Disinformation, Conspiracy Theories and Violent Extremism in South Asia
Disinformation and conspiracy theories have long shaped extremist ideologies, but in South Asia, they are not just pathways to radicalisation; they also serve as ideological tools for extremist groups to validate their narratives and sustain violence. Keeping in view the proactive and tech-savvy nature of extremist groups, eager to learn and survive in a digitally interconnected world, as well as the weaponisation of disinformation and conspiracy theories as bait for extremist recruitment, the security and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) initiatives in South Asia face far-reaching consequences. South Asia is one of the youngest regions in the world. If regional governments do not prioritise proactive policies that channel young talents into national development, empower youth with key knowledge to delegitimise extremist ideologies, promote critical thinking and refute extremist narratives, extremist groups will continue to thrive on the vulnerabilities of the region.
Introduction
In the last few years, hyperconnectivity and decentralised flows of information have brought disinformation and conspiracy theories to centre stage.[1] Here, disinformation refers to the deliberate spread of false or inaccurate information to deceive the masses,[2] while conspiracy theories depict an event or a situation that is the result of a secret plan made by powerful people.[3] Sometimes, disinformation fuels conspiratorial extremist beliefs, and vice versa. Hence, in this article, disinformation and conspiracy theories will be used interchangeably due to their overlapping nature within the extremist milieu. They have become an integral part of violent extremists’ toolkit to recruit, radicalise and incite violence, adding a new dimension to the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) work.[4]
Historically, conspiracy theories have played a crucial role in shaping extremist ideologies, serving as tools for both justification and mobilisation.[5] However, the Covid-19 pandemic was a turning point in the weaponisation of disinformation and conspiracy theories for propaganda dissemination and violent attacks. For instance, while neo-luddites carried out arson attacks in Europe, conspiratorially believing that radiation from 5G-towers spread the coronavirus,[6] the anti-vaxxer movement grew suspicious of the Covid-19 vaccinations based on misleading information.[7] Jihadist groups like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) have not only weaponised conspiracy theories but also embedded them within cultural and political discourses to assert legitimacy and challenge state authority.[8] For example, the Taliban’s and AQ’s framing of the war on terror as a war against Islam has been a recurring theme in jihadist propaganda, invoking grievances and violence.[9] Until recently, the role of conspiracy theories in extremist ideologies remained underexplored due to a greater focus on understanding terrorism’s root causes and pathways. However, the surge in attacks linked to online extremism has led terrorism scholars to explore this subject in depth.[10]
Against this backdrop, this paper examines the prevalence of disinformation and conspiracy theories in South Asia’s extremist landscape and their consequences for security and PCVE initiatives. South Asia, with a median age of 28 years, is one of the youngest regions in the world. It is also home to a plethora of extremist groups trying to lure alienated youth through different strategies, including disinformation campaigns.[11] According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), around 54 percent of South Asian youth leave school without the necessary skills to secure a job by 2030. The region contributes the largest labour force to the world with an estimated 100,000 young people entering the job market every year.[12] If South Asian governments do not turn this youth bulge into an advantage, the extremist networks, hungry for their attention, will.
The first section of this study outlines the correlation of disinformation and conspiracy theories with violent extremism while using the two overlapping concepts interchangeably as both reinforce and complement each other. The second section situates the South Asian extremist landscape in that discussion before concluding it with a discussion on the implications of this concerning trend. The paper posits that at any rate, the surge in online radicalisation underscores the dangerous consequences of and the link between disinformation, conspiracy and violent extremism.[13]
Link between Disinformation, Conspiracy Theories and Violent Extremism
Recent research in terrorism studies has established the correlation between disinformation, conspiracy theories and violent extremism.[14] The rapid progress in information communication technologies has made disinformation and conspiracy theories accessible to a broader audience on the internet.[15] Violent extremists have exploited the internet’s broad reach to prey on individual and collective fears, powerlessness, anxieties, uncertainties and cognitive biases, pushing disinformation and conspiracy theories as plausible explanations for their situations. In doing so, they have opportunistically prescribed violent extremism as a remedy.[16] In a way, disinformation and conspiracy theories provide simple (and unsubstantiated) answers to complex world problems.[17] Research shows that extremist content that provides a black-and-white explanation of a complex world offers clear guidance to its consumers on social hierarchies, and thus provides them a comforting (but misleading) clarity.[18]
Disinformation is a powerful radicalisation tool due to its propensity to arouse emotions, especially surprise, anxiety, anger and disgust, resulting in shares, likes and comments on social media.[19] Typically, it radicalises people who lack critical thinking, have low cognitive flexibility (the black-and-white worldview, us-versus-them mentality), experience self-uncertainty and grievances, and suffer from social exclusion.[20] Emotional aspects of disinformation also impact its speed: the stronger the feelings of anger and disgust, the faster disinformation is spread.[21]
Violent extremists proliferate disinformation and conspiracy theories through social media echo chambers, where vulnerable users consume content that corresponds to their cognitive biases, inspiring some to join online fringe communities and perpetuate such narratives, while others react violently.[22] The UK’s far-right riots in August 2024 exemplified this, as the proliferation of disinformation on social media about the religious identity of the murderer[23] of three teenage girls sparked nationwide violence against migrant communities, especially Muslims.[24] Extremist views packaged through disinformation campaigns and conspiracy theories are presented as irrefutable, misleading consumers to feel superior to those who are different.[25] As a result, they withdraw from the mainstream, develop a delusion of superior knowledge and reject broader perspectives, which they view as flawed or evil.[26]
The Role of Disinformation and Conspiracy Theories in South Asian Extremism
In South Asia’s diverse and multi-actor threat landscape, disinformation and conspiracy theories have been an integral part of extremist groups’ ideological narratives and propaganda campaigns.[27] However, unlike in Western far-right movements, where disinformation and conspiracy theories may act as pathways to violent extremism, in South Asia’s extremist context, they are employed as legitimacy tools. These tools serve to validate pre-existing ideological beliefs, perpetuate violence, and further harden radical attitudes rather than merely inciting them.[28]
In South Asia, conspiracy theories amplified through disinformation campaigns can be divided into three categories: anti-minority conspiracies, rumours about superpowers’ intervention and interference in the region and anti-vax sentiments. Whenever disinformation proliferates on social media around these issues, intentionally or unintentionally, it sparks riots, sectarian clashes,[29] vandalism, vigilante killings and other forms of violence.[30] Extremist groups in South Asia use such opportunities to validate their worldviews as well as recruit, radicalise and justify violence.[31] In South Asian conflict zones, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh – where the state-society gap is high, the trust level is low and polarisation is rampant – disinformation and conspiracy theories serve as catalysts for violent extremism.[32] The 2024 riots in Bangladesh in the wake of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster were amplified by Hindutva groups’ online disinformation campaign on social media, especially on X and WhatsApp. Hindutva groups deliberately mischaracterised political violence against Sheikh Hasina’s Bangladeshi Hindu supporters, about eight percent of the country’s 170 million population, as acts of communal violence.[33] The disinformation campaign, propagated through sensationalist doctored images and unrelated videos, resulted in retaliatory violence by Hindutva mobs against Muslim workers living in a shanty town in India’s Ghaziabad district. The latter were accused of being Bangladeshi citizens.[34]
Individuals in South Asian conflict zones subscribing to the ideological worldview of extremist networks develop strong in-group identity and discount alternative and competing narratives that undermine in-group/out-group divisions.[35] During a crisis emanating from riots, protests, clashes and heavy-handed state crackdowns, among other factors, people of conflict-hit areas in South Asia are more susceptible to violent extremists’ disinformation campaigns. In such scenarios, the in-group’s survival and success is dependent on hostile action against the out-group.[36] To retain their influence and relevance in conflict zones and undermine that of the states, violent extremists try to strengthen the in-group/out-group divisions. Critically, any deviation from or questioning of the in-group’s worldview is considered treason and treachery.[37]
Conspiracy Theories About Superpower Military and Economic Interventions
Since the “Afghan Jihad” of the 1980s, conspiracy theories about superpowers’ military and economic interventions have been a constant feature of jihadist groups’ recruitment, radicalisation and fundraising campaigns in South Asia. For instance, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 following the Saur Revolution (communist rebellion) was framed as an effort to reach the Arabian Sea’s warm-water ports, i.e. the real target was not landlocked Afghanistan but Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan province.[38] Similarly, after the United States (US) intervention in Afghanistan, anti-American sentiments not only fueled jihadist recruitment, funding and violence, but also gave birth to a plethora of conspiracy theories, such as the war on terror as a cover to attack Islam.[39] In spreading such conspiracies, jihadist groups gained sympathies, recruits and finances for their militant campaigns.[40] Likewise, Pakistan-backed jihadist proxies framed the war on terror and the US presence in Afghanistan as a cover to denuclearise Pakistan.[41] Subsequently, this rhetoric was employed to rationalise the policy of tolerating and supporting the “good Taliban”.[42] The covert presence of American private military contractor Blackwater[43] and the arrest of the CIA contractor Raymond Davies from Lahore in 2011 lent further credence to such rhetoric.[44]
Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, China has found itself at the receiving end of conspiratorial propaganda of some jihadist and ethno-nationalist groups in the region.[45] China’s economic footprint through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been targeted by groups like AQ, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) for varying reasons. For instance, a key AQ ideologue, Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi, framed the US exit from Afghanistan as a victory for the Taliban while calling China a “new superpower” and an enemy of Islam.[46] In a video titled “Let’s Disturb China”, al-Burmi reminded the mujahideen “that the coming enemy of the Ummah is China, which is developing its weapons day after day to fight the Muslims”. [47]
Meanwhile, ISK has targeted China’s rise as a great power in its propaganda publications, generating an impression that, unlike the Western powers, Chinese global dominance will be short-lived as it lacks a decisive military edge over its Western competitors, i.e. the US and Europe.[48] For instance, the September 2022 issue of ISK’s monthly flagship English-language magazine, the Voice of Khorasan, ran an article titled “China’s Daydream of Imperialism” which critiqued China’s global rise.[49] In that article, ISK compared the BRI with the United Kingdom (UK)’s East India Company, which facilitated British imperialism in the Indian Subcontinent. ISK referred to China’s economic footprint in different Muslim countries across Asia and Africa as an effort to rob their resources.[50]
The Baloch separatists, especially BLA, have also spread numerous conspiracy theories about the BRI’s flagship project, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor in Balochistan.[51] For instance, BLA conspiratorially maintains that in collusion with the Pakistani military establishment, China is stealing Balochistan’s resources and furthering the pre-existing socio-economic, political and ethnic grievances of the Baloch people.[52] BLA has carried out several high-profile attacks against China in Balochistan and Karachi.[53]
Anti-Polio Narratives
Scepticism about polio vaccinations has been prevalent in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the US’ May 2011 operation in Abbottabad to kill AQ chief Osama bin Laden.[54] Since then, the Taliban’s propaganda against polio vaccination has hindered efforts to eliminate the polio virus in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[55] Though the Taliban have dropped their opposition to polio vaccination in recent years,[56] the polio virus persists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[57] ISK has also targeted polio immunisation through propaganda and physical attacks.[58] In 2024, as many as 27 terrorist attacks were recorded against polio vaccinators and police teams protecting them in Pakistan.[59] Reportedly, since July 2012, around 70 health workers have been killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan while administering polio vaccine.[60]
In 2011, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) organised a Hepatitis B vaccination campaign with the help of a local doctor, Dr Shakil Afridi, as a cover to get the DNA samples of children living in the compound where Osama bin Laden was believed to be residing.[61] The US planned to compare the collected DNA samples with the DNA of bin Laden’s sister who had lived in Boston and died in 2010, to obtain definite proof that bin Laden was indeed living in that residential compound.[62] The outcome of the Hepatitis B vaccination campaign was unclear. Unfortunately, using vaccination as a cover to gather intelligence destroyed the credibility of the polio vaccination programmes.[63]
Two months after Bin Laden’s killing, the Guardian ran a story disclosing the CIA’s collaboration with Shakil Afridi. Following publication of this story, the Taliban banned polio vaccinations and linked polio programmes to the war on terror and hence a threat to Islam.[64] A fatwa issued by the Taliban in June 2012 maintained, “Polio agents could also be spies as we have found in Dr Shakil Afridi’s case.”[65]
Concurrently, TTP also launched an aggressive anti-polio campaign, framing it as an espionage effort by the US-backed non-governmental organisations to gather intelligence. For instance, then TTP head for Swat, Mullah Fazlullah, through his radio sermons upheld that the polio eradication campaign was a “conspiracy of Jews and Christians to make Muslims impotent and stunt the growth of Muslims”.[66] TTP’s propaganda spread three rumours about polio immunisation. First, the group labelled health workers as CIA agents. Second, it alleged that the polio vaccination was a cover to sterilise the Muslim population. Third, the group falsely claimed that the polio vaccination was made of pig fat and hence it was not halal.[67]
Anti-Ahmadiyya Conspiracies in Pakistan
The heterodox Ahmadiyya community has been facing persecution in Pakistan due to its religious beliefs both at the state and societal levels.[68] After Pakistan’s inception in 1947, Ahmadis held several high-ranking positions due to their educated backgrounds, not faith.[69] For instance, Pakistan’s first foreign minister Zafrullah Khan was an Ahmadi.[70] The disproportionately high number of Ahmadis in influential positions was viewed conspiratorially by Pakistan’s right-wing groups. As a result, a coalition of religious-political parties, Majlis-e-Ahrar,[71] started an agitation campaign in the 1950s, demanding the then Pakistani government to declare Ahmadis non-Muslims and remove them from key positions.[72]
The state ex-communicated Ahmadis from Islam through a constitutional amendment in 1974, paving the way for extremist groups to justify violence against them.[73] Since then, extremist groups have framed the Ahmadiyya community as a threat to Islam and Pakistan, notwithstanding that it is only 0.22 percent of the country’s 242 million population.[74] As a result, a large majority of Ahmadis have left Pakistan while those living in the country reside in ghettos or gated residences.[75] In 1984, military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq’s constitutional amendments to anti-blasphemy[76] laws criminalised the Ahmadis’ efforts to preach their faith, build mosques or make the call for Muslim prayers.[77] In sum, open proselytisation of the Ahmadi faith and worship became a criminal offence.[78]
During the 2000s and 2010s, TTP carried out several attacks against the Ahmadis, portraying them as enemies of Islam and hence a threat. In recent years, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a Barelvi extremist group, has embraced blasphemy activism as the mainstay of its politics.[79] The party has positioned itself as the defender of Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws and Prophet Muhammad’s honour. TLP emerged from the protest movement which demanded the then Pakistani government to free Mumtaz Qadri, a police bodyguard accused of murdering former Punjab governor Salman Taseer on false blasphemy accusations.[80] Following Mumtaz Qadri’s hanging in February 2016,[81] TLP registered as a political party and used blasphemy activism as one of the main planks of its politics.[82] Since then, TLP has protested any efforts by successive Pakistani governments to give the Ahmadiyya community religious freedom or amend the anti-blasphemy laws.[83] TLP, while showcasing Ahmadis as a threat to Islam and Pakistan, has popularised slogans suggesting death sentences for alleged blasphemers.[84] TLP vigilantes have ransacked the Ahmadi community’s properties, worship places and graveyards across Pakistan.[85]
“Love Jihad” Conspiracy in India
The conspiratorial notion of Love Jihad refers to alleged “attempts by Muslim men to lure Hindu women into romantic relationships with the hidden aim of converting them to Islam through marriages”.[86] Hindutva groups view inter-faith marriages as a weapon used by Muslims as part of their “jihad” against the Hindu faith. The term Love Jihad gained prominence in the 2000s and early 2010s, especially in the states of Kerala and Karnataka.[87] Under the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s rule, 11 out of 28 Indian states have passed anti-conversion laws to curtail the so-called Love Jihad.[88]
Critically, the Love Jihad narratives “deprive Hindu women of any agency and portray them as passive recipients of romantic advances by Muslim men.[89] They use Hindu women as tools to gain sympathies and incite Hindu men to protect them through politicised emotions.”[90] For instance, in July 2023, the Global Hindu Heritage Foundation, a US-based Hindutva group, published a statement about Love Jihad alleging that “Muslim youth are groomed to act like Hindu, dress like Hindu, look like Hindu, adopt Hindu names and spend liberally to attract the Hindu Girls. Lot of money is pledged to the Muslim youth to trap and marry and convert (them) to Islam.”[91]
Such narratives also urge Hindu families to protect their daughters and women while calling for the restoration of family and community honour.[92] They are intrinsic to broader Hindutva majoritarian and patriarchal structures and include appeals to Hindu males to protect their women from Love Jihad.[93]
Implications
In a digitally interconnected world marked by rapid technological developments, extremist groups have been successful in negotiating the shifting sands through mutual learning and resilience.[94] South Asian extremist groups have employed disinformation campaigns and conspiracy theories for ideological validation rather than using them as potential pathways towards violent extremism. It is important to mention that during crisis situations in South Asia, disinformation and conspiracy theories have occasionally incited violence.[95] However, this dynamic can change quickly as South Asian extremist groups would learn to weaponise disinformation campaigns and conspiracy theories to recruit, radicalise and fuel violence. This trend will particularly affect new generations of South Asian militants who are frequent consumers of social media for information and communication.
Simultaneously, the permeation of disinformation and conspiracy theories within the South Asian extremist milieu, beyond ideological legitimisation, would lower the threshold (entry barriers) of radicalisation. However, it does not mean vulnerable individuals falling for such campaigns will almost always perpetrate violence. Nonetheless, they will keep online cultures sustaining these groups in the digital space alive. Extremist groups adopt a variety of frames and tools to lure vulnerable individuals into their folds, such as memes, jokes and cartoon characters.[96] In doing so, they normalise violent narratives while evading content moderation campaigns, especially during crisis situations. The troll armies of extremist actors try to target online fence sitters with highly emotive content to stir their emotions and evince reactions through likes, shares and comments.[97] During crisis situations, when the truth is hard to ascertain and emotions are high, people consume and process information less critically and can fall for extremist narratives.[98] Unfortunately, the lack of adequate content moderation on social media of South Asian local and regional languages, combined with heavy reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) tools, have facilitated the unhindered proliferation of disinformation campaigns.[99] The tumultuous power transitions in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have also brought into sharp focus the dangers of disinformation campaigns by malignant actors during a crisis.
Finally, the weaponisation of disinformation and conspiracy theories by South Asia extremist networks will have far-reaching consequences for PCVE initiatives which are over reliant on kinetic interventions. In the past, extremist networks in South Asia have shown digital resilience in the face of deplatforming, account suspensions and content removal by social media companies.[100] They have persisted in the digital space with a great degree of success.[101] On the contrary, the strategic communication of South Asian states in the digital space has left a lot to be desired. Effective legislations against disinformation campaigns and the incorporation of social media components into non-kinetic interventions in PCVE frameworks are crucial. There is also a need to be responsive and accommodative towards youth who are searching for answers about their identity, sense of belonging and purpose in life. If respective governments in South Asia fail to satisfy youth on these questions and fail to resolve their issues by strengthening state-society bond and citizen-centric policies, governance and development, extremist networks will show them an alternative way through violence.
Conclusion
In South Asia’s ever-evolving extremist landscape, disinformation and conspiracy theories validate extremist narratives and sometimes foment violence as well. The diffusion of internet and communication technologies in South Asia’s peripheral areas where regional government’s control is tenuous at best, means violent extremist networks will continue to harness disinformation and conspiracy theories as important components in their toolkits to prey on grievances related to a sense of belonging and identity. The success of extremist groups with the youth population is directly proportional to the magnitude of anger and grievances that youth may have against their respective governments. Hence, the South Asian states will have to match security responses against this threat with adequate people-centric governance and development. At the same time, they will have to spread digital literacy through public awareness campaigns to alert the masses about the perils of disinformation campaigns.
PCVE initiatives in South Asia will have to incorporate strategies to counter disinformation campaigns and conspiracy theories by extremist networks as part of their non-kinetic interventions. Promoting digital literacy, critical thinking, introducing youth engagement policies as well as enhanced social media monitoring are crucial in securing youth against extremist conspiracy theories and disinformation.
About the Author
Abdul Basit is a Senior Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Mick Haupt on Unsplash
Citations
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[2] John Palfrey, “Misinformation and Disinformation,” Britannica, accessed February 24, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/misinformation-and-disinformation;
[3] Scott A. Reid, “Conspiracy Theory,” Britannica, accessed February 24, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/conspiracy-theory.
[4] Sara Zeiger and Joseph Gyte, “Prevention of Radicalization on Social Media and the Internet,” in Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness, ed. Alex P. Schmid (The Hague: ICCT Press Publication: 2021), pp. 358-395, https://icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-01/Handbook_Schmid_2020.pdf.
[5] Andrew Heath Fink, The Importance of Conspiracy Theory in Extremist Ideology and Propaganda (PhD diss., University of Leiden, 2020), pp. 2-18, https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2965634/view; Cody Zoschak and Katherine Keneally, “Conspiracy Theories Continue to Mobilize Extremists to Violence,” Institute of Strategic Dialogue, June 26, 2024, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/conspiracy-theories-continue-to-mobilize-extremists-to-violence/; Daniel Jolley, Mathew D. Marques and Darel Cookson, “Shining a Spotlight on the Dangerous Consequences of Conspiracy Theories,” Current Opinion in Psychology, Vol. 47 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101363.
[6] Laurens Cerulus, “How Anti-5G Anger Sparked a Wave of Arson Attacks across Europe,” Politico, April 30, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/30/how-anti-5g-anger-sparked-a-wave-of-arson-attacks-across-europe-228050.
[7] Jim Reed, “Rise of Vaccine Distrust – Why More of Us Are Questioning Jabs,” BBC News, January 16, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1jgrlxx37do.
[8] Shenila Khoja-Moolji, Sovereign Attachments: Masculinity, Muslimness, and Affective Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021), p. 6.
[9] Rubén Arcos, Irena Chiru and Cristina Ivan, “Hybrid Security Threats and the Information Domain: Concepts and Definitions,” in Disinformation: The Jihadists’ New Religion (London: Routledge, 2023), pp. 9-19.
[10] Jacob Ware, The Third Generation of Online Radicalization (Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2023), pp17-25, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-06/third-generation-final.pdf.
[11] “More Than Half of South Asian Youth Are Not on Track to Have the Education and Skills Necessary for Employment in 2030,” UNICEF, October 29, 2019, https://www.unicef.org/rosa/press-releases/more-half-south-asian-youth-are-not-track-have-education-and-skills-necessary.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Peter Suciu, “Misinformation Making Social Media Extremism Worse and Even Dangerous,” Forbes, September 20, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2024/09/20/misinformation-making-social-media-extremism-worse-and-even-dangerous/; Richard Morris, “Researchers Warn of Rise in Extremism Online After Covid,” BBC News, December 30, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-61106191; European Foundation of South Asian Studies, “The Role of Fake News in Fuelling Hate Speech and Extremism Online; Promoting Adequate Measures for Tackling the Phenomenon,” June (2021), https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/the-role-of-fake-news-in-fueling-hate-speech-and-extremism-online/; Jorg Matthes, Nicoleta Corbu, Soyeon Jin, Yannis Theocharis, Christian Schemer, Peter van Aelst, Jesper Stromback, Karolina Koc-Michalska, Frank Esser, Toril Aalberg, et al., “Perceived Prevalence of Misinformation Fuels Worries about COVID-19: a Cross-Country, Multi-Method Investigation,” Information Communication and Society, Vol. 26, No.16 (2023), pp. 3133-3156.
[14] Elise M. Roberts-Ingleson and Wesley S. McCann, “The Link Between Misinformation and Radicalisation: Current Knowledge and Areas for Future Inquiry,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2023), pp. 36-49.
[15] Freddie J. Jennings, Ryan Neville-Shepard, Dani B. Jackson, Amanda Magusiak and Katelynn Sigrist, “From Fringe to Mainstream: How Celebrity Endorsement on Social Media Contributes to the Spread of Conspiracy Theories,” Southern Communication Journal, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2024), pp. 119-131, https://doi.org/10.1080/1041794X.2024.2308892.
[16] Roberts-Ingleson and McCann, “The Link Between Misinformation and Radicalisation.”
[17] Marta Marchlewska, Aleksandra Cichocka and Małgorzata Kossowska, “Addicted to Answers: Need for Cognitive Closure and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Beliefs,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2018), pp. 109–117, https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2308.
[18] Roberts-Ingleson and McCann, “The Link Between Misinformation and Radicalisation.”
[19] Rana Ali Adeeb and Mahdi Mirhoseini, “The Impact of Affect on the Perception of Fake News on Social Media: A Systematic Review,” Social Sciences, Vol. 12, No. 12 (2023), pp. 1-24, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12120674.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Emily Booth, Jooyoung Lee, Marian-Andrei Rizoiu and Hany Farid, “Conspiracy, Misinformation, Radicalisation: Understanding the Online Pathway to Indoctrination and Opportunities for Intervention,” Journal of Sociology, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2024), pp. 440-457, https://doi.org/10.1177/14407833241231756; Jula Lühring, Apeksha Shetty, Corinna Koschmieder, David Garcia, Annie Waldherr and Hannah Metzler, “Emotions in Misinformation Studies: Distinguishing Affective State from Emotional Response and Misinformation Recognition from Acceptance,” Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, Vol. 9, No. 8 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-024-00607-0.
[22] Booth et al., “Conspiracy, Misinformation, Radicalisation.”
[23] “UK Attack Suspect Not a Muslim or Asylum-Seeker as Claimed by Far-Right,” TRT World, August 2, 2024, https://www.trtworld.com/europe/uk-attack-suspect-not-a-muslim-or-asylum-seeker-as-claimed-by-far-right-18190606.
[24] Daniel De Simone, “Riots Show How the UK’s Far Right Has Changed,” BBC News, August 21, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c74lwnxxxzjo; Amani Syed, “How Online Misinformation Stoked Anti-Migrant Riots in Britain,” TIME, August 7, 2024, https://time.com/7007925/misinformation-violence-riots-britain/; “UK Riots: Why Are Far-Right Groups Attacking Immigrants and Muslims?,” Al-Jazeera, August 5, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/5/uk-riots-why-are-far-right-groups-attacking-immigrants-and-muslims.
[25] European Foundation of South Asian Studies, “The Role of Fake News.”
[26] Ibid.
[27] Abdul Basit,“Conspiracy Theories as Fomenters of Violent Extremism in South Asia,” The Diplomat, September 30, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/conspiracy-theories-as-fomenters-of-violent-extremism-in-south-asia/.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Tehreem Azeem, “Pakistan’s Social Media Is Overflowing With Hate Speech Against Ahmadis,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/pakistans-social-media-is-overflowing-with-hate-speech-against-ahmadis/; Saleem Mubarak, “Attack on Ahmadi Worship Place: Fake Social Media Posts Spurred Violence in Ghaseetpura,” Dawn, August 27, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1429144.
[30] Faisal Mahmud and Saqib Sarker, “Islamophobic, Alarmist: How Some India Outlets Covered Bangladesh Crisis,” Al-Jazeera, August 8, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/8/islamophobic-alarmist-how-some-india-outlets-covered-bangladesh-crisis; “Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Social Media Shut Down in Sri Lanka in Bid to Stem Misinformation,” The Guardian, April 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/21/social-media-shut-down-in-sri-lanka-in-bid-to-stem-misinformation.
[31] Basit,” Conspiracy Theories as Fomenters.”
[32] Ibid.
[33] “Attacks, Misinformation Frighten Bangladeshi Hindus,” South China Morning Post, August 11, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3274073/attacks-misinformation-frighten-bangladeshi-hindus.
[34] Peeyush Khandelwal, “Ghaziabad: Hindu Raksha Dal Attacks Families of Muslim Workers, 2 Arrested,” Hindustan Times, August 11, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/noida-news/ghaziabadhindu-raksha-dal-attacks-families-of-muslim-workers-2-arrested-101723319852624.html.
[35] Booth et al., “Conspiracy, Misinformation, Radicalisation.”
[36] Ibid.
[37] Roberts-Ingleson and McCann, “The Link Between Misinformation and Radicalisation.”
[38] The Pakistani establishment used this rhetoric to mobilise, train and fund (with the US’ and Saudi Arabia’s help) the so-called Afghan Mujahideen groups. To date, not a single evidence-based explanation has been provided to substantiate this claim, which in the aftermath radicalised an entire generation of militants and reduced Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan to a hub of global jihadists during that time. For details see, Kyle Sallee, “Aggression or Desperation: Reevaluating the Soviet Motivations for Invading Afghanistan,” Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History, Vo. 8, No. 2 (2018), pp. 113-131; Marvin G. Weinbaum, “War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1991), pp. 71-85. https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh/vol8/iss2/8.
[39] Konstantinos Kavrakis, “Identity and Ideology Through the Frames of Al Qaeda and Islamic State,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 35, No. 5 (2023), pp. 1235-1252, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2035366.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Zamir Akram, “Pakistani-U.S. Relations After 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2002), pp. 115-123.
[42] Pakistan prioritised operations against anti-Pakistan militant groups like TTP and spared Afghanistan-focused groups like the Haqqani Network which fought the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. For details see Owen Bennett-Jones, “Why Pakistan Gambled on Supporting the Taliban,” The Telegraph, August 27, 2021, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2021/08/27/pakistans-military-gambled-supporting-taliban/.
[43] Declan Walsh and Ewen MacAskill, “Blackwater Operating at CIA Pakistan Base, Ex-Official Says,” The Guardian, December 11, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/11/blackwater-in-cia-pakistan-base; Sana Saleem, “Blackwater: Widening the Rift,” Dawn, September 22, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/813006/blackwater-widening-the-rift.
[44] Though the US has withdrawn from Afghanistan, the apprehensions of Pakistan’s alleged denuclearisation linger on, albeit through different frames. Ironically, as the ties between the Taliban and Pakistan have soured, the resulting rise in incidents of terrorism in the country has sustained international concerns of Pakistani nukes falling into terrorists’ hands. For details see “Pakistan-Row CIA Man Raymond Davis Arrested over Fight,” BBC News, October 3, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-15147690; Hameed Hakimi, “Why Have Pakistan’s Ties with the Afghan Taliban Turned Frigid?” Al-Jazeera, December 28, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/28/analysis-why-have-pakistans-ties-with-the-afghan-taliban-turned-frigid.
[45] Abdul Basit, “How the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan Raises China’s Risk of Jihadist Attacks,” South China Morning Post, June 23, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3138259/how-us-withdrawal-afghanistan-raises-chinas-risk-jihadist-attacks.
[46] Lucas Webber, “Abu Zar al-Burmi: Jihadi Cleric and Anti-China Firebrand,” Small Wars Journal, June 4, 2021, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2021/04/06/abu-zar-al-burmi-jihadi-cleric-and-anti-china-firebrand/.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Haiyun Ma, “Afghan Militants Have China in Their Crosshairs,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/afghan-militants-china-imperialism-islamic-state/.
[49] Lucas Webber, “ISKP Publishes Its Most Comprehensive Critique of China Yet, Threatens War with Beijing, and Sees Opportunity in “WW3”,” The Militant Wire, September 2, 2022, https://www.militantwire.com/p/iskp-publishes-its-most-comprehensive.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Seema Khan, “Claiming Agency from a Distance: Baloch Diasporic Resistance to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Ethnopolitics, November 26, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2024.2429273
[52] Riccardo Valle and Lucas Webber, “Rising Anti-China Sentiment in Balochistan Threatens Increased Attacks on Chinese Interests in Pakistan,” The Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/rising-anti-china-sentiment-in-balochistan-threatens-increased-attacks-on-chinese-interests-in-pakistan/.
[53] Libby Hogan, “Rise in Violence Against Chinese Nationals in Pakistan Threatens China’s Silk Road Vision,” ABC News, October 21, 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-10-21/rise-in-violence-against-chinese-nationals-in-pakistan/104487244.
[54] Mark Bowden, “The Death of Osama bin Laden: How the US Finally Got its Man,” The Guardian, October 12, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/12/death-osama-bin-laden-us.
[55] Jon Boone, “Taliban Leader Bans Polio Vaccinations in Protest at Drone Strikes,” The Guardian, June 26, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/26/taliban-bans-polio-vaccinations.
[56] Rick Noack, “After Long Banning Polio Campaigns, Taliban Declares War on the Disease,” The Washington Post, December 5, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/05/taliban-afghanistan-polio-vaccination/.
[57] Ayaz Gul, “WHO Warns Polio Progress in Afghanistan, Pakistan at Risk Due to US Funding Cut,” Voice of America, January 29, 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/7955883.html.
[58] Ayaz Gul, “Gunmen Kill Pakistan Polio Vaccinator and Police Guard Near Afghan Border,” Voice of America, September 11, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/gunmen-kill-pakistan-polio-vaccinator-and-police-guard-near-afghan-border/7779922.html.
[59] “Attacks on Polio Vaccinators in Pakistan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed February 9, 2024, https://www.satp.org/civilian-data-details/Attack-on-Polio-workers/pakistan.
[60] “Pakistan’s Failure to Eliminate Polio Reflects Acute Lack of Commitment,” ETHealthworld.com, July 3, 2022, https://health.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry/pakistans-failure-to-eliminate-polio-reflects-acute-lack-of-commitment/92631727.
[61] Monica Martinez-Bravo and Andreas Stegmann, “In Vaccines We Trust? The Effects of the CIA’s
Vaccine Ruse on Immunization in Pakistan,” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2022), pp. 150-186, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab018.
[62] “CIA’s Fake Vaccine Drive to Get Bin Laden Gamily DNA,” BBC News, July 12, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-14117438.
[63] Jonathan Kennedy, “How Drone Strikes and a Fake Vaccination Program Have Inhibited Polio Eradication in Pakistan,” International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2017), pp. 807-825, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48513022.
[64] Saeed Shah, “CIA Organised Fake Vaccination Drive to Get Osama bin Laden’s Family DNA,” The Guardian, July 11, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/11/cia-fake-vaccinations-osama-bin-ladens-dna.
[65] Animesh Roul, “The Pakistani Taliban’s Campaign Against Polio Vaccination,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, No. 8 (2014), pp. 17-19, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss85.pdf.
[66] Ashfaq Yousafzai, “Resistance to Vaccination Drive Dates Back to 2005,” Dawn, December 24, 20212, https://www.dawn.com/news/773653/resistance-to-vaccination-drive-dates-back-to-2005.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Zaki Rehman, “The Ahmadiyya in Pakistan: Religious Persecution, Human Rights, and Islam,” Oxford Human Rights Hub, July 22, 2024, https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-ahmadiyya-in-pakistan-religious-persecution-human-rights-and-islam/.
[69] Minority Rights Group, “Ahmaddiyas in Pakistan,” accessed February 9, 2025, https://minorityrights.org/communities/ahmaddiyas/.
[70] “Brief Life Sketch of Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan,” Al-Islam, accessed on February 9, 2024, https://www.alislam.org/articles/brief-life-sketch-chaudhry-sir-muhammad-zafrulla-khan/.
[71] Rameez Raja, “The Principles of the Flourishing Community,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2020), pp. 765-795, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27001558.
[72] This agitational politics resulted in sectarian clashes and a military crackdown which quelled the far-right rioters. In the aftermath of the military operation, Majlis-e-Aharar was disbanded, but demands to ex-communicate Ahmadis from Islam persisted.
[73] Nadeem F. Paracha, “The 1974 Ouster of the ‘Heretics’: What Really Happened?” Dawn, November 21, 2013, https://www.dawn.com/news/1057427.
[74] Minority Rights Group, “Ahmaddiyas in Pakistan.”
[75] “Thousands of Ahmadis Fleeing Persecution in Pakistan and seeking Asylum overseas,” Rabwah Times, September 4, 2016, https://www.rabwah.net/thousands-of-ahmadis-fleeing-persecution-in-pakistan-and-seeking-asylum-overseas/.
[76] For details see “Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law: All You Need to Know,” Al-Jazeera, August 18, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/18/all-you-need-to-know-about-pakistans-blasphemy-law.
[77] Mujeeb ur Rahman, “Apartheid of Ahmadis in Pakistan,” The Review of Religion, December 23, 2015, https://www.reviewofreligions.org/12287/apartheid-of-ahmadis-in-pakistan/.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Sushant Sareen, “Tehrik-E-Labbaik Pakistan: The New Face of Barelvi Activism,” Observer Research Foundation, September 15, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/tehrik-e-labbaik-pakistan-the-new-face-of-barelvi-activism.
[80] Roohan Ahmed, “Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan: An Emerging Right-Wing Threat to Pakistan’s Democracy,” The Atlantic Council, January 15, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/tehreek-e-labbaik-pakistan-an-emerging-right-wing-threat/.
[81] “Taseer’s Killer Mumtaz Qadri Hanged,” Dawn, February 29, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1242637.
[82] Tehreek Labbaik Pakistan, “Political Itinerary,” accessed February 9, 2024, https://tlyp.org.pk/pages/political.php.
[83] Shamil Shams, “Blasphemy Agreement: Is Pakistan Ruled by Islamists?” DW, March 11, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/blasphemy-agreement-is-pakistan-ruled-by-islamists/a-46141981.
[84] “Who Are the Pakistani Islamists Vowing Death to Blasphemers?,” Reuters, December 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/who-are-pakistani-islamists-vowing-death-blasphemers-2023-08-21/.
[85] Abid Hussain, “Pakistan’s Ahmadis Living in Fear as Graves, Religious Sites Attacked,” Al-Jazeera, September 27, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/27/pakistans-ahmadis-living-in-fear-as-graves-religious-sites-attacked.
[86] Yash Sharma and Laura Dudley Jenkins, “Legislation as Disinformation: The Love Jihad Conspiracy Theory in Law and Lived Experience,” Social and Legal Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5 (2024), pp. 767-789, https://doi.org/10.1177/09646639231225424.
[87] Shahina K. K., “The Roots and Evolution of the Myth of Love Jihad in Kerala,” Outlook, April 11, 2023, https://www.outlookindia.com/national/the-roots-and-evolution-of-the-myth-of-love-jihad-in-kerala-news-277712.
[88] Chander Uday Singh, “Lies, Insistence and Disregard for Evidence: The Journey of Love Jihad Laws,” The Wire, December 30, 2022, https://thewire.in/communalism/lies-insistence-and-disregard-for-evidence-the-journey-of-love-jihad-laws.
[89] Mohammad Amaan Siddiqui, “Mapping Hindutva Discourse in India: Exploring ‘Love Jihad’ Narratives on X,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, January 3, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/01/03/mapping-hindutva-discourse-in-india-exploring-love-jihad-narratives-on-x-twitter/.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Save Temples, “Our Lady Pracharaks Fulmali Ree Rescued Hindu Girl from Torturous Love Jihad in Assam; Reconverted to Hinduism Ritualistically,” SaveTemples.org, July 22, 2023, https://www.savetemples.org/post/ghhf-our-lady-pracharaks-fulmali-ree-rescued-hindu-girl-from-torturous-love-jihad-in-assam-reconverted-to-hinduism-ritualistically.-/1670.
[92] Siddiqui, “Mapping Hindutva Discourse.”
[93] Ibid.
[94] “Editorial Note: Resilience and Diversity of Terrorist Social Media Propaganda,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2023), pp. 2-4, https://www.jstor.org/stable/e48514282.
[95] Shaikh Azizur Rahman, “Tensions Peak as Bangladesh Blames India for Spreading Misinformation,” Voice of America, December 10, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/tensions-peak-as-bangladesh-blames-india-for-spreading-misinformation-/7895753.html; Charani Patabendige, “Unmasking Islamophobic Disinformation in the Aftermath of Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Attack,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, September 29, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/09/29/unmasking-islamophobic-disinformation-in-the-aftermath-of-sri-lankas-easter-sunday-attack/.
[96] Gabriel Weimann, Alexander T. Pack, Rachel Sulciner, Joelle Scheinin, Gal Rapaport and David Diaz, “Generating Terror: The Risks of Generative AI Exploitation,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2024), pp. 17-24, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/CTC-SENTINEL-012024.pdf.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Maryam Shahbazi and Deborah Bunker, “Social Media Trust: Fighting Misinformation in the Time of Crisis,” International Journal of Information Management, Vol. 77 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2024.102780.
[99] Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi, Nurrisha Ismail and Saddiq Basha, “Key Trends in Digital Extremism 2024: The Resilience and Expansion of Jihadist and Far-Right Movements,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 17, No. 1, (2025), pp.100-111, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/CTTA-Annual-2025.pdf.
[100] Kabir Taneja, “A Revival of Online Terror Propaganda Ecosystems in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, November 6, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/11/06/a-revival-of-online-terror-propaganda-ecosystems-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/.
[101] Soumya Awasthi, “Digital Battleground: ISKP vs. Taliban,” The Observer Research Foundation, April 8, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/digital-battleground-iskp-vs-taliban.
