The Question of Misinformation-Triggered Violence in Singapore: The Interplay between Misinformation, Faultlines and Violence
This article explores the link between misinformation, faultlines, and the escalation to violence, in the context of Singapore. Singapore has not experienced misinformation-triggered violence to the extent seen in other parts of the world, despite instances of misinformation tapping on existing faultlines. However, the article argues that the absence of cases of misinformation-triggered violence and the presence of laws and policies to prevent violence, does not necessarily mean that there is no risk for Singapore. The article also highlights the importance of considering violence in a broader sense to include psychological violence.
Introduction
Online misinformation has kindled violence in different parts of the world in recent years. In 2024, following the murder of three girls in the United Kingdom (UK), misinformation about the attacker, including a fake name and allegations on his background, found traction online and stirred violence in the country.[1] Some extreme right wing accounts were among those that called people to join the protests.[2] India has also had various cases of misinformation aggravated violence over the years. In 2013, the Muzaffarnagar riots in Uttar Pradesh, sparked by misinformation claiming a Muslim mob was killing Hindu youth, resulted in deaths and displacement.[3] In 2018, fake videos where children are abducted from the streets kindled child abduction rumours, which led to lynches and mob attacks.[4]
In most of these cases, the misinformation appealed to existing faultlines in the society and led to tensions between different groups. While some view misinformation (and disinformation) as a symptom of societal faultlines, the relationship between the two is mutually reinforcing. Misinformation and disinformation (dis/misinformation from here onwards)[5] have been identified as a “meta-risk”, which impacts perceptions of other risks (e.g., climate change), and thus how these risks are managed.[6] Definitionally, misinformation refers to the spread of false content that is shared without knowing it is false while disinformation is “intentionally false and designed to cause harm”.[7] The effects of misinformation and disinformation however, can be similar, even without strategic intent.
Singapore has had its own share of misinformation circulation over the years. Although some of this misinformation targeted the faultlines in the country, they have not sparked physical violence to the extent seen in other parts of the world. Singapore has various levers in place to keep violence, including that fomented by misinformation, at bay. However, the lack of cases does not mean an absent threat of violence. Besides, some cases of misinformation (as well as hate) targeting faultlines have also raised the question if more attention should be paid to psychological violence[8] when exploring dis/misinformation-triggered violence in the Singapore context. This article explores this question as well as the relationship between dis/misinformation, faultlines and violence with attention to dis/misinformation cases in Singapore.
Misinformation and Violence: Cases from Around the Globe
The incitement of hate, whether through disinformation, misinformation or hate speech, can be a predictor of violence.[9] At the same time, not all acts of hate lead to violence and hate is not the only instigator of violence. The cases explored below illustrate the interplay and interconnectedness between hate (speech) and dis/misinformation, where “verbal attacks and distortion of facts” are employed to effectively “incite violence and discrimination against specific populations”.[10] These distortions and attacks occur along existing societal faultlines and practices of othering (i.e., anti-immigrant sentiments, Islamophobia etc.).
From July 30 to August 5, 2024, riots broke out across many parts of the UK, “led by the far right and fuelled by anti-immigrant hate”.[11] In Rotherham, rioters attempted to set a hotel housing migrants on fire.[12] These racially motivated instances of violence were fuelled by dis/misinformation on social media surrounding the fatal stabbings at a children’s dance class on July 29, speculating that the suspect was an illegal migrant.[13] Social media analysis of the mobilisation behind the riots revealed a network of far-right influencers amplifying dis/misinformation on their platforms, which then proliferated across social media platforms, reaching a sizable audience.[14] Some claims portrayed this audience as “racists and terrorists”, while others hypothesised that they are “left-behind communities whose legitimate anger has been warped by the far right”.[15] Both examples point to the resonance of certain narratives (in this case anti-immigrant narratives) among communities with deeply held beliefs about an “othered” group.
Dis/misinformation has also been linked to mob killings in India, where WhatsApp vigilante lynchings are spurred by dis/misinformation on a range of issues from cow theft and other bovine-related misdemeanours to child kidnappings.[16] The content often included Islamophobic hate speech, religious nationalist propaganda and misogyny.[17] Widespread dis/misinformation in the Indian instant messaging and social media spheres cannot, however, be attributed solely to digital illiteracy and ignorance. Research has found that those who participate in the spread of dis/misinformation and the mobilisation to violence have a range of digital skill sets – the common factor between them being “deeply held and widespread prejudices… against minority groups”.[18] The anti-Muslim statements expressed by elements of the current ruling party of India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have potentially created a lucrative ground for such prejudices to flourish.[19]
There have also been well recorded instances of discursive practices combining hate speech and dis/misinformation against minority groups in the Rwandan and Yugoslavian genocides of the past and more recently, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar.[20] Additionally, disinformation can also be weaponised by extremists across the ideological spectrum.[21] According to a 2021 study, the extreme right-wing “utilises and benefits from disinformation campaigns more than any other group”.[22] In the lead-up to the United States (US) Capitol riots in 2021, for example, disinformation was amplified online, reinforcing conspiracy theories and divisions along partisan lines.[23]
Faultlines and Dis/Misinformation in Singapore
In 2019, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) released a study on faultlines in Singapore that listed race, religion, immigration, class/socio-economic status (SES), and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender)[24] as faultlines in Singapore.[25] While the report was not focused on dis/misinformation, misinformation concerning these faultlines could potentially create polarisation and division in society. There have been various instances of misinformation appealing to the faultlines listed in the IPS report in the past. The Ministry of Digital Development and Information’s (MDDI) 2024 Online Safety Poll found that there has been a 13% jump in the witnessing of race and religion-related content that can spark tension within society, as well as a 19% increase in violent content compared to the 2023 survey.[26] While the survey focused on online harms and the content in question may not necessarily be misinformation, this finding exposes a troubling trend. There has been some race-related misinformation in the past, including those claiming that the people accused of the Orchard Towers murder received a “preferential treatment because of their Chinese ethnicity”, and misinformation claiming that the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) and the Standard Chartered Bank in Singapore were hiring foreigners as opposed to locals.[27] The latter instance brought into focus the intersection between existing class, immigration, and racial faultlines in society.
On religion, intersecting with scams, a fake Facebook account using Singaporean Archbishop William Goh’s name and photo solicited donations online.[28] More importantly, dis/misinformation concerning major geo-political conflicts can appeal to sentiments in Singapore, including Israel’s ongoing operations in Gaza that might tap on religious sentiments.[29]
On gender, there have been various cases of deepfakes in Singapore, including those targeting public-facing individuals and women. While women were not the only targets, some studies suggest that they are at greater risk of being targeted by image-based sexual abuse.[30] A Singapore-based study also revealed that more than half of the youth participants see the “sexualisation/objectification of women” as “a negative effect” of Generative Artificial Intelligence (Gen AI).[31] A recent case of deepfakes targeting women involved the creation and circulation of deepfake nude photos of women studying at the Singapore Sports School by male students.[32] Recent technological advancements have made it easier to manipulate audio, video and images and make the end product more realistic, although the targeting of women with doctored content is not new and does not always involve sophisticated technologies. In early 2020, a doctored (“digitally altered”) photo of a banner which portrayed Member of Parliament Tin Pei Ling in revealing clothes with an edited message encouraging residents to vote for the People’s Action Party (PAP) circulated online.[33]
Despite potentially deepening fissures along identity lines, these cases of dis/misinformation did not necessarily escalate to physical violence, unlike the aforementioned cases in other countries. While the question of if and who believes such misinformation and acts on them is one dimension of the issue, the reasons why such misinformation did not lead to violence partly has to do with the preventive measures in place in Singapore.
Where is Violence in Singapore?
Dis/misinformation appealing to Singaporeans have circulated in information spheres. However, many instances of such dis/misinformation have not led to protests or physical violence as defined in examples cited from cases around the globe. This could be due to the misinformation narratives not being strongly compelling; consumers of such misinformation not falling for them for various reasons; or those who fell for them not having a strong urge to initiate violence. Besides, Singapore has various laws and policies to combat misinformation, such as the Protections from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), and to ensure social harmony, the Protection from Harassment Act (POHA) and Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA). Moreover, there is also the Public Order Act to regulate “public assemblies and processions”.[34] Fittingly, in response to the 2024 misinformation-triggered riots in the UK, the Minister for Law and Home Affairs K. Shanmugam pointed to Singapore’s policies and laws that are designed to “pre-empt such a situation from arising” and that “give priority to law and order”.[35]
A lack of experience with significant cases of misinformation (or disinformation) triggered riots and violence does not mean, however, that there has not been or there is no such risk for Singapore. Some cases of disinformation in the past have allegedly sought to create panic or violence. For instance, Minister Shanmugam, speaking on misinformation alleging that a foreign worker “committed suicide in Singapore because of a lack of money and work”, argued that such false information is spread “to create panic […] unhappiness, anger, and hopefully violence”.[36] Although the number of such cases is limited, it cannot be assumed going forward, that Singapore will always be safe from dis/misinformation-fuelled violence and that the country’s laws can keep harms at bay at all times.
There have also been cases where harmful narratives came close to sparking violence. Singapore has had cases of self-radicalisation triggered by consumption of online extremist narratives. While such content cannot necessarily be classified as dis/misinformation, the people consuming these narratives are likely misinformed. The latest string of arrests in recent years concerning radicalisation reflect a shift in extremist spaces online – self-radicalised individuals are younger,[37] and they consume a variety of extremist narratives, including far-right discourses.[38] In late 2024 and early 2025, three people were subject to Singapore’s Internal Security Act due to self-radicalisation.[39] Among them, an 18-year-old Singaporean who subscribed to “violent far-right extremist ideologies”, “search[ed] for and consum[ed] extremist online content” and considered attacking Malays and Muslims in Singapore.[40] The two other cases demonstrated the influence of global conflicts on people living or working in Singapore. A 56-year-old Singaporean was also self-radicalised upon consuming online content on the Israel-Hamas war, in addition to a 34-year-old Malaysian national who consumed pro-Islamic State (IS) content online. [41]
Many articles on dis/misinformation consider the societal threats dis/misinformation may pose and some focus on the exploitation of faultlines by an external actor to instigate societal violence. While dis/misinformation tapping on faultlines like race, class and immigration may not result in violent protests in Singapore, online debates that follow may feature hate and discrimination against particular groups and are indicative of potential fissures in social cohesion. For instance, anti-Indian sentiments rampant in online discourses during the pandemic exposed the intersection of race and nationality as social divides in Singapore.[42] If not adequately safeguarded against, these fissures in social cohesion and the widening of faultlines may bring about the risk of violence, including psychological violence.
Beyond violence in its more physical manifestations (i.e., extremist attacks etc.), there is also psychological violence that needs to be taken into account when analysing dis/misinformation-triggered violence, including in the Singapore context. Fittingly, while focusing on society, experts should not forget that it is individuals who form society. Taking psychological harm into consideration is key to approaching evolving harms in the information and digital spheres, which are often overlooked for lacking physicality.[43] In the cases of deepfakes, for example, the consequences include psychological trauma, the withdrawal of participation in digital spaces and reputational damages.[44] In her analysis of violence against women in politics, Mona Lena Krook argues for a typology of violence that covers “traditional understandings of violence (physical, sexual, and economic)” and also psychological and “semiotic violence”.[45] This can also be applied to dis/misinformation-linked violence against other identity groups, where hate and dis/misinformation targeting identity faultlines can create hostile environments for certain groups of people.
Furthermore, on the use of deepfake nudes targeting women in Singapore, for instance, the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) has used “gender-based violence”[46] as a framework of analysis, adding a layer of nuance to “technology-facilitated sexual violence”[47] which describes the medium of violence. Indeed, such an intersection of dis/misinformation and misogyny should be analysed for its centrality to, and indication of, societal change and development. More specifically, it should be examined as a phenomenon that intertwines interpersonal violence[48] with structural violence against women more broadly. This is especially true given that much of the attention on deepfakes focuses on their potential political dangers, while many deepfakes are “used to target women”.[49]
Conclusion
Dis/misinformation as well as hate speech do not thrive in a vacuum. Many appeal to faultlines existing in a society and kindle violence and unrest under specific conditions. This article attempted to explore the link between faultlines, dis/misinformation and violence within the context of Singapore. Where hate can be a precursor to violence (here we embrace a wide definition of violence as argued above), it is essential to monitor the spread of dis/misinformation and more generally, to manage the faultlines it might exploit. Accordingly, the countermeasures required are not limited to those that target dis/misinformation, such as media literacy, but also include those that seek to mend faultlines, such as civil society and government initiatives towards racial and religious harmony.
Singapore has multiple countermeasures targeting dis/misinformation and the aforementioned faultlines. In addition to the creation of new countermeasures and the improvement of existing ones against the changing threat and technological landscapes, the link between the measures targeting faultlines and misinformation could be strengthened through regular exchanges between civil society, government and industry groups driving these initiatives. Furthermore, experts can question the presence of dis/misinformation-triggered psychological violence in cases where physical violence is absent, acknowledging that society is a group formed by individuals. Accordingly, future research could further unpack the relationship between misinformation and violence, taking the wider definition of violence into account.
About the Authors
Dr Gulizar Haciyakupoglu and Yasmine Wong are Senior Associate Fellow and Associate Research Fellow respectively at the Centre of Excellence for National Security, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
Thumbnail photo by Hartono Creative Studio on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Martin Lindsay and Calim Grewar, “Social Media Misinformation ‘Fanned Riot Flames’,” BBC, August 9, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70jz2r4lp0o; Sophie Kiderlin, “Online Disinformation Sparked a Wave of Far-Right Violence in the UK — Here’s How,” CNBC, August 9, 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/08/09/online-disinformation-sparked-a-wave-of-far-right-violence-in-the-uk.html; Rebecca Metteo, “Lessons for Singapore from Recent Riots in UK Fuelled by Misinformation,” Channel News Asia, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/uk-britain-riots-misinformation-lessons-singapore-4576611.
[2] Kiderlin, “Online Disinformation.”
[3] Murali Krishnan, “India: Violence-Inciting Fake News Scourge Tough to Tackle,” Deutsche Welle, November 3, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/whatsapp-in-india-scourge-of-violence-inciting-fake-news-tough-to-tackle/a-52709823.
[4] “Social Media Fuels Mob Attacks in India,” Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/social-media-fuels-vigilantism-and-mob-attacks-in-india/a-44224875.
[5] The authors are using dis/misinformation where intent is not clearly identified in an example and in cases where disinformation is used, the authors are also interested in the misinformation circulated by audiences who fall for the false information and circulate it without an intent to harm yet aggravate the problem simply by increasing the reach of false information.
[6] Sander van der Linden, Ulrich Ecker and Stephan Lewandowsky, “Misinformation Is a Threat to Society – Let’s Not Pretend Otherwise,” LSE Blogs, October 8, 2024, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2024/10/08/misinformation-is-a-threat-to-society-lets-not-pretend-otherwise/.
[7] Misinformation is false content that is shared without knowing it is false, while disinformation is “intentionally false and designed to cause harm”. See Claire Wardle, “Understanding Information Disorder,” First Draft, September 22, 2020, https://firstdraftnews.org/long-form-article/understanding-information-disorder/.
[8] According to the European Institute for Gender Equality, the “statistical definition” of psychological violence is “Any act which causes psychological harm to an individual. Psychological violence can take the form of, for example, coercion, defamation, verbal insult or harassment”. See “Psychological Violence,” European Institute for Gender Equality, https://eige.europa.eu/publications-resources/thesaurus/terms/1241?language_content_entity=en. According to the Council of Europe “All forms of violence have a psychological aspect, since the main aim of being violent or abusive is to hurt the integrity and dignity of another person”. See “Gender Matters”, Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/gender-matters/psychological-violence.
[9] Andres Shoai and Sergio Garcia Magarino, “State-Sponsored Disinformation, Hate Speech, and Violence: Mapping Conceptual Connections through Iran’s Anti-Baha’i Propaganda,” in State-Sponsored Disinformation, Hate Speech, and Violence, eds. Andres Shoai and Sergio Garcia Magarino (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2024), p. 302.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Pamela Duncan, Carmen Aguilar Garcia, Michael Goodier, Olivia Lee and Alex Clark, “Local. Left Behind. Prey to Populist Politics? What the Data Tells Us about the 2024 UK Rioters,” The Guardian, September 25, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/sep/25/local-left-behind-prey-to-populist-politics-data-2024-uk-rioters.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ed Thomas and Shayan Sardarizadeh, “How a Deleted LinkedIn Post Was Weaponised and Seen by Millions before the Southport Riot,” BBC, October 26, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c99v90813j5o.
[14] Dominic Casciani and BBC Verify, “Violent Southport Protests Reveal Organising Tactics of the Far-Right,” BBC, August 2, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cl4y0453nv5o.
[15] Duncan et al., “Local. Left Behind.”
[16] Shakuntala Banaji and Ram Bhat, “WhatsApp Vigilantes: An Exploration of Citizen Reception and Circulation of WhatsApp Misinformation Linked to Mob Violence in India”, LSE Blogs, November 11, 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2019/11/11/whatsapp-vigilantes-an-exploration-of-citizen-reception-and-circulation-of-whatsapp-misinformation-linked-to-mob-violence-in-india/.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Shoai and Magarino, “State-sponsored disinformation,” p. 302.
[21] Elisabeth Braw, Karen Monaghan, Judy Pal, Christopher Rodriguez, Alex Townsend-Drake and Jessica White, Mis-and Disinformation: Extremism in the Digital Age (Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network, 2023), https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2023-12/CTPN%20Report%202023%20-%20Mis-and%20Disinformation%2C%20Extremism%20in%20the%20Digital%20Age%20%28Single%20Pages%29.pdf.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] The authors used LGBT instead of LGBTIQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer) as it is how IPS refers to the faultline. UNWomen uses LGBTIQ+ instead.
[25] Mathew Mathews, Melvin Tay and Shanthini Selvarajan, “Faultlines in Singapore: Public Opinion on Their Realities, Management and Consequences,” IPS Working Papers, No. 37 (2019), https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/working-paper-37_faultlines-in-singapore_public-opinion-on-their-realities-management-and-consequences_final.pdf.
[26] The survey involved 2,098 participants in Singapore aged 15 and above. See Ministry of Digital Development and Information, “MDDI Survey: Two Thirds of Respondents Encountered Harmful Online Content”, MDDI, July 25, 2024, https://www.mddi.gov.sg/media-centre/press-releases/mddi-survey-two-thirds-respondents-encountered-harmful-online-content/#:~:text=A%20recent%20survey%20by%20the,Authority%20(IMDA)%20under%20the%20Code.
[27] Justin Ong, “When Race Made the News in Singapore,” The Straits Times, December 5, 2020, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/when-race-made-the-news-in-singapore.
[28] Nur Asyiqin Mohamad Salleh, “Religious Groups Step Up Efforts against Online Falsehoods, Call for More Public Education,” The Straits Times, March 14, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/religious-groups-step-up-efforts-against-online-falsehoods-call-for-more-public-education.
[29] Yasmine Wong and Gulizar Haciyakupoglu, “Information Pollution and the War in Gaza: Implications for Singapore,” RSIS Commentary, June 24, 2024, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/information-pollution-and-the-war-in-gaza-implications-for-singapore/.
[30] Agnes E. Venema, “Deepfakes as a Security Issue: Why Gender Matters”, Women In International Security (WIIS), https://wiisglobal.org/deepfakes-as-a-security-issue-why-gender-matters/.
[31] “She’s Comments on the Proposed Model Governance Framework for Generative AI”, SHE, https://she.org.sg/news/shes-comments-on-the-proposed-model-governance-framework-for-generative-ai.
[32] Rachel Lim, “Police Investigating Deepfake Nude Photos of Singapore Sports School Students”, Channel News Asia, November 12, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/singapore-sports-school-deepfake-nude-images-students-police-investigating-4742506.
[33] Clement Yong, “Police Investigating Doctored Photo of Chinese New Year Banner Featuring Tin Pei Ling,” The Straits Times, January 22, 2020, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/police-investigating-doctored-photo-of-chinese-new-year-banner-featuring-tin-pei-ling.
[34] “Maintaining Public Order,” Ministry of Home Affairs, https://www.mha.gov.sg/what-we-do/maintaining-law-and-order/maintaining-public-order.
[35] Samuel Devaraj, “Singapore Has Laws and Policies Designed to Prevent Situations Like UK Riots: Shanmugam,” The Straits Times, August 17, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/singapore-has-laws-and-policies-designed-to-prevent-situations-like-the-uk-riots-shanmugam.
[36] Charmaine Ng, “Some Spreading Fake News about Foreign Worker Dorms to Incite Violence: Shanmugam,” The Straits Times, April 29, 2020, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/some-people-spreading-fake-news-about-foreign-worker-dorms-to-incite-violence-shanmugam.
[37] Noor Huda Ismail, “Youth Radicalisation in Singapore: A Growing Threat in the Digital Age”, RSIS Commentary, October 21, 2024, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/youth-radicalisation-in-singapore-a-growing-threat-in-the-digital-age/.
[38] Ang Qing, “AskST: What Is Far-Right Extremist Ideology and How Did a S’porean Teen Become Radicalised?,” The Straits Times, November 8, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/askst-what-is-far-right-extremist-ideology-and-how-did-a-s-porean-teen-become-radicalised.
[39] Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), “Issuance of Orders under Internal Security Act (ISA) to Two Singaporeans & Arrest of a Foreigner under ISA,” February 10, 2025, https://www.mha.gov.sg/isd/stay-in-the-know/media-detail/issuance-of-orders-under-internal-security-act-(isa)-to-two-singaporeans-and-arrest-of-a-foreigner-under-isa/.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Laavanya Kathiravelu, “Doubly Minoritised: Indianness in Singapore and Xenophobia as Racism,” Academia, October 12, 2022, https://www.academia.sg/academic-views/indianness-in-singapore/.
[43] Yasmine Wong and Gulizar Haciyakupoglu, “Southeast Asia Must Be Wary of Gendered Cyber Abuse,” The Diplomat, June 13, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/southeast-asia-must-be-wary-of-gendered-cyber-abuse/.
[44] Karen Hao, “Deepfake Porn Is Ruining Women’s Lives. Now the Law May Finally Ban It.,” MIT Technology Review, February 12, 2021, https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/12/1018222/deepfake-revenge-porn-coming-ban/.
[45] Emily Harmer and Rosalynd Southern, “Digital Microaggressions and Everyday Othering: An Analysis of Tweets Sent to Women Members of Parliament in the UK,” Information, Communication and Society, Vol. 24, No. 14 (2021); See also: Mona Lena Krook, Violence Against Women in Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
[46] Loraine Lee, “More Convincing Scams, Fake Nudes: The Stakes Are Getting Higher in the War Against Deepfake Abuse,” Channel News Asia, December 20, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/today/big-read/deepfake-crimes-crisis-truth-society-4815796.
[47] “Technology-Facilitated Sexual Violence,” Sexual Assault Care Centre (AWARE), https://sacc.aware.org.sg/technology-facilitated-sexual-violence/.
[48] World Health Organization defines Interpersonal Violence as “violence between individuals, and is subdivided into family and intimate partner violence and community violence. The former category includes child maltreatment; intimate partner violence; and elder abuse, while the latter is broken down into acquaintance and stranger violence and includes youth violence; assault by strangers; violence related to property crimes; and violence in workplaces and other institutions”. See World Health Organization, “The VPA Approach,” https://www.who.int/groups/violence-prevention-alliance/approach#:~:text=Interpersonal%20violence%20refers%20to%20violence,in%20workplaces%20and%20other%20institutions.
[49] Hao, “Deepfake porn is ruining women’s lives.”
