Al-Qaeda’s Evolution: Future Course and Key Implications for Peace and Security
This article examines Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s evolution from a centralised global jihadist group into a decentralised network of regional affiliates. It argues that sustained counter terrorism pressure, leadership losses and competition from the Islamic State (IS) has compelled AQ to adopt strategic patience, prioritising local insurgencies over large-scale international attacks. The study highlights the growing significance of regional affiliates such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) in the Sahel, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in South Asia. AQ’s relationship with its regional affiliates demonstrates how it embeds within fragile states to exploit governance vacuums. While no longer the dominant global jihadist force, AQ remains a persistent and adaptive threat with long-term implications for regional stability and international security.
Introduction
Al-Qaeda (AQ), once the most prominent global jihadist group, no longer commands the same international attention. Its operational strength significantly decreased during the United States (US)-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan[1] and subsequent counter terrorism measures. At present, AQ has neither the capacity to perpetrate terrorist attacks against the West (the far enemy) nor to conduct violent operations in Muslim-majority countries (the near enemy).[2] Though AQ is not considered a substantial global risk, its affiliates continue to pose an imminent threat in parts of Asia and Africa. In the context of the Israel–US–Iran war,[3] AQ may get an opportunity to rebrand itself by exploiting the emerging security vacuums in the Middle East. Nevertheless, AQ must not be mistaken for irrelevance; rather, it has made a strategic recalibration to survive, adapt and embed itself within local jihadist groups in parts of Asia and Africa.[4]
Before the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), AQ was the torchbearer and the vanguard of the global jihadist movement.[5] It aimed to create a network of jihadist groups to jointly create a self-styled global Sunni caliphate. AQ has based its jihadist narrative on international conflicts involving Muslim states, such as Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and several conflicts in Africa.[6]
Against this backdrop, it is important to unpack AQ’s transformation strategy to understand its future trajectory. Ostensibly, AQ has evolved from a tight-knit, centralised, transnational jihadist organisation into a decentralised network of local militant groups.[7]
From Global to Regional to Local
Since its inception in the late 1990s and growth in the early 2000s, AQ, also described as Al-Qaeda Central or Al-Qaeda Core, worked as a hierarchical organisation with a centralised command structure based in Afghanistan.[8] It had training camps in Afghanistan operating under the first Taliban regime’s (1996–2001) protection umbrella.[9] After the US intervention and subsequent counter terrorism operations in Afghanistan, AQ’s command structure was disrupted, its top leadership was decapitated and its financial networks were tracked and hunted down.[10] Nonetheless, AQ fought on till the death of its emir, Osama bin Laden, in May 2011,[11] and the command structure remained in central control. However, AQ’s next leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was not as charismatic as his predecessor.[12]
In the post-2011 scenario, AQ transitioned from a centralised vanguard model into a distributed network of affiliates. Even after the killing of Zawahiri in August 2022,[13] AQ survived, as it adopted a symbolic and ideological role while backing and sponsoring its regional affiliates as well as giving the operational initiative to local branches.[14] As of 2026, these regional affiliates operate with substantial autonomy, but remain aligned with AQ and seek its strategic guidance. They function as semi-autonomous nodes within AQ’s global ecosystem of jihadism.
The Strategic Logic of Patience
According to terrorism scholar Sara Harmouch, “Bin Laden’s strategic logic was simple: Striking the far enemy—the United States, Israel, and other powers propping up local apostate regimes (the near enemy)—would collapse the regional order by severing its external support and forcing American withdrawal from the Middle East. Only spectacular violence, he believed, could achieve that end—a conviction reflected in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the 2000 USS Cole attack and ultimately September 11 (2001).”[15]
After bin Laden, Zawahiri’s policy was to avoid mass-casualty attacks, and he directed local AQ affiliates by issuing the General Guidelines for Jihad in 2013.[16] Zawahiri instructed them to refrain from sectarian violence and from targeting civilians, and to prioritise the cultivation of local support from the general population.[17]
After leadership losses and growing competition from its Iraqi offshoot, the so-called Islamic State (IS), AQ has embraced the policy of strategic patience.[18] This does not mean AQ has shunned its objective of establishing a self-styled Sunni global caliphate. Rather, it is now trying to achieve this goal indirectly by working with regional affiliates. This involves embedding itself within local conflicts rather than dominating them. AQ’s strategy to work with the Afghan Taliban and help them regain power in Afghanistan exemplifies this. Most importantly, AQ has been avoiding high-profile terrorist attacks, especially in Western countries, to avoid international counter terrorism pressure. Ostensibly, this has worked well for AQ, as it seems to have gone off the Western security radar despite working alongside its regional affiliates in Africa, South Asia, Central Asia and other parts of the world.[19]
After Zawahiri’s killing in Kabul in 2022, AQ’s new presumed emir, Sayf al-Adl, has elucidated his thoughts in the book, 33 Strategies of War. He believes in reorienting AQ into a disciplined, professional and methodical military organisation, rather than just a network that seeks spectacular attacks. He favours low visibility, strategic patience and carefully timed operations. He believes that earlier jihadist movements failed because of poor planning and a lack of expertise. His jihadist strategic doctrine stresses training, operational discipline and avoiding premature confrontation. Moreover, he is of the view that AQ, as a jihadist organisation, must be ready for a prolonged generational fight, which requires institutional strength, gradual expansion and survival under pressure.[20]
Growing Amongst Networks: A Geographic Assessment of Al-Qaeda
In recent years, AQ has broadened its network of affiliates across the globe, especially in Africa and Asia. This section looks at AQ’s major affiliates in the two regions.
Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen in the Sahel Region
AQ has experienced unprecedented growth in Africa’s Sahel region, where it operates through Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), a conglomerate of Al-Mourabitoun, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) and Ansar Dine, among others. Founded in 2017, JNIM has capitalised on political instability, military coups and governance vacuums across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to entrench its footprint in the Sahel.[21] Under its governance model JNIM works with local communities instead of imposing rigid bureaucratic structures on them. It often negotiates with local communities while presenting itself as a security provider to fill the vacuum created by state failures.[22] This has allowed JNIM to expand throughout the Sahel without drawing much international attention. Reportedly, JNIM rules over large chunks of land in the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo). JNIM’s emir, Iyad ag Ghaly,[23] a Tuareg from Mali, commands over 6,000 militants.[24]
Al-Shabaab in Somalia
Al-Shabaab, an old AQ affiliate, formally aligned with AQ while Osama bin Laden was alive. After the state’s failure in Somalia, Al-Shabaab managed to emerge as a powerful insurgent organisation, controlling territory in southern and central Somalia and maintaining a parallel governance structure. Al-Shabaab militants have carried out terrorist attacks in in Somalia and Kenya[25].
Despite the collapse of AQ elsewhere, Al-Shabaab remains strong in eastern Africa. Its emir, Ahmed Diriye (Abu Ubaidah), commands a force of 7,000-12,000 militants.[26] While primarily focused on local objectives, its allegiance to AQ underscores continued transnational ideological connections.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen
Despite being torn apart due to regional politics and interventions, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), continues to operate in southern and eastern Yemen with impunity. AQAP is a network of Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen, the Islamic Army of Aden and Abyan, and Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. It consists of a potent force of around 4,000[27] well-armed jihadist militants and is headed by Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki.[28]
In the past, AQAP launched several international terrorist attacks in Europe and North America. AQAP was famed for having prominent AQ commanders and jihadist ideologues among its members, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Qasim al-Raymi and Khalid Batarfi.[29][30]
AQAP is now weak compared to its peak years but continues to operate within Yemen’s fragmented political landscape. Although its external plotting capacity appears reduced, the group retains ideological significance and the potential for regeneration if the security vacuum in Yemen persists.[31]
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent in South Asia
The South Asian chapter of AQ, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), was Zawahiri’s brainchild.[32] It was formed in 2014[33] because of AQ’s growing competition with IS in the region. Although AQ Core was based in Pakistan even then, AQIS was established to execute terrorist strikes in the region. The 2014 attempted hijacking of the Pakistan Navy’s ship, the PNS Zulfiqar, off the coast of Karachi, was a failed high-profile attack launched immediately after the proclamation of AQIS.[34]
Though AQIS has achieved limited operational impact, it maintains a symbolic presence in South Asia. At present, AQIS is based in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. It has found refuge in local militant alliances, such as Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, which is a conglomerate of Pakistan-focused militant groups based in Afghanistan.[35] Currently, AQIS is headed by Osama Mahmood and his deputy Yahya Ghouri, and is based in Kabul.[36]
In sum, AQ affiliates prioritise local insurgencies rather than orchestrating coordinated global attacks. In this sense, the “near enemy” becomes the focus of AQ and its affiliates’ attention rather than the “far enemy”. This is despite the fact that AQ continues to reinforce its anti-Western narrative, comprising global Muslim victimhood and an imminent civilisational confrontation between Dar ul Islam (the House of Peace) and Dar ul Harb (the House of War).[37] The latter remains part of AQ’s rhetorical discourse but is not currently the primary operational target.[38] Under AQ’s strategy of strategic patience, though global jihadism persists as an ideological glue, its execution is local.
Major Challenges
Leadership Issues and Transitions
The foremost challenge confronting AQ is persistent leadership losses. Scores of high-value AQ leaders have been eliminated in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere, and many have also been arrested, creating a serious leadership crisis.[39] After the killing of bin Laden in May 2011, there has been no able or charismatic leader to lead AQ.[40] The current leadership status is unclear, but it is speculated that Sayf al-Adl has taken over as the new emir. It is important to mention that AQ has not made a formal announcement of his appointment.
Nonetheless, presumed de facto leader al-Adl is a former Egyptian military officer and one of AQ’s founding members. He was involved in the planning and execution of the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.[41] His location is said to be in Iran under the custody of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[42] It could be argued that he is currently imprisoned and not able to execute his duties as emir of AQ.
These transitions have weakened AQ and diminished its potency as a premier jihadist organisation globally. This is another reason that AQ has opted to follow a strategy of localisation.
Competition with IS
IS, now AQ’s archnemesis, emerged on the global stage after taking over Iraq’s Mosul in 2014.[43] IS’s rise forced AQ to redefine itself, and fierce competition ensued. IS, after splitting from AQ, adopted a somewhat different approach as far as executing violence and perpetrating terrorist attacks are concerned. IS embraced hyper-brutality,[44] territorial governance and international terrorist attacks, and presented itself as the true heir of bin Laden. This change of strategy eventually benefited AQ after the fall of IS territories in Iraq and Syria. AQ started to reinvigorate its affiliates, particularly in parts of Africa. From then on, AQ started its less conspicuous model, which may prove more sustainable over time.[45]
It is important to point out that competition between global jihadist factions can produce cycles of escalation, particularly in contested theatres, such as the Sahel. In a bid to outdo and outcompete each other, rival jihadist factions may carry out large-scale terrorist attacks.[46] Therefore, policymakers must monitor these dynamics carefully.
Contemporary Threat Profile and Future Implications
Presently, AQ poses a different type of threat than it did in 2001. It is not potent enough to perpetrate mass-casualty terrorist attacks in Western countries, but there is a likelihood of sustained growth in fragile states where Islamist insurgencies are gaining momentum, such as in Africa and the Middle East. AQ is trying to gradually entrench itself within local political and social structures and to promote its ideological influence.
Amid this situation, devising counter terrorism policies becomes complicated. Currently, the AQ threat is less dramatic but more persistent. The United Nations Security Council sanctions regime, which covers AQ and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or Daesh), remains active, with the list updated as recently as February 2026, reflecting ongoing designations.[47]
Threat to Fragile States in Asia and Africa
AQ still carries weight as far as terrorism in the fragile states of Asia and Africa is concerned, by playing the role of a mentor to local jihadist movements in these regions. The absence of AQ’s high-profile terrorist attacks in Western countries does not indicate a diminished threat.[48] Rather, AQ is now focused on embedding itself within local jihadist groups, as discussed above. Local jihadist insurgencies enable AQ chapters to erode governance, fuel humanitarian crises and create permissive environments for militant growth.
The Sahel region (earlier discussed) illustrates how political instability, economic marginalisation and military coups create conditions conducive to militant expansion. The same situation exists in regions like Syria, where Hurras al-Din, a branch of AQ, established itself against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war, but later dissolved.[49] Afghanistan, another war-torn country, has witnessed the growth of AQIS, which is now working in tandem with the Afghan Taliban regime. Therefore, it is apparent that seeking refuge in fragile countries is now a paramount policy of AQ.
Conclusion
The US intervention in Afghanistan marked the beginning of a sustained global counter terrorism campaign against AQ. Though AQ no longer retains the operational capacity to launch high-profile international attacks, it would be imprudent to consider it strategically defeated. Rather, it has evolved into a decentralised network of regional affiliates, which reflects a deliberate long-term strategy. AQ’s organisational evolution has complicated the traditional counter terrorism metrics and responses.
AQ’s transformation comes at a critical time when global counter terrorism is no longer a priority of the US. Hence, there would be limitations as far as global counter terrorism approaches are concerned, particularly vis-à-vis AQ and its local affiliates. Therefore, it is crucial to prioritise non-kinetic counter terrorism measures, including political stabilisation, local capacity-building and counter ideological efforts in fragile states where AQ is reinvigorating itself. Concurrently, there is also a need to craft effective counter terrorism policies against an evolving AQ to contain and mitigate its threat.
About the Author
Farhan Zahid has a PhD in Terrorism Studies from the University of Brussels, Belgium. He has authored three books and several research papers and articles on counter terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS) and other militant groups in South Asia. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Vincent Rivaud on Pexels
Citations
[1] “After 13 Years, Operation Enduring Freedom Concludes in Afghanistan,” National Guard of the United States, December 29, 2014, https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/576922/after-13-years-operation-enduring-freedom-concludes-in-afghanistan/.
[2] For details on this concept, see Abdul Salam Faraj, The Forgotten Duty (Maktabah al-Ansar, 2000). Faraj argued that fighting the near enemy must take precedence over fighting foreign occupiers, including Israel. The far enemy refers to the United States and its Western allies (sometimes referred to as the “Zionist-Crusader alliance”).
[3] “US-Israel Attacks on Iran: Death Toll and Injuries Live Tracker,” Al Jazeera, March 1, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/us-israel-attacks-on-iran-death-toll-and-injuries-live-tracker.
[4] Colin P. Clarke and Clara Broekaert, “The Global State of al-Qai’da 24 Years After 9/11,” CTC Sentinel 18, no. 9 (2025): 20–30, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/CTC-SENTINEL-092025_article-2.pdf.
[5] Robin Wright et al., The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Beyond (United States Institute of Peace and Wilson Center, 2016–2017), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf.
[6] Daniel L. Byman, “Comparing Al-Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals and Different Targets,” Brookings, May 29, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/.
[7] Clarke and Broekaert, “The Global State of al-Qai’da.”
[8] Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Works: The Jihadist Group’s Evolving Organizational Design,” Hudson Institute, June 1, 2018, https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/how-al-qaeda-works-the-jihadist-group-s-evolving-organizational-design.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Rohan Kumar Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda: Changing Shape Again?” Royal United Services Institute, November 13, 2007, https://www.rusi.org/publication/al-qaeda-changing-shape-again.
[11] Peter Baker, Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, “Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says,” The New York Times, May 1, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html
[12] “Ayman al-Zawahiri Appointed as Al-Qaeda Leader,” BBC News, June 16, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13788594.
[13] “Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri Killed: How the World Reacted?” Al Jazeera, August 2, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/2/al-qaeda-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-killed-how-the-world-reacted.
[14] Barak Mendelsohn, The Al-Qaeda Franchise (Oxford University Press, 2016).
[15] Sara Harmouch, “Al-Qaeda’s Third Phase,” Modern War Institute at West Point, March 3, 2026, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/al-qaedas-third-phase/.
[16] Shaikh Ayman al Zawahiri, General Guidelines for Jihad (Al-Sahab Media, 2013), https://www.talibeilm.net/uploads/4/7/1/3/4713847/general_guidelines_for_jihad.pdf.
[17] Harmouch, “Al-Qaeda’s Third Phase.”
[18] Thomas Hegghammer, “The Future of Jihadism in Europe: A Pessimistic View,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016): 156–70, https://pt.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/pdf/615-the-future-of-jihadism-in-europe-a-pessimistic-view-by-thomas-hegghammer.pdf.
[19] Assaf Moghadam, Nexus of Global Jihad: Understanding Cooperation among Terrorist Actors (Columbia University Press, 2019).
[20] Sayf al-Adl, The Book 33: Strategies of War (Noor Books, July 2023), https://www.noor-book.com/كتاب-قراءة-حرة-في-كتاب-33-استراتيجية-للحرب-pdf.
[21] Daniel Eizenga and Wendy Williams, “The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel,” Africa Security Brief, no. 38 (2020): 1–8, https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ASB-38-EN.pdf.
[22] “Understanding JNIM’s Expansion Beyond the Sahel,” International Crisis Group, February 20, 2026, https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/sahel-west-africa/321-le-jnim-et-le-dilemme-de-lexpansion-au-dela-du-sahel.
[23] “Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” Counter Terrorism Guide, 2026, https://www.dni.gov/nctc/terrorist_groups/jnim.html.
[24] International Crisis Group, “Understanding JNIM’s Expansion.”
[25] Mevlüt Özkan, “Kenyan Police Foil Al-Shabaab Attack Targeting Chinese Workers,” Anadolu Agency, December 16, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/kenyan-police-foil-al-shabaab-attack-targeting-chinese-workers/3773174.
[26] European Union Agency for Asylum, “1.2.2 Al-Shabaab Control Areas, Presence, and Influence,” in COI Report – Somalia: Security Situation (May 2025), https://www.euaa.europa.eu/coi/somalia/2025/security-situation/12-armed-actors-and-relevant-developments/122-al-shabaab-control-areas-presence-and-influence.
[27] “Saad bin Atef Al Awlaki Takes Helm of AQAP Following Leader’s Death,” The Media Line, December 3, 2024, https://themedialine.org/headlines/saad-bin-atef-al-awlaki-takes-helm-of-aqap-following-leaders-death/.
[28] “Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki,” Counter Extremism Project, January 8, 2025, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/saad-bin-atef-al-awlaki.
[29] “AQAP Fast Facts,” CNN, August 20, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/world/middleeast/aqap-fast-facts.
[30] David Gritten, “Al-Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Announces Death of Leader Khalid Batarfi,” BBC News, March 11, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68533649.
[31] Elisabeth Kendall, “Death of AQAP Leader Shows the Group’s Fragmentation—and Durability,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 14, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/death-aqap-leader-shows-groups-fragmentation-and-durability.
[32] Ammad Malik, “The Resurgent Jihadist Threat: A Thematic Analysis of Contemporary Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Propaganda,” Pakistan Journal of Terrorism Research 2, no. 2 (2019), https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/The-Resurgent-Jihadist-Threat.pdf.
[33] Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: The Nucleus of Jihad in South Asia (The Soufan Center, 2019), https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Al-Qaeda-in-the-Indian-Subcontinent-AQIS.pdf.
[34] Vijay Sakhuja, “Maritime Terrorism: Karachi as a Staging Point,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, October 6, 2014, https://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=4680.
[35] Author’s discussion with a senior security analyst, Quetta, April 2026; “Emergence of ‘Ittehad ul Mujahideen Pakistan’: A New Militant Alliance Challenges TTP’s Monopoly. Weekly Report 11–17 April 2025,” Pakistan Institute of Conflict and Security Studies, April 18, 2025, https://www.picss.net/latest-reports/emergence-of-ittehad-ul-mujahideen-pakistan-a-new-militant-alliance-challenges-ttps-monopoly-weekly-report-11-17-april2025/.
[36] Siyar Sirat, “UNSC Says Al-Qaeda’s Indian Subcontinent Leaders Based in Kabul,” Amu TV, February 11, 2026, https://amu.tv/225829/.
[37] The terms Dar ul Islam and Dar ul Harb are commonly used in jihadist literature to define the distinct nature of an “us versus them” struggle and to describe jihadist ideologues’ division of the world into two rival camps which can never be at peace.
[38] The terms “near enemy” and “far enemy” were coined by jihadist ideologue Abdul Salam Faraj in his book The Forgotten Duty. According to him, the far enemy is the United States (US), which protects the near enemy, comprising Middle Eastern and other Muslim-majority states allied with the US. Al-Qaeda has shifted its strategy from attacking the far enemy to the near enemy after becoming more localised and adopting the doctrine of strategic patience.
[39] Sara Harmouch, “The Question of Succession in Al-Qaeda,” War on the Rocks, September 29, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/the-question-of-succession-in-al-qaeda/.
[40] Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan’s Osama bin Laden Report: Was Pakistan Clueless or Complicit in Harboring Bin Laden?” Brookings, July 12, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistans-osama-bin-laden-report-was-pakistan-clueless-or-complicit-in-harboring-bin-laden/.
[41] “Most Wanted Terrorists: Saif al-Adl,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/saif-al-adel-1/download.pdf.
[42] Oubai Shahbandar, “Al-Qaeda–Iran Tactical Alliance Laid Bare by UN Report on Terror Group’s ‘De Facto Leader’ Saif Al-Adel,” Arab News, February 24, 2023, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2257556.
[43] “Islamic State: What Has Happened since the Fall of Mosul?” BBC News, January 10, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32784661.
[44] Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 2006).
[45] Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Works.”
[46] Samir Wahby, “Jihadist ‘Civil War’ Erupts in Africa’s Sahel Region,” The Arab Weekly, May 15, 2020, https://thearabweekly.com/jihadist-civil-war-erupts-africas-sahel-region.
[47] United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 21 July 2025 From the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2011) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2025/482, July 24, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482.
[48] Clarke and Broekaert, “The Global State of al-Qai’da.”
[49] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Hurras al-Din: The Rise, Fall, and Dissolution of al-Qai’da’s Loyalist Group in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 18, no. 5 (2025): 18–22, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/hurras-al-din-the-rise-fall-and-dissolution-of-al-qaidas-loyalist-group-in-syria/.
