From Disinformation to Violence: The UK Far Right and 2024 Riots

Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan

In the summer of 2024, the United Kingdom (UK) faced serious rioting following a stabbing attack in the town of Southport on July 29. Social media accounts initially claimed that the attacker was a Muslim who had recently arrived illegally via boat; these claims drove attacks on targets associated with Islam, including a mosque in Southport.^[1] When it was revealed that the attacker was Welsh and of Rwandan Christian background, the violence pivoted towards more general anti-immigrant attacks. In two cities, rioters attempted to set hotels housing refugees on fire.^[2] This paper seeks to build on existing quantitative work^[3] and reporting^[4] on social media to assess disinformation promoted by far-right groups which aimed to elicit violent physical reactions. The paper is divided into two sections. The first summarises the UK far right’s shift from traditional organisational structures towards more amorphous and post-organisational networks. The second is a qualitative analysis of content across Telegram and X, assessing disinformation targeting Muslims, immigrants and anti-Semitism which underpinned the violence.

 The UK Far Right in 2024

The UK far right has evolved significantly over the course of the 21^st century, most notably shifting away from organisations such as the English Defence League (EDL). The EDL emerged in 2009 in response to Islamist disruption of the Royal Anglian Regiment’s homecoming parade^[5]; it drew early supporters from football hooligan firms, ‘anti-Jihad’ groups and existing far-right groups such as the British National Party (BNP).^[6] Ideologically, the EDL characterised itself as being “anti-Islamist”, pitting itself as an opponent to groups such a Sharia for Europe^[7]; members describe themselves as focused purely on the threat of “Islamisation”.^[8] While academic research on the EDL found more general anti-Muslim sentiments^[9], the group repeatedly sought to position itself as anti-racist and open to non-white participation (in contrast with older groups including the BNP and National Front).^[10]

Although not a “card-carrying organisation”, the EDL was marked by the high profile of its leaders – particularly co-founder and leader Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (better known by his moniker of Tommy Robinson), who left the group in 2013.^[11] The organisation entered a terminal decline from the mid-2010s; scholars Morrow and Meadowcraft argue that this was due to indiscriminate recruitment of “marginal members” who had little loyalty to the group and left soon after joining.^[12] Although former members of the EDL are alleged to have taken part in counter-protests in November 2023, the group is largely viewed as moribund.^[13]

Today, the UK far right is typified by a number of smaller groups, loose networks of ideologically similar individuals and informal channels rather than a single dominant street movement. It encompasses both the “extreme right”, which supports the overthrow of liberal democracy, as well as members of the “radical right” who wish to achieve their goals within existing constitutional frameworks.^[14] This “broad church” includes organisations such as Patriotic Alternative, which combines advertising for “baking contests, film nights and video game sessions” with explicit far-right propaganda and can mobilise hundreds of activists,^[15] and extreme-right networks that include the amorphous Terrorgram Collective, whose members “glorify terrorism, call for violence, spread extremist ideological material and demonise minority groups.”^[16] On 22 April 2024, the UK became the first country in the world to proscribe the Terrorgram collective.^[17]

Beyond these organisations, a range of other actors contributed to the spread of disinformation related to the riots. Their connections through channels and chat groups on Telegram are focused on a range of topics including football hooliganism, conspiracy theories related to health and climate change and combat footage. Individuals can join or leave multiple groups and there is no singular membership; unlike the EDL, these groups typically lack a clear leadership figure. The affordances of Telegram allow users to rapidly forward content from other channels; as forwarded content is typically labelled with the channel from which it originated, it also makes it easier for users to find similar content.^[18]

Across organisations, networks and loose groups, a unifying factor has been an emergence of generalised anti-immigrant hate and white nationalist beliefs. This marks a break from earlier groups such as the EDL, which sought to build connections with non-Muslim immigrants for legitimacy.^[19] A search through the Telegram channel belonging to Patriotic Alternative, for example, has repeatedly characterised immigrants as “invaders” or an “invasion”. Another Telegram channel which promotes far-right football hooliganism (described in the selection below as Channel 1) includes explicit support for white nationalism through symbols such as the Celtic Cross and veneration of white power band Skrewdriver.^[20] Although anti-immigrant sentiment was particularly obvious during the 2024 riots, it was not the catalyst. An analysis of the 2022 Leicester riots between Hindus and Muslims found that almost all far-right groups analysed on Telegram promoted narratives that were equally antipathetic to both faiths.^[21]

It is significant to note that anti-migrant sentiment has become significantly more prominent in mainstream discourse both in the UK and internationally.^[22] Polling of the British public in September 2024 found that 32% of Britons named immigration as the most important issue, ahead of the National Health Service and the economy.^[23] Although this analysis focuses on social media, it is important to note analysis of mainstream newspapers points to similar dehumanising language in these publications.^[24]

Methodology

The analysis seeks to analyse far-right efforts to stoke violence using disinformation from 29 July until 7 August 2024. This covered the period from the stabbing attack and the start of the spread of disinformation until the day that large-scale anticipated riots failed to materialise.

Telegram channels and X (formerly Twitter) accounts were chosen as they play different roles for the far right and other extreme ideologies. Telegram has traditionally enacted less strict moderation than other platforms, leading to its adoption by a range of extremists^[25]; the wide range of channels which can be created on the platform also makes it ideal for mobilisation, disseminating propaganda and sharing content.^[26] A “similar channel” feature which came into effect in 2023 has been found to promote extremist content to users who are browsing channels which are ostensibly apolitical or focused on other ideologies.^[27]

By contrast, X is a larger and more public-facing platform; by default, most content on X is readily accessible to any user, whereas on Telegram, users need to know the name of a channel to search for it or have its address to join it. Previous research has noted the use of X by far-right parties and actors.^[28] Assessing two platforms rather than focusing on a single one also allows for evidencing of cross-platform pollination, demonstrating how far-right groups and networks build on each other.

Telegram channels were found through a combination of methods, including searching for keywords such as “Southport”, looking for content forwarded from other channels, using Telegram’s “similar channels” feature and drawing on a seed list of existing accounts identified by researchers as promoting anti-immigrant narratives.^[29] Content from X was surfaced using the advanced search function. The accounts are not named here to reduce amplifying hate speech.

Based on this analysis, ten content producers (six Telegram channels and four X accounts) were chosen to represent a range of far-right actors. A primary focus was on whether the narratives they produced could constitute “disinformation”, following Wardle and Derakhshan’s definition of “information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country”.^[30] As the line between disinformation and misinformation (i.e. false information shared without the aim of causing harm) is blurred, this analysis particularly focuses on misleading narratives that sought to undermine official statements rather than more unclear videos of clashes with counter-protesters.

Table 1. List of Telegram channels and X accounts analysed.

One data limitation is that some relevant content has been deleted on both X and Telegram. While this makes it difficult to perform a fully exhaustive search for relevant material, the Telegram content captured during the riots and in searches on X was sufficient to perform a qualitative analysis.

Previous academic research has identified the correlation between disinformation about target groups and violence perpetrated against them in a variety of contexts and countries.^[31] The disinformation outlined below often did not call explicitly for violence; however, it provided the rationale for attacks. In many cases, this content emerged in a milieu where extreme threats of violence were being discussed: for example, in a Telegram Channel which promoted neo-Nazi content designed as Channel 2 (see table below), misinformation accusing the attacker of being a Muslim continued to circulate while other members of the channel said those reading should “burn” any buildings “housing immigrants”, days before attempts by rioters to burn down two hotels housing asylum seekers.

Primary Narratives

Anti-Muslim hate appeared repeatedly throughout far-right channels, with disinformation seeking to blame the attack on Islamism based on false reports that the attacker was a Muslim. Even when confronted with evidence that this was wrong, far-right groups sought to promote anti-Muslim hate and, in some cases, promoted explicit calls for retributive violence.

A Telegram channel (Channel 1), focused on white nationalist football hooliganism with more than 19,000 subscribers, alleged on July 29 that the attacker was a “Muslim immigrant”. Similar content received high levels of engagement on X. An X account which promotes British nationalist content (Account 1) with more than 100,000 followers also claimed on August 29 that a “Muslim [had] kill[ed] kids” and accused the Muslim community of silence, receiving 39,000 likes and almost 800,000 views.

At 12:30 on  August 1, a reporting restriction was lifted, revealing that the attacker was a Christian of Rwandan origin who had been born in Wales.^[32] However, far-right accounts on both Telegram and X repeatedly promoted disinformation to undermine this. At 21:57, Account 1 claimed that the attacker had “been radicalized recently” and stated he had “done what Allah wanted”. The post, which received 14,000 likes and 1.7 million views, also alleged that the police and the government were engaged in covering up his religion. The evidence for this is an image of a supposedly forwarded message on WhatsApp from an unnamed former police officer. In total, the posts from Account 1 which promoted the disinformation that the attacker was a Muslim after this had been disproved received more than 88,000 likes; they repeatedly accused authorities of covering up the truth on the basis of their own unverified claims.

The same image was posted at 22:27 on August 1 by the administrator of a Telegram channel focused on Southport with significant white nationalist content (Channel 2). While the message on X focused on the alleged state conspiracy to hide the attacker’s faith, in the white nationalist Telegram channel, it was used to further support calls to violence. On August 2, an administrator in Channel 2 also alleged that the perpetrator had attended a Southport mosque based on an unclear reading of Google Maps, using it to allege that he was a Muslim in a post that also used a dehumanising anti-black slur. This claim does not appear to have been supported by any other sources.

Another common narrative sought to claim that Muslims were the primary cause of violence in the ensuing riots, providing further support for claims that Islam is incompatible with the West and legitimising anti-Muslim violence. On Telegram, a far-right news aggregator channel (Channel 3) with more than 37,000 members claimed that a Muslim had been arrested while carrying a knife. On X, a video was posted by another account (Account 2) at 11:16 on 1 August, showing the arrest of the same individual and accusing him of being Muslim, receiving 4,600 likes and almost 230,000 views. The same claim was made by an alternative media channel with almost 130,000 followers (Account 4) which has repeatedly promoted far-right content. It described the attacker as “a migrant man of North African appearance”, and implied that the violence in Southport was due to his arrest. In reality, the man arrested was not Muslim and was accused by the sentencing judge of seeking to “stir up trouble”. ^[33]

However, disinformation related to Southport was not singularly focused on Muslims. On both X and Telegram, the attacker was repeatedly referred to as a “migrant” despite being born in Wales and growing up there. A Telegram post in a far-right channel with almost 20,000 members described him as a “knife wielding migrant” (Channel 4); another post in a channel with more than 22,000 subscribers referred to the attacker as an example of “migrant occupiers” (Channel 5). On X, an ‘anti-woke’ account (Account 3) also accused the attacker of being a “migrant” in three separate tweets on July 31, receiving a total of 19,000 likes and 789,000 views.

Far-right accounts also promoted disinformation that the attacker was African, promoting the idea that ethnicity and nationality are intrinsically linked. A white nationalist channel which has over 4,000 subscribers (Channel 6) described the attacker as a “state imported African”, drawing on the antisemitic Great Replacement conspiracy theory.^[34] Channel 4 described the perpetrator as an “African”, accusing media of hiding this fact by describing him as being a “Cardiff boy” despite this being accurate; in a later post, they described him as an “African invader”.

Conclusion

 The events of July and August 2024 marked the high-water point for far-right violence in the UK for the past two decades. However, it is notable that anti-migrant narratives have continued to dominate British media headlines till recently. In the months since the UK riots, there has been significant anti-migrant sentiments on X – firstly targeting Indians in the US^[35] and secondly targeting Muslims in relation to abuse perpetrated by gangs of British-Pakistani men.^[36] Narratives which portray migrants as inherently disloyal, untrustworthy and dangerous are likely to fuel further violence.

This conclusion seeks to provide some recommendations for public stakeholders to mitigate these risks. For law enforcement, the messaging on social media was extremely complex and at times contradictory. Some channels promoted calls to violence enthusiastically, while others accused them of being a ploy to entrap far-right supporters. The post-organisational nature of the network also meant that even when channels were removed, messages continued to circulate among a loose network of supportive accounts. This was further amplified by elements of the transnational far right online^[37]; these accounts were able to help drive significant disinformation narratives and support members of the British far right, both amplifying existing narratives and driving the promotion of new ones. Engagement with these accounts and the spread of their propaganda further obfuscated the likelihood of violence at specific locations. Security service assessments of which calls to violence are likely to manifest offline will always be a fraught decision. The confusing media ecosystem outlined in the paragraph above further amplifies this. One recommendation is for continued monitoring of major far-right groups online; a number of these played a significant role. Having an understanding of the transnational element is also vital, to understand how messages spread across borders. As noted above, the UK has sought to combat post-organisational networks such as the Terrorgram Collective through a proscription order. However, even more informal networks – such as that which sprang up around Channel 1 – can arise rapidly and lack the formal nature for proscriptions. As such, proactive media monitoring coupled with close partnership with specialist organisations is vital to assess the significance of these entities.

There are also implications for other public service stakeholders and the private sector. Ofcom, the UK regulator in charge of the Online Safety Act, found a “clear link” between social media messaging and violence, and noted “uneven” platform responses.[38] For regulators seeking to hold social media accompanies to a high standard – and the companies themselves – the amorphous nature of these networks provides a similar challenge to law enforcement. Even when platforms act to remove channels or accounts, they can be rapidly re-formed. As Ofcom’s full powers under the Online Safety Act are yet to enter effect, it remains to be seen their significance in reducing the noxious impact of disinformation on society.

Anti-migrant rhetoric remains common in the UK, even with the sentencing of the Southport perpetrator.[39] Media reporting on mainstream parties suggests that they are continuing to push stronger stances on migration,[40] reflecting concerns about being outflanked politically. A search for “Southport” on far-right channels on Telegram shows that it remains a focal point for promoting propaganda and attempting to build support. It is vital that all stakeholders remain vigilant about these discussions and maintain wariness about potential violence.

About the Author

Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan is a researcher based in the UK, working as an analyst and editorial manager at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. His research interests include Hindu nationalism, online misogyny and anti-migrant hate. He was previously a journalist at the Financial Times.

Thumbnail photo by Ehimetalor Akhere Unuabona on Unsplash

Citations

[1] “Clashes in Southport after Town Mourns in Vigil for Victims of Stabbing Attack,” BBC News, July 29, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cevwgqz0x41t.

[2] Aine Fox, “Asylum Seekers “Traumatised” after Hotel Riot,” BBC News, August 12, 2024,  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgxn0662x2o.

[3] “Quantifying Extremism: A Data-Driven Analysis of UK Riot-Related Far-Right Telegram Networks,” Institute of Strategic Dialogue, September 13, 2024, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/quantifying-extremism-a-data-driven-analysis-of-riot-related-far-right-telegram-networks/.

[4] Ed Thomas and Shayan Sardarizadeh, “Southport Riot: How a LinkedIn Post Helped Spark Unrest – BBC Tracks Its Spread,” BBC News, October 25, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c99v90813j5o.

[5] Jamie Cleland, Chris Anderson and Jack Aldridge-Deacon, “Islamophobia, War and Non-Muslims as Victims: An Analysis of Online Discourse on an English Defence League Message Board,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 41, No. 9 (2017), pp. 1541–1557, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1287927.

[6] Andrew Brindle, “Cancer Has Nothing on Islam: A Study of Discourses by Group Elite and Supporters of the English Defence League,” Critical Discourse Studies, Vol. 13,  No.4 (2015), pp. 444-459; Julian Richards, “Reactive Community Mobilization in Europe: The Case of the English Defence League,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2011), pp. 177–193, https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2011.575624.

[7] “Reciprocal Populism: The Interaction of Right-Wing Anti-Islam Movements and Radical Islamist Groups in Europe,” ECPS, December 2021, https://www.populismstudies.org/reciprocal-populism-the-interaction-of-right-wing-anti-islam-movements-and-radical-islamist-groups-in-europe/.

[8] Joel Busher, “Why Even Misleading Identity Claims Matter: The Evolution of the English Defence League,” Political Studies, Vol. 66, No. 2 (2018), pp. 323-338, https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717720378.

[9] James Treadwell and Jon Garland, “Masculinity, Marginalization and Violence: A Case Study of the English Defence League,” The British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 51, No.4 (2011), pp. 621-634.

[10] George Kassimeris and Leonie Jackson, “The Ideology and Discourse of the English Defence League: ‘Not Racist, Not Violent, Just No Longer Silent’,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 17, No.1 (2015), pp. 171-188.

[11] “EDL Leader Tommy Robinson Quits Group,” BBC News, October 8, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-24442953.

[12] Elizabeth A. Morrow and John Meadowcroft, “The Rise and Fall of the English Defence League: Self-Governance, Marginal Members and the Far Right,” Political Studies, Vol. 67, No. 3 (2019), pp. 539-556.

[13] David Lowe, “Palestinian Protests, Freedom of Expression and Freedom Association: When Do Speeches Become a Hate Crime or Incitement to Commit Acts of Terrorism?,” Expert Witness Journal, Vol. 52 (2023), pp. 60-63.

[14] William Allchorn, “Towards a Truly Post-Organisational Movement?: The Contemporary UK Far Right and Its Organisational Trajectory Since 2009,” in The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe, eds. Katherine Kondor and Mark Littler (Routledge, 2023), pp. 258-274.

[15] William Allchorn, “Turning Back to Biologised racism: A Content Analysis of Patriotic Alternative UK’s online discourse,” GNET, February 22, 2021, https://gnet-research.org/2021/02/22/turning-back-to-biologised-racism-a-content-analysis-of-patriotic-alternative-uks-online-discourse/.

[16] Jakob Guhl and Jacob Davey, “A Safe Space to Hate: White Supremacist Mobilisation on Telegram,” Institute of Strategic Dialogue, June 26, 2024, https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/a-safe-space-to-hate-white-supremacist-mobilisation-on-telegram/.

[17] Home Office GOV.UK, “Terrorgram Added to List of Proscribed Terrorist Organisations,” April 21, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/terrorgram-added-to-list-of-proscribed-terrorist-organisations.

[18] Stijn Peeters and Tom Willaert, “Telegram and Digital Methods: Mapping Networked Conspiracy Theories through Platform Affordances,” M/C Journal, Vol. 25, No.1 (2022), https://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/2878.

[19] Busher, “Why Even Misleading Identity.”

[20] Anti-Defamation League, “Celtic Cross,” February 21, 2023, https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/celtic-cross.

[21] Institute of Strategic Dialogue, Analysing the Role of Ideology in the 2022 Leicester Unrest (Upcoming).

[22] Mathew J. Creighton and Amaney A. Jamal. “An Overstated Welcome: Brexit and Intentionally Masked Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the UK,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5 (2022), pp. 1051-1071; Stephen Miller, David Horowitz and Roan Garcia-Quintana, “Anti-Immigrant,” Southern Poverty Law Center, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/anti-immigrant. Also see, Andrea Nasuto and Francisco Rowe, “Exposing Hate–Understanding Anti-Immigration Sentiment Spreading on Twitter,” ArXiv, January 12, 2024, https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.06658.  

[23] Michael Clemence, Gideon Skinner and Laura King, “Immigration Remains the Biggest Issue Facing Britain,” Ipsos, October 8, 2024, https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/immigration-remains-biggest-issue-facing-britain.

[24] Isabella Gonçalves, “Promoting Hate Speech by Dehumanizing Metaphors of Immigration,” Journalism Practice, Vol. 18, No.2 (2024), pp. 265–282, https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2023.2212661.

[25] Samantha Walther and Andrew McCoy, “US Extremism on Telegram,” Perspectives on Terrorism Vol. 15, No. 2 (2021), pp. 100-124.

[26] Heidi Schulze, Julian Hohner and Diana Rieger, “Far-Right Conspiracy Groups on Fringe Platforms: A Longitudinal Analysis of Radicalization Dynamics on Telegram,” Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies, Vol. 28, No.4, (2022), pp. 1103-1126.

[27] “Digital Threat Report: Telegram’s Toxic Recommendations Perpetuate,” Southern Poverty Law Center, December 13, 2024, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2024/12/13/telegrams-toxic-recommendations-perpetuate-extremism.

[28] Caterina Froio and Bharath Ganesh, “The transnationalisation of far right discourse on Twitter: Issues and actors that cross borders in Western European democracies,” European Societies, Vol., 21, No.4 (2018), 513–539, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295.

[29] “Digital Threat Report.”

[30] Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2017), https://edoc.coe.int/en/media/7495-information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research-and-policy-making.html.

[31] Jeremy Liebowitz, “Hate Speech, Disinformation and Political Violence in Myanmar,” (paper presented at Fake News & Elections in Asia Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, July 10-12, 2019), https://asiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Fake-News-Conference-Proceeding.pdf; Also see, Shakuntala Banaji and Ram Bhat, “WhatsApp Vigilantes: An Exploration of Citizen Reception and Circulation of WhatsApp Misinformation Linked to Mob Violence in India,” LSE Blogs, November 11, 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2019/11/11/whatsapp-vigilantes-an-exploration-of-citizen-reception-and-circulation-of-whatsapp-misinformation-linked-to-mob-violence-in-india/.

[32] “Suspect Named as Axel Muganwa Rudakubana as Starmer Announces New “Capability” to Curb Riots,” BBC News, September 18, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cydvr9d0vd3t?page=3.

[33] Laura O’Neill and PA News, “Man Caught With Knife near Vigil for Southport Stabbing Victims Jailed,” BBC News, August 9, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gz79dln5xo.

[34] Mattias Ekman, “The Great Replacement: Strategic Mainstreaming of Far-Right Conspiracy Claims,” Convergence, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2022), pp. 1127-1143.

[35] “Indian Govt Closely Monitoring Backlash against H-1B Visa Holders in US,” Business Standard, December 31, 2024, https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/indian-govt-h1b-visa-holders-us-backlash-124123100201_1.html.

[36] Anna Gross and Jennifer Williams, “Why Has Elon Musk Reignited Debate over the UK Rape Gangs Scandal?,” Financial Times, January 6, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/a2ff027d-be2a-40ff-ada7-6dc2bf31e3db.

[37] Bharath Ganesh and Caterina Froio, “Transnational Far-Right Digital Publics and Radicalisation,” in Radicalisation: A Global and Comparative Perspective, eds. Akil N. Awan and James R. Lewis (London: Hurst & Company, 2023), p. 247; Also see, Anastasiia Kononova, “Populist Far Right and Radical Movements: Analysing the AfD and Generation Identity’s Shared Narratives on (Re)migration” (Masters Thesis, Central European University, 2024).

[38] “Tom Singleton and Graham Fraser, “Ofcom: Clear Link Between Online Posts and Violent Disorder,” BBC News, October 24, 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c70w0ne4zexo.

[39] “Institute of Strategic Dialogue. Failing to Prevent: Lessons from the Southport Tragedy,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, January 24, 2025, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/failing-to-prevent-lessons-from-the-southport-tragedy/.

[40] Iain Watson and Pete Saull, “Red Wall Labour MPs Want Tougher Message on Immigration to Head Off Reform,” BBC News, February 5, 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0lze0lnd25o.