Afghanistan
Since August 2021, following the Taliban’s takeover, Afghanistan has entered a turbulent period of transition, particularly in terms of shifts in governance, security and geopolitics. Seeking to foster diplomatic ties with all neighbouring countries, the Taliban regime has been facing serious internal security threats that have the potential to influence its international commitments and engagements. Militant groups such as Al-Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the National Resistance Front (NRF), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and Jamaat Ansaar Ullah (Tehreek-e-Taliban Tajikistan), have been presenting internal security challenges to Afghanistan. These groups may not only pose direct threats through attacks and destruction, but also have the potential to negatively impact Afghanistan’s relationships with other nations.
Trends
Taliban’s Governance and Internal Divisions
The Taliban’s claim of having control over the country’s governance has faced persistent challenges, even from various local leaders within Taliban power factions.[1] As a result, frequent political tensions have arisen between Kabul (the political power centre) and Kandahar (the spiritual power centre).[2] The international community lacks a structural understanding of the Taliban’s governance structures and decision-making hierarchy. Hence, it is unable to exert the kind of diplomatic influence required to mould decisions palatable to the world. On top of that, the Taliban’s vague counter terrorism commitments, a ruthless crackdown against the ISK notwithstanding, and the ban on girls’ and women’s rights to education and work, have made matters worse. The West terms the Taliban’s policies towards women as gender apartheid, while the Taliban view it as the continuation of the former’s cultural war against Afghanistan.
The Taliban leadership is divided mainly into two categories: the spiritual order and the political order. The former, based in Kandahar, makes decisions based on their interpretation of Islamic shariah, no matter how politically unpopular its implementation might be for the political order on the ground. On the other hand, the political order resides in Kabul and dispenses day-to-day governance and engages with the international community and other stakeholders.[3]
The internal differences among the Taliban leadership are tribal in nature rather than ideational.[4] With much affiliation to the likes of Pashtun tribal culture, climbing the hierarchical ladders over others, whether they are friends or foes, is an established trend with centuries of documented history. Therefore, the reported differences between the major factions of the Taliban – the Haqqani Network and the Kandaharis – are mostly over tribal dominance, rather than an ideological divide.[5] Kandaharis have traditionally dominated the Afghan leadership, whether during the Taliban or non-Taliban periods, while the greater Paktika region (Khost, Paktika and Paktiya provinces), which currently represents the Haqqani Network, remains a major support base for Kandaharis to take control of either Kabul or Kandahar. The Haqqanis and Kandaharis bicker over the distribution of cabinet positions, government jobs and credit claims for the August 2021 victory.[6] The Haqqanis maintain that the war was won through a military campaign which they spearheaded. On the contrary, the Kandaharis believe that negotiations in Doha led by current Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar resulted in an agreement in 2020 which paved the way for the United States (US)’s exit from Afghanistan.[7]
The Taliban’s primary and firm strength lies in their ideological framework, which works as a gel holding the movement’s coherence together and undoing even the strongest tendencies of tribal rivalries. Though at the surface there are differences and disagreements, they have never been so intense as to cause major discord. The Taliban have always settled their rivalries in the wake of an external threat.
In the future, the leader of the Haqqani Network and current Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, with all his contributions in the military, political and financial spheres, will make him a strong candidate to succeed the current Spiritual Leader, Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada. Furthermore, to maintain a balance between Afghanistan’s southern and eastern parts, the Taliban’s leadership council may prefer him over other leaders from the Kandahar region, such as Defence Minister Mullah Muhammad Yaqoob, who is the son of the Taliban’s founder Mullah Omar. However, Sirajuddin’s ostensibly liberal stance on certain domestic issues, such as girls’ right to education, and his openness to work with the West, make him a less favourable candidate. The Taliban, for internal cohesion, require a radical ideologue.
Differences will likely persist, mainly on political matters, but there is nothing to suggest that these political differences will lead to infighting. All key Taliban leaders realise that escalation beyond a certain point will result in a civil war that will not benefit any of the factions and, more importantly, their ideology – something they will never compromise.
Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)
Since its inception in 2015, ISK has been one of the most brutal enemies of the Afghan Taliban and its affiliates, including religious scholars and local political leaders.[8] ISK has challenged the Taliban’s claim of restoring peace in Afghanistan by targeting religious minorities and the Taliban’s leader as well as assaulting their ideological base through relentless social media propaganda, portraying the Taliban as power hungry and opportunistic. ISK’s propaganda arm, Al-Azaim Foundation, has labelled the Taliban as apostates for being soft on Shias and diplomatically engaging with Iran.[9]
In October 2022, ISK killed Sheikh Rahim Ullah Haqqani, one of the top pro-Taliban religious scholars and a vocal critic of the former.[10] Following the incident, the militant outfit carried out a series of attacks against the Taliban as well as on minorities in Afghanistan.[11]
In January 2023, ISK carried out two devastating attacks in Kabul, targeting the Kabul International Airport on January 1[12] and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 11[13] with suicide bombers. These attacks signalled a change in ISK tactics, which had been evolving since late 2022. ISK began to carry out attacks less frequently but with a focus on mass casualties, mostly deploying suicide bombers. Hence, several suicide operations and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks were carried out in urban centres such as Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Faizabad, targeting high-ranking Taliban officials, including northern Balkh province’s governor Mohammad Daud Muzammil,[14] Badakhshan’s governor Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi,[15] the police chief of Baghlan Safiullah Samin, and the police chief of Badakhshan Mawlawi Abdul Haq Omar. Other attacks, though less impactful, took place in the form of ambushes and targeted killings, mostly in Kunar province and Herat city.
At any rate, ISK continues to attract the international community’s attention as a transnational jihadist entity in competition with the Taliban, and its appeal remains strong.[16] The group has successfully recruited individuals from outside Afghanistan, particularly Uzbek and Tajik nationals, who have been travelling to Afghanistan to join ISK and participate as suicide bombers in the group’s major operations. As a result, ISK’s threats are firmly anchored in the transregional and transnational appeal that the group wields, thereby sustaining the organisation and enabling it to carry out major attacks across Afghanistan’s urban landscape. The terrorist group has tried to fracture the relationship of the Taliban with its neighbours, while simultaneously backing its dense propaganda and ability to successfully execute its threats against a plethora of local and regional adversaries. It has targeted Russian, Chinese and Pakistani diplomats in Kabul, along with conducting fire raids on the Uzbek and Tajik borders.
With its so-called caliphate decimated in Iraq and Syria, ISK has confirmed itself as the most dynamic Islamic State province in terms of adaptation to a new security environment, rivals and propaganda narratives. Since its official inception in January 2015, ISK has undergone several transformations in its tactics while keeping intact its broad strategy in the region.[17] The group’s trajectory manifests its resilience to political and security changes in the region, overcoming territorial and operational setbacks over the years. Furthermore, contrary to more militarily successful provinces – such as Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP), Islamic State in Sahel Province and Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP) – ISK does not control any territorial stronghold. However, ISK is the only province in IS’ ecosystem which has been projecting itself as the launching pad for regional and international operations aimed at targeting Afghanistan’s neighbours as well as the West.
The National Resistance Front (NRF)
When the Taliban took over Afghanistan, experts worldwide raised concerns regarding security issues posed by militant organisations.[18] However, not enough attention was paid to the National Resistance Front (NRF)’s uprising in the northern and north-eastern provinces of the country, led by Ahmad Massoud, son of the Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud.
According to Amnesty International’s 2022 report, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented a minimum of 160 extrajudicial executions by Taliban fighters between the group’s assumption of control on August 15, 2021 and June 15, 2022.[19] The UN reported in December 2022 that there were at least 69 additional extrajudicial killings, with 48 of them involving NRF members, occurring between September 12 and 14 in Panjshir province.
With time, the NRF has acquired a strong ground presence despite being attacked by the Taliban. According to the latest on-ground reports, the NRF has claimed to have killed at least eight members of the Taliban.[20] However, the Taliban have consistently denied a strong presence of the NRF in the North. Nevertheless, due to the proliferation of anti-Taliban sentiments in the region, over 20 smaller militant groups have emerged. The key challenge they face is a lack of unity, which hinders their ability to operate as a cohesive force against the Taliban. In a future scenario, if the Central Asian republics see the Taliban as a growing threat or witness ethnic cleansing of communities linked to these countries, the NRF could be empowered by the Central Asian republics.
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda (AQ) faced a major setback after the killing of its topmost leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Kabul in August 2022.[21] Since then, the group has not yet chosen a new leader, notwithstanding that Saif al-Adel, who resides in Iran, is touted as the group’s de facto leader. Zawahiri’s killing in Kabul once again brought into sharp focus the close ties between AQ and the Taliban.
Under the Doha Agreement 2020, the Taliban are obligated to ensure that Afghanistan’s soil will not be used for terrorist activities against any other country.[22] While the Taliban claim to maintain a watchful eye on AQ, it is important to recognise that AQ’s ideology is global and its goal is to serve as a vanguard for jihad worldwide.
In 2023, AQ boosted its propaganda once again with Al-Qaeda in the Indian-Subcontinent (AQIS) being the most active. AQIS is AQ’s official South Asian franchise, whose current leader is Ustaz Osama Mahmood. Reports suggest that senior AQ leadership in Afghanistan continues to oversee plans for attacks in other regions of the world. Reportedly, AQIS is operating from Afghanistan. The propaganda of AQ also suggests that it is helping groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Evidence has also emerged of AQ’s involvement in terrorist attacks in Pakistan with the TTP’s help and under cover names of newly emerging jihadist entities like the Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP)[23] – a shadow group that has conducted large-scale attacks on military installations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces (a more detailed discussion in the Pakistan threat assessment in this issue). All these pose a potential threat to the Taliban’s international engagement, and their professed commitment to a free and secure Afghanistan may serve as a facade concealing the actual global threat.
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Although the TTP does not pose a direct threat to the internal security of Afghanistan, it is damaging the country’s relations with Pakistan. While hosting the top commanders of the TTP and their families in Khost and Kunar provinces, the Taliban have asked Pakistan to resolve disputes and ongoing issues with the TTP through negotiations (a more detailed discussion in the Pakistan threat assessment in this issue). The Pakistan-TTP talks spanning over a year with the mediation of Sirajuddin Haqqani in 2022[24] remained unsuccessful. Keeping in view recent bilateral tensions, the TTP is the most critical element affecting Pakistan and Afghanistan relations.
A recent large-scale attack along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan in the Badakhshan-Chitral region saw more than 400 TTP fighters attacking Pakistani check posts, the first large-scale attempt by the group to enter and control territory in Pakistan.[25] After a terse military and diplomatic response from Pakistan, TTP fighters pulled back. But the incident further strained the already abysmal ties, resulting in direct policy changes from Islamabad, affecting the fate of around 1.6 million Afghan immigrants inside the country.[26]
Response
Considering the presence of ISK and the NRF, the two biggest competitors to the Afghan government, the Taliban have deployed most of their resources to counter the agendas of the two groups. In the face of ISK’s escalating attacks, the Taliban’s campaign against the group has been ruthlessly effective. It has forced ISK to change its tactics, adopting a lower profile while preparing for other significant attacks, as well as relocating some of its fighters to Pakistan.[27]
Reportedly, in 2023, the Taliban killed 14 top ISK leaders together with more than 50 low-ranking members, leading to the dismantling of several networks, such as the one in Badakhshan which orchestrated several attacks in the province.
Likewise, to counter narratives that undermine their credibility, the Taliban have established a propaganda organisation, Al-Mirsaad (a vantage point to observe and attack). The primary mission of Al-Mirsaad is to provide detailed responses to all ideological arguments put forth by ISK to discredit the Taliban, thereby addressing the core of ISK’s ideology.[28] Though Al-Mirsaad has consistently emphasised its complete independence from the Taliban government, the fact that it is headquartered in Kabul suggests a close collaboration with the Taliban authorities. Officially launched in February 2022, Al-Mirsaad has been publishing and featuring content which directly attacks the Islamic State as a whole and ISK in particular. Now, Al-Mirsaad acts as a counter to ISK’s regional mouthpiece, Al-Azaim Foundation, publishing in different languages including Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Uzbek and English.
In order to restore diplomatic relations with Pakistan and clean up the image of the Taliban government, a series of background meetings has resulted in the Taliban making public statements that condemn acts of terrorism inside Pakistan. For instance, the Afghan Consul General Hafiz Mohibullah Shakir was asked to make a public statement, “Jihad in Pakistan is not Jihad”.[29] This was an extension of a legal decree by Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah, who, after taking charge of his office, said that no actions outside Afghanistan’s border would be taken without his consent.
Outlook
In 2023, the US lauded Afghanistan for apparently gaining control over ISK and its activities within the country. However, it cannot be ignored that, apart from the NRF and ISK, there is a multitude of small militant groups, such as the Afghanistan Freedom Front, Afghanistan Islamic National & Liberation Movement, Watan Dost Patriotic Front and Ghazdomak Unit (Death Squad), in the central and eastern regions of Afghanistan which continue to stoke militant sentiments and entice individuals to join various extremist organisations.
Internal militant threats in Afghanistan are aggravated by the precarious economic and political instability that the country has been facing since August 2021, in addition to the social grievances the Afghan Taliban rule is fuelling. While the Taliban security apparatus has been effectively countering direct, physical threats to the country, other non-kinetic and fluid threats persist, which can lure individuals and militant factions into challenging the Taliban authorities – such as the ideology of jihadist groups; economic opportunities from war; shifting alliances; or revenge for imposed grievances. Should the Taliban security apparatus be overstretched and weakened, such militant groups may take advantage and reopen warfronts in other areas of Afghanistan where militancy has been dormant recently.
While there is a continued need for international engagement with the Taliban, the war in Ukraine and the crisis in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas have overshadowed the developments in Afghanistan. Even though the Taliban have announced a general amnesty for everyone,[30] evidence suggests that ordinary Afghans with affiliations to the previous Ashraf Ghani government have been targeted.[31] The situation with respect to girls’ education and the overall humanitarian outlook paint a grim picture in Afghanistan, which is expected to further deteriorate with the influx of newer repatriations from Pakistan and Iran. This has the potential to further boost the ranks of groups like the NRF and ISK.
While the Taliban have a no-tolerance policy towards ISK, the group has a more indulgent policy towards the TTP. The TTP has a past with ISK, as the latter was formed out of a broken faction of the former and the Taliban. The TTP is currently inclusive of 41 militant groups, small and large. The relationship with one of the larger groups, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), has been a bumpy ride for the TTP after the leader of JuA, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was killed in a mine explosion during the peace talks with the Pakistani state, which JuA had shown its reservations against. JuA, when it broke off from the TTP, had formed an informal alliance with ISK from 2014 to 2017, resulting in some of the most brutal attacks along sectarian lines. With the Taliban restraining the TTP, which was evident from the trajectory of attacks in the last quarter of 2023, JuA has acted independently, carrying out some high-profile attacks against non-combatants, such as the devastating suicide bombing in a mosque in Peshawar in late January. The attack left more than 100 people dead. At the same time, some large-scale attacks in Pakistan have been unclaimed, which is a deliberate tactic to not attract the wrath of the Taliban. These initial differences are suggestive that if the Taliban tighten the noose against the TTP, the group may split into factions, with ISK being one of the potential recruiters.
About the author
Iftikhar Firdous is an academic and journalist, and has a PhD in psycholinguistics. He has been an Editor for Pakistan’s major English publications. Currently, he is the founding editor of The Khorasan Diary – a platform dedicated to research and news from conflict zones. He has been reporting extensively from conflict zones on militant organisations’ ideologies and strategies. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Joel Heard on Unsplash
Citations
[1] “Afghanistan’s Security Challenges Under the Taliban,” International Crisis Group, Report No. 326, August 12, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistans-security-challenges-under-taliban.
[2] Hassan Abbas, The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan After the Americans Left (London: Yale University Press, 2023), pp. 125-133.
[3] Ahmed Ali, “Faith and Faction: Internal Conflicts Among Afghan Taliban,” Pak Institute for Peace Studies, June 7, 2023, https://www.pakpips.com/article/7681.
[4] Michael Semple, “Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban movement,” United States of Institute of Peace, December, 2014, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW102-Rhetoric-Ideology-and-Organizational-Structure-of-the-Taliban-Movement.pdf.
[5] “In Power, the Taliban’s Divisions Are Coming to the Fore,” The Economist, October 2, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/10/02/in-power-the-talibans-divisions-are-coming-to-the-fore.
[6] Lynne O’Donnell, “Taliban Splintered by Internal Divisions, External Spoilers,” Foreign Policy, November 21, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/12/taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-factions-fighting-division-unity/.
[7] The Economist, “In Power, the Taliban’s Divisions Are Coming to the Fore.”
[8] Amira Jadoon et al., “The Islamic State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: Tracing the Resurgence of Islamic State Khorasan,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2022, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/.
[9] Lucinda Creighton and Dr Hans-Jakob Schindler, “Security Risks Emanating from Afghanistan,” European Union Institute of Security Studies, April 2023,
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_8_Security%20risks%20emanating%20from%20Afghanistan.pdf.
[10] “Rahimullah Haqqani: Afghan Cleric Killed by Bomb Hidden in Artificial Leg – Reports,” BBC News, August 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62508070.
[11] “Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities,” Human Rights Watch, September 6, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/06/afghanistan-isis-group-targets-religious-minorities.
[12] Ayaz Gul, “Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Kabul Attack,” Voice of America, January 2, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-kabul-attack-/6900591.html.
[13] “Deadly Suicide Blast Outside Afghan Foreign Ministry in Kabul,” Al Jazeera, January 11, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/11/explosion-outside-afghan-foreign-ministry-in-kabul.
[14] “Afghanistan Blast: Taliban Governor Killed in His Office,” BBC News, March 9, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64899335.
[15] The Khorasan Diary (@khorasandiary), “Afghan Taliban’s Deputy Governor for Badakhshan, Mawlawi Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi, has been Killed Together with Six Other People in an Explosion in Faizabad, Badakhshan province,” X, June 6, 2023, https://x.com/khorasandiary/status/1665970123939749888?s=20.
[16] Abdul Sayed and Tore Refslund Hamming, “The Growing Threat of the Islamic State in
Afghanistan and South Asia,” United States Institute of Peace, June 2023,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/sr-520-growing-threat-islamic-state-afghanistan-south-asia.pdf.
[17] Catrina Doxsee and Jared Thompson, “Examining Extremism: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP),” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2021,
https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-khorasan-province-iskp.
[18] Asfandyar Mir, “Two Years Under the Taliban: Is Afghanistan a Terrorist Safe Haven Once Again?” United States Institute of Peace, August 15, 2023,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/two-years-under-taliban-afghanistan-terrorist-safe-haven-once-again.
[19] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “UN Releases Report on Human Rights in Afghanistan Since the Taliban Takeover,” July 20, 2022, https://unama.unmissions.org/un-releases-report-human-rights-afghanistan-taliban-takeover.
[20] “NRF Claims Killing and Injuring 8 Taliban forces in Recent Attacks,” Kabul Now, September 2, 2023, https://kabulnow.com/2023/09/nrf-claims-killing-and-injuring-8-taliban-forces-in-recent-attacks/.
[21] “Ayman al-Zawahiri: Shock in Kabul as US Kills Al-Qaeda Leader,” BBC News, August 2, 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62393618.
[22] “Joint Declaration Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of State, February 29, 2020,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf.
[23] Iftikhar Firdous, “Does Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan Actually Exist?” The Khorasan Diary, April 29,2023, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2023/04/29/does-tehreek-e-jihad-pakistan-actually-exist.
[24] “Pakistan Begins Negotiations with Taliban,” Middle East Policy Council, 2022,
https://mepc.org/commentary/pakistan-begins-negotiations-taliban.
[25] Abid Hussain, “Four Soldiers, 12 TTP Fighters Killed in Northwest Pakistan,” Al Jazeera, September 7, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/7/four-soldiers-12-ttp-fighters-killed-in-northwest-pakistan.
[26] “Govt Sets Deadline of Nov 1 for Illegal Immigrants to Leave Pakistan,” Dawn, October 3, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1779106.
[27] Shahab al-Muhajir, War of Nerves, (Al-Azaim Maktabah, 2021), p. 30.
[28] “ داعش د اسلامي تاريخ، تر ټولو تور او کرغيړن باب (ISIS is the darkest chapter of Islamic history ),” Al-Mirsaad, November 1, 2023.
[29] “Afghan Diplomat Says Taliban Govt Already Declared Attack on Pakistan Not Jihad,” Pakistan Today, October 25, 2023, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2023/10/25/afghan-diplomat-says-taliban-govt-already-declared-attack-on-pakistan-not-jihad/.
[30] “Taliban Announces ‘Amnesty,’ reaches Out to Women,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/17/taliban-announces-amnesty-urges-women-to-join-government.
[31] “200 Former Afghan Troops, Officials Killed Since Taliban Takeover: UN”, Al Jazeera, August 22, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/22/over-200-former-afghan-troops-officials-killed-since-taliban-takeover-un.
