Africa
Africa continues to be the global epicentre of terrorist attacks; the latter’s destabilising impact persisted in 2025, a trend that has been on a gradual rise in the past two decades. Terrorist groups, operating across the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa, Mozambique and the Horn of Africa, are affiliates of both the global Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ) networks.
Introduction
In 2024, there were an estimated 22,307 fatalities attributed to Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ)-linked terrorist groups in Africa. This represented a 60 percent increase compared to the 2020-2022 period. Nearly half of the fatalities (10,685) were in the Sahel. Somalia represented roughly a third of the continental fatalities (7,289). Along with the Lake Chad Basin, these regions accounted for over 90 percent of militant Islamist-linked fatalities in Africa. There was also a 14 percent rise in battle-related deaths across the continent (15,678).[1]
2025 also saw militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia expand their hold on territory. Across Africa, an estimated 950,000 square kilometres (367,000 square miles) of populated territories are outside government control due to militant Islamist insurgencies. This is equivalent to the size of Tanzania.[2]
The Global Terrorism Index (2025) confirms that the Sahel region now represents more than half of all global terrorism-related deaths, at 51 percent.[3] Deaths from terrorism have increased almost tenfold since 2019. Burkina Faso topped the international list, followed by Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique and Kenya, respectively.[4]
Why Do These Groups Flourish?
Several factors account for the rapid growth and expansion of these groups. Terrorist groups in Africa, like those elsewhere in the world, are adept at leveraging existing political and socio-cultural issues, new technologies and economic marginalisation of communities – especially those at the fringe and in lawless borderlands with limited state presence – to recruit and expand their control.
Several African countries struggle to provide basic security and social services across vast, ungoverned border areas, allowing such groups to step in and fill the gaps. Coupled with financial incentives and employment opportunities for disillusioned youth in many disenfranchised communities, terrorist groups also protect locals against predatory states, other armed groups and rival communities.
Many African areas with active terrorist group presence have pre-existing illicit economies that support such groups’ operations and are located in politically unstable regions ravaged by climate-induced crises and high levels of poverty. These predisposing factors increase the coercive co-option of the local populace to support such groups.
Domestic Threats Landscape in Africa – IS Affiliates and Activities
Islamic State-Somalia (IS-Somalia)
IS-Somalia, established by Abdiqadir Mumin, a defector from Al-Shabaab during the height of the IS caliphate a decade ago, operates in the Bari region of the Puntland state of Somalia. The group has approximately 1,000-plus fighters, primarily drawn from North Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Africa and some from Asia, as well as the local Majerteen Ali Saleban sub-clan. The elusive Mumin has, in recent times, been touted to take over the global leadership of IS. It is believed the group has raised a considerable amount of revenue through extortion and illegal taxation of businesses, telco companies and local pastoralist communities.[5] The group’s central role as the financial nerve centre for coordinating terror funds transfers to other IS affiliates in Africa, the Middle East and Asia through its Maktab al-Karrar office, has made it an indispensable cog in sustaining the group’s global resilience.[6]
Since December 2024, the Puntland government has launched a vigorous counterinsurgency campaign against the group, dubbed Operation Hilaac,[7] reducing its fighting force by nearly 80 percent, capturing key leaders and eliminating others. They have recovered large areas of territory and sophisticated weapons, including complex cave systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) training camps and administrative offices. The counterinsurgency efforts, supported by dozens of airstrikes[8] and technical assistance from the United States (US) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), along with widespread mobilisation by the Puntland authorities, have been largely successful compared to the federal government’s campaigns against Al-Shabaab.[9]
Among the top leaders who were captured in the operations are Abdirahman Shirwac Aw-Saciid, the head of an extortion ring, and Abdiweli M Yusuf, the group’s key financier.[10] In short, the significant degradation of its fighting force and the resultant dismantling of its extortion networks will bring some relief. It will disrupt the group’s extortive fund-raising tactics and transfers to affiliates in central and southern Africa. However, its resilience and reliance on other African and global affiliates may keep the remnants going.
Despite nearly a year of operations and the near collapse of its extensive extortion network and transnational terror financing capabilities, as well as the elimination of several of its fighters, IS-Somalia has adopted highly deadly asymmetric guerrilla tactics. These include improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines,[11] mobile ambushes and further retreat into the rugged, hard-to-access Al-Miskaad Mountains, where it has been based for years.[12]
Islamic State-Mozambique (IS-Mozambique)
IS-Mozambique, also known as Ahlul Sunna wa Jamaa (locally called Al-Shabaab), began in October 2017 as a low-scale insurgency fuelled by local grievances and discourses of marginalisation in the hydrocarbon- and mineral-rich northernmost region of Cabo Delgado, close to the Tanzania border.[13]
Now in its eighth year, the group has withstood counterinsurgency operations launched by the Mozambican forces, with the support of over 5,000 Rwandan security personnel and the short-lived, two-year deployment of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).[14] The US and the European Union (EU) have supported the capacity building of the Mozambican security forces to strengthen the latter’s counter terrorism (CT) operations. Currently, IS-Mozambique is active in several of the 17 Cabo Delgado districts and carries out attacks nearly every day against military installations and civilian populations.[15] The Mozambican government’s security-centric and heavily militarised operations have had limited success, as they fail to address the complex structural and historical factors which primarily drive the insurgency.[16]
Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) – DRC
ISCAP (since 2019), also known as the Alliance Democratic Forces (ADF), operating out of eastern DRC and western Uganda, has continued its lethal attacks against the civilian population. Amid intense pressure launched by the Ugandan and Congolese forces under Operation Shujaa, the group was subjected to coordinated aerial and ground attacks. Some of its top leaders were taken prisoner, camps were demolished and weapons were seized. However, the operation has also pushed the group out of its stronghold in North Kivu into Ituri and southwards into Lubero, creating new zones of insecurity and displacement.[17]
Adopting agile small units while infiltrating urban and peri-urban communities as taxi drivers and small-scale traders, the group has sustained its operations by blending terror financing with the licit economies of eastern DRC. Operation Shujaa has relatively loosened the ADF’s grip on and embeddedness in illicit mining, including gold, timber and cocoa, as well as forced taxation and cross-border trade. However, it could easily bounce back due to its long-term expertise and resilience as one of the dozen non-state armed actors in eastern DRC. The armed conflict between the FARDC (the Armed Forces of the DRC) and the M23 (March 23 Movement) rebel group has seen the FARDC focus less on the ADF.[18] The ADF, as an affiliate of IS, benefits from terror financing, propagation of its attacks and operations on IS’s media platforms, recruitment into eastern Africa, and weaponry skills transfers and capacity building from other affiliates such as IS-Somalia.
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
ISWAP, a splinter group from and bitter rival of Boko Haram (also called Jama’atul Ahl Sunnah Liddawati wal Jihad, or JAS), scaled up its attacks against Nigeria’s security forces in 2025. Between January and May 2025, the group attacked military installations in Mallam Fatoru near the Niger border and in Wajiroko, Kumshe and Katafila in southern Borno, as well as the Buni Gari military camp which houses Nigeria’s 27 Task Force Brigade. ISWAP also coordinated assaults against the towns of Marte, Dikwa and Rann in eastern Borno and Damboa in western Borno. Under its campaign dubbed “the holocaust of camps”, ISWAP seized weapons and key commanders, forced the retreat of military units and displaced hundreds of civilians.[19]
Though the five-nation Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the Nigerian Army and the Borno state-led counterinsurgency and amnesty programme have put pressure on the group, ISWAP appears to be strategically reorganising and expanding its territorial reach to the Far North region of Cameroon as well as into Nigeria’s northern Adamawa state, including a cell near the federal capital of Abuja.[20] The group’s use of modified commercial drones for attacks and reconnaissance, deployment of motorcycles for nightly raids and deep integration into the illicit economies of the Lake Chad region, make the group highly lethal.
JAS, though weakened by frequent assaults by ISWAP, has in recent months made a comeback. The focus on ISWAP by regional forces has prompted JAS to regroup and expand its territories. Between June and September 2025, JAS carried out attacks against a Nigerian naval base near Lake Chad, a Cameroonian military camp near Talakatchi and an MNJTF position in Kirawa.[21] It massacred dozens of civilians on suspicions of espionage for ISWAP in Mallam Karamti and Kwatandashi villages in Borno. JAS’s notorious Ghazwah wing, infamous for ransoming, robbery and extortion, provides the group with access to finances, blending jihadism with organised criminality.[22]
Additionally, Lakurawa, an emergent militant group which formed along the Sokoto and Kebbi borders in northwestern Nigeria, near the border with Niger, acts as an anti-banditry militia and poses a significant security threat. The group’s activities also often blur the line between transnational organised crime and jihadism. Believed to be armed herders initially from Mali, members have married local women and used financial incentives and threats to recruit local unemployed youth into the group’s ranks.[23] Its coercive enforcement of strict religious conservatism, extortion networks that raise revenue from taxing herders and businesses, kidnapping for ransom and cattle rustling, and frequent attacks against government officials and communities, open a new jihadi front in northwestern Nigeria, connecting the poorly governed borderlands to the centre of Sahelian jihadism.[24] Lakurawa, designated by the Nigerian government as a terrorist group in early 2025,[25] is believed to be affiliated with the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) as an operational wing.[26]
Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)
ISSP, one of the most active IS affiliates in Africa, operates in the tri-border area of western Niger, northern Burkina Faso and eastern Mali, taking advantage of the withdrawal of international forces and subsequent reduction in CT operations as well as the ineffective counterinsurgency efforts by the three countries, which are led by military juntas following coups that overthrew civilian regimes. It is increasingly looking southwards towards the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions of Niger as well as parts of Menako and Gao in Mali, to expand its territories.[27]
With a decentralised leadership, a shariah-based governance structure and a reliance on local nomadic community alliances, ISSP leverages existing illicit economies fuelled by gold mining, narcotics trafficking, smuggling of migrants, extortion, and taxing of traders and herders to finance its operations. The group has shown tactical flexibility by employing ambushes, IEDs and large-scale attacks on isolated military bases and rural areas using motorcycles. In the past year, the group has carried out devastating attacks against civilians, accusing them of spying for governments or its rival Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), and against military installations belonging to regional governments. Key towns where the group orchestrated attacks include Chetoumane (Niger), Kobe in the Gao region (Mali), Banibangou (Niger), Fambita (Niger) and Manda (Niger). In Burkina Faso, ISSP primarily operates in smaller cells in the northern regions of the country, and the group is also expanding southwards to Niger’s Dosso region and Nigeria’s northwestern Sokoto and Kebbi states.[28]
Similar to the al-Karrar office run by IS-Somalia, ISSP and ISWAP fall under Maktab al-Furqan (the Furqan office), an elusive organisation likely based in Nigeria which provides these IS branches with operational guidance and international funding under the purview of the General Directorate of Provinces (GDP) of IS global.[29]
AQ Affiliates
Al-Shabaab
Now in its 19th year, Al-Shabaab represents one of the longest-running AQ affiliates. It controls a large swath of southern and central Somalia. It engages in regular attacks against positions of the Somali National Army (SNA), the African Union Mission (AUM) forces, and Kenyan and Ethiopian forces stationed in Somalia. It also frequently attacks public vehicles and security personnel in the northeastern region and in coastal Lamu County of Kenya, which borders Somalia. The group is estimated to collect up to US$100 million annually through illegal taxation of traders, farmers and herders as well as from road taxes, charcoal sales and arms trafficking.[30]
The group regained a significant amount of territory it had lost to the SNA and Macawisley (an assortment of clan militias) during the 2022-2024 counterinsurgency operations. It is currently engaged in intense combat with the SNA, the AUM forces and clan militias over control of key towns and critical supply chains. Despite massive air support from the US and Turkey and years of capacity development support from the international community, there has been limited success in degrading the locally embedded jihadists. The growing link between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis in Yemen may offer the group lucrative arms supplies and financing which could bolster its insurgency operations in the region.
Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM)
JNIM, a coalition of AQ jihadists active in the Sahelian countries of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and part of West Africa, is one of the most destabilising terror outfits in the region. Just as with ISSP, it operates in the tri-border area of the three countries. It is also increasingly threatening the littoral states of Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire as it expands southwards. The three countries’ military governments, which came to power through coups, expelled international CT partners and vowed to eliminate terror groups, but are barely managing despite assistance from Russia-linked private military corporations. JNIM raises revenue through illegal gold mining, control of commodity and human smuggling routes, and taxing of local communities.
JNIM has enforced blockades in western Mali, particularly in the Kayes and Nioro-du-Sahel regions, preventing fuel imports from neighbouring countries, including Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania.[31] The group has also publicly threatened transport operators. JNIM’s strategy extends beyond military attacks to include economic pressure, such as cutting fuel supplies, creating scarcity and increasing costs, all of which weaken state legitimacy.[32]
Responses
Responses to terrorism in Africa vary by region. In Somalia, as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) transitions to the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), it faces a bleak future due to a funding gap of over US$180 million. The United Kingdom’s pledge of US$30 million for non-lethal support to the Somali forces and African Union-led security efforts will be a significant boost.[33] Traditional stakeholders, facing donor fatigue, are non-committal. The capacity building of specialised units, donation of UAVs, critical air support from partners such as the US and Turkey against Al-Shabaab and similar support for Puntland’s counterinsurgency operations, have been instrumental in holding terrorist groups at bay.
In Mozambique, the government’s militarised approach, conducted with the support of the Rwandan forces, has been the sole response which requires a rethink to address the underlying factors that fuel the insurgency. In the DRC, the resurgence of the M23 movement and its takeover of cities in the eastern region have shifted attention away from the ADF, allowing the latter to further expand its operations despite initial losses through Operation Shujaa.
In the Sahel, the of the three states are increasingly mobilising civilian vigilantes and defence groups to bolster their overwhelmed armies, with limited success. Deployment of the Russia-backed African Corps has not filled the void left by the United Nations mission and the French security forces. In the Lake Chad regionmilitaries , the MNJTF has carried out multiple operations, shared intelligence and logistics, and worked on amnesty and reintegration programmes despite the resurgence of terror groups.
Challenges to Counter Terrorism
Across the continent, governments and regional CT operations face funding gaps. Overreliance on external financial and aerial support is hindering the growth of locally driven, effective CT measures. The regions most affected by terrorism continue to face political instability, infighting among elites, corruption, poor governance, violence against civilians, and human rights violations committed by armies and associated civilian vigilante groups, which further marginalise the communities impacted by terrorism. Growing authoritarianism in the military-led Sahelian region is eroding goodwill and mass support for the regimes’ CT operations. Their inability to curb the growing strength of jihadist groups is posing a considerable threat to their legitimacy.
Threat Outlook
In the Sahel, groups such as JNIM and ISSP may intensify their encirclement strategy, exacerbating shortages of essential goods and hindering cross-border mobility through blockades, and thereby eroding the legitimacy of states. The groups may continue to pose a threat to Benin, Togo and northwestern Nigeria as they attempt to expand their territories, unless urgent measures are taken. On a positive note, the thawing of relations between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the newly formed Alliance of Sahelian States (Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) could lead to actual joint CT collaboration in the coming months and years.
The use of generative artificial intelligence (AI), especially in disinformation and misinformation, could be the next frontier for jihadist propaganda. The increasing use of UAVs by diverse groups, with the ability to assemble and deploy them for surveillance and attacks, is a trend to watch. Additionally, terror mobility, skills transfers, enduring global networks, and collaboration within the continent and with other affiliates and other armed actors in the Middle East, Asia and Europe, may continue to pose threats to effective regional CT measures.
The use of digital currencies and digital assets for terror financing and transfers is increasing across all terrorist groups. Countries need to collaborate, share information, strengthen anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing laws, prosecute and dismantle terrorist financing networks, and impose targeted sanctions against jihadist-linked individuals and firms.
About The Author
Dr Halkano Abdi Wario is Regional Organized Crime Observatory Coordinator – East Africa, at the
Institute for Security Studies, based in Kenya.
Citations
[1] “Africa Surpasses 150,000 Deaths Linked to Militant Islamist Groups in Past Decade,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 28, 2025, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-2025-mig-10-year/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Global Terrorism Index 2025 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2025), https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2025.pdf.
[4] Ibid.
[5] “Treasury Designates Senior ISIS-Somalia Financier,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 27, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1652
[6] “The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat,” International Crisis Group, September 12, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/somalia/b201-islamic-state-somalia-responding-evolving-threat.
[7] Ido Levy, “How the Small Autonomous Region of Puntland Found Success in Battling Islamic State in Somalia,” American University, April 7, 2025, https://www.american.edu/sis/news/202050407-how-the-small-autonomous-region-of-puntland-found-success-in-battling-islamic-state-in-somalia.cfm.
[8] “US Carries Out Fresh Airstrikes on ISIS Militants in Somalia – Military,” Garowe Online, September 27, 2025, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/us-carries-out-fresh-airstrikes-on-isis-militants-in-somalia-military.
[9] Daisy Muibu, “Islamic State in Somalia: A Global Threat and Efforts to Counter the Militants,” Orion Policy Institute, March 6, 2025, https://orionpolicy.org/islamic-state-in-somalia-a-global-threat-and-efforts-to-counter-the-militants/.
[10] Jacob Zenn, “Abdiweli M. Yusuf: Islamic State Financer Captured in Somalia,” The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor 16, no. 2 (2025), https://jamestown.org/brief/abdiweli-m-yusuf-islamic-state-financer-captured-in-somalia/.
[11] “Somalia: Puntland Military Commander Killed in Landmine Explosion in Qandala,” AllAfrica, September 23, 2025, https://allafrica.com/stories/202509240080.html.
[12] “Puntland Forces Kill ISIS Cell Behind Deadly Landmine Attack on Gen. Qalyare,” Hiiraan Online, September 29, 2025, https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2025/Sept/203114/puntland_forces_kill_isis_cell_behind_deadly_landmine_attack_on_gen_qalyare.aspx.
[13] Jason Warner et al., “The Islamic State’s Central Africa Province – Mozambique,” in The Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront (Oxford University Press, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197639320.003.0010.
[14] Peter Bofin, “Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to Civilian Protection,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), April 23, 2025, https://acleddata.com/report/rwanda-mozambique-limits-civilian-protection.
[15] Borges Nhamirre, “Cabo Delgado Insurgency Persists amid Failed Military Strategy,” ISS Today, October 7, 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/cabo-delgado-insurgency-persists-amid-failed-military-strategy.
[16] “Mozambique Conflict Monitor: Update 15 – 28 September 2025,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), October 1, 2025, https://acleddata.com/update/mozambique-conflict-monitor-update-15-28-september-2025.
[17] Nirvaly Mooloo, “Focusing on M23 Allows ADF Insurgents to Expand in Eastern DRC,” ISS Today, September 23, 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/focusing-on-m23-allows-adf-insurgents-to-expand-in-eastern-drc.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Malik Samuel and Ed Stoddard, “Resurgent Jihadist Violence in Northeast Nigeria Part of Worrying Regional Trend,” The New Humanitarian, June 2, 2025, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/06/02/resurgent-jihadist-violence-northeast-nigeria-part-worrying-regional-trend; Taiwo Adebayo, “Lake Chad Basin’s Military Bases in ISWAP’s Crosshairs,” ISS Today, July 14, 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lake-chad-basin-s-military-bases-in-iswap-s-crosshairs.
[20] Samuel and Stoddard, “Resurgent Jihadist Violence.”
[21] Taiwo Adebayo, “JAS Resurgence Deepens Lake Chad Basin’s Complex Security Crisis,” ISS Today, September 11, 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/jas-resurgence-deepens-lake-chad-basin-s-complex-security-crisis.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Shola Lawal, “Lakurawa, the New Armed Group Wreaking Havoc on the Nigeria-Niger Border,” Al Jazeera, January 10, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/10/lakurawa-the-new-armed-group-wreaking-havoc-on-the-nigeria-niger-borde.
[24] John Sunday Ojo, “Mapping the Enemy, Mobilising the Future: Surveillance and Recruitment Strategies of Lakurawa Terror Group in Nigeria,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), March 7, 2025, https://gnet-research.org/2025/03/07/mapping-the-enemy-mobilising-the-future-surveillance-and-recruitment-strategies-of-lakurawa-terror-group-in-nigeria/.
[25] Chris Ewokor and Mansur Abubakar, “New Nigerian Jihadist Group Declared Terrorists,” BBC News, January 24, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqjvqe4n7gzo.
[26] Zagazola Makama, “Islamic State Sahel Province Claims Lakurawa Group as Operational Wing, Establishes Cross-Border Corridor Linking Mali to Lake Chad Axis,” Global Upfront Newspapers, May 11, 2025. https://globalupfront.com/2025/05/11/islamic-state-sahel-province-claims-lakurawa-group-as-operational-wing-establishes-cross-border-corridor-linking-mali-to-lake-chad-axis/.
[27] Jalale Getachew Birru, “IS Sahel’s Tactics Cause Mass, Indiscriminate Violence,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), January 13, 2023, https://acleddata.com/report/sahels-tactics-cause-mass-indiscriminate-violence.
[28] Ladd Serwat et al., “Q&A: The Islamic State’s Pivot to Africa,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), September 4, 2025, https://acleddata.com/qa/qa-islamic-states-pivot-africa.
[29] Adam Rousselle, “Combating Islamic State Finance: West Africa and the Sahel,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), February 18, 2025, https://gnet-research.org/2025/02/18/combating-islamic-state-finance-west-africa-and-the-sahel/.
[30] United Nations Security Council, Thirty-fifth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2734 (2024) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, S/2025/71, February 6, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/71.
[31] Daniel Eizenga, “JNIM Attacks in Western Mali Reshape Sahel Conflict,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2025, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/jnim-attacks-western-mali-sahel/.
[32] Baba Ahmed and Ope Adetayo, “Armed Group Linked to al-Qaida Sets Fuel Trucks Ablaze As It Blockades Imports in Mali,” Military.com, September 8, 2025, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/09/08/armed-group-linked-al-qaida-sets-fuel-trucks-ablaze-it-blockades-imports-mali.html.
[33] “UK Contributes Over £30 Million to Support Somalia’s Security Transition,” British Embassy Mogadishu, September 29, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-contributes-over-30-million-to-support-somalias-security-transition.
