Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • Taiwan After Ukraine
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO22067 | Taiwan After Ukraine
    Sean King

    20 June 2022

    download pdf

    SYNOPSIS

    Pundits warned Russia’s Ukraine invasion was a prelude to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) moving on Taiwan, with some even suggesting Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping were coordinating strikes. In fact, the two situations are very different. Taiwan should study the ways Ukraine has been holding off Russia and train its citizens in civil defence and offensive counteractions against any future intruders. But what counts most, should a PRC invasion ever come, is US and Japanese support.

    2022 06 20 17.35.25
    Chess pieces in front of displayed China and Taiwan’s flags, Reuters 

    COMMENTARY

    UKRAINE’S LAND border with Russia, stretching some 2,000 kilometres, was all too easy for Vladimir Putin’s troops to cross. Ukraine was also part of the Soviet Union from 1922-1991, so there are Russian military officials alive today who served there and who know its territory. Still, Russian forces have been thwarted in many instances.

    By contrast, Taiwan lies 160 kilometres from the Chinese mainland across the often rough Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s inhospitable western coastline could turn any Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) amphibious landing into a kill zone for invaders contrasted with Russia’s relative waltz into Ukraine. What’s more, the PLA has not fought a war since 1979 (briefly against Vietnam) and PLA personnel have never set foot on Taiwan.

    Not All Good News

    But other differences do not favour Taiwan. Specifically, Beijing sees Taiwan as inalienably Chinese in a way that Moscow does not see Ukraine as Russian. [Even Taipei’s own Republic of China (ROC) constitution claims sovereignty over “all China,” although, as of 1991, it acknowledges its jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan, some other islands and possessions.]

    Hence Beijing’s will to absorb Taiwan is greater than any ambition Russia has for Ukraine. And its military power dwarfs whatever Moscow has launched at Ukraine.

    Ukraine is also a member of the United Nations (UN) while Taipei left the UN, in 1971, just before it could be kicked out upon the PRC’s acceptance into the world body.

    While many countries have sanctioned Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian economy is much smaller than the PRC’s which is also far bigger than Taiwan’s. Would governments risk incurring Beijing’s wrath by punishing it over Taiwan as they have Moscow over Ukraine? Maybe, not.

    And Xi is learning from Putin’s Ukraine mistakes, fine-tuning whatever eventual plans the PRC may have for Taiwan. Emerging power Beijing will not be rushed into action by fading power Moscow but Taiwan had best beware all the same.

    Taiwan and US: Too Important to Fail

    Also, unlike in Ukraine, we can expect the United States to come to Taiwan’s defence so long as Taipei does not provoke the conflict.

    The PRC is America’s 21ˢᵗ Century nation-state rival and its gaining Taiwan would allow it to break through the all-important First Island Chain, a string of archipelagoes which fences in East Asia that runs from Japan, through Taiwan, down to the Philippines and over to Borneo.

    The PLA Navy would thereafter enjoy unimpeded access to the increasingly contested Western Pacific, in range of US territories and associated states.

    Taiwan is also a Top Ten US trade partner and home to critical technology. The Economist Intelligence Unit lists Taiwan eighth on its global Democracy Index. In short, Taiwan is too important to fail.

    Taiwan and Japan: Would Tokyo Send Troops?

    Japanese Self-Defence Forces would almost certainly not deploy to Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack but they could support the US from within Japan where 50,000 American troops are stationed. Japan might also be called upon to take in Taiwanese refugees.

    US President Joe Biden told reporters in Tokyo last month the US would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan in case of a mainland assault (the third time he has said so as president).

    Biden’s words are not a security guarantee per se, or what has been labelled strategic clarity, as America cannot credibly commit itself to defend an island whose government it does not even formally recognise.

    His remarks are seen as a sincere answer to the question posed and are thought to be in line with general American thinking today. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for his part seemed pleased by what Biden said.

    Tokyo sees its own security and territorial integrity tied to Taiwan’s not least because Beijing could use Taiwan as a staging ground to seize Japan’s Senkaku Islands which Beijing claims on the basis of how it says they appertain to Taiwan. Taipei too claims the islands but rarely pushes the issue, especially not since it signed a 2013 agreement with Tokyo that allows both Taiwanese and Japanese to fish nearby.

    Taiwan is also a former Japanese colony where most people actually like Japan. Tokyo appears to relish these generally favourable feelings, and likes to back Taipei whenever it can.

    Taiwan and South Korea: Standoffish Seoul

    One might assume South Korea and Taiwan make for an ideal pair, as both face threats from nominally communist, nationalist dictatorships that claim them. But relations have been bumpy over the years.

    The late Chiang Kai-shek is thought to have tried meddling in the Korean War for his own purposes and when Seoul abruptly recognised Beijing in 1992, Taipei retaliated by suspending all Taiwan-South Korea commercial flights by the two sides’ carriers until 2004.

    Seoul has also long thought it needs Beijing’s help on North Korea. And they share a historical antipathy toward Japan from the Second World War and before. Seoul tends to overly focus on Korean peninsular issues and has only recently begun to adopt a wider Indo-Pacific outlook, particularly under newly inaugurated pro-US leader Yoon Suk-yeol.

    The last two US-South Korean presidential summit joint statements notably called for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait while the South Korean public (especially, its youth) is increasingly sympathetic toward Taiwan and critical of mainland China. But Seoul, even under Yoon, would still look to sit out any Taiwan conflict.

    And any effort to redirect any of the 28,500 US troops in South Korea to Taiwan could leave Seoul more vulnerable to an attack from Pyongyang. US treaty ally Australia could help in a Taiwan contingency but it is much further away and hosts far fewer American troops.

    Taiwanese should use this time to learn what Ukrainians have done right as they can be sure Beijing is studying where Moscow has gone wrong. But if push comes to shove, it is US hard power – with Japanese support – that matters most. The more indispensable Taiwan can make itself to the outside world in the meantime, the more likely it can survive the unthinkable.

    About the Author

    Sean King is a senior vice president at Park Strategies, a New York business advisory firm which has undertaken research and analysis on Taiwan and its neighbourly relations. He is also an Affiliated Scholar at the University of Notre Dame Liu Institute for Asia & Asian Affairs in the US.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / International Political Economy / International Politics and Security / Non-Traditional Security / Global / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Europe / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN
    comments powered by Disqus

    SYNOPSIS

    Pundits warned Russia’s Ukraine invasion was a prelude to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) moving on Taiwan, with some even suggesting Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping were coordinating strikes. In fact, the two situations are very different. Taiwan should study the ways Ukraine has been holding off Russia and train its citizens in civil defence and offensive counteractions against any future intruders. But what counts most, should a PRC invasion ever come, is US and Japanese support.

    2022 06 20 17.35.25
    Chess pieces in front of displayed China and Taiwan’s flags, Reuters 

    COMMENTARY

    UKRAINE’S LAND border with Russia, stretching some 2,000 kilometres, was all too easy for Vladimir Putin’s troops to cross. Ukraine was also part of the Soviet Union from 1922-1991, so there are Russian military officials alive today who served there and who know its territory. Still, Russian forces have been thwarted in many instances.

    By contrast, Taiwan lies 160 kilometres from the Chinese mainland across the often rough Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s inhospitable western coastline could turn any Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) amphibious landing into a kill zone for invaders contrasted with Russia’s relative waltz into Ukraine. What’s more, the PLA has not fought a war since 1979 (briefly against Vietnam) and PLA personnel have never set foot on Taiwan.

    Not All Good News

    But other differences do not favour Taiwan. Specifically, Beijing sees Taiwan as inalienably Chinese in a way that Moscow does not see Ukraine as Russian. [Even Taipei’s own Republic of China (ROC) constitution claims sovereignty over “all China,” although, as of 1991, it acknowledges its jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan, some other islands and possessions.]

    Hence Beijing’s will to absorb Taiwan is greater than any ambition Russia has for Ukraine. And its military power dwarfs whatever Moscow has launched at Ukraine.

    Ukraine is also a member of the United Nations (UN) while Taipei left the UN, in 1971, just before it could be kicked out upon the PRC’s acceptance into the world body.

    While many countries have sanctioned Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian economy is much smaller than the PRC’s which is also far bigger than Taiwan’s. Would governments risk incurring Beijing’s wrath by punishing it over Taiwan as they have Moscow over Ukraine? Maybe, not.

    And Xi is learning from Putin’s Ukraine mistakes, fine-tuning whatever eventual plans the PRC may have for Taiwan. Emerging power Beijing will not be rushed into action by fading power Moscow but Taiwan had best beware all the same.

    Taiwan and US: Too Important to Fail

    Also, unlike in Ukraine, we can expect the United States to come to Taiwan’s defence so long as Taipei does not provoke the conflict.

    The PRC is America’s 21ˢᵗ Century nation-state rival and its gaining Taiwan would allow it to break through the all-important First Island Chain, a string of archipelagoes which fences in East Asia that runs from Japan, through Taiwan, down to the Philippines and over to Borneo.

    The PLA Navy would thereafter enjoy unimpeded access to the increasingly contested Western Pacific, in range of US territories and associated states.

    Taiwan is also a Top Ten US trade partner and home to critical technology. The Economist Intelligence Unit lists Taiwan eighth on its global Democracy Index. In short, Taiwan is too important to fail.

    Taiwan and Japan: Would Tokyo Send Troops?

    Japanese Self-Defence Forces would almost certainly not deploy to Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack but they could support the US from within Japan where 50,000 American troops are stationed. Japan might also be called upon to take in Taiwanese refugees.

    US President Joe Biden told reporters in Tokyo last month the US would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan in case of a mainland assault (the third time he has said so as president).

    Biden’s words are not a security guarantee per se, or what has been labelled strategic clarity, as America cannot credibly commit itself to defend an island whose government it does not even formally recognise.

    His remarks are seen as a sincere answer to the question posed and are thought to be in line with general American thinking today. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for his part seemed pleased by what Biden said.

    Tokyo sees its own security and territorial integrity tied to Taiwan’s not least because Beijing could use Taiwan as a staging ground to seize Japan’s Senkaku Islands which Beijing claims on the basis of how it says they appertain to Taiwan. Taipei too claims the islands but rarely pushes the issue, especially not since it signed a 2013 agreement with Tokyo that allows both Taiwanese and Japanese to fish nearby.

    Taiwan is also a former Japanese colony where most people actually like Japan. Tokyo appears to relish these generally favourable feelings, and likes to back Taipei whenever it can.

    Taiwan and South Korea: Standoffish Seoul

    One might assume South Korea and Taiwan make for an ideal pair, as both face threats from nominally communist, nationalist dictatorships that claim them. But relations have been bumpy over the years.

    The late Chiang Kai-shek is thought to have tried meddling in the Korean War for his own purposes and when Seoul abruptly recognised Beijing in 1992, Taipei retaliated by suspending all Taiwan-South Korea commercial flights by the two sides’ carriers until 2004.

    Seoul has also long thought it needs Beijing’s help on North Korea. And they share a historical antipathy toward Japan from the Second World War and before. Seoul tends to overly focus on Korean peninsular issues and has only recently begun to adopt a wider Indo-Pacific outlook, particularly under newly inaugurated pro-US leader Yoon Suk-yeol.

    The last two US-South Korean presidential summit joint statements notably called for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait while the South Korean public (especially, its youth) is increasingly sympathetic toward Taiwan and critical of mainland China. But Seoul, even under Yoon, would still look to sit out any Taiwan conflict.

    And any effort to redirect any of the 28,500 US troops in South Korea to Taiwan could leave Seoul more vulnerable to an attack from Pyongyang. US treaty ally Australia could help in a Taiwan contingency but it is much further away and hosts far fewer American troops.

    Taiwanese should use this time to learn what Ukrainians have done right as they can be sure Beijing is studying where Moscow has gone wrong. But if push comes to shove, it is US hard power – with Japanese support – that matters most. The more indispensable Taiwan can make itself to the outside world in the meantime, the more likely it can survive the unthinkable.

    About the Author

    Sean King is a senior vice president at Park Strategies, a New York business advisory firm which has undertaken research and analysis on Taiwan and its neighbourly relations. He is also an Affiliated Scholar at the University of Notre Dame Liu Institute for Asia & Asian Affairs in the US.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / International Political Economy / International Politics and Security / Non-Traditional Security

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info