Disinformation and the Battle for Influence and Power in an the Emerging Post-Assad Syria
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, spearheaded by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has created a power vacuum and a fertile ground for disinformation campaigns. As HTS aims to establish legitimacy and expand its influence, the Southern Operation Room (SOR) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are also vying for power in a new Syria. This volatile competition is further complicated by the potential regrouping and resurgence of the Islamic State (IS), which could exploit any rivalry among the competing factions to its advantage, putting Syria on another warpath. Against this backdrop, the first section of this article examines the aftermath of the ouster of Assad’s regime. Then, it explains HTS’ transformations and rebranding efforts to position itself as a legitimate military and political force within the complex landscape of post-Assad Syria. It also explains how disinformation campaigns have become a critical tool used by various rebel factions, including HTS, aiming to shape public perception, manipulate narratives, and influence both domestic and international audiences. The rest of the article discusses HTS’ rivalry with the SDF and the SOR, the continued threat of IS, and the broader implications of these developments for Syria and the Middle East.
Syria’s Power Vacuum: A Fertile Ground for Disinformation
Disinformation campaigns have played a crucial role in shaping narratives of competing sides during conflicts. The collapse of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s regime has resulted in a power vacuum that various competing factions have sought to fill. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)[1], an Islamist militant rebel group, has emerged as a dominant force in Syria’s current political landscape. HTS successfully toppled Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024 under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa[2], who has become Syria’s transitional president.[3] The group has immensely benefited from disinformation,[4] that is, the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information aimed at deceiving or influencing public perception. Social media platforms have become battlegrounds in a conflict that mirrors the physical fighting in Syria; they are rife with disinformation intended to demoralise local and external forces loyal to Assad.[5]
On December 1, 2024, two misleading videos surfaced on YouTube[6] and X,[7] allegedly showing al-Assad’s resignation and power transfer to the Speaker of the People’s Assembly. In these videos, he was also shown expressing regret to the Syrian people and claimed to end all agreements with Iran. However, this was later debunked[8] as the audio in the video clip was discovered to be artificially generated and originally released on September 2, 2023. On December 6, 2024, the Syrian Ministry of Information denied the video’s authenticity, coinciding with HTS-led rebel factions capturing Hama, Syria’s fourth-largest city. HTS effectively took advantage of disinformation campaigns during the critical period leading up to December 2024 to enhance its standing amidst ongoing conflict in Syria.
However, HTS’ position as a key player in the Syrian conflict has significant implications for other rebel factions that view it as a competitor. These rival groups are motivated to assert their influence and control over Syria, disseminating their own disinformation to advance their respective agendas. This context helps explain the proliferation of numerous fake websites[9] titled “Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic”[10] which emerged during HTS’ military engagements. On December 1, 2024, the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), the military forces of Syria, issued a statement that disinformation was being spread by armed terrorist groups – not explicitly identified in the statement – and emphasised that these groups are engaged in a coordinated media campaign to undermine public morale and the effectiveness of military forces.[11] Another significant instance of disinformation in December 2024 involved fraudulent online webpages with fake accounts on Facebook,[12] which attracted more than a hundred thousand views. These pages were designed to imitate legitimate human rights organisations and appeared to target the pro-Assad Alawite community.[13] By adopting names of recognised human rights organisations, these misleading accounts sought to enhance the credibility of their false narratives to ultimately instil fear within the Alawite community.[14]
HTS: The Dual Strategy of Rebranding and Legitimacy Seeking
HTS, a listed terrorist organisation,[15] has emerged as a dominant force from the remnants of Jabhat al-Nusra, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda (AQ). With an estimated 16,000 fighters, HTS managed to topple Assad’s regime within two weeks by leading a coalition that included Ahrar al-Sham,[16] the National Front of Liberation (NFL),[17] the Free Syrian Army (FSA),[18] the Syrian National Army (SNA)[19] and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement.[20] The group successfully expanded its territorial control[21] to include significant centres – notably Aleppo, one of Syria’s largest cities – and solidified its control over other strategic areas in northwestern Syria. HTS has positioned itself as a quasi-government in Syria, providing civil services and managing local issues despite facing claims of human rights violations.[22] HTS aims to establish a sharia state but has sought to present a more palatable image to gain local support and legitimacy in Syria.[23]
In Syria’s emerging political landscape, HTS employs propaganda to present itself as a legitimate entity by distributing news through official media channels, referring to itself as ‘the Military Operations Department in Syria’[24] to emphasise its role in delivering governance and services in post-Assad Syria. It has also warned of disinformation campaigns against it.[25] However, concerns persist regarding the extent to which Al-Sharaa and HTS have truly distanced themselves from their extremist past.[26]
Post-Assad Syria: HTS Rivalries and Emerging Challenges
The emergence of HTS has intensified rivalries among various rebel groups operating within Syria. Notably, groups such as the Syrian Operation Room (SOR) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have continued to compete for territorial control and influence over local Syrians. They may seek to enhance their influence and exploit HTS’ vulnerabilities to strengthen their power and control in an ever-changing Syria.
The SOR[27] rebel coalition, originating in southern Syria (Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra) and led by Ahmad Al-Awda,[28] is a looming threat to HTS. This coalition was established on December 6, 2024, with the objective of coordinating military efforts in southern Syria to support HTS during the conflict in December 2024. However, Al-Awda chose not to participate in a meeting convened by the HTS-led interim government on December 25, 2024, to unify different rebel factions in Syria into a singular national defence force. Al-Awda has asserted that his faction remains operational and that the SOR has not been disbanded. The faction’s propaganda often focuses on unity among moderate rebels while attempting to distance itself from more radical elements within the opposition. The SOR coalition could be a threat to HTS as concerns among southern factions continue to grow over how the interim administration can unify the different former rebel groups, each with its own leaders and distinct ideologies.
Similarly, the Kurdish-led SDF[29], which is composed of Kurdish fighters, is another challenge to HTS. Since 2015, the SDF has emerged as a key player in the fight against the Islamic State (IS),[30] which emerged in Syria in 2013 to establish a self-styled global Sunni caliphate. The SDF has since gained significant territorial control in northeastern Syria, operating as a quasi-state there due to its established governance and territorial control of major cities like Qamishli and Kobani, collectively known as Rojava. Since the collapse of the Assad regime, the SDF controls roughly 40 percent[31] of Syria, following their deployment to regions previously under the control of the Syrian army in Deir ez-Zor province.
As a Kurdish-led force, the SDF faces hostility from Turkey due to its ties with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), both of which are considered terrorist organisations by Turkey. The SDF aims to maintain control over its territories while working towards the establishment of an independent state. It has, however, refused[32] to relinquish its weapons or disband, and was not invited[33] to the meeting convened by the HTS-led interim government on December 25. The rise of Kurdish militia in northeastern Syria poses a direct threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. This is perhaps why Turkey supports HTS – to counterbalance Kurdish influence and prevent the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region along its border.[34] The SDF, which also oversees IS prisons in Syria, has refused[35] to transfer the control of these prisons to the new administration. This is interpreted as their strong desire to maintain influence in northeastern Syria. The YPG, a key SDF component, has acted as Iran’s proxy militia in Syria and is not aligned with HTS.[36] It is promoting narratives that primarily accuse HTS of eliminating members of the Syrian army and of targeting the Alawite, Kurdish and Christian minorities in Syria.
HTS’ Major Challenge: The Lack of Credibility
The combination of HTS’ radical background and its controversial governance practices has resulted in a significant lack of credibility among many Syrians. While some may view HTS as a necessary force against the Assad regime or IS, others consider it as the new IS regime in Syria. A notable incident highlighted this challenge: on January 1, 2025, Fadel Abdul Ghany, the Executive Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) – an independent organisation that has come under scrutiny for its potential connections to HTS and Turkey, particularly following the collapse of Assad’s regime[37] – tweeted his deep concern over the extensive disinformation prevalent in Syria and urged the community to rely on credible sources.
Ghany’s followers responded by accusing HTS of hypocrisy. [38] One follower pointed out that HTS had previously reported on the assassination of a family near Manbij in December 2024, attributing the crime to the SDF. However, this same crime had been documented 11 days earlier and implicated the SNA, now under HTS, in the murder and associated looting. It is crucial to note that Manbij has been the site of intense conflict[39] between the SDF and HTS since the ousting of Assad in December 2024. Another follower described HTS as the new evolution of IS in Syria,[40] claiming that there will be a surge of propaganda portraying life under the new HTS regime in Syria as idyllic and utopian. He cautioned to remain sceptical of such narratives. This comment was made in response to a post on X on January 1, 2025, which discussed a meeting between social media influencers and bloggers with Syria’s new HTS-led administration;[41] the post had attracted more than a hundred thousand views. Another follower accused the SNHR Executive Director of being a propaganda agent serving Al-Sharaa and his masters, referring to the United States (US) and Israel, while stating that his false narratives would not serve the Syrian people.
While it is unclear which rival faction is behind the disinformation campaigns, if not all of them, numerous images and videos have been shared online, especially on X, highlighting offences and implying that they are attributed to HTS. One notable video[42] was posted on December 8, 2024, allegedly showing “opposition fighters”, in reference to HTS, forcibly moving civilians into a ditch before executing them; in fact, these images document a massacre carried out by soldiers of the Assad regime in Damascus in 2013.[43] This instance exemplifies that HTS is also a target of disinformation.
The Persistent Challenge of Countering IS
IS, which has historically positioned itself as the authentic representative of jihadist ideology, views al-Sharaa as an adversary and has employed extensive propaganda campaigns aimed at undermining his credibility. It has disseminated narratives that portray HTS as a proxy for Western interests.[44] Moreover, the group published fatwas calling for al-Sharaa’s assassination in December 2024 in its biweekly online newsletter, Al-Nabaa.[45] Additionally, IS has threatened to continue with military operations within Syrian territory, claiming a ‘vendetta against the remnants of al-Assad’s regime’.[46] This strategy mirrors the response from the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK)[47], which also initiated an anti-HTS campaign based on a series of conspiracy-driven allegations to discredit HTS and portray the takeover of Damascus akin to the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Kabul, which ISKP perceives as a political settlement.[48]
While IS has lost much territory since its peak between 2014 and 2015, it remains active in northern Syria. [49] Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the US has continued its anti-IS operations[50] and plans to sustain its military presence in the region to thwart any attempts by the terrorist organisation to regroup. Reportedly, al-Hawl[51] and al-Roj prison camps[52] are currently home to over 40,000 displaced persons, the majority affiliated with IS. There is a concern that these camps will contribute to the rise of a new generation of IS fighters who are looking to exploit the existing power vacuum in Syria. Additionally, the SDF oversees various detention centres housing more than 8,000 individuals associated with IS from over 50 different nations. There are growing apprehensions[53] that IS could free these detainees by conducting jailbreaks, taking advantage of vulnerabilities in HTS’ governance, and subsequently regroup and resurge.
From January 2023 to December 2024, there were about 404 terrorist incidents in Syria, with 130 of those incidents attributed to IS, making it the single most dangerous group in Syria (See Figure 1). A significant challenge lies in how IS and other factions in Syria will undermine the HTS leadership.
The rivalry between HTS and IS has been marked by violent confrontations. Both groups vie for control over territory and influence among local Syrians. HTS has actively engaged in military operations[55] against IS fighters, viewing them as a direct threat to its authority in Syria. This animosity is not merely tactical; it is deeply rooted in their ideological differences, especially regarding governance and jihadism.
Implications
Military Resolutions That Could Incite Civil War in a New Syria
Despite HTS’ negotiations[56] to integrate both the SDF and the SOR into the national army, a military resolution looms.[57] While the SOR has not responded to HTS’ proposal to integrate into the national army, the SDF has officially rejected it, especially following recent clashes with Turkish-backed factions in northern Syria. HTS emphasised that it would be prepared to use force if necessary.[58] This escalation of tension presents significant challenges given that since 2015, the US forces have been providing training and support to the SDF, putting HTS and its principal backer Turkey, on a potential war footing with the US.
HTS could escalate tensions with SOR as well, potentially leading to civil war in Syria as the competition for resources and territory intensifies. Skirmishes are likely to escalate into larger confrontations which may lead to the fragmentation of alliances, given the factions are backed by external powers like Turkey and the US. Furthermore, public sentiment cannot be ignored as Syrians become increasingly polarised along factional lines due to disinformation campaigns. As different factions vie for power and legitimacy in post-Assad Syria, disinformation can serve as a tool for inciting conflict between groups with historical and sectarian grievances against one another.
Potential Resurgence of IS as Lone Wolves in a New Syria
IS has consistently urged its supporters to engage in ‘do it yourself’ attacks. Since the onset of the Israeli offensive in Gaza in October 2023, there has been an increase in ‘lone wolf’ attacks linked to IS. Notable incidents include a mass stabbing at a festival in Solingen, Germany, [59] which was linked to a Syrian individual who was affiliated with IS. In March 2024, Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, the spokesperson for IS, urged lone wolves to carry out attacks against Christians and Jews in Western nations and Israel, declaring that Ramadan signified a period of jihad.[60] As outlined above, HTS has actively engaged in military operations against IS fighters; should these operations fail, IS and its lone actor militants could re-emerge as an even bigger threat, especially if it recruited individuals disillusioned with HTS or any of its main rivals.
Conclusion
The ongoing rivalry between HTS, the SDF, and the SOR represents a significant challenge for HTS as it seeks to establish itself as a legitimate and unifying authority in the post-Assad Syria. The rivalry threatens HTS’ survival and risks escalating tensions that could lead to a renewed civil war. The potential for civil war is exacerbated by the potential resurgence of IS, which might take advantage of the rivalry between the three factions.
The current landscape in Syria indicates that if HTS fails to navigate its relationships with rival factions effectively, it may inadvertently contribute to further disunity in Syria. This fragmentation could empower extremist elements that thrive in chaotic environments, undermining any progress made toward stability in Syria. Moreover, disinformation campaigns are likely to proliferate amidst this rivalry, obfuscating public perception and further polarising communities. Ultimately, the future of Syria hinges on whether HTS can adapt and forge alliances while addressing internal divisions to avoid a more destabilised Syria.
About the Author
Dr Ghada Farag Sayed Soliman is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Her research focuses on extremism in the Middle East and North Africa region. She can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Hoseingh Charbai on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Scott Detrow, “Who Are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Group That Overthrew the Assad Regime?” NPR, December 8, 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/12/08/nx-s1-5221633.
[2] “Rebel Leader Who Toppled Syria’s Assad Regime Named Interim President,” CBC, January 29, 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/syria-interim-president-named-sharaa-assad-1.7445119; US Embassy Syria (@USEMbassySyria), “We remain committed to bringing leading AQS figures in HTS to justice. #Syria,” X, May 15, 2017, https://x.com/USEmbassySyria/status/864144602584035328.
[3] “Appointment of Ahmed Al-Sharaa as Syria’s Transitional President,” DW Arabic, January 29, 2025, https://shorturl.at/WiFIw.
[4] John Palfrey, “Misinformation and Disinformation,” Britannica, February 4, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/misinformation-and-disinformation.
[5] “Who Are the Pro-Assad Militias in Syria?,” Middle East Eye, September 25, 2015, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/who-are-pro-assad-militias-syria.
[6] Ibrahiem Elsharkawy, “888_ Address by Bashar al-Assad Resigning and the Capture of Damascus by Opposition Forces, Along with Footage of Assad’s Flight,” YouTube, December 9, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ffpEEDWJww.
[7] Kimo (@kimo_aly22), “Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad announces his resignation and the transfer of his authority to the President of the People’s Assembly,” X, December 1, 2024,
[8] “Syrian Ministry of Information: Cautions Against Video Clip Declaring Assad’s Ouster,” Al-Arabiya, December 6, 2024, https://shorturl.at/moheu.
[9] “Our Reporter: Misleading Pages Titled Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic Spread Inaccurate Information,” RT Arabic, December 2, 2024, https://shorturl.at/U7EGz.
[10] Online monitoring by author. For example of such fake accounts on Facebook, see https://shorturl.at/d2zjP.
[11] “A Coordinated Media Campaign: Syrian Army Issues Warning About Disinformation,” Al-Ain, December 1, 2024, https://al-ain.com/article/syria-army-fake-news.
[12] Zouhir Al-Shimale (@ZouhirAlShimale), “Misleading Facebook CIB network are spreading fake news and sectarian propaganda in Syria, targeting Alawites…,” X, December 26, 2024, https://x.com/ZouhirAlShimale/status/1871989130097578356.
[13] The Assad family, who governed Syria from 1971 to 2024, are members of the Shia Alawite community, who constitute approximately 12% of Syria’s population. The Alawis have played a crucial role in supporting the regime, occupying high-ranking positions within the government, military, and intelligence agencies; they have, therefore, historically feared the repercussions should the Assads be removed from power.
[14] Joshua Landis (@joshua_landis), “Syrian forces burned down the Mausoleum of al-Khasibi in Aleppo. This is a game changer for the Alawites, who already have been shaken by the growing number of revenge killings…,” X, December 26, 2024, https://rb.gy/uxi2yf.
[15]Yahya Kanakreh, “Can Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Its Golani Leader Be Delisted from Terrorist Designations?,” BBC News, December 24, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/c4g3vjpxwr7o.
[16] “Who Are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian Groups that Took Aleppo?” Al-Jazeera, December 2, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/2/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-and-the-other-syrian-opposition-groups-in-aleppo.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Institute for the Study of War, “Interactive Map: Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria,” accessed January 31, 2025, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/1933cb1d315f4db3a4f4dcc5ef40753a.
[22] Sara Harmouch, “What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham? And How Did the Islamist Group Evolve into a Key Player in Syria’s Civil War?,” The Conversation, December 2, 2024, https://theconversation.com/what-is-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-and-how-did-the-islamist-group-evolve-into-a-key-player-in-syrias-civil-war-245017.
[23] Ibid.
[24] “The Syrian Government Is Taking Steps to Address Misconduct, Caution Against Misinformation, and Initiate a Military Campaign in Latakia,” BBC News Arabic, January 25, 2025, https://rb.gy/hz9rnl.
[25] Ibid.
[26] “Foreign Fighters and Their Jihadist Ideologies: the Shadow of Extremism Behind Syria’s New Leader,” France24, December 20, 2024, https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241220-syria-foreign-fighters-jihadism-extremism.
[27] Zeinab Awali, “South Operations Room Does Not Agree to Disband in Favour of Ahmed Al-Sharaa,” Sadadahie, January 1, 2025, https://sadadahie.com/?p=193911.
[28] Ibid.
[29] “Kurdish-Led Forces Push Back Turkish-Backed Syrian Rebels in a Tense Offensive,” Associated Press, December 8, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/syria-kurds-turkey-sdf-manbij-kobani-84928d1755cc09c239fe00074291ff0f.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Karwan Faidhi Dri, “SDF Controls About 40% of Syrian Territory: Official,” Rudaw, December 7, 2024, https://rb.gy/egvgjw.
[32] “Commander of Syrian Kurdish-Led Militia Rejects Disarmament,” Kurd Press, January 20, 2025,
https://en.kurdpress.com/news/159874/Commander-of-Syrian-Kurdish-led-militia-rejects-disarmament.
[33] Ibid.
[34] “Erdogan Says YPG ‘Will Be Buried’ in Syria If It Doesn’t Lay Down Arms,” Al-Jazeera, December 25, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/25/erdogan-says-ypg-will-be-buried-in-syria-if-it-doesnt-lay-down-arms.
[35]Ahmed Mohammed, “SDF to Retain Control Over ISIS Detainees Despite Calls for Transfer of Responsibility,” Kurdistan News Channel 8, January 5, 2025, https://channel8.com/english/28182.
[36] Ibid.
[37]Fadel Abdul Ghany (@FADELABDULGHANY), “The volume of disinformation circulating about #Syria is both staggering and deeply concerning. While some of it results from deliberate, organized efforts…” X, January 1, 2025, https://surl.li/slpxbk.
[38] Fella (@falafel9099), “Do you have no SHAME! your organization posted a report about a family assassinated around Manbij, and you accused SDF. while that same crime was documented 11 days prior…” X, January 2, 2025, https://x.com/falafel9099/status/1874721192361517479.
[39] “Nine Killed in Blast Targeting Syrian National Army in Manbij,” Asharq Al Awsat English, February 2, 2025, https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5107632-nine-killed-blast-targeting-syrian-national-army-manbij.
[40] David Miller (@Tracking_Power), “In the coming months, when you’re bombarded with organic looking propaganda about how utopian life under the new ISIS regime in Syria is, remember this meeting,” X, January 1, 2025, https://x.com/Tracking_Power/status/1874413902307402227.
[41] Zouhir Al-Shimale (@ZouhirAlShimale), “Social media influencers & bloggers are increasingly gaining recognition & high-level engagement w/ #Syria’s new administration, which appears to be positioning them as key messengers to shape narratives…” X, January 1, 2025, https://x.com/ZouhirAlShimale/status/1874184642917765419.
[42] Diva Carla-H (@ElycarlaH), “Here are the actions of the so-called opposition groups: ‘are you happy now with Al-Golani? You monsters…” X, December 8, 2024, https://surl.li/binjog.
[43] Daniel Hilton and Omar al-Aswad, “Syrians Live Among Bones After Years of Tadamon Killings,” Middle East Eye, December 19, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-tadamon-mass-graves-justice-0.
[44] “IS Issues Death Threat to Al-Golani and Initiates Violent Campaign Against Him,” Newsalist, December 15, 2024, https://www.newsalist.net/daash-yhdd-aljwlany-balqtl-wyshn-hmlh-anyfh-alyh/#google_vignette.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Abdul Sayed and Riccardo Valle, “How Did ISKP React to the HTS Victory in Syria?,” The Diplomat, January 20, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/how-did-iskp-react-to-the-hts-victory-in-syria/.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Kersten Knipp, “What Threat Does ISIS Represent for the Future of Syria Following Assad’s Downfall?,” DW, December 10, 2024, https://surl.li/ucfpdh.
[50] Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis and Nechirvan Mando, “US Scrambles to Quell ISIS Resurgence in Syria After Fall of Assad,” CNN, December 11, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/11/politics/us-scrambles-to-quell-isis-resurgence-syria/index.html.
[51] Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee, “ISIS Infiltrated a Refugee Camp to Recruit Fighters. Inside the Biden Admin’s Plan to Stop It,” NBC News, October 7, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/isis-syria-al-hol-camp-population-reduced-biden-administration-plan-rcna50877.
[52] “Al Roj: Inside Camp Where Dozens of Ex-IS Brides and Their Children Are Desperate to Go Home,” Sky News, February 26, 2024, https://news.sky.com/video/al-roj-inside-camp-where-dozens-of-ex-is-brides-and-their-children-are-desperate-to-go-home-13081438.
[53] U.S. Central Command, “Statement: USCENTCOM Commander Visits Syria,” January 16, 2025, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/4032390/uscentcom-commander-visits-syria/.
[54] Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center, GTTAC Record of Incident Database 2024 Codebook (Bethesda: Development Services Group, 2024).
[55] Ibid.
[56] “Door to Negotiation’ With Kurdish-Led SDF Open, Says Syrian Minister,” France24, January 22, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250122-syria-minister-says-open-to-talks-with-kurds-but-ready-to-use-force.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Derek Scally, “German Prosecutors Warn of Further ‘Lone Wolf’ Attacks As Syrian Man (26) Confesses to Stabbings,” The Irish Times, August 25, 2024, https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2024/08/25/germany-stabbing-attack-solingen-latest-news/.
[60] Joseph Wilkes and James Liddell, “ISIS Calls for Ramadan Massacre of Christians and Jews by Lone Wolves Across US, Europe and Israel,” Mirror, March 29, 2024, https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/us-news/breaking-isis-calls-ramadan-massacre-32465683.
