Afghanistan
In 2024-2025, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) reached its lowest level of activity ever, after a partial recovery in 2023-2024. Although there is some evidence that ISK has been trying to reorganise while keeping a low profile, it is also clear that the lack of a proper haven and lack of funding are undermining its viability. The role of Afghanistan-based terrorist cells in organising long-range attacks in Europe and the Middle East seems to have been compromised as well. On the other hand, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has maintained a high level of activity against Pakistan out of its Afghan hideouts. Despite some improvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations in the second quarter of 2025, igniting hopes of action against the TTP, bilaterial tensions reached a boiling point in October following Pakistan’s airstrikes against the terror group in Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan.
Trends
Reduced Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) activities in Afghanistan
Although in the last quarter of 2024 and first quarter of 2025, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)’s activities in Afghanistan showed a small surge from about two reported attacks per month to three, in the second quarter of 2025, its activities collapsed to almost nil. In fact, ISK has been involved in regular skirmishes with the Taliban in the far east of Afghanistan, and these small clashes generally do not get reported, but there is no doubt that by mid-2025 its visibility was very low.[1]
The decline in visible activities by ISK has been due to multiple factors. The terror group suffered some serious counter terrorism hits against its core structure. It also came under serious pressure in Pakistan’s Balochistan province from the Pakistani authorities as well as from Baloch nationalist insurgents, the latter of whom attacked one of its camps in Mastung in March 2025.[2] This in turn complicated ISK’s logistics in southern and western Afghanistan, at least temporarily, but ISK has retained a presence in the area, where it still has another four camps.[3]
The expanding Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province also forced ISK underground there. ISK’s leaders appeared to have been worried by the seemingly unstoppable growth of the TTP’s presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2023-2024. Much of ISK’s leadership and assets had to be moved to Balochistan, eventually exposing them. The TTP first started calling ISK “Kharijites” in June 2024, to which ISK’s media responded with accusations against the TTP of links to intelligence agencies (read: India). ISK’s leadership strengthened its rhetoric against the TTP in late 2024; in response, in December 2024, presumably after having moved out its vulnerable assets, the TTP’s leadership ordered its men to cut off all links and communications with ISK.[4]
The Taliban, despite little reporting, kept pressure up on ISK, and were mostly successful in southern and western Afghanistan, where ISK cells are isolated and poorly supplied. ISK sources in these areas reported in the first half of 2025 that there was hardly any recruitment going on and that the group’s losses could not be replaced.[5] Without supplies, ISK was considering abandoning these areas altogether.
Furthermore, some of the funding that was accruing to ISK from the Islamic State (IS)’s global leadership was likely redirected in 2025 towards Syria, where IS sees a strategic opportunity for a relaunch. Sources within the new Syrian government have indicated intensifying efforts by IS to reclaim ground there.[6]
During the second half of 2024 and first half of 2025, ISK also appeared to have played little to no role in the organisation of long-range terrorist attacks, which had reached a peak in the first half of 2024. A source among Afghan ISK recruits in Türkiye reported in January 2025 that efforts to infiltrate members into Europe had been abandoned in late 2024.[7] This was perhaps a result of difficulties faced at a time of high alert in Europe, but it also seems clear that ISK has struggled to recover from the capture in Pakistan of Abu Munzir in the spring of 2024, which subsequently led to the detention of a number of members of his cell of operatives, who had been dedicated to organising long-range attacks.[8] Additionally, perhaps owing to growing pressure in Türkiye and Afghanistan, ISK came to consider Balochistan as a potential safe haven – due also to an understanding it had negotiated with the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) – but this turned out to be a costly mistake.[9]
The main drivers of ISK’s reduced activities seem to be a lack of funding and poor logistics. ISK is nonetheless trying to adapt by focusing on infiltrating the Taliban’s ranks and exploiting the crisis of other anti-Taliban armed opposition groups, such as the National Resistance Front (NRF). ISK sources maintain that the only areas where recruitment is going well are the NRF’s areas of operation, such as Kapisa and other Tajik-majority areas north of Kabul.[10] Even ISK’s online activities seem to have suffered from the capture of Abu Yasir al Turki – who ran the group’s propaganda operations in Turkish and English – in Pakistan in June 2025.[11]
ISK sources indicated in 2025 that the group’s leadership sees no point in going on the offensive from such a position of weakness, deciding instead to keep its forces in reserve for better opportunities.[12]
The TTP Keeps Up Operations Out of Afghanistan, Despite Taliban Pressure
Although the TTP has long moved most of its military assets to Pakistan, it still retains bases in Afghanistan and its leaders spend much, if not most, of their time there. This was evidenced by the killing of the TTP’s self-styled governor for Balochistan, Naqeebullah Agha, near Spin Boldak in June 2025.[13] Many TTP members base their families in Afghanistan and cross the border regularly to see them. Individual commanders and networks of the Afghan Taliban continue to provide the TTP with support, particularly ammunition.[14] In May 2025, as rumours of an imminent split of the radical faction Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) away from the TTP were intensifying, the Afghan Taliban intervened by warning the leaders of JuA that if they were indeed to splinter, they would have to leave Afghanistan altogether, and that any linkage with ISK would bring immediate retaliation.[15]
However, the relationship between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban has not always been smooth and in fact soured considerably in the second quarter of 2025. The TTP’s rank and file have increasingly been convinced that within the Taliban’s ranks, there is complicity with Pakistani intelligence in targeting TTP commanders and in tracking TTP columns when they cross into Pakistan.[16] Even the killing of Naqeebullah Agha on Afghan territory was attributed by many TTP members to the Taliban. A new wave of arrests of TTP members in June 2025 was again attributed to the Taliban’s willingness to appease the Pakistani authorities in the context of improving Afghanistan-Pakistan relations.[17]
Indeed, according to Taliban sources, at a Taliban leadership meeting in Kandahar in late March or early April 2025, the Taliban’s emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, raised the issue of sticking too close to the TTP. Akhundzada stated that he was not willing to compromise the relationship with Pakistan for the TTP’s sake. At the meeting, Sirajuddin Haqqani emerged as the main defender of the TTP, on the grounds of the support it had lent the Afghan Taliban during their “jihad”. In general, however, the Taliban’s leaders seem increasingly worried about the constant friction with Pakistan.[18] The 12-day war between Iran and Israel, when the Iranian border was closed, must have served as a reminder of the constraints placed on Afghanistan by its landlocked status.
The Taliban do not seem intentioned to increase the pressure beyond the current level, which is probably what they consider the maximum the TTP can bear. The Taliban remain deeply divided over how to treat foreign jihadists in general and the TTP in particular, the latter being by far the most popular foreign jihadist group within the Taliban’s ranks and even among the population.
The Taliban Emirate’s Anti-ISK Measures
During the last half of 2024 and first half of 2025, the Taliban’s Emirate adopted a cautious counter terrorism approach. The Taliban seem to consider that publicising clashes with ISK or detentions of its members would only serve to advertise ISK’s presence in the country, and therefore tended to avoid doing so, even if from time to time information was leaked. ISK sources suggest that their losses have been underreported.[19] For sure, the Taliban have avoided large-scale operations, even in areas where ISK’s presence is more firmly established. One partial exception was the spring 2025 raid against the ISK network in central Badakhshan province. The local Taliban forces and their foreign jihadist allies had long been in denial about ISK’s presence there and had previously avoided taking action.[20]
The Taliban’s relative inactivity against ISK during the period under review is also likely due to the perception of a declining ISK threat, even if Taliban sources have expressed concerns about insistent ISK efforts to infiltrate their ranks.[21] Taliban-released information about the outcomes of occasional raids against ISK hideouts in Kabul suggest efforts by the latter to prepare a new wave of terrorist attacks in the capital.[22]
The Taliban have also benefited from the worsening predicament of ISK in Pakistan and especially in Balochistan, as discussed above.
The Taliban Emirate’s Handling of Foreign Jihadists
From 2021 onwards, the Taliban have committed to some neighbouring countries to restrain foreign jihadists hosted on their territory. After Uyghur and Uzbek jihadists were coerced into complying with the Taliban’s rules in 2021-2023, in 2024, it became the turn of Tajik jihadist groups, such as Jamaat Ansarullah.
In exchange for its pledge to refrain from taking any hostile action against Tajikistan, the Taliban’s leadership agreed to Jamaat Ansarullah patrolling the border, citing the Taliban’s agreement with Russia.[23] Jamaat Ansarullah resumed hostile actions against the Tajik government in 2023, most likely with the help of local Afghan Taliban networks. It also started recruiting again. In a Jamaat Ansarullah booklet distributed in August 2023, resuming militant activities in Tajikistan was explicitly stated as the group’s key aim.[24]
Jamaat Ansarullah sources claimed that the Taliban met with Tajik intelligence because of Jamaat Ansarullah’s raids into Tajikistan. The Taliban’s leadership overruled the Tajik Taliban and ordered a crackdown on Jamaat Ansarullah.[25] After the Taliban started enforcing tighter rules on Jamaat Ansarullah, including by limiting militants’ movements between districts, the group’s activities declined visibly.[26] After its leader Mahdi Arsalan vanished, Jamaat Ansarullah’s morale plummeted, and many of its followers and operatives were disappointed. They either left the group and married Afghan women or started their own businesses.[27]
Many began to suspect that Arsalan’s disappearance was connected to the Taliban’s negotiations with Dushanbe to improve bilateral relations. Ibrahim, the acting head of Jamaat Ansarullah, was open to a deal between the Taliban and Tajikistan, but some members objected and the desertions resumed. They feared being forced to relocate and losing their freedom of movement, as well as potentially experiencing the same fate as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).[28]
The Taliban further tightened restrictions and requested that Jamaat Ansarullah list all members and notify the Taliban of all movements between districts, due to the risk of Jamaat Ansarullah members joining ISK. Members of Jamaat Ansarullah complied to the demands and swore allegiance to the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate.[29] The Taliban have now compelled the group to register every member.[30]
Jamaat Ansarullah’s border guards were collected by the Taliban between July and August 2024 and moved to central Badakhshan, where they were instructed to remain silent until further directives were given.[31] Up until their dismissal in the spring of 2025, about 70 members of Jamaat Ansarullah had been incorporated into the Emirate’s military.[32]
The announcement by Tajikistan in November 2024 that it would permit a Taliban diplomat to assume control of the Afghan Embassy in Dushanbe marked yet another watershed. Feeling abandoned by the Taliban, Jamaat Ansarullah’s members became extremely concerned.[33] Finally, in 2025, the Taliban – both Tajik and Pashtun – warned Jamaat Ansarullah that the Emirate would not be able to permit Jamaat Ansarullah to remain based in Afghanistan for very long. They implied that Jamaat Ansarullah would have to move to Tajikistan or somewhere else, or else eventually be disarmed.[34] If the Taliban’s pressure becomes intolerable, Jamaat Ansarullah has threatened to ally with ISK.[35]
According to sources in Jamaat Ansarullah, the Taliban’s actions have greatly infuriated Al-Qaeda (AQ), with which Jamaat Ansarullah is still closely associated. According to these sources, ISK has made persistent efforts to contact Jamaat Ansarullah and other foreign jihadists to extend an invitation to collaborate. AQ has also lamented the Taliban’s pressure to avoid external operations, even though it enjoys better conditions in Afghanistan than the Central Asian jihadists.[36] AQ has continued to operate training camps in Afghanistan. In June 2024, AQ’s de facto leader, Sayf al-Adl, sent out an invitation to would-be radicals to travel to Afghanistan. According to Kandahar-based Taliban sources, the intention was to welcome trainees from any location.[37] Nevertheless, it appears that AQ’s training facilities are primarily intended to aid the Pakistani Taliban’s war efforts.[38] If the Emirate chooses to further solidify the improvement in relations with Pakistan, it is not impossible that these activities would also be subject to pressure.
Signs of a Flow of Arrivals from Syria
Rising tensions between foreign fighters in Syria and the new Ahmed al-Sharaa interim government, as well as between foreign fighters and the Syrian population, led in early 2025 to a trickle of arrivals from Syria to Afghanistan, according to a source inside one of the Central Asian jihadist outfits based in Afghanistan.[39] Very few individuals had moved to Afghanistan as of July 2025, although a delegation from Jamaat Imam al-Bukhari had visited the country from Syria in April to assess the prospect of relocating some of its members there.[40] The delegation spent several weeks in Afghanistan, was welcomed by the Haqqani network, and toured areas with Central Asian presence in the northeast and northwest of Afghanistan. The delegation’s findings appear to not have been very encouraging, however, and among the options still being considered is a move to TTP-held territory.[41]
At the same time, ETIM leaders in Syria were manoeuvring to establish their Syrian-based forces as a separate entity from the original ETIM. It is not clear whether this was due to disagreements with the Afghanistan-based leadership or to the desire to gain some international legitimacy.[42]
Outlook
Although ISK is for now overshadowed by Syria, the latter of which looks more promising for the central leadership of IS, that could change in the future. In the meantime, ISK needs to maintain a minimum level of activity to advertise its survival capabilities and to keep recruiting. As of mid-2025, it was unable to do even that, and its leaders must be feeling the need to change the situation. One of its key mistakes was to start multiple wars with states and other insurgent organisations. Not only does ISK have few allies left among other insurgent groups, but it has also embroiled itself in a war with the BLA. The group is therefore seriously embattled.
The growing disaffection of AQ-linked jihadist groups with the Taliban is the best chance ISK has of staging a recovery, but these groups must be wondering what ISK has to offer them, other than the stigma of a brand that attracts the hostility of almost all states in the world.
The Afghan Taliban seem able to constrain ISK, even if not to completely eradicate it. The Emirate’s main problem, as far as militant groups go, is now the TTP. It is under serious economic pressure and can ill afford to continue arguing with Pakistan about the TTP. The TTP, however, is too powerful and has connections too deep within the Afghan Taliban to simply be treated like the smaller Central Asian jihadist groups. One should therefore expect continuing friction between the Taliban and the TTP.
About the Author
Dr Antonio Giustozzi has a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). He is the author of several articles and papers on Afghanistan, as well as of six books, including The Islamic State in Khorasan (Hurst, 2018) and The Taliban at War (Hurst, 2019). Beyond Afghanistan, Dr Giustozzi published articles on the conflict in Syria and jihadist groups in Central Asia. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Jihadist Threat in Retreat?” International Crisis Group, July 16, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/b183-islamic-state-afghanistan-jihadist-threat-retreat.
[2] Farhan Zahid, “The BLA and ISKP Clash in Balochistan,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 23, no. 6 (2025), https://jamestown.org/the-bla-and-iskp-clash-in-balochistan/.
[3] Author’s interview with an ISK source, Afghanistan, July 2025.
[4] Author’s interviews with TTP commanders in Pakistan, February 2025.
[5] Author’s interviews with ISK members, Afghanistan, April 2025.
[6] Author’s interview with a political analyst close to the Ahmed al-Sharaa government, Damascus, May 2025; author’s interview with a Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) army major, Damascus, June 2025.
[7] Author’s interview with a former ISK member, Türkiye, January 2025.
[8] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-Fifth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2734 (2024) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, S/2025/71, February 6, 2025, 17.
[9] Muhammad Amir Rana, “IS-K in Balochistan,” Dawn, June 1, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1914647.
[10] Author’s interviews with ISK members, Afghanistan, April 2025.
[11] “The Islamic State in Afghanistan,” International Crisis Group.
[12] Author’s interviews with ISK members, Afghanistan, April 2025.
[13] Author’s interview with a TTP commander, Afghanistan, July 2025.
[14] Author’s interviews with TTP commanders, Pakistan, April 2025.
[15] Author’s interview with a Taliban commander, Jalalabad, May 2025.
[16] “54 Terrorists Killed As Infiltration Attempt Thwarted in KP: ISPR,” Dawn, April 27, 2025; “Security Forces Kill 30 Terrorists As Major Infiltration Bid at Pak-Afghan Border Foiled,” Dunya News, July 4, 2025; ”16 Militants Killed During Infiltration Attempt at Pak-Afghan Border: Army,” The Press Trust of India, March 23, 2025.
[17] Author’s interview with a TTP cadre, Pakistan, July 1, 2025.
[18] Author’s interview with a Taliban cadre close to Sirajuddin Haqqani, April 2025; author’s interview with a senior Taliban official in Kabul, April 2025.
[19] Author’s interviews with ISK members, Afghanistan, April 2025.
[20] Author’s interview with a member of foreign jihadist group, Badakhshan, June 2025.
[21] Author’s interview with a pro-Taliban elder in Badakhshan, June 2025.
[22] Abu Ahmad, “ISK Suicide Belt Manufacturing Facility Destroyed in Kabul,” Al-Mersaad, June 10, 2025.
[23] Author’s interview with a Taliban commander, Badakhshan, February 2022; author’s interview with a pro-Taliban elder in Badakhshan, February 2022.
[24] Author’s interview with an official in Faizabad, September 2023; author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member, Badakhshan, June 2025.
[25] Author’s interview with a Taliban commander, Badakhshan, June 2025.
[26] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member, Badakhshan, June 2025.
[27] Author’s interview with a Jamaath Ansarullah member, Badakhshan, January 2025.
[28] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member in Badakhshan, February 2024; author’s interview with a contact of a Tajik Taliban commander in Badakhshan Province, February 2024.
[29] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member in Badakhshan, June 2025.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member in Badakhshan, August 2024.
[32] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member in Badakhshan, June 2025; author’s interview with a Taliban commander, Badakhshan, June 2025.
[33] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member in Badakhshan, November 2024.
[34] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member in Badakhshan, June 2025.
[35] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member in Badakhshan, June 2025; Author’s interview with a Jamaat Ansarullah member, Jurm, June 2025.
[36] Author’s interview with a pro-Taliban elder in Badakhshan, June 2025.
[37] Author’s interviews with Taliban officials, Kandahar, June 2024.
[38] Author’s interview with a TTP commander, June 2024.
[39] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Imam al-Bukhari member, Afghanistan, April 2025.
[40] Jamaat Imam al-Bukhari is an offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), comprising Uzbek militants.
[41] Author’s interview with a Jamaat Imam al-Bukhari member, Afghanistan, July 2025.
[42] Author’s interview with a Ministry of Defence official, Damascus, June 2025.
