    Is the Threat Real?

    Three things are clear from this development: first, this submarine will likely be the prototype of a Hero Kim Kun Ok-class, with more submarines expected to be constructed; second, some 20 ageing Romeo-class submarines will be modernised following the lessons learned from building the Hero Kim Kun Ok; third, the KWA-Navy intends to develop a nuclear-powered submarine – an SSN.

    The Hero Kim Kun Ok is a modified version of the Romeo-class submarine which has been enhanced in two main ways. Its conning tower has been enlarged from 6.4m to 10.4m with the attachment of a missile section, and its length has been expanded to allow the loading of Pukuksong-class Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), KN-23 series mini-SLBMs, Hwasal-2 Long-Range Cruise Missiles (LRCMs), and Haeil torpedoes supposedly capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The range of these weapons covers the Korean Peninsula, parts of Japan, and Guam.

    There are some serious technical and operational issues for the Hero Kim Kun Ok: the 10m extension has broken the Romeo-class length/width ratio of 10:1, significantly reducing the strength of the submarine when launching SLBMs and LRCMs underwater; its centre-of-gravity will be higher, significantly affecting underwater operation and manoeuvring, so that it will likely prove very difficult to handle; and the superstructural missile section may be unreliable for cold launching missiles. Presumably to address these flaws, Hero Kim Kun Ok has port and starboard stabilisers on its conning tower, but this means it will be much noisier than the teardrop design of US submarines such as the Virginia-class SSNs and the next-generation Columbia-class SSBNs.

    What is Next?

    Many naval experts were expecting North Korea to develop a strategic submarine, so Kim Jong Un’s characterisation of the Hero Kim Kun Ok as a tactical nuclear attack submarine is significant. It is probably intended as an intermediate phase development, to establish safety and operational parameters, before developing SSNs and SSBNs. Kim’s plan is apparently for the KWA-Navy to build nuclear-powered submarines in the near future.

    North Korea apparently intends to build as many Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines as it can, and the website 38 North reported on 8 September 2023 that the Sinpho Shipyard has another submarine pen suitable for this purpose, and that on 11 September 2023 two ageing Romeo-class submarines were in dry dock for maintenance. These are probably undergoing shape remodeling and engine refits, and one or both of them will likely be moved soon to a larger pen for conversion to Hero Kim Kun Ok-class.

    What are the Ramifications?

    The deployment of North Korea’s Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines in the East Sea (aka Sea of Japan) and the Western Pacific will impact the ROK Navy’s current underwater operations as well as its future submarine requirements. North Korea will likely depend on quantity rather than quality in challenging the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. Some naval experts insist, nevertheless, that the Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines will attempt to implement an Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter more capable ROK and US underwater assets from operating close to the east coast of North Korea. The Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines could also perhaps operate in a way similar to the Soviet Navy’s “Bastion Strategy”.

    Although the weapons carried by the Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines have a regionally significant range, their technical flaws – especially their noisiness and the operational weaknesses arising from their ad hoc construction designs – will limit their effectiveness, at least in the near term.

    In any case, the ROK and the US need to decide on how to respond to the launch of the Hero Kim Kun Ok “tactical nuclear attack submarine”, since the KWA-Navy clearly intends to continue to develop this project, and they may get some assistance from Russia.

    Kim Jong Un made a six-day visit to Russia in mid-September, meeting with President Vladimir Putin at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome spaceport. North Korea has begun to play its “Russia card”, not least with respect to China. Kim is assumed to have promised artillery shells and rockets for Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, and, in return, the North Korean side may get help with missile, space, and nuclear technologies. North Korea has tried and failed to launch satellites, and it is currently unclear whether it has mastered ICBM reentry or warhead miniaturisation.

    How To Respond?

    Reaction in the ROK to the launch of Hero Kim Kun Ok has been mixed. Some argue that since the project is obviously half-baked, the best response is further diplomatic pressure against North Korea and Russia, and this seems to be the position of ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol.

    Popular media in the ROK take a different view, however, preferring a military response: Kim Jong Un went to Russia to try to obtain sophisticated modern missile and nuclear technologies which China would not provide, so the best way to counter North Korean underwater platforms is for the ROK to build its own.

    The ROK is currently building KSS-Ⅲ attack submarines, and many are now suggesting that these should be propelled by nuclear reactors. Nuclear-powered submarines enjoy much extended endurance for secret underwater operations, and such vessels would be effective in conducting the ROK’s “anti-exit” strategy, as well as for platform-to-platform confrontation between the two Koreas. For the ROK, to construct an indigenous SSN is still a big request for the US, however, and the ROK may prefer to avoid upsetting the ROK-US alliance. Certainly, the US and its other allies have so far been quite cautious in their response to North Korea’s “tactical nuclear attack submarine”.

    There are hardliners, both in the ROK and the US, who will use the launch of the Hero Kim Kun Ok to argue for serious and escalatory military options, particularly in the light of Kim Jong Un’s obvious desire to acquire missile and nuclear technologies from Russia. The problem which must be faced is not really the rather odd Hero Kim Kun Ok submarine, flawed as its military capabilities clearly are, but Kim’s overweening ambition to acquire tactical and strategic nuclear attack capabilities which pose a genuine threat to the ROK, to Japan, to US forces in Korea, to US bases in the Western Pacific, and perhaps eventually to the continental US. Sooner or later North Korea will have more worrying underwater platforms, such as autonomous extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles. This is why the ROK and its allies must decide now on how to deal with Kim’s underwater ambitions before the situation becomes more challenging.

    About the Author

    Captain Sukjoon Yoon, ROKN retired, is a senior fellow of The Korea Institute for Military Affairs, Republic of Korea.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / Southeast Asia and ASEAN / Global / East Asia and Asia Pacific / South Asia
    comments powered by Disqus

    SYNOPSIS

    North Korea has launched an indigenous submarine. It demonstrates Kim Jong Un’s intention to develop strategic underwater assets, and ultimately nuclear-powered submarines. How should the US and its allies, especially South Korea, respond to this new threat?

    231012 CO23144 Responding to North Koreas Tactical Nuclear Attack Submarine
    Source: Wikimedia

    COMMENTARY

    On 6 September 2023, at North Korea’s Sinpho Shipyard, the North Korean Navy (KWA-Navy) launched a new type of submarine, described as a “tactical nuclear attack submarine” and named “Hero Kim Kun Ok” after a historical figure.

    At the launch, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared that the KWA-Navy, currently rather small and weak, by becoming “nuclearised” would be much more powerful and capable of resisting its enemies, the United States (US), Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Kim is already boasting that this submarine provides a second-strike attack capability, but there are good reasons to doubt such a claim.

    Is the Threat Real?

    Three things are clear from this development: first, this submarine will likely be the prototype of a Hero Kim Kun Ok-class, with more submarines expected to be constructed; second, some 20 ageing Romeo-class submarines will be modernised following the lessons learned from building the Hero Kim Kun Ok; third, the KWA-Navy intends to develop a nuclear-powered submarine – an SSN.

    The Hero Kim Kun Ok is a modified version of the Romeo-class submarine which has been enhanced in two main ways. Its conning tower has been enlarged from 6.4m to 10.4m with the attachment of a missile section, and its length has been expanded to allow the loading of Pukuksong-class Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), KN-23 series mini-SLBMs, Hwasal-2 Long-Range Cruise Missiles (LRCMs), and Haeil torpedoes supposedly capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The range of these weapons covers the Korean Peninsula, parts of Japan, and Guam.

    There are some serious technical and operational issues for the Hero Kim Kun Ok: the 10m extension has broken the Romeo-class length/width ratio of 10:1, significantly reducing the strength of the submarine when launching SLBMs and LRCMs underwater; its centre-of-gravity will be higher, significantly affecting underwater operation and manoeuvring, so that it will likely prove very difficult to handle; and the superstructural missile section may be unreliable for cold launching missiles. Presumably to address these flaws, Hero Kim Kun Ok has port and starboard stabilisers on its conning tower, but this means it will be much noisier than the teardrop design of US submarines such as the Virginia-class SSNs and the next-generation Columbia-class SSBNs.

    What is Next?

    Many naval experts were expecting North Korea to develop a strategic submarine, so Kim Jong Un’s characterisation of the Hero Kim Kun Ok as a tactical nuclear attack submarine is significant. It is probably intended as an intermediate phase development, to establish safety and operational parameters, before developing SSNs and SSBNs. Kim’s plan is apparently for the KWA-Navy to build nuclear-powered submarines in the near future.

    North Korea apparently intends to build as many Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines as it can, and the website 38 North reported on 8 September 2023 that the Sinpho Shipyard has another submarine pen suitable for this purpose, and that on 11 September 2023 two ageing Romeo-class submarines were in dry dock for maintenance. These are probably undergoing shape remodeling and engine refits, and one or both of them will likely be moved soon to a larger pen for conversion to Hero Kim Kun Ok-class.

    What are the Ramifications?

    The deployment of North Korea’s Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines in the East Sea (aka Sea of Japan) and the Western Pacific will impact the ROK Navy’s current underwater operations as well as its future submarine requirements. North Korea will likely depend on quantity rather than quality in challenging the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. Some naval experts insist, nevertheless, that the Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines will attempt to implement an Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter more capable ROK and US underwater assets from operating close to the east coast of North Korea. The Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines could also perhaps operate in a way similar to the Soviet Navy’s “Bastion Strategy”.

    Although the weapons carried by the Hero Kim Kun Ok-class submarines have a regionally significant range, their technical flaws – especially their noisiness and the operational weaknesses arising from their ad hoc construction designs – will limit their effectiveness, at least in the near term.

    In any case, the ROK and the US need to decide on how to respond to the launch of the Hero Kim Kun Ok “tactical nuclear attack submarine”, since the KWA-Navy clearly intends to continue to develop this project, and they may get some assistance from Russia.

    Kim Jong Un made a six-day visit to Russia in mid-September, meeting with President Vladimir Putin at Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome spaceport. North Korea has begun to play its “Russia card”, not least with respect to China. Kim is assumed to have promised artillery shells and rockets for Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, and, in return, the North Korean side may get help with missile, space, and nuclear technologies. North Korea has tried and failed to launch satellites, and it is currently unclear whether it has mastered ICBM reentry or warhead miniaturisation.

    How To Respond?

    Reaction in the ROK to the launch of Hero Kim Kun Ok has been mixed. Some argue that since the project is obviously half-baked, the best response is further diplomatic pressure against North Korea and Russia, and this seems to be the position of ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol.

    Popular media in the ROK take a different view, however, preferring a military response: Kim Jong Un went to Russia to try to obtain sophisticated modern missile and nuclear technologies which China would not provide, so the best way to counter North Korean underwater platforms is for the ROK to build its own.

    The ROK is currently building KSS-Ⅲ attack submarines, and many are now suggesting that these should be propelled by nuclear reactors. Nuclear-powered submarines enjoy much extended endurance for secret underwater operations, and such vessels would be effective in conducting the ROK’s “anti-exit” strategy, as well as for platform-to-platform confrontation between the two Koreas. For the ROK, to construct an indigenous SSN is still a big request for the US, however, and the ROK may prefer to avoid upsetting the ROK-US alliance. Certainly, the US and its other allies have so far been quite cautious in their response to North Korea’s “tactical nuclear attack submarine”.

    There are hardliners, both in the ROK and the US, who will use the launch of the Hero Kim Kun Ok to argue for serious and escalatory military options, particularly in the light of Kim Jong Un’s obvious desire to acquire missile and nuclear technologies from Russia. The problem which must be faced is not really the rather odd Hero Kim Kun Ok submarine, flawed as its military capabilities clearly are, but Kim’s overweening ambition to acquire tactical and strategic nuclear attack capabilities which pose a genuine threat to the ROK, to Japan, to US forces in Korea, to US bases in the Western Pacific, and perhaps eventually to the continental US. Sooner or later North Korea will have more worrying underwater platforms, such as autonomous extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles. This is why the ROK and its allies must decide now on how to deal with Kim’s underwater ambitions before the situation becomes more challenging.

    About the Author

    Captain Sukjoon Yoon, ROKN retired, is a senior fellow of The Korea Institute for Military Affairs, Republic of Korea.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info