Back
About RSIS
Introduction
Building the Foundations
Welcome Message
Board of Governors
Staff Profiles
Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
Dean’s Office
Management
Distinguished Fellows
Faculty and Research
Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
Visiting Fellows
Adjunct Fellows
Administrative Staff
Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
RSIS Endowment Fund
Endowed Professorships
Career Opportunities
Getting to RSIS
Research
Research Centres
Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
Centre of Excellence for National Security
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
Research Programmes
National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)
Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
Other Research
Future Issues and Technology Cluster
Research@RSIS
Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
Graduate Education
Graduate Programmes Office
Exchange Partners and Programmes
How to Apply
Financial Assistance
Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
RSIS Alumni
Outreach
Global Networks
About Global Networks
RSIS Alumni
Executive Education
About Executive Education
SRP Executive Programme
Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
International Programmes
About International Programmes
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)
International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
Publications
RSIS Publications
Annual Reviews
Books
Bulletins and Newsletters
RSIS Commentary Series
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Commemorative / Event Reports
Future Issues
IDSS Papers
Interreligious Relations
Monographs
NTS Insight
Policy Reports
Working Papers
External Publications
Authored Books
Journal Articles
Edited Books
Chapters in Edited Books
Policy Reports
Working Papers
Op-Eds
Glossary of Abbreviations
Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
RSIS Publications for the Year
External Publications for the Year
Media
Cohesive Societies
Sustainable Security
Other Resource Pages
News Releases
Speeches
Video/Audio Channel
External Podcasts
Events
Contact Us
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
  • About RSIS
      IntroductionBuilding the FoundationsWelcome MessageBoard of GovernorsHonours and Awards for RSIS Staff and StudentsRSIS Endowment FundEndowed ProfessorshipsCareer OpportunitiesGetting to RSIS
      Staff ProfilesExecutive Deputy Chairman’s OfficeDean’s OfficeManagementDistinguished FellowsFaculty and ResearchAssociate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research AnalystsVisiting FellowsAdjunct FellowsAdministrative Staff
  • Research
      Research CentresCentre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)Centre of Excellence for National SecurityInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      Research ProgrammesNational Security Studies Programme (NSSP)Social Cohesion Research Programme (SCRP)Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      Other ResearchFuture Issues and Technology ClusterResearch@RSISScience and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      Graduate Programmes OfficeExchange Partners and ProgrammesHow to ApplyFinancial AssistanceMeet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other eventsRSIS Alumni
  • Outreach
      Global NetworksAbout Global NetworksRSIS Alumni
      Executive EducationAbout Executive EducationSRP Executive ProgrammeTerrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
      International ProgrammesAbout International ProgrammesAsia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)International Conference on Cohesive Societies (ICCS)International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
  • Publications
      RSIS PublicationsAnnual ReviewsBooksBulletins and NewslettersRSIS Commentary SeriesCounter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesCommemorative / Event ReportsFuture IssuesIDSS PapersInterreligious RelationsMonographsNTS InsightPolicy ReportsWorking Papers
      External PublicationsAuthored BooksJournal ArticlesEdited BooksChapters in Edited BooksPolicy ReportsWorking PapersOp-Eds
      Glossary of AbbreviationsPolicy-relevant Articles Given RSIS AwardRSIS Publications for the YearExternal Publications for the Year
  • Media
      Cohesive SocietiesSustainable SecurityOther Resource PagesNews ReleasesSpeechesVideo/Audio ChannelExternal Podcasts
  • Events
  • Contact Us
    • Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
      rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
      rsis.sg
      rsissg
      RSIS
      RSS
      Subscribe to RSIS Publications
      Subscribe to RSIS Events

      Getting to RSIS

      Nanyang Technological University
      Block S4, Level B3,
      50 Nanyang Avenue,
      Singapore 639798

      Click here for direction to RSIS

      Get in Touch

    Connect
    Search
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • The Future of Factional Politics in China under Xi Jinping
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • RSIS Commentary Series
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • Future Issues
    • IDSS Papers
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers

    CO23123 | The Future of Factional Politics in China under Xi Jinping
    Lee Jonghyuk

    31 August 2023

    download pdf

    SYNOPSIS

    The recent leadership reshuffle in the Communist Party of China reflects a significant departure from the longstanding tradition of balancing factional politics and working collectively on an overarching goal to buttress control across the party’s membership and bureaucratic structure on the ground. With Xi Jinping’s approach, officials compete with each other in a bid to gain favour. Unfortunately, this could come at the cost of stifling local initiatives, which have historically played a significant role in China’s progress.

    230901 CO23123 The Future of Factional Politics in China under Xi Jinping
    Source: Wikimedia

    COMMENTARY

    The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in October 2022 saw the appointment of Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi to the Politburo Standing Committee. They are all known for their close ties to President Xi Jinping. Candidates from the Youth League faction, including Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, were sidelined, and Hu Chunhua, once considered a strong contender for the premiership, even failed to retain his position in the Politburo.

    This result marks the demise of China’s long-standing collective leadership system, as Xi Jinping has surrounded himself with those perceived to be his loyal confidants. For the past two decades, Chinese politics were characterised by checks and balances among various factions, such as the Shanghai Gang under Jiang Zemin and the Youth League clique under Hu Jintao, among others. Now that the factional balance has been fully dismantled, ushering in the era of Xi Jinping’s dominance, the question arises: how will factional politics in China transform?

    Factional Politics under One Strong Leader

    During times of conflict between different factions, members within each faction should collaborate with each other to collectively confront opposing factions. However, we have now reached a stage where only the Xi Jinping faction remains, and it is expected that competition will emerge among its members. Historically, when power struggles between factions subsided following the emergence of a strong leader, how did China’s political landscape evolve?

    Deng Xiaoping was a prime example of one who leveraged factional politics. Deng united talented individuals under a common objective: economic growth. He fostered competition among different factions, such as reformists and conservatives as well as technocrats and generalists, to identify the most effective policies for achieving this goal. Each faction strove to advocate policies that aligned with the overarching objective of economic development.

    They could freely apply their expertise and political philosophy, covering a range of areas from industrial policies to financial, fiscal, and eventually social policies. Deng Xiaoping assumed the role of an arbiter, effectively overseeing the entire process behind the scenes. This was possible because of Deng’s unquestionable legitimacy as the supreme leader.

    Xi Jinping’s Effort to Build Legitimacy

    With Xi Jinping now in the supreme position, how will factional politics unfold under his leadership? A major challenge is Xi’s lack of personal legitimacy compared to Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s legitimacy was bolstered by his remarkable accomplishments, including the revitalisation of the country following the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the success of his economic reforms and open-door policies. In contrast, Xi’s legitimacy stems primarily from the historical achievements of the CPC.

    In Xi Jinping’s various speeches, he highlighted his own accomplishments, such as in poverty alleviation, anti-corruption efforts, reducing inequality, and building a modern socialist country. However, these assertions alone are insufficient to confer personal legitimacy upon Xi. Moreover, his frequent comparisons to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping as a means to solidify his own legitimacy raised doubts among both the Chinese people and party members. The narrative that Xi will lead the country towards strength, akin to Mao’s nation-building and Deng’s prosperity, is perceived by many as lacking the imprimatur of the people.

    To compensate for this deficit, Xi Jinping has emphasised the importance of ideological struggle. His objectives, such as the “China Dream” and “Great Modern Socialist Country”, are somewhat vague and abstract. Not only the CPC but the entire society is encouraged to promote these ideals. Xi Jinping faces challenges in setting clear goals such as in achieving double-digit GDP growth: Chinese society has become more complex compared to the 1980s, and clear goals may trigger backlash if not accomplished.

    The Future of Factional Politics under Xi Jinping

    Factional competition under these ambiguous goals may not lead to productive policy debates but rather excessive loyalty competitions. The focus will likely shift towards accommodating Xi Jinping’s personal preferences, such as the transforming of memorials of Xi’s father into sacred sites, promotion of traditional Chinese values, and establishment of Confucius temples. Likewise, many local officials are competing to create ideological learning centres or regional landmarks named after Xi Jinping, despite previous restrictions on idolising the supreme leader.

    Furthermore, local officials will be very cautious about ingratiating themselves with Xi Jinping, having learnt from the implementation of the zero-COVID policy. Despite the need to strike a balance between public well-being and epidemic prevention, local governments engaged in a race to enforce the strictest possible quarantine measures. Numerous human rights violations were reported in various regions, such as in Shanghai, Beijing, Jilin and Guangdong to avoid any failure in controlling the virus that would impact adversely on Xi Jinping’s political standing and popularity.

    Unless Xi lightens up, Chinese bureaucrats are likely to continue opting for conservative and stringent measures, posing significant challenges to both economic and social development in their jurisdictions. The principles of meritocracy and decentralisation, which have been instrumental in China’s remarkable economic development, are at risk of erosion. Instead of prioritising local economies and the well-being of the people, bureaucrats may find themselves caught in a loyalty competition between Xi Jinping’s close associates.

    Conclusion

    Despite the absence of democratic attributes, the CPC has effectively ensured accountability to the people and provided for good long-term performance through the maintenance of a delicate balance among its different factions.

    One significant organisation is the Communist Youth League, which serves as a training centre for party bureaucrats. Members of the league, lacking political privileges, can only compete on the basis of their abilities, surviving through a rigorous merit-based selection system. In contrast, other factions, particularly those dominated by the elite, rely on nepotism and personal connections for promotions.

    Efforts had been made to institutionalise a fairer selection process, but they failed during Hu Jintao’s time. It turned out that many senior officials were individuals who had gained advantages through political connections. In recent years, the absence of Youth League cadres ascending to the role of provincial party secretaries, the highest position within a Chinese province, serves as a notable illustration.

    This phenomenon indicates the possibility that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China might not be particularly inclined to promote officials who hold differing political perspectives. In these circumstances, there is a degree of stability for the CPC’s enduring governance, which may be advantageous for short-term efficiency in governance, as it minimises unnecessary political conflicts among the leadership. Yet, it also raises concerns about the CPC’s long-term capacity to effectively address the intricate socio-economic landscape of the country.

    About the Author

    Jonghyuk Lee is an assistant professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies’ China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies / East Asia and Asia Pacific / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN / Global
    comments powered by Disqus

    SYNOPSIS

    The recent leadership reshuffle in the Communist Party of China reflects a significant departure from the longstanding tradition of balancing factional politics and working collectively on an overarching goal to buttress control across the party’s membership and bureaucratic structure on the ground. With Xi Jinping’s approach, officials compete with each other in a bid to gain favour. Unfortunately, this could come at the cost of stifling local initiatives, which have historically played a significant role in China’s progress.

    230901 CO23123 The Future of Factional Politics in China under Xi Jinping
    Source: Wikimedia

    COMMENTARY

    The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in October 2022 saw the appointment of Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi to the Politburo Standing Committee. They are all known for their close ties to President Xi Jinping. Candidates from the Youth League faction, including Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, were sidelined, and Hu Chunhua, once considered a strong contender for the premiership, even failed to retain his position in the Politburo.

    This result marks the demise of China’s long-standing collective leadership system, as Xi Jinping has surrounded himself with those perceived to be his loyal confidants. For the past two decades, Chinese politics were characterised by checks and balances among various factions, such as the Shanghai Gang under Jiang Zemin and the Youth League clique under Hu Jintao, among others. Now that the factional balance has been fully dismantled, ushering in the era of Xi Jinping’s dominance, the question arises: how will factional politics in China transform?

    Factional Politics under One Strong Leader

    During times of conflict between different factions, members within each faction should collaborate with each other to collectively confront opposing factions. However, we have now reached a stage where only the Xi Jinping faction remains, and it is expected that competition will emerge among its members. Historically, when power struggles between factions subsided following the emergence of a strong leader, how did China’s political landscape evolve?

    Deng Xiaoping was a prime example of one who leveraged factional politics. Deng united talented individuals under a common objective: economic growth. He fostered competition among different factions, such as reformists and conservatives as well as technocrats and generalists, to identify the most effective policies for achieving this goal. Each faction strove to advocate policies that aligned with the overarching objective of economic development.

    They could freely apply their expertise and political philosophy, covering a range of areas from industrial policies to financial, fiscal, and eventually social policies. Deng Xiaoping assumed the role of an arbiter, effectively overseeing the entire process behind the scenes. This was possible because of Deng’s unquestionable legitimacy as the supreme leader.

    Xi Jinping’s Effort to Build Legitimacy

    With Xi Jinping now in the supreme position, how will factional politics unfold under his leadership? A major challenge is Xi’s lack of personal legitimacy compared to Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s legitimacy was bolstered by his remarkable accomplishments, including the revitalisation of the country following the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the success of his economic reforms and open-door policies. In contrast, Xi’s legitimacy stems primarily from the historical achievements of the CPC.

    In Xi Jinping’s various speeches, he highlighted his own accomplishments, such as in poverty alleviation, anti-corruption efforts, reducing inequality, and building a modern socialist country. However, these assertions alone are insufficient to confer personal legitimacy upon Xi. Moreover, his frequent comparisons to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping as a means to solidify his own legitimacy raised doubts among both the Chinese people and party members. The narrative that Xi will lead the country towards strength, akin to Mao’s nation-building and Deng’s prosperity, is perceived by many as lacking the imprimatur of the people.

    To compensate for this deficit, Xi Jinping has emphasised the importance of ideological struggle. His objectives, such as the “China Dream” and “Great Modern Socialist Country”, are somewhat vague and abstract. Not only the CPC but the entire society is encouraged to promote these ideals. Xi Jinping faces challenges in setting clear goals such as in achieving double-digit GDP growth: Chinese society has become more complex compared to the 1980s, and clear goals may trigger backlash if not accomplished.

    The Future of Factional Politics under Xi Jinping

    Factional competition under these ambiguous goals may not lead to productive policy debates but rather excessive loyalty competitions. The focus will likely shift towards accommodating Xi Jinping’s personal preferences, such as the transforming of memorials of Xi’s father into sacred sites, promotion of traditional Chinese values, and establishment of Confucius temples. Likewise, many local officials are competing to create ideological learning centres or regional landmarks named after Xi Jinping, despite previous restrictions on idolising the supreme leader.

    Furthermore, local officials will be very cautious about ingratiating themselves with Xi Jinping, having learnt from the implementation of the zero-COVID policy. Despite the need to strike a balance between public well-being and epidemic prevention, local governments engaged in a race to enforce the strictest possible quarantine measures. Numerous human rights violations were reported in various regions, such as in Shanghai, Beijing, Jilin and Guangdong to avoid any failure in controlling the virus that would impact adversely on Xi Jinping’s political standing and popularity.

    Unless Xi lightens up, Chinese bureaucrats are likely to continue opting for conservative and stringent measures, posing significant challenges to both economic and social development in their jurisdictions. The principles of meritocracy and decentralisation, which have been instrumental in China’s remarkable economic development, are at risk of erosion. Instead of prioritising local economies and the well-being of the people, bureaucrats may find themselves caught in a loyalty competition between Xi Jinping’s close associates.

    Conclusion

    Despite the absence of democratic attributes, the CPC has effectively ensured accountability to the people and provided for good long-term performance through the maintenance of a delicate balance among its different factions.

    One significant organisation is the Communist Youth League, which serves as a training centre for party bureaucrats. Members of the league, lacking political privileges, can only compete on the basis of their abilities, surviving through a rigorous merit-based selection system. In contrast, other factions, particularly those dominated by the elite, rely on nepotism and personal connections for promotions.

    Efforts had been made to institutionalise a fairer selection process, but they failed during Hu Jintao’s time. It turned out that many senior officials were individuals who had gained advantages through political connections. In recent years, the absence of Youth League cadres ascending to the role of provincial party secretaries, the highest position within a Chinese province, serves as a notable illustration.

    This phenomenon indicates the possibility that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China might not be particularly inclined to promote officials who hold differing political perspectives. In these circumstances, there is a degree of stability for the CPC’s enduring governance, which may be advantageous for short-term efficiency in governance, as it minimises unnecessary political conflicts among the leadership. Yet, it also raises concerns about the CPC’s long-term capacity to effectively address the intricate socio-economic landscape of the country.

    About the Author

    Jonghyuk Lee is an assistant professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies’ China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

    Categories: RSIS Commentary Series / Country and Region Studies

    Popular Links

    About RSISResearch ProgrammesGraduate EducationPublicationsEventsAdmissionsCareersVideo/Audio ChannelRSIS Intranet

    Connect with Us

    rsis.ntu
    rsis_ntu
    rsisntu
    rsisvideocast
    school/rsis-ntu
    rsis.sg
    rsissg
    RSIS
    RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    Getting to RSIS

    Nanyang Technological University
    Block S4, Level B3,
    50 Nanyang Avenue,
    Singapore 639798

    Click here for direction to RSIS

    Get in Touch

      Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
      Privacy Statement / Terms of Use
      Help us improve

        Rate your experience with this website
        123456
        Not satisfiedVery satisfied
        What did you like?
        0/255 characters
        What can be improved?
        0/255 characters
        Your email
        Please enter a valid email.
        Thank you for your feedback.
        This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
        OK
        Latest Book
        more info