3D-Printed Firearms and Terrorism: Trends and Analysis Pertinent to Far-Right Use
This study examines the proliferation of 3D-printed firearms and their use by terrorist groups. Examining several case studies, a data-driven analysis of the 3D-printed firearm, looking into the geographical spread, ideological breakdown, individual profiles and most popular types of firearms, is presented. Due to ideological and geographical factors, 3D-printed firearms are more prevalent among far-right groups as opposed to jihadists or other ideological groups. Finally, the article discusses the evolving threat landscape and implications for counter terrorism efforts, and suggests strategies to mitigate this emerging security challenge.
Introduction
3D-printing, also known as additive manufacturing, is an industrial engineering method that was first developed in the early 1980s. In simple terms, 3D-printing involves downloading computer-assisted design (CAD) files (similar to Word files in standard 2D-printing) which are available online and feeding them into a 3D-printer that produces a 3-dimensional object using specialised plastics or polymers as its raw material. It was first called rapid prototyping because of its ability to create cost-effective prototypes for industries.[1] Ever since the 1980s, 3D-printing technology has evolved rapidly, becoming cheaper, easier to use and more user-friendly. The applications of the technology span several areas and industries, namely, construction, medicine, engineering, aerospace and other commercial uses.
As with other dual-use technologies, 3D-printing has been taken advantage of by certain parties for the manufacture of weapons, in particular, firearms. In 2013, University of Texas law student Cody Wilson designed and produced the first 3D-printed gun called the Liberator.[2] Inspired by the FP-45 Liberator, a single-shot pistol designed by the United States (US) military during World War II,[3] Wilson’s Liberator was a single-shot pistol that consisted of 16 parts, out of which 15 were 3D-printed.[4] The only non-3D-printed component was a regular nail that acted as the firing pin. Several law enforcement agencies test-fired the gun and, despite its limitations, noted that it was a potentially lethal firearm.[5]
Ever since then, 3D-printed firearms, sometimes known as ‘ghost guns’ due to their untraceability as they have no serial numbers, have proliferated. Designs for new and more lethal guns are being developed and tested on a daily basis. This is facilitated by online communities of ghost gun designers, enthusiasts and testers which have mushroomed on social media platforms such as X, Rocket.Chat, Reddit and Odysee. While most of the individuals involved in 3D-printing firearms are gun enthusiasts, this technology has garnered the attention of several terrorist cells and extremists who have either used or attempted to use them in terrorist attacks.
Classification
Armament Research Services (ARES) classifies 3D-printed firearms into three categories: Fully 3D-printed (F3DP); Hybrid; and Parts-Kit Completion (PKC).[6] As the name suggests, F3DP are firearms that are almost entirely 3D-printed except for certain minor non-printed parts.[7] The majority of the firearms in this category are single-shot pistols or guns that are only usable for a minimum number of shots, such as the Liberator, Songbird and Washbear-type pistols.[8] Likewise, hybrid firearms are also primarily 3D-printed, but utilise commercial, unregulated (mostly hardware store) materials to complete the assembly. In most cases, the lower receivers (frames) are printed and the firearms are supplemented by commercial hardware store materials such as steel tubing and springs that are modified to re-enforce the assemblies and to act as barrels and chambers.[9] Examples of firearms in this category are the FGC-9, Urutau and the Shuty.
Meanwhile, PKCs are firearms that have a 3D-printed receiver (or frame). Most or all of the pressure-bearing components such as the slide, barrel and bolt are commercial, factory-made components.[10] The difference between PKCs and hybrid firearms is the fact that PKCs make use of commercially available firearm components to complete assembly, whereas hybrid firearms make use of hardware store materials that are modified. PKCs are generally more reliable than other types of firearms with 3D-printed parts, but may be more challenging to assemble, especially in countries where the sale of commercial firearm parts is banned.[11] An example in this category is the Glock-type handgun.
Global Trends – 3D-Printed Firearms and Terrorism
The analysis below is based on the author’s Global 3D-Printed Firearm database, where an incident/case is defined as any report of an arrest, raid or discovery of a 3D-printed firearm/component[12] The classification of 3D-printed firearms in this study follows the ARES classification with the addition of a separate category called ‘firearm components’, where components of printed firearms that have not been assembled into a workable firearm are discovered. The data collection for the database was primarily based on open-source media reports, academic literature, open-source law enforcement databases and certain social media channels. The analysis below was based on 165 cases recorded between 2013 and March 2024.
Geographically, the number of incidents involving 3D-printed firearms was concentrated in North America and Europe (see Figure 1). A significant number of cases were recorded in Asia due to the relatively high use of 3D-printed weapons in the ongoing Myanmar conflict.[13]
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of 3D-printed firearm cases.
The use of 3D-printed firearms is a relatively recent phenomenon, with a significant jump occurring between 2020 and 2023 as shown in Figure 2. A possible reason for this is the advancement of 3D-printing technology, which has become cheaper and more accessible in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic may also have played a role. Given the heavy role of online communities and activities in the proliferation of 3D-printed firearms, the lockdowns resulting from the pandemic may have prompted individuals to seek refuge in online spaces and hence sparked their interest in these firearms in the same way we saw an increase in online extremism and radical activity during the same time.[14]
Figure 2: Timeline of 3D-printed firearm cases.
Figure 3 shows that while majority of the cases (60 percent) were criminal in nature, 15 percent of the 165 cases of 3D-printed firearms were linked to terrorism. Among the terrorism-linked cases, 3D-printed firearms seemed to be the most popular with the far-right, as seen in Figure 4.
Figure 3: Distribution of 3D-printed firearm cases by nature of activity.
Figure 4: Ideological breakdown of 3D-printed firearm cases.
Europe, particularly the United Kingdom (UK), recorded the highest number of far-right-related 3D-printed firearm cases, contributing to 46 percent of the total number of far-right cases across all continents (see Figure 5). This may possibly be due to the fact that these cases are being reported much more frequently in the UK than in other countries, or that this technology has gained the most traction in the UK. Other European countries that recorded far-right cases were Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. A single far-right case was recorded in Brazil.
Figure 5: Far-right case distribution by continent.
In terms of the perpetrator type, most of the far-right cases involving 3D-printed firearms were lone actors and cells as shown in Figure 6.[15]
Figure 6: Far-right case distribution by perpetrator type.
Interestingly, 82 percent of the far-right cases involved the manufacture of the firearm (see Figure 7). Out of all the cases, only one was a success – whereby the perpetrator had discharged the firearm. The rest of the cases (95 percent; 19) were failures, in that the perpetrator(s) were interdicted or arrested before they were able to discharge the firearm. The high number of failures could be attributed to effective law enforcement that was able to detect these individuals before they had the opportunity to carry out attacks or use the weapons.
Figure 7: Distribution of 3D-printed firearm cases by type of use.
Figure 8 shows the countries where youth (aged between 15-24) were involved in far-right activity linked to 3D-printed firearms. Youth involvement was primarily centred in Europe, with the UK recording the highest number of cases. Youth involvement by perpetrator type (see Figure 9) showcases a similar pattern as Figure 6.
Figure 8: Distribution of youth by country.
Figure 9: Distribution of youth by perpetrator type.
In terms of the firearms, the most prominent type that was used/recovered in far-right cases were hybrid firearms, in particular the FGC-9,[16] and firearm components (see Figures 10 and 11). ‘NA’ refers to cases where the perpetrators were in possession of blueprints without having manufactured the firearm. No F3DP firearms linked to far-right cases were detected.
Figure 10: Distribution of firearms by classification.
Figure 11: Distribution of firearms by specific type.
Prevalence with the Far-Right
As the data above shows, 3D-printed firearms have been most prevalent with the far-right compared to other extremist groups such as jihadists due to ideological and geographical factors. Within the ideological spectrum, far-right ideologies seem to place a prominent emphasis on the stockpiling of weapons and firearms.[17] Far-right forums have also been found to share blueprints and materials relating to 3D-printed firearms more widely compared to other ideologies, for example, the jihadists.[18]
3D-printed weapons and firearms have not been featured prominently in jihadist chat rooms, forums and propaganda. Jihadist groups like the self-styled Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda still prefer to use tried-and-tested attack methods such as explosives, conventional weapons, suicide bombings, and knife and vehicular attacks. The author’s observations indicate that brief discussions of 3D-printed firearms were found on IS social media channels, but these were not followed up. The lack of emphasis on this technology compared to other modes of attack may have played a role in the strategic calculus of jihadist groups with regard to the adoption of this technology.[19]
Another reason for the absence of adoption among jihadists groups may be the lack of a successful attack on the jihadist front using 3D-printed firearms. Jihadist groups and sympathisers tend to emulate past successful attacks.[20] Lack thereof of any using a new technology like 3D-printing may steer prospective actors to tried-and-tested methods of attacks instead of new ones. On the other hand, within the far-right sphere, the 2019 Halle attack in Germany carried out by Stephan Balliet serves as a precedent ‘success’ story that prospective far-right attackers may look up to.[21]
Balliet was a far-right extremist motivated primarily by anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and anti-feminism.[22] He attempted to storm a Jewish synagogue and carry out a shooting attack.[23] He killed two individuals before he was arrested. This was the first terrorist attack that made use of firearms with 3D-printed components, i.e., a hybrid Luty submachine gun.[24] Balliet’s firearm, however, malfunctioned in the process of the attack, reducing the number of casualties. Nevertheless, the Halle attack is regarded as a success and several far-right plotters have since been found to be in possession of his manifesto, possibly serving as an inspiration.[25]
Another figure that is widely regarded within the 3D-printed firearm community is Jacob Duygu (who went by the online moniker “JStark1809”). Duygu was famously known for designing the FGC-9, a hybrid, semi-automatic pistol caliber carbine that requires no regulated parts.[26] Apart from the printed parts, it can be completed with regular hardware store components, making it a weapon that can be entirely assembled at home.[27] The FGC-9 has become one of the most prevalent hybrid firearms within both the far-right and criminal networks. It has also inspired the development of other hybrid weapons with no regulated components such as the Urutau and Nutty9.
The main motivation for the creation of the FGC-9 by Duygu was to circumvent gun laws in Europe and enable anyone to own and manufacture firearms.[28] He founded an online community of enthusiasts and gun designers called Deterrence Dispensed to enable them to share printed gun designs and encourage their use.[29] As a result, he has been revered as a martyr for the right to bear arms.[30] Duygu was found to have xenophobic, anti-Semitic and incel tendencies.[31]
A far-right-linked individual named Jim Holmgren from Sweden was alleged to have sourced firearm designs from Duygu’s Deterrence Dispensed and was active in its online community.[32] Holmgren was found to have attempted to manufacture several types of 3D-printed firearms. In addition to ideological factors, geography plays a role in the prevalence of 3D-printed firearms among the far-right. The far-right is primarily centred in Europe, where gun laws are relatively strict and access to weapons is challenging. In Europe, buying a gun would require access to the black market and it would cost approximately £ 5,000 GBP.[33] 3D-printing offers a cheap, viable alternative to obtain weapons which would only cost at most a few hundred pounds.
Jihadist groups, on the other hand, are primarily centred in the Middle East and North Africa, where weapons are easily available through the black market and smuggling networks. Thus, there is no incentive on the part of the jihadists to engage in 3D-printing of weapons. It must be noted here that 3D-printed weapons require a substantial amount of time and effort, and a considerable amount of skill to manufacture. It is not as easy as ‘Download-Print-Shoot’. The quality and efficacy of the weapon is highly dependent on the skill and experience of the maker.[34] Therefore, conventional weapons remain the more effective weapon of choice, particularly in areas where they are readily available compared to regions where they are difficult to obtain. 3D-printed weapons may be an attractive option only in the latter scenario.
Selected Case Studies
In February 2024, a three-man far-right cell comprising two youths aged 24 and a 33 year old, were accused of plotting an attack on an Islamic centre in Leeds using a 3D-printed firearm.[35] During the raid, British police discovered a 3D-printed FGC-9 firearm, a 3D-printer and instructions of how to make 3D-printed firearms, alongside neo-Nazi material.[36] The cell was part of a Telegram chat group that discussed arms and terrorist plotting.[37]
In October 2023, a German cell whose members were believed to be part of a German right-wing extremist group called Knockout 51, was found to be in possession of 3D-printed firearm parts, and 3D-printing equipment, materials and instructions.[38] Similarly, in July 2023, Finnish police uncovered a four-man accelerationist cell that had manufactured FGC-9s and had intended to use them in ethnic and racially motivated attacks against public infrastructure and politicians.[39] Likewise, a far-right-linked individual was arrested in Tenerife, Spain, in 2020 for allegedly running a 3D-printed weapons workshop.[40]
In April 2024, a 35 year old from California was arrested for possession of 3D-printed firearm components and two 3D-printers.[41] He was affiliated with a racially motivated violent extremist group called San Fernando Valley Peckerwoods, and had used social media to post anti-Semitic remarks and to offer to manufacture 3D-printed firearms for others.[42]
While most terrorist cases linked to 3D-printed firearms are far-right in nature, other ideologies also emerge from time to time. For instance, in March 2024, a 23-year-old youth from Pescara, Italy who was allegedly influenced by left-wing anarchist ideology was arrested for manufacturing an FGC-9.[43] He had also attempted to manufacture ammunition and intended to spread these weapons among anarchist circles.[44]
An Evolving Threat
The threat from 3D-printed firearms is evolving rapidly. Information, material and manuals pertaining to the manufacture of these weapons are readily available on the open-source web. 3D-printing technology is also becoming cheaper and easier to use. New firearm designs that are becoming increasingly easier to produce and that make use of lesser commercial parts (entirely homemade and improvised) are being developed.
Considering these developments, while still primarily a criminal enterprise, 3D-printed firearms are becoming increasingly more attractive to terrorist elements, particularly the far-right in Europe. These weapons will be the weapon of choice for individuals who prioritise secrecy and anonymity as these can be manufactured almost entirely at home and without any interaction with the outside world.[45] Although the durability of these weapons is heavily dependent on the skill of the maker and quality of the material used, these weapons are still very capable of localised, small-scale attacks. Walther notes that the threat projection can be divided into three categories: gun designers developing better models; advances in chemistry leading to the development of stronger plastics and polymers; and advancements in 3D-printers themselves.[46]
While 3D-printing is primarily done with plastics, the dawn of metal printing is a new development that needs to be monitored. In 2013, a Texas-based engineering firm successfully built the first metal 3D-printed firearm – a Browning 1911 pistol – a standard issue firearm for the US military until 1985.[47] The gun managed to successfully fire 50 rounds.[48] While expensive industrial-level printers were used then,[49] advancements in technology cannot discount the possibility of metal 3D-printers becoming cheaper and more accessible in the same way as polymer 3D-printers. Some metal milling machines costing as low as US$1200, which allow users to mill firearm components (such as lower receivers from steel and aluminium) at home, are commercially available on the market.[50]
Counter Measures
The dual-use nature of 3D-printing technology poses several counter terrorism challenges to the authorities. In this regard, strong legislation, cyber-intelligence and intelligence sharing among authorities are vital. As the primary starting point for printing a weapon is in the online manuals, some countries such as Singapore have banned the possession and downloading of these manuals.[51] The National Crime Agency in the UK has called for similar measures to be enforced in the country.[52] Under Canadian law, the production and possession of 3D-printed firearms are prohibited.[53]
3D-printing is heavily dependent on online communication and activity. As such, cyber intelligence and patrolling of online chat rooms and social media channels by law enforcement is key to interdicting this phenomenon. Apart from cyber intelligence, cooperation with other services such as postal and delivery services is crucial. For example, if an individual is found to be purchasing commercial parts such as barrels and slides without the lower receivers, this can be considered a red flag and an indication that the individual might be manufacturing his or her own receivers.
In conclusion, the rapid evolution of 3D-printed firearms presents a multifaceted challenge, with readily available information and advancing technology making these weapons increasingly accessible. Addressing this threat necessitates strong legislation, enhanced cyber-intelligence capabilities, and international cooperation among various stakeholders, combined with a mix of preventive and proactive measures to contain and prevent it from spilling over into a national and international security concern.
About the Author
Rueben Dass is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Kool C on Unsplash
Citations
[1] Pavol Cabada, “Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense,” in Handbook of Cyber-Development, Cyber-Democracy, and Cyber-Defense, eds. Elias G. Carayannis, David F. J. Campbell and Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), p. 734, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06091-0_11-1.
[2] Georgi Kantchev, “Authorities Worry 3-D Printers May Undermine Europe’s Gun Laws,” The New York Times, October 17, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/business/international/european-authorities-wary-of-3-d-guns-made-on-printers.html; N.R. Jenzen-Jones, “Small Arms and Additive Manufacturing: An Assessment of 3D-Printed Firearms, Components, and Accessories,” in Behind the Curve: New Technologies, New Control Challenges (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2015), p. 46, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10742.10.
[3] Gwilym Roberts Harry, 3D Printed Firearms: A History of Their Creation, Distribution and Efforts at Restriction (New York: IANSA and NonViolence International, 2021), 2, https://iansa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/3D-PRINTED-FIREARMS-1.pdf.
[4] Gerald Walther, “Printing Insecurity? The Security Implications of 3D-Printing of Weapons,” Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 21, No. 6 (2015), p. 1436, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-014-9617-x.
[5] “NSW Police Commissioner Warns of Dangers of 3D Guns,” TheNSWPolice, May 23, 2013, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9taL4svjH_g.
[6] G. Hays, Ivan T. and N.R. Jenzen-Jones, Desktop Firearms: Emergent Small Arms Craft Production Technologies (Australia: Armament Research Services, 2020), pp. 13–16, https://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ARES-Research-Report-8-Desktop-Firearms.pdf.
[7] Ibid., p. 13.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., p. 14.
[10] Ibid, p. 15.
[11] Ibid.
[12] This is still a work in progress and thus may not reflect absolute values. Given the heavy dependence on open-source media reporting, one of the major unavoidable limitations that the database faces is under-reporting and irregular reporting of cases. Nevertheless, some useful analyses of the phenomenon may still be discerned from the database.
[13] Manuel Nicola Primitivi, “Anti-Junta Rebels Resort to 3D-Printed Weapons in Myanmar,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 22, No. 7 (2024), https://jamestown.org/program/anti-junta-rebels-resort-to-3d-printed-weapons-in-myanmar/.
[14] Richard Morris, “Researchers Warn of Rise in Extremism Online After Covid,” BBC News, December 30, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-61106191.
[15] Cell is defined as more than one perpetrator involved, does not have a clear leadership hierarchy, and is not part of an established criminal/terrorist network. Group is defined as more than one perpetrator involved, has a clear leadership hierarchy, and is part of an established criminal/terrorist network.
[16] More information about the FGC-9 can be found in Hays, T. and Jenzen-Jones, Desktop Firearms: Emergent Small Arms Craft Production Technologies.
[17] Rajan Basra, “The Future Is Now: The Use of 3D-Printed Guns by Extremists and Terrorists,” GNET Insights, June 23, 2022, https://gnet-research.org/2022/06/23/the-future-is-now-the-use-of-3d-printed-guns-by-extremists-and-terrorists/.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Daniel Koehler, “The Halle, Germany, Synagogue Attack and the Evolution of the Far-Right Terror Threat,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 12, No. 11 (2019), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/halle-germany-synagogue-attack-evolution-far-right-terror-threat/.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Basra, “The Future Is Now.”
[26] Rajan Basra, Behind the Mask: Uncovering the Extremist Messages of a 3D‑Printed Gun Designer (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2023), p. 3, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/ICSR-Report-Behind-the-Mask-Uncovering-the-Extremist-Messages-of-a-3D%E2%80%91Printed-Gun-Designer.pdf.
[27] “Urutau 9mm Carbine,” Impro Guns, December 20, 2022, https://homemadeguns.wordpress.com/2022/12/20/urutau-9mm-carbine/.
[28] Basra, Behind the Mask, pp. 25–29.
[29] Ibid., p. 26.
[30] Ibid., p. 4.
[31] Ibid., pp. 33–35, pp. 39–43.
[32] Ibid., p. 46; Basra, “The Future Is Now.”
[33] Hyder Abbasi, “What’s Behind Far-Right Trend of Using 3D Tech to Make Guns?” Al Jazeera, July 31, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/31/what-behind-far-right-trend-using-3d-tech-make-guns.
[34] Rueben Dass and Benjamin Mok, “Assessing the Impact of 3D-Printed Weapons on the Violent Extremist Milieu,” GNET Insights, February 20, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/02/20/assessing-the-impact-of-3d-printed-weapons-on-the-violent-extremist-milieu/.
[35] Duncan Gardham, “Three Men Accused of Preparing ‘3D-Printed Firearm Attack’ on Islamic Centre,” Sky News, February 27, 2024, https://news.sky.com/story/three-men-charged-with-preparing-act-of-terrorism-after-suspected-extreme-right-wing-activity-13081942.
[36] Vikram Dodd, “Three Men Charged Over Far-Right Terror Plot Allegedly Involving 3D-Printed Gun,” The Guardian, February 27, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/feb/27/three-men-charged-over-far-right-terror-plot-allegedly-involving-3d-printed-gun.
[37] Daniel De Simone and Jeremy Culley, “Three Men Charged with Planning Attack on Islamic Education Centre,” BBC News, February 27, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-68411163.
[38] Hemkentokrax von Johanna, “Neonazi-Gruppe Knockout 51 hatte Kontakt in die Bundeswehr,” MDR.DE, October 13, 2023, https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/thueringen/knockout-neonazi-bundeswehr-waffenlager-100.html.
[39] Finland Police, “Kaksi esitutkintaa valmistunut liittyen epäiltyihin terrorismirikoksiin,” July 20, 2023, https://poliisi.fi/-/kaksi-esitutkintaa-valmistunut-liittyen-epailtyihin-terrorismirikoksiin.
[40] Policía Nacional, “Desmantelado El Primer Taller Ilegal de Impresión de Armas 3D En España,” April 18, 2021, https://www.policia.es/_es/comunicacion_prensa_detalle.php?ID=8705.
[41] United States Attorney’s Office, Central District of California, “Reseda Man Who Expressed Anti-Semitic Hate Sentenced to Federal Prison for Illegally Possessing Ammunition and Machine Guns,” April 19, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/reseda-man-who-expressed-anti-semitic-hate-sentenced-federal-prison-illegally.
[42] Ibid.
[43] “Terrorismo, Armi agli Anarchici: Perquisizione a un 23enne di Pescara,” la Repubblica, March 23, 2024, https://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2024/03/23/news/terrorismo_armi_agli_anarchici_perquisizione_a_un_23enne_di_pescara-422362775/.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Matt Schroeder et al., Privately Made Firearms in the European Union (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2023), p. 11, https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/privately-made-firearms-european-union.
[46] Walther, “Printing Insecurity?” p. 1437.
[47] Samuel Gibbs, “First Metal 3D Printed Gun Is Capable of Firing 50 Shots,” The Guardian, November 8, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/08/metal-3d-printed-gun-50-shots.
[48] Ibid.
[49] “Powerful and Here to Stay: US Firm Claims First 3D-Printed Metal Gun,” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 9, 2013, https://www.smh.com.au/technology/powerful-and-here-to-stay-us-firm-claims-first-3dprinted-metal-gun-20131111-2xava.html.
[50] Andy Greenberg, “The $1,200 Machine That Lets Anyone Make a Metal Gun at Home,” WIRED, October 1, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/10/cody-wilson-ghost-gunner/.
[51] Vanesa Listek, “New Singapore Law Criminalizes Possession of Blueprints for 3D Printing Guns,” 3DPrint.com, January 6, 2021, https://3dprint.com/277588/new-singapore-law-criminalizes-possession-of-blueprints-for-3d-printing-guns/.
[52] Rajeev Syal, “NCA Calls for Possession of 3D-Printed Gun Blueprints to Be Made Illegal,” The Guardian, October 31, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/nca-calls-for-possession-of-3d-printed-gun-blueprints-to-be-made.
[53] Vanesa Listek, “Daring AM: Canada Tackles Increase of 3D Printed Gun Arrests and Sentences”, 3DPrint.com, January 10, 2024, https://3dprint.com/?p=306013.
