Afghanistan-Pakistan’s Radical Social Media Ecosystem: Actors, Propaganda Comparison and Implications

By Abdul Basit

Since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, the intra-jihadist competition in Afghanistan and Pakistan has expanded in the physical and cyber spheres. Though the Taliban have been effective against the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) on the physical battlefield, they have not been as efficacious in the digital space. Despite the Taliban’s infiltration of ISK’s social media channels and the launch of the multilingual Al-Mirsaad counternarrative initiative, the latter persists in the digital sphere. Likewise, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISK’s arch-foe and the Taliban’s ideological Pakistani brethren, has upgraded its social media propaganda in the past two years. Against this backdrop, a discussion and comparison of TTP and ISK’s social media arms are useful in understanding the implications of their propaganda on violent extremism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond, as well as the policy interventions required to check their appeal. 

Introduction

Publicity is the oxygen of terrorist groups as their main aim is not just to intimidate, but to draw attention to their causes, grievances and goals.[1] Terrorism, “as propaganda of the deed, is a communication tool that requires an audience for its violent theatrics”.[2] Hence, as a strategy, terrorism is as much about communication as it is about violence. Terrorist groups use propaganda not just for publicity and communication, but also for recruitment and financing.[3]

The Internet and the advent of social media have revolutionised terrorist propaganda by lowering the entry barriers to terrorism, bridging the recruiters-recruits gap and accelerating the decentralised information flow.[4] In the context of terrorism and counter terrorism, the digital world’s advancements and permeation in all spheres of life have expanded the battlefield from the real to the cyber world. They have compelled terrorist groups to develop dedicated social media arms.[5]

Jihadist groups refer to social media propaganda as “media jihad”.[6] Galloway defines media jihad as “psychological war made of texts, images, iconographies that (terrorist) organisations intend for widespread distribution”.[7] Critically, media jihad has allowed groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) to keep their ideological narratives and jihadist brands alive, despite battlefield losses and organisational weaknesses.

Against this backdrop, this paper, relying on primary[8] and published secondary sources as well as the author’s own observations, discusses the social media ecosystems of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, respectively. In doing so, it identifies ISK’s Al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production and TTP’s Al-Umar Media’s main content materials and social media dissemination strategies, and their implications for violent extremism in South and Central Asia and beyond.[9]

Afghanistan-Pakistan’s Radical Social Media Ecosystem

The radical social media ecosystem of Afghanistan and Pakistan evolves rapidly, where new structures emerge as swiftly as old ones fade away due to jihadist groups’ mergers, splintering or tech companies’ de-platforming efforts.

Since its territorial losses and battlefield defeats in Afghanistan, ISK has been persistent in the digital space as part of IS’ global campaign of Baqiya wa Tatamadad (remaining and expanding).[10] Following the Taliban’s takeover, as many as 374 URLs linked to ISK’s official propaganda channels, primarily archiving sites and file-sharing platforms, have been active. According to Tech Against Terrorism, around 211 of these channels have been taken down; however, as many as 163 remain active.[11]

ISK has been a trendsetter in using social media platforms for recruitment, communication, propaganda dissemination and delegitimising its adversaries in South and Central Asia and beyond. Despite setbacks, ISK’s propaganda operations on social media have reached a new peak in form, volume and languages.[12] Unlike other jihadist groups in the region, ISK has harboured ambitions of attacking the West by tapping into Central Asian diasporic networks in Europe inspired by the group’s social media propaganda. For instance, in January 2023, nine ISK-inspired Central Asian radicals were arrested for funding a terrorist group linked to IS and plotting attacks in Germany.[13] As many as 15 terrorist plots, nine in very advanced stages, which targeted European embassies, consulates, churches and other interests, were traced to ISK in Afghanistan in March 2023.[14] Crucially, ISK inspired and recruited these Central Asian radicals through social media networks, bringing into sharp focus its ability to undermine regional and global peace if its physical and digital footprint is not effectively disrupted.[15]

Similarly, TTP’s social media propaganda has also flourished since the Taliban’s takeover; it has become more disciplined and organised. For instance, in the recent past, TTP’s magazines were published haphazardly compared to Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)’s[16] bimonthly Urdu-language periodical Nawai Ghazwat-ul-Hind. However, the publication has now become more regular and professional due to a revamped and centralised structure. Under the new structure, Al-Umar Media comes under TTP’s so-called shadow Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, headed by Mufti Ghufran.[17] Likewise, with the absorption of two AQIS factions into TTP’s fold, the group’s propaganda has improved both in quality and frequency.[18] The former AQIS media propagandist Qari Munib Jatt, who was running the operations of As-Sahab Media, is now overseeing Al-Umar Media.[19]

 ISK’s Al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production (Al-Azaim)

Al-Azaim is a relatively young media organisation that became visible in 2021 after the Taliban’s takeover by improving the frequency and quality of ISK’s propaganda. The main thrust of ISK’s messaging has been to undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy by referring to their regime as murtad (apostates).[20] The bulk of ISK’s propaganda comes in the form of books, long monographs and manuals by its ideologues and strategists. Though Al-Azaim is not an officially recognised propaganda arm of ISK, it publishes the bulk of the group’s original content. Crucially, while IS has never recognised Al-Azaim officially or shared its media content, the group has never disowned it, either.[21] However, some experts believe Al-Azaim is indeed ISK’s official media channel.[22]

Though Al-Azaim operates in a centralised fashion, ISK ‘s media content is shared through top-down (official) and bottom-up (semi/unofficial or munasireen) channels.[23] The latter are run by its supporters and sympathisers who circulate Al-Azaim’s media materials, along with producing content in ISK’s name, including translations in more than 12 languages. Al-Azaim has spread its tentacles in South and Central Asia in the past two years; for example, it has initiated the Al-Azaim Uzbek and Al-Azaim Tajik media arms as well.[24] In terms of its propaganda potential, ISK is IS’ most capable and ambitious regional franchise, matching the capabilities of the mother group.[25] Al-Azaim has played a crucial role in keeping IS’ brand of global jihad alive in South and Central Asia.[26] Sometimes, Al-Azaim takes the lead in claiming attacks in the Khorasan region before IS issues a statement through Al-Amaq, the group’s official news agency.

Until 2021, there were several channels involved in creating propaganda materials for ISK, such as Khalid Media producing videos, and the Black Flags publishing audio and text statements, among others. However, after the Taliban’s takeover, several pro-ISK media organs were merged into Al-Azaim. Since then, ISK’s media content has been published more systematically, notwithstanding persistent irregularities and haphazard intervals between publications. This haphazard pattern could possibly be due to the Taliban’s ruthless crackdown against ISK,[27] both in the physical and cyber space. The Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) successfully infiltrated several ISK channels on Telegram in 2022, compelling the group to urge its operatives and supporters to migrate to safer platforms.[28] This significantly reduced Al-Azaim’s media output;[29] however, it has since bounced back following a lengthy reconsolidation period.[30] During this period, the Taliban also killed several top-ranking ISK leaders across Afghanistan.[31]

Though Al-Azaim publishes propaganda in more than 12 different languages, the bulk of its content (roughly 70 percent) is in Pashto and the rest are translations of original materials. It also translates IS’ bi-weekly newsletter al-Naba’s content into Pashto, Urdu, Dari, Uzbek, Tajik, Russian and occasionally into Bengali and Uyghur. These translations are also shared on I’lam on the dark web, the pro-IS content repository.[32]

Al-Azaim occasionally publishes three monthly magazines, the Voice of Khorasan, Khorasan Ghag and Yalghar,[33] in English, Pashto and Urdu, respectively. The group also publishes infographics of its attacks which appear in al-Naba as well as audio and video statements.[34]

TTP’s Al-Umar Media

Al-Umar Media, named after the Taliban’s founder Mullah Muhammad Omar, has been intermittently functional since 2003. It started off anonymously and, in 2006, TTP’s trainer for suicide bombers, Qari Hussain Ahmed, named it Umar Studio, which later changed to Al-Umar Media in 2010.[35] TTP’s broadcasting during this period was irregular and mostly revolved around video testimonies of suicide bombers and attack footage. TTP then set up a Media Commission in 2014 to improve its information operations, albeit without much success.

Four factors account for the dramatic improvement in Al-Umar Media’s propaganda operations in the past two years. First, since July 2020, the mergers of around 40 militant factions into the TTP have enabled the group to publish content more regularly with improved quality.[36] The mergers brought well-trained media operatives like AQIS’s Muneeb Jatt, who oversaw As-Sahab Media and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JUA), into Al-Umar Media. Currently, Jatt is in charge of Al-Umar Media and is part of TTP’s five-member media commission.

Second, TTP’s social media propaganda improved after the group was uprooted from the ex-FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), now merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, to Afghanistan’s border areas in the Zarb-e-Azb Operation.[37] During this period (2015-2019), TTP revisited its political, military and propaganda strategies, which helped the group perform better after its resurgence.[38]

Third, TTP’s organisational restructuring along the Taliban’s insurgency model has also contributed to Al-Umar Media’s enhanced capabilities. Within a centralised structure, Al-Umar Media falls under TTP’s so-called Ministry of Information and Broadcasting led by Mufti Ghufran. The top-down structure has given Al-Umar Media proper organisation and space, and removed haphazard content production.[39]

Finally, the Taliban’s shelter in Afghanistan has given TTP the operational freedom to expand and enhance Al-Umar Media’s operations. For instance, from 2007 to 2013, TTP produced around 65 videos, but from 2021 to present, it has published more than 64 videos.[40] In the ex-FATA region, Pakistan’s counter terrorism pressure forced TTP to keep a mobile and rudimentary media infrastructure before it was uprooted.[41] Now, TTP has the space to buy new equipment (e.g., cameras and laptops), film more frequently and focus on content production.

The majority of TTP’s media content is in Urdu and Pashto, and is occasionally translated into Dari/Persian and Arabic. TTP uploads these materials on its websites and WhatsApp and Telegram channels. Supporters also release them on Twitter and Facebook. Al-Umar Media’s products include audio and video statements, attack claims, current affairs statements, a daily Pashto radio broadcast, a bi-weekly current affairs podcast Pasoon (uprising) and three periodicals – Mujallah Taliban,[42] Banat-e-Khadijat-ul-Kubra (for females) in Urdu and Sada Taliban (launched in August 2023) in Pashto.

A Comparison of Al-Azaim and Al-Umar Media

In comparing the two social media organs, it is clear that the digital space has become an integral part of both ISK and TTP’s propaganda outreach. For ISK, persistence in the digital space is part of its Baqiya wa Tatamadad campaign.[43] After losing the so-called Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, retaining the “digital Caliphate” has been essential in keeping its ideological narrative and jihadist brand alive as well as staying in touch with its worldwide network of affiliates, supporters and sympathisers.[44]

Despite its centralised structure, Al-Azaim’s propaganda dissemination is both top-down, through official channels, and bottom-up, through semi/unofficial channels of supporters and sympathisers who also produce their own content. In contrast, Al-Umar Media is top-down, and there are very few supporter and sympathiser channels, most of which only recirculate original content for wider dissemination, barring JuA’s Ghazi Media.[45]

Likewise, ISK’s social media footprint is diverse, extensive and sophisticated. It operates on multiple social media platforms, such as X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook as well as encrypted social media apps like Telegram, Hoop, Matrix, Element and RocketChat. Furthermore, apart from propaganda dissemination, ISK also uses its social media channels for recruitment and communication. For instance, the group has been able to mobilise recruits from South (India, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Pakistan) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan), and to make some inroads into vulnerable Central Asian diasporic individuals in Europe.[46] A case in point is ISK’s April 2020 botched plot, which attempted to target US and NATO bases in Germany using a cell of Tajik diasporic nationals.[47] Likewise, the 15 terrorist plots in Europe traced to ISK in Afghanistan in February 2023 were an outcome of the group’s ability to enlist Central Asian diasporic individuals[48] by leveraging the Quran burning episodes in Sweden and Denmark to recruit and incite attacks.[49]

TTP, on the other hand, is only present on X, WhatsApp and Telegram and, to a lesser extent, on Facebook and Instagram. It still relies on more traditional recruitment methods, such as tribal and social networks and families of deceased militants, whom the group looks after under its Kafalat-ul-Yateem initiative.[50] TTP also recruits militants through longstanding jihadist links, such as the 40 jihadist factions that pledged allegiance to the group’s current leader, Emir Mufti Nur Wali Mehsud.[51]

While Al-Azaim does not have a website,[52] its media content is published in 12 local and regional languages (see Table 1). It bears mention that the bulk of ISK’s propaganda materials is in Pashto, which is then translated into other local and regional languages for a broader outreach. ISK’s multilingual propaganda matches its regional and global ambitions of reaching a wider audience.[53]

Another major difference lies in the type and quality of output in ISK and TTP’s propaganda strategies. ISK has produced more than 300 books to date while TTP rarely publishes books. Yet, on the production and editorial sides, TTP has a decisive edge over ISK, as the former’s editorial and linguistic skills have massively improved since AQIS’ Muneeb Jatt faction joined it.[54] On the contrary, ISK’s print materials suffer from clumsy grammar and poor phrasing.[55] Though the quality of ISK’s videos matches that of TTP, the publication of its visual content is limited. In terms of regularity and frequency, Al-Umar Media’s content is produced on time while ISK’s media content is published haphazardly. The difference in Al-Azaim and Al-Umar Media’s content production could be due to the availability of professional and financial resources, or the lack thereof. Al-Azaim’s haphazard publications could also be by design to avoid detection. Under the current Taliban’s shield, TTP enjoys greater freedom to expand its media capabilities and invest in them intellectually and financially. Conversely, ISK is on the run and is facing financial difficulties, making it challenging for the group to match Al-Umar Media’s quality, regularity and professionalism.

Table 1: Differences between Al-Umar Media and Al-Azaim Foundation

Implications for (Counter) Radicalisation in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Despite setbacks due to the Taliban’s infiltration, ISK has shown digital depth and resilience by producing propaganda materials which continue to challenge regional counter terrorism authorities. The Taliban’s infiltration has done temporary damage, since ISK has gradually regained its social media footprint. Interestingly, the Taliban have launched the Al-Mirsaad (the watch over) initiative in Urdu, English, Dari and Pashto languages to ideologically discredit ISK as well as share details of the GDI’s operations against the group.[56] Al-Mirsaad represents the Taliban’s anti-ISK propaganda, just as Al-Azaim signifies the latter’s propaganda against the former. Under this initiative, the Taliban uploads video testimonials of ISK’s arrested militants to deter those flirting with the idea of joining the group.[57] However, Al-Mirsaad’s impact will be less pronounced on those who are virtually connected or thinking of linking up with ISK. To effectively disrupt this trend, a more robust digital strategy is required, where tech companies and regional counter terrorism authorities will have to work together. To this end, the main stumbling block will be the discomfort and unwillingness of some regional states and international bodies to work with the Taliban as a counter terrorism partner. It is a catch-22 situation: the reluctance will be to ISK’s advantage, while a counter terrorism partnership with the Taliban will indirectly legitimise the self-styled Islamic Emirate.[58]

ISK refers to TTP as a “fighting group” instead of a jihadist group in its propaganda literature to undermine it ideologically, the same pattern it has adopted towards the Taliban.[59] Crucially, ISK refers to TTP’s top leadership as murtad (apostates) but stays silent about the fighters with a view to recruit them. TTP, on the other hand, echoes the Taliban’s ideological position on ISK by labelling the group as khawarij (deviants) from its top leaders to its fighters.[60] Despite the TTP-ISK ideological and strategic contestations at the top level, the ground reality at the foot soldiers’ level is more complex and fluid, where side-switching and shifting loyalties are prevalent due to material considerations.[61] This is crucial for those devising Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It brings into sharp focus that the socio-economic uplifting of peripheral conflict-hit zones is as important as promoting counternarratives against extremist ideologies, both online and offline.

Finally, the ISK and TTP’s antagonistic propaganda, where they are needling each other, will have implications for violent extremism in South and Central Asia in a paradoxical way. On the one hand, such adversarial inter-jihadist propaganda will increase ISK and TTP’s respective appeals among their core constituents, barring the fighter-level fence-sitters discussed above.[62] On the other, adversarial ideological discourses portray jihadist groups negatively in the public sphere, if done properly. Those working on the strategic communication side of P/CVE initiatives can amplify these discourses to further undermine their appeal among the vulnerable segments of society.

Conclusion

Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, ISK and TTP’s propaganda materials have been mushrooming on various social media platforms. ISK has shown more sophistication, deeper penetration and widespread appeal in the digital sphere compared to TTP’s limited but equally effective footprint. In the offline setting, TTP’s influence and violent credentials have expanded in an unprecedented manner. ISK has managed to mobilise recruits from Central Asia as well as inspire some vulnerable Central Asian diasporic individuals in the West over the internet for low-scale attacks in Europe. Hence, the threat of the so-called “digital Caliphate” is not just virtual but physical as well. While the Taliban have shown ruthless efficacy in eliminating ISK’s top leaders in past six months through covert assistance from the US,[63] it remains a conundrum as to how regional states and the international community can work with the Taliban to undermine ISK’s digital footprint without legitimising the “Islamic Emirate” itself.

About the Author

Abdul Basit is a Senior Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].

Thumbnail photo by Priscilla Du on Unsplash

Citations

[1] Maurice Tugwell, “Terrorism and Propaganda: Problem and Response,” Conflict Quarterly (Spring 1986), pp. 5-15.

[2] Chris Galloway, “Media Jihad: What PR Can Learn in Islamic State’s Public Relations Masterclass,” Public Relations Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2016), pp. 582-590, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2016.03.014.

[3] Ariel Victoria Lieberman, “Terrorism, the Internet, and Propaganda: A Deadly Combination,” Journal of National Security, Law and Policy, Vol. 9, No. 95 (2017), pp. 95-124.

[4] Laura Wakeford and Laura Smith, “Islamic State’s Propaganda and Social Media: Dissemination, Support and Resilience,” in ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message, eds. Stephane J. Baele et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 155-187.

[5] Charlie Winter, “Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare,” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (London: ICSR, 2017), https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Media-Jihad-The-Islamic-State’s-Doctrine-for-Information-Warfare.pdf.

[6] Jihadist groups also refer to their propaganda operations as pen jihad, tongue jihad, intellectual jihad and psychological jihad.

[7] Galloway, “Media Jihad,” pp. 582-583. He maintains that “media jihad is fought with bulletins, not bullets, not with rockets but reports, not with tanks but with timely theological thought pieces.”

[8] This study has specifically consulted ISK’s monthly English-language magazine, the Voice of Khorasan’s  March 2023 issue, and TTP’s monthly Urdu-language periodical Mujallah Taliban and female-focused periodical Banat-e-Khadijat-ul-Kubra’s June and July 2023 issues, respectively. It has also looked at the Islamic State of Hind’s Serat-ul-Haq magazine’s second issue published by Al-Jauhar Media Centre, an unofficial publication.

[9] “Importance of Media in Jihad for Muslims in India,” Serat-ul-Haq, p. 6.

[10] The Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) has infiltrated ISK’s private Telegram channels, compelling the group to ask its operatives and supporters to migrate to new channels and platforms. As a result, the frequency of ISK’s social media propaganda has declined in recent months.

[11] “After the Taliban Takeover: How Islamic State-Khorasan Are Exploiting the Online Ecosystem and Projecting the Threat,” Tech Against Terrorism, August 24, 2023, https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/2023/08/24/after-the-taliban-takeover-how-islamic-state-khorasan-are-exploiting-the-online-ecosystem-and-projecting-the-threat/.

[12] Amira Jadoon et al., “The Enduring Duel: Islamic State Khorasan’s Survival under Afghanistan’s New Rulers,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 16, No. 8 (2023), pp. 8-15, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CTC-SENTINEL-082023.pdf.

[13] “Nine Arrested in Europe for Terrorism Offences Related to Islamic State Khorasan Province,” Pool Re, July 17, 2023, https://www.poolre.co.uk/nine-arrested-in-europe-for-terrorism-offences-related-to-islamic-state-khorasan-province/.

[14] Dan Lamothe and Joby Warrick, “Afghanistan Has Become a Terrorism Staging Ground Again, Leak Reveals,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/22/afghanistan-terrorism-leaked-documents/.

[15] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2023/549, July 25, 2023,  p. 16, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/189/74/PDF/N2318974.pdf?OpenElement.

[16] Official franchise of Al-Qaeda in South Asia.

[17] TTP has remodelled its organisational framework by imitating the Taliban’s shadow insurgency model. The group has announced seven shadow ministries and nine shadow provinces (wilayat) in Pakistan for its organisational spread in the country. Furthermore, it has divided Pakistan into two military zones: the north and the south. For details, see Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 16, No. 5 (2023), p.4, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-after-the-talibans-afghanistan-takeover/.

[18] Abdul Sayed, “Analysis: Resurgence of Umar Media Boosts Pakistani Taliban Messaging,” BBC Monitoring, January 13, 2023, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2040oi5.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Lucas Webber, “Voice of Khorasan Magazine and the Internationalization of Islamic State’s Anti-Taliban Propaganda,” Jamestown Foundation, May 6, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/voice-of-khorasan-magazine-and-the-internationalization-of-islamic-states-anti-taliban-propaganda/.

[21] Mina Al-Lami, “Analysis: Al-Azaim Media Boosts IS Afghanistan Messaging,” BBC Monitoring, July 26, 2022.

[22] Jadoon et al., “The Enduring Duel.”

[23] The bulk of ISK’s supporter channels are on Telegram and Facebook, while others operate on Matrix, Hoop and Element. For details see Iftikhar Firdous and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, “TKD EXCLUSIVE: Creeping Ideology; The ‘Generation-Z’ Freelancers of the ISKP,” The Khorasan Diary, August 31, 2023, https://thekhorasandiary.com/2023/08/31/creeping-ideology-the-generation-z-freelancers-of-the-iskp/.

[24] Laith Alkhouri and Lucas Webber, “Islamic State launches new Tajik propaganda network,” eurasianet, July 20, 2022, https://eurasianet.org/islamic-state-launches-new-tajik-propaganda-network; Lucas Webber and Bruce Pannier, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Enduring Influence on IS-Khurasan,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, March 3, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/03/03/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistans-enduring-influence-on-is-khurasan/.

[25] Mona Thakkar and Vineet P, “The State of Play: Islamic State Khorasan Province’s Anti-India Propaganda Efforts,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, May 22, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/05/22/the-state-of-play-islamic-state-khorasan-provinces-anti-india-propaganda-efforts/.

[26] Dante Schulz, “ISKP’s Propaganda Threatens Asia’s Security Apparatus,” Stimson Centre, October 4, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/iskps-propaganda-threatens-asias-security-apparatus/.

[27] Iftikhar Firdous et al., “ The Persistent Threat of Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP) Against Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) in Bajaur,” The Khorasan Diary, August 2, 2023, https://thekhorasandiary.com/2023/08/02/tkd-analysis-the-persistent-threat-of-islamic-state-khorasan-iskp-against-jamiat-e-ulema-e-islam-fazl-jui-f-in-bajaur-2/.

[28] Lucas Webber and Riccardo Valle, “Islamic State Khurasan Province Grows Increasingly Concerned About Spies and Infiltrators,” The Militant Wire, August 7, 2022, https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-khurasan-province-grows?utm_source=substack&utm_campaign=post_embed&utm_medium=web.

[29] For instance, ISK’s spokesman Sultan Aziz Azzam was issuing audio statements frequently until the Taliban infiltrated the group’s social media channels. Since then, the frequency of Azzam and other ISK propagandists’ audio statements has reduced, indicating that Al-Azaim’s capabilities have been disrupted if not damaged in the Taliban’s ongoing crackdown.

[30] Lucas Webber, “Islamic State Khurasan Down but Not Out Under Increased Taliban CT and Spy Pressure,” The Militant Wire, May 12, 2023, https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-khurasan-down-but-not.

[31] Between December 2022 and May 2023, the GDI eliminated ISK’s deputy chief Engineer Abbas Omar, intelligence chief Qari Fateh, main propagandist Ziauddin Mullah Muhammad, the founding emir of Jammu, and Kashmir Abu Usman Kashmiri, the chief of the Indian Subcontinent unit Ijaz Amin Ahangar. For details, see Webber, “Islamic State Khurasan Down but Not Out.”

[32] Al-Lami, “Analysis: Al-Azaim Media Boosts IS Afghanistan Messaging.”

[33] Abdul Sayed, “Islamic State’s Pakistan Province Launches New Jihadist Magazine,” Jamestown Foundation, June 4, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-states-pakistan-province-launches-new-jihadist-magazine-revealing-struggling-propaganda-effort/#:~:text=The%20first%20Urdu%2Dlanguage%20magazine,P%27s%20first%20indigenous%20propaganda%20product.

[34] Al-Lami, “Analysis: Al-Azaim Media Boosts IS Afghanistan Messaging.”

[35] Ibid.

[36] Abdul Sayed (@abdsayedd), “Pakistani Taliban (TTP) announced the first-ever merger from Kohat district, saying a militant group led by Salahuddin Ayubi joined TTP,” X, August 21, 2023, https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1693533577546264960.

[37] Saif ur Rehman Tahir, “A Study of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Social Media Communication: Major Trends, Key Themes and Propaganda Appeals,” Pakistan Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2020), pp. 1-26, https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Journal_Volume-II_Issue-I_2020_Final_10-July_For-Website.pdf.

[38] Archie Macfarlane, “Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Operating with Impunity Online,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, April 17, 2013, https://gnet-research.org/2023/04/17/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp-operating-with-impunity-online/.

[39] “An Interview With Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s Minister for Information and Broadcasting Mufti Ghufran,” Mujallah Taliban, August 2023, pp. 13-16.

[40] Sayed, “Analysis: Resurgence of Umar Media Boosts Pakistani Taliban Messaging.”

[41] In 2015, when the Pakistan Army took over the town of Mir Ali in North Waziristan tribal district in the Zarb-e-Azb Operation, Al-Umar Media was based in a small room with only two computers and a couple of cameras.

[42] Since 2016, Mujallah Taliban has been published on a quarterly basis and the group has published 11 issues, including two in 2022. However, in January 2023, TTP decided to publish it as a monthly periodical.

[43] Eitan Azani and Daniel Haberfiled, “Media Jihad Campaign: The Islamic State’s Response to Deplatforming,” International Institute for Counter Terrorism, July 2023, p. 16, https://ict.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Azani-Haberfeld_Media-Jihad-Campaign_2023_07_13-1.pdf.

[44] “Strengthen the Media War,” Voice of Khorasan, March 2023, pp. 9-21.

[45] Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)’s propaganda arms, Ghazi Media, produces its original content independent of TTP as well. This is due to JuA’s differences with TTP, compelling it to put across its position on some issues separately.

[46] “Nine Arrested in Germany and Netherlands Over Islamist Terrorist Fears,” Euro News, July 7, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/07/nine-arrested-in-germany-and-netherlands-over-islamist-terrorist-fears. Authorities arrested nine ISK conspirators of Turkmen, Tajik and Kyrgyz nationalities in Germany and the Netherlands who arrived via Ukraine.

[47] Nodirbek  Soliev, “The April 2020 Islamic State Terror Plot Against U.S. and NATO Military Bases in Germany: The Tajik Connection,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2021), pp. 30-38, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CTC-SENTINEL-012021.pdf.

[48] Lamothe and Warrick, “Afghanistan Has Become a Terrorism Staging Ground Again, Leak Reveals.”

[49] Armani Syed, “Why Quran Burning Is Making Sweden and Denmark So Anxious,” TIME, August 15, 2023, https://time.com/6303348/quran-burning-sweden-denmark/; Ugur Yilmaz and Anton Wilen, “Gun Attack Leaves Swedish Consulate Employee Wounded in Turkey,” Bloomberg, August 2, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-02/gun-attack-leaves-swedish-consulate-employee-wounded-in-turkey#xj4y7vzkg. ISK has been able to make inroads into vulnerable Central Asian diasporic individuals and can use them for attacks on occasions like Quran burning by channelling their anger towards violence.

[50] “Militancy and Jihadism in the Region,” Times Glo, YouTube video, May 5, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5wR_aIu4mE.

[51] Abdul Sayed (@abdsayedd), “Pakistani Taliban (TTP) announced the first-ever merger from Kohat district.”

[52] ISK’s media content is uploaded on I’lam on the dark web, IS’s main media dump.

[53] Antonio Giustozzi, “How Much of a Threat is the Islamic State in Khorasan?” Royal United Services Institute, March 28, 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-much-threat-islamic-state-khorasan.

[54] Sayed, “Analysis: Resurgence of Umar Media Boosts Pakistani Taliban Messaging.”

[55] Al-Lami, “Analysis: Al-Azaim Media Boosts IS Afghanistan Messaging.”

[56] “Insight,” BBC Monitoring, May 18, 2023, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0000f2w.

[57] Almirsad English (@AlmirsadEnglish), “Al Mersaad Urdu (website) has been launched,” X, August 27, 2023, https://twitter.com/AlmirsadEnglish/status/1695827751234933061. Per Almirsad English’s X page, it is part of the (Taliban’s) “ideological struggle against the seditionists (Khawarij). Considering it a religious and human duty, Al-Mirsaad aims relentlessly to eliminate seditionists and their suspicions on the basis of religious and logical reasons.”

[58] Edmund Fitton-Brown, “Can Terrorists Become Counter-Terrorists?” Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, https://www.aissonline.org/en/opinions/can-terror…/1148.

[59] “Those Seeking Democracy (JUIF) are Apostates,” Al-Azaim Foundation, August 18, 2023.

[60] “TTP’s Statement of Condemnation on Bajaur’s Horrendous Attack,” Al-Umar Media, July 30, 2023.

[61] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, p. 6.

[62] Ibid.

[63] The White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Supreme Court’s Decision on the Administration’s Student Debt Relief Program, June 30, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/30/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-supreme-courts-decision-on-the-administrations-student-debt-relief-program/.