01 January 2021
- RSIS
- Publication
- External Publications
- Understanding the tragedy of the commons in the South China Sea fisheries: The prisoner’s dilemma model revisited
Understanding the tragedy of the commons in the South China Sea fisheries: The prisoner’s dilemma model revisited
The South China Sea (SCS) fisheries crisis is becoming a textbook example of the tragedy of the commons (TOC). The discussion of the SCS fisheries governance, however, has been poorly informed by the rich findings of the studies on the commons. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game model is most widely applied to examining collective action problems, including the social dilemma faced by fishers in the SCS. While generations of studies have shed light on how cooperation in the PD model could be improved, two important factors are overlooked, namely, the real motivation of the fishers and the boundary issue when the model is applied to a large scale fishery commons. Taking these two factors into consideration, the “exit” and “move” options need to be granted to the players in the PD model. In this paper, I show that incorporating the ‘exit’ and ‘move’ options into the PD model can generate new insights on how to improve fishery governance and avert the TOC in the SCS. The findings offered in this paper can help avert fishing crises in other regions, as well as other commons challenges.
The South China Sea (SCS) fisheries crisis is becoming a textbook example of the tragedy of the commons (TOC). The discussion of the SCS fisheries governance, however, has been poorly informed by the rich findings of the studies on the commons. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game model is most widely applied to examining collective action problems, including the social dilemma faced by fishers in the SCS. While generations of studies have shed light on how cooperation in the PD model could be improved, two important factors are overlooked, namely, the real motivation of the fishers and the boundary issue when the model is applied to a large scale fishery commons. Taking these two factors into consideration, the “exit” and “move” options need to be granted to the players in the PD model. In this paper, I show that incorporating the ‘exit’ and ‘move’ options into the PD model can generate new insights on how to improve fishery governance and avert the TOC in the SCS. The findings offered in this paper can help avert fishing crises in other regions, as well as other commons challenges.
